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The Renaissance evinced a strong interest in 
self-knowledge, and the theme is a persistent 
one in the moral and dramatic literature of 
the age. The ancients' slogan nosce teipsum 
b e c a m e a universal watchword of m e n 
schooled in the paramount importance of 
coming to k n o  w themselves. 
Shakespeare's abiding interest in the con­
cept of self-knowledge shows itself in the dra­
matic patterns of his plays—in images, ideas, 
themes, and character portrayals. The recur­
rence of such motifs as the search for the self 
and the dangers and rewards of finding one­
self as well as the prominence of such ideal 
or nearly ideal characters as Henry V , D u k e 
Vincentio, and Prospero testify to the power­
ful influence humanistic notions of self-
knowledge exerted on Shakespeare as a 
writer and thinker. But his was a changing 
and developing art in a restless and dynamic 
age. Professor Soellner suggests that as m u c  h 
as Shakespeare's artistic development, which 
also affects his patterns of self-knowledge, is 
part of his natural growth into a mature and 
incomparable dramatist, it is yet analogous 
to the stylistic and philosophic changes that 
led from the Renaissance through Mannerism 
toward the Baroque. 
M r  . Soellner examines twelve plays in 
which self-knowledge as the Renaissance 
understood it figures prominently. Mindful 
that concepts of self-knowledge are not in­
dependent of cultural contexts, and that the 
definitions in the moral literature of the time 
were notoriously imprecise and unscientific, 
he recognizes that the meaning of the term 
in Shakespeare's time must be acquired as 
Shakespeare acquired it; that is, contextu­
ally. 
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Preface

I have sought in the following study to quote primary rather than 
secondary sources wherever feasible. I have modernized the spellings 
in the titles and in the quotations taken from sixteenth- and seven­
teenth-century books and also modified the punctuation so as to make 
it better conform to modern usage. In a study of ideas like mine, the 
old spellings would have hindered more than helped. W  e do, of 
course, generally quote Shakespeare from modernized texts; not to 
grant the same advantage to his contemporaries means to provide 
them with an even greater handicap than they already have by in­
trinsic merit. In quoting from the Bible, I have used the versions of 
Shakespeare's time, that is, the Bishops' Bible, the Genevan, and its 
variant, the Genevan-Tomson; but in most cases I have had the 
Genevan closer at hand, and it is the version referred to unless 
specified differently. It also offers ample, even if at times rather 
doctrinal, notes. T h  e Shakespeare edition used is that of The Com­
plete Works, edited by Peter Alexander (American edition: N e  w 
York, 1952). In a few instances, indicated in m  y notes, I have pre­
ferred readings different from Alexander when they are supported 
by the Folio or an authoritative quarto; and in Appendix C I have 
retained the spelling and punctuation of the sources because they are 
substantive to m  y argument. T h  e abbreviations of the titles of pe­
riodicals in the notes conform to PMLA practice. 
Whatever I can say in expressing m  y gratitude for what I owe to 
others in conceiving and writing this book is, to speak with Shake­
speare's Kate, "too little payment for so great a debt." In m a n  y cases 
I shall not be able to acknowledge particular debts since it is im­
possible for a Shakespeare scholar to remain aware of the myriad 
influences his predecessors have exerted on him. But I a  m gratefully 
conscious of the abiding effect that two masters of Shakespeare 
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scholarship have had on m e  : Levin L  . Schucking, m  y mentor during 
m  y German student days, and T  .  W . Baldwin, m  y adviser during m  y 
graduate studies at the University of Illinois. T  o the latter, this 
book is affectionately dedicated. I began m  y exploration of Renais­
sance moral philosophy while I held a Guggenheim fellowship, and 
I a  m most appreciative of the personal encouragement I received 
from the president of the foundation, Gordon N  . Ray. Professor 
Paul Jorgensen, w h  o in his study of hear was the first to bring 
Renaissance nosce teipsum concepts to bear on the interpretation of a 
Shakespeare play, was most generous in giving up his plans of ex­
tending this approach and in leaving thefield to m  e when he heard 
that I had a similar intention. A travel grant by m  y former institu­
tion, Kansas State University, aided m  y work; but I would not have 
been able to complete it if it had not been for the kindness and help I 
received from m  y colleagues in the English Department of the Ohio 
State University, then under the leadership of Albert J. K u h n  , w h  o 
guided m  y weary steps and revived m  y hope. For reading and 
criticizing parts of m  y manuscript at various stages, I a  m indebted 
to Ruth Hughey, Joan Webber, Jewell Vroonland, John Gabel, 
Julian Markels, and Charles Wheeler; to Edwin Robbins I a m grate­
ful for reading the whole and for making some excellent suggestions. 
Samuel Schoenbaum of Northwestern University scrupulously read 
the penultimate version; I have benefited immensely from his great 
learning, critical discernment, and editorial know-how. Where I stub­
bornly stuck to arguments he criticized, I have at least tried to 
strengthen them. 
M  y research was done at the British M u s e u m in London, the 
Henry Clay Folger Library in Washington, D . C . , and the Henry E . 
Huntington Library in San Marino, California; the latter library 
awarded m  e a grant-in-aid, and the personnel of all three were 
most understanding and helpful. Mrs . June Johnson painstakingly 
typed the manuscript; and m y student M r . D a n Atwood acted as 
both proofreader and stylistic critic. Finally, I a  m grateful to M r  . 
Weldon A  . Kefauver, director of the Ohio State University Press, 
for his interest and encouragement, and to M r . Robert S. Demorest, 
the editor, for his care in guiding the manuscript through its final 
stages. Whatever in this book (to speak with Kate again, in her 
triumph of self-knowledge) is still "muddy, ill-seeming, thick, and 
bereft of beauty," I must acknowledge as undeniably m  y o w n  . 
Introduction

TH  E R E N A I S S A N C E  , particularly the humanistic Renais­sance, evinced a strong interest in self-knowledge. The ancients' slogan nosce teipsum, or yvaJ0L cravrov, became a 
universal watchword. It was, it is true, not u n k n o w n in the Middle 
Ages, w h e n self-knowledge was thought desirable by some thinkers, 
especially the mystics, as a prerequisite to the knowledge of G o d  ; 
but at no time was there the same fascination with the study of the 
self as in the Renaissance.1 Sir Philip Sidney's was then one of the 
m a n y voices to acclaim its significance and to do so with the charac­
teristic admonition of making the results of self-study fruitful for the 
moral conduct of life. In An Apology for Poetry, he said that all 
sciences were "directed to the highest end of the mistress-knowledge, 
by the Greeks called dpxtreKT0i;t/o?> which stands, as I think, in the 
knowledge of a man's self, in the ethic and politic consideration, 
with the end of well-doing and not of well-knowing only. . . ." 2 
Sidney saw the poet, ahead of even the moralist and the historian, 
as the best guide toward this goal. 
T h  e idealistic hope expressed by Sidney that m u c  h can be gained 
for the conduct of life from the study of literature has in some form 
always been one of the major attractions of that part of literature 
which w e consider great (but w e must remember that great litera­
ture shares this attraction with m u c  h artistically inferior w o r k )  . A n  d 
this hope was and is one of the major reasons for the appeal of 
Shakespeare. Even of the activity of modern Shakespeare critics, 
averse as they are to being thought subjective and moralistic, more 
m a y be motivated by this feeling than appears at first sight. For 
instance, w  e have become fond of saying that Shakespeare's tragic 
heroes are destroyed because they do not k n o  w themselves. Surely, 
the indistinct hope that w  e can learn something from their failures is 
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a major reason for the popularity of this phrase. B y saying that 
Shakespeare's tragic heroes do not k n o  w themselves, w  e can think of 
them as negative examples for us without being too obviously moral­
istic; w  e need not pose and answer the vexing question of what, if 
any, moral commitment Shakespeare had. W  e can use the phrase to 
m e a  n vaguely that the tragic heroes have weaknesses that m a k  e it 
impossible for them to cope with their fate. Since all of Shakespeare's 
tragic heroes, with the possible exception of R o m e o , have some re­
sponsibility for their downfall and destruction, w  e m a k  e a safe, even 
if hardly very meaningful, statement about them when accusing them 
of lack of self-knowledge. 
T h e present study is not concerned with what w e moderns think 
self-knowledge is, or with what Shakespeare m a y be able to con­
tribute to our much-needed ethical amelioration, although perhaps I 
have not altogether been able to conceal m  y feelings on these matters. 
T h e subject of this book is what the Elizabethans and Jacobeans 
thought self-knowledge was and what dramatic patterns Shakespeare 
created from this thought. If the concept of self-knowledge is to be­
come useful in the criticism of Shakespeare, it will have to be given 
a more specific content than it has had; and I believe that little will 
be gained by asking our contemporary psychologists, philosophers, 
and theologians, vitally interested in ideas of self-knowledge as they 
are, for help. W h a  t they have to say differs widely, determined as it 
is by the special concern of the defmers; and it differs even more 
from what the Renaissance theorists, particularly the Christian hu­
manists, had to say. Neither do I think that m u c  h can be gained by 
asking the literary critics, ancient or modern. 
This last point m a y require some illustration. Aristotle, whose 
Poetics has given rise to m a n  y cliches about tragedy, held a concept 
that superficially resembles the statement of modern critics that the 
tragic heroes do not k n o  w themselves. This is the famous hamartia, 
vulgarly translated in its application to Shakespeare as "the tragic 
flaw." But for Aristotle, the term did not have the psychological or 
moral implications it has in modern use, but meant merely some­
thing like "miscalculation." W h a  t he had in mind is perhaps best 
illustrated by King Oedipus, to which he repeatedly referred. T h  e 
hamartia of Oedipus is his inquiry into his o w  n background, not in 
itself blamable, particularly in view of the Greeks' intellectual curi­
osity. N  o more does that other often-invoked term anagnorisis, dis­
covery or recognition, parallel what w e mean when w e say that at 
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some points during the action Shakespeare's tragic heroes get to 
k n o  w themselves or discover themselves or have a tragic illumina­
tion. According to Aristotle, anagnorisis is an external identification, 
whether of things, events, or persons, that is dramatically most 
effective whe  n it occurs together with peripeteia, the change of for­
tune from good to ill or the reverse. T h e anagnorisis in Oedipus is 
the King's recognition that he has killed his father and married his 
mother as the oracle predicted he would. Thu  s Aristotle's anagnorisis 
reflects the Greeks' sympathy with h u m a  n errors and their belief in 
the inexorable nature of fate. Aristotle did not have Shakespeare's 
interest in individual character; he was not concerned with the 
psychic constitution of particular m e n that makes them prone to 
failure. Neither did he have Shakespeare's Christian consciousness 
that some failures are different from others because they are sins 
rather than mistakes and that m u c h more is at stake in committing 
the former than the latter. If w e use the Aristotelian term for Shake­
speare—and like others from the Poetics it has become too m u c h a 
part of our critical vocabulary to do without it—we must redefine it 
with an awareness that concepts of self-knowledge are not indepen­
dent of cultural contexts. 
T h e idea of self-knowledge as a modern critic of drama m a y con­
ceive it cannot be applied to Shakespeare without such an awareness. 
For instance, in an essay on the c o m m o n m a n as tragic hero, Arthur 
Miller has said that tragedy is the consequence of man's total c o m ­
pulsion to evaluate himself justly.3 W h a  t Miller m a  y m e a  n by this 
statement can presumably be illustrated by his o w  n dramatic prac­
tice—best seen, perhaps, in his Death of a Salesman, w h e n he has 
Willy L o m a  n lose himself in the spiritual emptiness of his dream of 
success. This is the tragedy of a c o m m o n m a n w h o abandons his 
individuality and humanity by listening to the siren songs of his 
age. Obviously, Shakespeare's tragic heroes are not c o m m o  n m e n  , 
and he knew nothing of salesmen. H  e did not have Miller's socio­
logical orientation or his heightened belief that an individual must 
build his o w  n value system. Miller's, as well as Aristotle's, ideas of 
self-knowledge are too deeply rooted in their respective cultures to 
aid us in establishing Shakespeare's concept. 
O u rfirst and primary source for this purpose is, of course, Shake­
speare himself. Direct allusions to self-knowledge through phrases 
denoting knowing oneself and not knowing oneself occur with some 
frequency in his dramas and poems—fifteen times altogether,4 and 
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considerably more often if variations are included, such as finding 
oneself, being oneself, being true to oneself, and losing oneself, not 
being oneself, and forgetting oneself. T h  e context of these occur­
rences makes it clear that self-knowledge had for Shakespeare and 
his audience a different emphasis from what it has for us. In 
most cases, the primary reference is to the control of passion by rea­
son. But this is generally more than the simple act of keeping one's 
temper. W h e n , for instance, Regan says so unkindly of her father 
that "he hath ever but slenderly k n o w  n himself" (I.i.293), she is 
referring to his recent outbreak of anger; but when she goes on to 
predict that his infirm and choleric years will increase this weakness, 
she is alluding to assumptions about the behavior of m e  n according 
to their age of life m a d  e by Shakespeare and his audience, but not by 
us. A few scenes later, Goneril accuses Lear of neglecting to check 
the "Epicurism and lust" of his retainers and demands that he re­
strict himself to "such m e n as m a y besort your age, / W h i c h k n o w 
themselves and you" (I.iv.250-51). Here again the reference is to 
proper behavior according to age, but Goneril's exhortation—we 
are, of course, not concerned with the question of whether it is justi­
fied—also points to a code of manners, to proper knightly behavior. 
A  s another illustration in which the reference to self-knowledge ex­
tends beyond its primary meaning of control of passion, w e m a y note 
an instance in a comedy, As You Like It. W h e  n Rosalind lectures 
Phoebe on her disdainful rejection of Silvius's wooing, she con­
cludes: "But, mistress, k n o w yourself" (III.v.57). Here the allu­
sion, as is evident from the context, points beyond the censure of 
pride to Elizabethan notions of the relationship of wooer and wooed, 
undeserving maid and deserving lover, m a n and w o m a n . 
In other allusions to self-knowledge in Shakespeare's plays, con­
trol of the emotions does not appear to be the main issue or is not 
involved at all. W h e  n Macbeth, after murdering Duncan, says " T o 
k n o  w m  y deed, 'twere best not k n o  w myself" (II.ii.73), he seems in 
some w a y to associate self-knowledge with a moral w a y of life. Else­
where the context of the reference does not give any satisfactory 
explanation of its meaning. W h e  n Hamlet says of Osric that "to 
k n o  w a m a  n well were to k n o  w himself" (V.ii.139), the turn of the 
phrase and the prince's enigmatic intellectuality suggest that some­
thing is meant in addition to the fencing skills that are the i m m e  ­
diate reference; but the text gives no clue at all. 
Shakespeare evidently used the concept of self-knowledge with 
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some vagueness, just as w e do, but his vagueness differed from ours. 
O  r w  e might say that the field of reference, a shifting one, differed 
in his time from that in ours. For him, as for us, the advantage of 
references to self-knowledge lay in their very vagueness and allusive­
ness. " K n o w thyself" was a signpost to a variety of ideas he and his 
audience considered important for man ' s behavior and character de­
velopment. If w e wish to identify and define these ideas, w e must 
follow the signs into the territory to which they point, and this can 
best be done by reading Renaissance moral literature. But whatever 
explicit definitions w  e m a  y find here are not likely to be very helpful 
since Renaissance definitions were notoriously unscientific, repeating 
generally what ancient or Christian authorities said on the subject. 
The meaning of self-knowledge in Shakespeare's time must be estab­
lished in the same w a y in which Shakespeare acquired it, that is, 
contextually. 
In following this procedure, I have undertaken something of a 
source study although I have not inflicted all m  y evidence on the 
reader. Even so, I have had to quote passages from Renaissance 
moral literature and, sometimes, extensively so. But m  y intention 
has been not to prove that Shakespeare read this or that book but 
that he received from somewhere similar currents of intellectual 
stimulation. O n  e cannot, of course, read through m a n  y Renaissance 
tracts without lighting here and there on passages that give one the 
feeling that Shakespeare knew them. But it is not important whether 
m y reader shares this feeling, provided I can convince him that these 
parallels prove that Shakespeare was interested in theories of self-
knowledge and that he knew m u c h about them. I hope to show that 
he was strongly and vitally interested in these theories by discussing 
a number of plays in which they are prominent in the dramatic pat­
terns, be it in thought, theme, or character portrayal. Seeing these 
patterns in the Renaissance context of nosce teipsum notions, I be­
lieve, is a valuable and heretofore little-used means for Shakespeare 
interpretation.5 
N  o study of this kind is free from assumptions based on what one 
confidently believes he knows clearly. A s to the Renaissance intellec­
tual background, m  y main assumptions, as far as I a  m aware, are 
two:first, that the Renaissance began as an educational movement, 
and, second, that it led to an increasing diversity in men 's concep­
tions of themselves and of the world. Shakespeare's patterns of self-
knowledge, I believe, reflect both this educational concern and this 
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increasing diversity. I have devoted the first part of the book and the 
introductory chapters of the other parts to general considerations of 
h o w the movement of the Renaissance, from its Christian humanist 
basis in the direction of greater individualization, influenced Shake­
speare's patterns. 
A  s to the Christian humanist aspect, I believe that the role of 
formal education is too often neglected in studies of Shakespeare's 
intellectual background. W  e sometimes talk vaguely about Shake­
speare's inheritance of medieval or humanistic ideas and forget that 
thefirst and, I think, lasting stimulus came in g r a m m a r school, the 
institution designed by the Christian humanists to teach both good 
Latin and good morals. I have followed Professor T  .  W . Baldwin's 
footsteps over part of this terrain in search of the influence of school 
indoctrination on Shakespeare's moral ideas, and m  y reader will find 
some reflections on this matter in m y first chapter.6 Insofar as the 
humanism into which Shakespeare grew was Christian, w e must not 
forget the religious ingredients, contained as they were sometimes 
in such literary exercises as translations of biblical passages from 
Latin into English and from English into Latin. However, the 
Christianization of pagan nosce teipsum concepts can best be seen in 
some English moral tracts that I have used throughout and whose 
nature I have briefly examined in thefirst chapter. 
M  y second assumption, that the Renaissance led to an increasing 
diversification of ideas (and that the Reformation, child of the 
Renaissance, contributed to that), is one of the oldest assumptions 
concerning the period; but it has been drawn into doubt so as to 
require some defense, at least in its validity for sixteenth-century 
England. W h e  n Jakob Burckhardt defined the Renaissance as the 
discovery of m a  n and nature, he saw its ethos in the emancipation 
from medieval unity and in the development of individual impulses 
that shaped man's conception of art and his attitude toward nature. 
N o b o d  y today is likely to accept this thesis in toto. T h  e change from 
the Middle Ages to the Renaissance was not a revolution; m a n y of 
the old ideas and attitudes persisted and became in Christian hu­
manism the core of a n e w attempt at an old synthesis. Yet the 
sixteenth century was different from the fourteenth and fifteenth, 
and Shakespeare was not Chaucer. There is, I believe, m u c h that is 
persuasive in the view of an early Burckhardtian like Wilhelm 
Dilthey that Renaissance literature arose from a change in Lebens­
gefiihl and Lebensjiihrung, which gave the individual greater scope 
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by acquainting him with choices of conduct and philosophy.7 Al­
though this individualization was a slow process, it did reach E n g ­
land in Shakespeare's time. In m  y second chapter, I have analyzed 
what I think were the major impulses on changes in the concepts of 
the self and self-knowledge owing to this development. 
A  s I studied the patterns of self-knowledge in Shakespeare's whole 
dramatic work, I distinguished three major periods: an early one in 
which he took the patterns as he found them and adapted them to 
his dramatic designs; a middle one, in which he showed an increasing 
awareness of their rigidity and occasional incongruity with experi­
ence ; and a final one, in which he accepted diversity as a fact of life 
and overcame his earlier hesitations in an emphatic synthesis of 
theory and life. T h  e first period is that of his early and middle plays 
up to and including Henry V and the great romantic comedies. T h  e 
second, overlapping with the first, is dominated by plays that, by 
various critics, have been called ' 'problem plays": Julius Caesar, 
Hamlet, Troilus and Cressida, All's Well That Ends Well, and 
Measure for Measure. T h  e third period begins with Othello and in­
cludes the major tragedies and the romances. I have examined four 
plays from each of these periods, plays in which the patterns of self-
knowledge are particularly prominent. 
In selecting these I have not been guided by considerations of 
genre, and I have included examples from comedy, history, tragedy, 
and romance not in order to have a sample of Shakespeare's work in 
each of these categories but because I saw strong patterns of self-
knowledge in the particular plays. I came to the conclusion that for 
Shakespeare there was no separate comic, tragic, or historical m a n , 
nor were there different kinds of self-knowledge; for him, m a  n was 
one and the same being whether he exulted in victory or writhed in 
defeat. I admit that I was temporarily drawn to a provocative dis­
tinction m a d e by L . J. Potts: 
I connect the essential distinction between tragedy and comedy 
with two opposing impulses deeply rooted in human nature. Until 
w e can find a way of reconciling the antinomy in our nature, w e 
are all torn between the desire to find ourselves and the desire to 
lose ourselves.8 
I believe that Shakespeare very m u c  h addresses himself to the an­
tinomy of our desire to find ourselves and to lose ourselves and also 
to the antinomy of our fear of finding ourselves and of losing our­
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selves; but I do not think that a real distinction can be made on this 
basis between Shakespeare's comedy and tragedy, or between his 
comical and tragical history. T h  e patterns of self-loss and self-
recovery pervade all of Shakespeare's dramas regardless of genre. 
Even if it is true that some kind of "finding" must take place at the 
end of the comedies and tragicomedies, in some of these the losses 
cannot be eradicated from our minds. Not all characters in Shake­
speare's comedies find themselves in the end—consider Malvolio, for 
instance—and not all endings lead to unconditional findings—con­
sider, for instance, the very conditional happiness of Bertram and 
Helena at the end of All's Well. N  o more do the tragedies present 
merely self-loss: Edgar at the end of King Lear emerges as a charac­
ter w h o has made one of the most spectacular self-discoveries. For 
that matter, all losing is not tragic or potentially so; the kind of self-
loss in romantic love that leads to marriage in the comedies and in 
Romeo and Juliet is an eminently desirable state, a paradoxical find­
ing-in-losing. Shakespeare holds the mirror up to nature in not sepa­
rating completely the tragic and comic worlds, which, w e know, 
cannot be separated in life. 
I should say that m  y principle for selecting plays and m  y way of 
discussing them owes something to m  y twofold assumption con­
cerning the Renaissance as an educational and individualizing move  ­
ment. In the second part of the book, which is devoted to Shake­
speare'sfirst period, I have concentrated on those earlier plays that 
seemed to m  e to demonstrate best Shakespeare's technical familiarity 
with the humanistic lore of self-knowledge; and I have discussed 
these with an eye on what was to come, particularly in the later 
tragedies. For that very reason, I have felt that it was more valuable 
to examine two early comedies like Love's Labor's Lost and The 
Comedy of Errors, which deal with the antinomy of losing and find­
ing in an almost formulaic way, rather than to examine Shake­
speare's two early tragedies, Titus Andronicus and Romeo and Juliet, 
which have less explicit patterns of self-loss and self-recovery. Of the 
histories, Richard II was an obvious choice since in the fate of its 
hero, the royal failure and sufferer, it foreshadows the self-loss of 
Shakespeare's later tragic heroes. The last chapter of this part, on 
Henry V, examines the hero-king as Shakespeare's embodiment of 
conventional humanistic ideals and thus as a norm by which to 
measure Shakespeare's later approaches to, and deviations from, the 
recognized Renaissance pattern of perfection. M  y later comparisons 
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of the portrait of Henry with modifications of the pattern—Brutus 
in Julius Caesar, D u k  e Vincentio in Measure for Measure, and Pros­
pero in The Tempest—will, I hope, be instructive demonstrations of 
Shakespeare's developing concepts of self-knowledge. 
I have chosen to include all plays that belong to the second period 
with the exception of the artistically least satisfactory All's Well. 
T h e two tragedies Julius Caesar and Hamlet are, of course, master­
works that had to be included; but I have discussed them as well as 
the difficult-to-classify Troilus and Cressida and the problematic 
comedy Measure for Measure for the transitional, searching, and 
sometimes tentative patterns of self-knowledge they contain. T h  e 
relatively prominent place they have in m  y study comes from their 
significance in showing the interplay of tradition and a n e  w spirit. 
T h  e very tentativeness of the questions posed and answered in these 
plays has m a d e them so congenial to our o w n age, which has lost 
m a n y certainties, as to warrant greater interest in them. 
T h  e selection of plays for individual discussion from Shakespeare's 
third period has been painful. Since everybody's interest in Shake­
speare's patterns of self-knowledge centers on the tragic heroes, I 
have chosen the three major tragedies, Othello, King Lear, and 
Macbeth. I regret the omission of Timon of Athens, Antony and 
Cleopatra, and Coriolanus, dictated by considerations of time and 
prudence. In discussing the tragedies, I have interpreted from the 
patterns of self-knowledge outward to attempt a whole critical assess­
ment of the plays. I have also dealt thus with The Tempest, the one 
romance included. T h e patterns of self-knowledge in this play form 
a natural culmination of those that preceded, and this chapter is 
therefore afitting conclusion to the book. 
Inevitably, I have had to concern myself throughout with the 
analysis of Shakespeare's dramatic characters; it is primarily through 
character that self-knowledge is sought, expressed, and achieved. But 
character analysis is at present somewhat out of fashion—a recent 
critic of Hamlet calls it "a valetudinarian topic." 9 This attitude is 
an understandable and largely wholesome reaction to the excrescences 
of romantic, impressionistic, and Bradleyan psychological criticism 
of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which often treated 
Shakespeare's characters as if they had a life independent of their 
parts in the dramas. But the main reactors to character analysis, the 
historical critics, have in turn become passe; and alternative critical 
modes, such as the close reading of the poetic fabric of the plays, 
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valuable as they are, have not succeeded in totally suppressing the 
universal and, I think, legitimate interest in what makes Shake­
speare's characters behave as they do. T h e time m a y have come to 
return to character analysis, chastened by the valid critique of the 
post-Bradleyans. 
If the thought of having engaged in a demode subject does not 
really disturb m e  , the realization does that I m a  y have contributed 
somewhat to the more questionable endeavor of searching in Shake­
speare's plays for his o w  n philosophy. His infinite variety and the 
temptation of passing off one's o w  n thoughts for Shakespeare's mak  e 
this a notoriously perilous enterprise, but paying heed to dramatic 
and historical conditions can be something of a check to the threaten­
ing subjectivism. I have examined Shakespeare's words and not m  y 
feelings about them, and I have tried to be sensitive to the poetic 
texture and to the plot situations. W  e m a y  , on the whole, assume that 
Shakespeare gave his views to sympathetic characters, but this is 
certainly not a uniform rule; even a villainous Iago can cite scrip­
ture to his purpose, and an unselfish idealist like Brutus can be dead 
wrong. W  e must see the ideas expressed by Shakespeare's characters 
in the total context, and w e should use only legitimate means to 
interpret their relevance to Shakespeare's philosophy. Such means 
are comparisons with sources and with moral attitudes as they can 
be identified by the study of the intellectual background. Even so, w e 
can often achieve only probability. Shakespeare was not a propagan­
dist ; his attitudes were subtle and qualified. But he was certainly not 
morally indifferent; if an idea is repeated in his plays by sympathetic 
characters and is underlined by theme and dramatic structure, w e 
can, with some assurance, say that it was part of his philosophic 
credo, at least at the time he stated it. 
Shakespeare was not, of course, a philosopher in the sense of an 
inventor or propagator of a coherent and consistent system. In any 
case, such synthesis would have been difficult to achieve in the fer­
menting and changing climate of the Renaissance. Even Bacon, w h o 
did not have Shakespeare's need to present dramatic tensions and 
conflicts, was more a herald of a n e w system than its instigator. If 
Shakespeare had aspired to the single-minded eminence of founding 
a philosophic system, he could not have been "myriad-minded"; he 
could not have looked at the world through the devilish soul of an 
Iago as well as the freedom-loving mind of a Brutus. 
Shakespeare had a "philosophy" in the sense in which all thinking 
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m e  n have one: a body of ideas, not totally consistent and very m u c  h 
subject to revisions, on m a n , life, and the world. This was a changing 
and growing structure of thought, as his was a growing and chang­
ing art. His philosophy was sometimes articulated and more often 
merely intimated, but it was almost always subordinated to dramatic 
purposes. Shakespeare so skillfully infused ideas—moral and im­
moral—into the thoughts of his characters that w  e tend to forget 
that these ideas were in some sense conceived by him, that is, 
acquired or invented, and in any case deeply understood in their 
bearing on life. H o  w else could he have m a d e them so powerfully 
appropriate ? 
In the course of m  y study I have come to appreciate increasingly 
Shakespeare's philosophical acumen, both in the w a y he used tradi­
tional ethical concepts and modified them or supplanted them with 
newer ones or with his o w  n ideas. In the conflict between tradition 
and innovation, Shakespeare gradually came to realize his inner re­
sources; he learned to k n o  w himself. A n  d as he learned to k n o  w 
himself, he came to master his art. 

PART ONE

Humanism and Antihumanism


CHAPTER ONE 
Nosce Teipsum: 
Learning the Method 
LI K  E M A N  Y A N O T H E  R Elizabethan, William Shakespeare presumably first heard the slogan nosce teipsum, "know 
—^  thyself," which he was to hear m a n y times afterward, in the 
grammar school of Stratford-on-Avon. H  e m a y have been told to 
memorize it together with other sententiae in one of the anthologies 
used in Elizabethan schools, such as Sententiae Pueriles or Disticha 
Catonis. In the latter collection, it appeared a m o n  g the sayings of the 
seven wise m e n of Greece and was attributed, as traditionally, to 
Chilon, the Lacedaemonian. Whether already at this point or later, 
Shakespeare must have been told something about the meaning of 
self-knowledge. H  e would thus have learned that nosce teipsum was 
inscribed on the entrance to the temple of Apollo at Delphi. H  e m a  y 
have been shown the composite emblem of the seven wise m e n , in 
which nosce teipsum was illustrated by a mirror.1 In any case, he 
would have met the phrase in such Latin authors as Ovid, Persius, 
and Cicero, and his schoolmaster would then very likely have taken 
the opportunity to instruct him on its significance and application. 
Such explanation would have been an introduction to the Chris­
tian humanists' philosophy of m a n  . T h  e reference books that a 
schoolmaster had at his disposal were compiled by them and con­
veyed their views. Erasmus's Adagia was here a very obvious choice. 
It contained the traditional remarks on the origin of the saying, de­
fined it as an advice for humility and moderation, and supplied vari­
ous other definitions and explanations from classical and Christian 
writers. Several of these stressed the difficulty of knowing oneself, 
the obligation to improve oneself, and the need to observe others in 
order to understand oneself. 
Erasmus was more explicit on these matters in his Enchiridion 
Militis Christiani (1502), a book that was still very influential up to 
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and during the time Shakespeare went to grammar school. The 
English Reformers had liked its insistence on purity of faith and its 
attacks on ceremonies. A translation ascribed to William Tyndale 
went through nine editions between 1533 and 1576, and Miles 
Coverdale made an abridged version in 1545. If there were no further 
English editions after 1576, the reason was surely that the Erasmian 
arguments had become c o m m o  n property in moral and religious 
thought. 
The metaphor that unifies and illuminates Erasmus's Enchiridion 
is that of life as warfare, a metaphor that was familiar to medieval 
and Renaissance Christians through Job 7  : 1 in the military termi­
nology of the Vulgate: "Militia est hominis vita super terram." For 
Erasmus, this warfare was primarily man 's struggle against internal 
enemies, the disturbing and destructive passions, which, leagued 
with the temptations of the world, led m a  n to vice and sin. T  o con­
quer his archenemies, the flesh and the devil, m a n must know him­
self; this, Erasmus said, was thefirst point of wisdom. The ancients 
believed that the injunction nosce teipsum came from heaven; but the 
saying also agreed with Christian religion, since the mystical lover 
in the Song of Solomon asked his bride to leave the house (i.e., the 
Church) unless she understood herself: " O  , thou beautiful among 
all w o m e n  , if thou k n o  w not thyself, go out of doors, and walk after 
the steps of thy flock and sort." 2 
The derivation of the injunction for self-knowledge from both 
pagan literature and the Bible was characteristic of Erasmus's philo­
sophia Christi. Although his Enchiridion had a more specifically re­
ligious purpose than the works he composed for school use, it too 
attempted to balance Socrates and Christ, earth and heaven, mind 
and spirit. Erasmus struck a similar balance when he spoke of the 
self, which, for him, was both good and bad, reasonable and pas­
sionate, divinely inspired and humanly corrupted. The problem of 
self-knowledge was to reconcile the warring elements in m a n ; outer 
and inner m a n  , body and soul, flesh and spirit, passion and reason 
must be given their due, and all must serve Christ. W h a t was against 
nature was as bad as what was against God. Faith alone was not a 
guarantee of salvation; self-discipline and self-control also must be 
used. 
Sometimes, it is true, Erasmus spoke of the self as if it were the 
enemy. H  e demanded conquering oneself, getting out of oneself, and 
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losing oneself. But, as the context shows, he meant here only the 
baser parts of the self, the flesh and the passions, and he did not 
really think that these could or should be completely suppressed. Th  e 
passions were not to be eradicated, Stoic fashion; they must be 
tempered in the w a y Aristotle and the Fathers recommended by 
using the better emotions for ennobling life and by controlling the 
baser ones. T h e m a n w h o knows himself is temperate. 
Erasmus saw the self as having a reassuring organic and hier­
archical structure. H  e adopted the Platonic analogy of m a  n to a 
monarchy, with reason enthroned in the head; the higher passions, 
such as love and shamefulness, located beneath it in the chest; the 
destructive ones, such as lust and ambition, exiled below the dia­
phragm. The ethical health of m a n depended on the preservation of 
this order; a revolt of the lower forces meant passion, vice, and sin, 
and threatened the immortal substance of the soul. T  o combat this 
danger, m a  n must use his reason according to God's instruction. But 
he must not fall prey to the allurement of this faculty; he must re­
main conscious of his h u m a n limitations. With a touch of contemptus 
mundi, Erasmus recalled the misery of man's entrance into life, the 
precariousness of his existence, and the certainty of his death. 
Erasmus and the Christian humanists gave nosce teipsum an active 
meaning; the injunction not only implied an assessment of the hu­
m a  n condition but also constituted an exhortation to a morally 
oriented life. A n  d they were optimistic about translating this m e a n  ­
ing into pedagogy; they put great faith in the efficacy of morality 
couched in grammatical and rhetorical instruction. In his program­
matic tract De Ratione Studii, Erasmus demanded that the schoolboy 
should learn verba in order to acquire, even if not immediately, res, 
that is, concepts and ideas. T h  e school curricula were planned so as 
to make the boys assimilate the ideas that the humanists considered 
right, that is, conforming to their moral outlook, and to enable them 
to express these according to formal principles derived from the 
ancients. 
A  n Elizabethan schoolboy like William Shakespeare thus was 
exposed to a great deal of moral advice of the nosce teipsum kind. 
Even before reaching grammar school, he was likely to have m e m  ­
orized some verses on manners and morals, such as those which 
constituted Francis Seager's The School of Virtue (1557, several 
times reprinted). It included the following admonition: 
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Let reason thee rule and not will thee lead 
T  o follow thy fancy a wrong trace to tread. 
But subdue thy lust and conquer thy will 
If it move thee to do that is ill.8 
A n  d the schoolboy's Catechism and Psalter gave similar advice; it 
warned him to bridle "the inward affections" of his heart and thus 
enjoined the temperance that the Christian humanists thought cen­
tral to self-control and self-knowledge. His little grammar , the 
Erasmus-Colet-Lily collaboration, probably was prefixed by some 
English moral sentences like the "Precepts of Living," which en­
joined subduing his appetites, thrusting d o w  n pride, and refraining 
from wrath, and it contained similar instructions in its illustrative 
Latin sentences.4 A n  d the schoolboy was inundated with such m a  ­
terial in the Latin phrase books for parsing and memorization: 
"cognosce teipsum . . . iracundiam tempera . . . ne cui invideas 
. . . invidia suum torquet auctorem . . . ingratitudo viciorum caput 
. . . perturbato corde nihil jucundum . . . gravior inimicus qui 
latet sub pectore . . . teipsum ne negligas . . . vive m e m o r m o r ­
tis." 5 O n  e understands the sententiousness and the morality of the 
Elizabethans better w h e  n he sits d o w  n with them, for a while, on a 
school bench. 
Erasmus himself devoted a considerable part of his Herculean 
labors to making it easier for the schoolboy to learn both Latin and 
self-knowledge. M a n  y of the sentences, figures, parables, and apo­
thegms in his De Copia Verborum ac Reruwi, De Conscribendis 
Epistolis, and Parabolae Sive Similia served clearly this dual pur­
pose. In two of the dialogues of his Colloquia, "Puerpera" and "Con ­
vivium Religiosum," he provided for the children's need to under­
stand the body-soul relationship fundamental to their self-knowledge 
by weaving into the conversation a list of appropriate metaphors: 
the body was the vessel, the garment, the house, the instrument, 
the tabernacle, the grave, the prison, the inn, and the fortress of the 
soul. B y these metaphors, the boy was taught the soul's integrity, 
preciousness, purity, and immortality as well as the body's frailty, 
impermanence, impurity, and burdensomeness. Shakespeare, like the 
other Elizabethan poets, never forgot the lesson; he used all the 
metaphors on Erasmus's list and similar ones; he knew h o w to ex­
press moral ideas in the w a  y the Christian humanists thought they 
should be expressed—only, of course, he did so in the vernacular 
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rather than in Latin. But, directly or indirectly, he was indebted to 
Erasmus for formulating basic moral ideas of self-knowledge as the 
knowledge of body and soul. 
M a n  y of Shakespeare's fundamental patterns of self-knowledge 
must have derived ultimately from what he learned in grammar 
school. O n e needs to take in hand some of the annotated Renaissance 
editions of the classics to understand h o  w the Christian humanists 
introduced moral ideas aimed at teaching self-knowledge into their 
commentaries. The injunction nosce teipsum appeared only occa­
sionally in these notes, but the precepts that were thought implied 
in it were numerous. T h e variorum editions of Terence with their 
full commentaries offer some of the best examples of the method. 
The plays were examined not only for the author's language and the 
comic types portrayed but also for the psychological and moral in­
struction they were assumed to convey. A notable humanistic com­
mentator, Jodocus Willichius, thus observed in minute detail Ter­
ence's depiction of the passions with some regard for their place in 
the play's structure but primarily from a physician's, rhetorician's, 
and moralist's point of view. In analyzing Geta's outbreak of anger 
in Adelphoe, IILii, he claimed, for instance, that physicians could 
use this example to teach the causes, symptoms, reasons, and results 
of anger as a passion.6 T h e claim and the method remind one of 
modern psychologists and psychiatrists w h o would use Shakespeare's 
plays as textbooks of their science; like these, Willichius read m u c  h 
into the text that it does not imply. But what some humanists like 
Willichius were reading into Terence reached Elizabethan school­
boys as certainly as what some Freudians have read into Shake­
speare is reaching the modern student. Even Montaigne, emancipated 
as he was from the Christian humanists' preceptorial methods of 
teaching self-knowledge, allowed their claims for Terence, judging 
him "wonderful conceited and apt lively to represent the motions and 
the passions of the mind and the condition of our manners; our ac­
tions make m  e often remember him." 7 
With a method similar to that applied to Terence, other ancient 
authors were made to demonstrate the advantages of self-knowledge 
and the consequences of its lack: Virgil, whose Aeneas furnished 
a model of manhood; Horace, whose odes were called "medicinal" 
by his Elizabethan translator, T h o m a s Drant; and Ovid, whose 
Metamorphoses was recommended to the reader by its translator, 
Arthur Golding, as "a mirror for thyself thine o w  n estate to see." 8 
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T w  o other authors deserve special attention here, the neo-Latin 
Palingenius and the classical Cicero; they needed no humanistic com­
mentaries to make them into nosce teipsum authors, and they were 
more influential than any of the others in forming Elizabethan no­
tions of self-knowledge. 
Palingenius's didactic poem Zodiacus Vitae (ca. 1531) had what 
seems to us an inordinate place in the curricula, where it appeared 
almost universally as a text in the lower forms of grammar school, 
hardly because of its questionable aesthetic quality, but because it 
poeticized a Christian-humanist philosophy of life and helped to 
immunize the student against whatever paganism he might be ex­
posed to elsewhere. Besides, the book conveyed some information on 
mythology, natural philosophy, and astrology, all mad  e subservient 
to a theologically tinged philosophy of m a n . In his Seventh Book, 
"Libra," Palingenius specifically expounded the meaning of nosce 
teipsum. A s he explained, self-knowledge must be combined with a 
search for the knowledge of God. M a  n must consider the nature of 
the Creator before examining His creation, m a n . So prepared, he 
will understand w h y G o d created m a n of two substances, body and 
soul, the one mortal, the other immortal. Just as his reason will show 
him that G o d is eternal, it will prove that the soul does not die. It 
follows that the soul must rule the body and the passions that tend to 
ally themselves with it. Self-knowledge makes m a  n capable of con­
trolling these by reason, God's grace assisting. 
Thus Palingenius went over the same ground as did Sir John 
Davies in Nosce Teipsum (1599), with which students of Eliza­
bethan literature are likely to be more familiar. Yet Zodiacus Vitae, 
which received an unattractive English translation by Barnabe Googe 
(1565), was a seminal book in Shakespeare's time, certainly one of 
Shakespeare's sources and, I suspect, one of Davies's.9 
Palingenius prepared the Elizabethan schoolboy for the moral 
philosophy of Cicero, to which he would be exposed in upper gram-
m a  r school. Cicero's eminence in the curricula, as well as his general 
esteem as a philosopher in the Renaissance, stemmed from the rhe­
torical rotundity and the religious emphasis of his eclectic ethics. In 
Cicero, Petrarch had read long before m u c  h of what he thought and 
felt, and the Christian humanists continued to find the R o m a  n 
philosopher and orator most like themselves a m o n  g the pagan 
writers. Cicero's divine felicity of speech, Erasmus said in his Preface 
to Tusculan Disputations, came from the sanctity of an erudite heart. 
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Renaissance commentators, such as Georgius Valla, Joachimus 
Camerarius, and Philippus Beroaldus, brought their learning and 
bias to bear on Cicero's text, thus constructing an eclectic humanistic 
moral philosophy by explaining Cicero in Platonic, Aristotelian, and, 
in particular, Christian theological terms. S o m e of this lore was likely 
to have reached the schoolboy William Shakespeare; if so, it helped 
to make him aware of what the humanists considered the "right" 
ideas of Cicero, but it would not have given him a feeling of the 
scope and variety of ancient philosophy. 
Of Cicero's moral philosophy, the works most widely used in the 
schools were De Officiis and four small tracts, De Amicitia, De 
Senectute, Par adoxa, and S omnium Scipionis (from the sixth book 
of De Republica), all of which were often printed together in an 
octavo edition. Of Cicero's other philosophical works, the one most 
favored in the schools was Tusculan Disputations. Shakespeare could 
also read these books in English; they had been translated long be­
fore he went to London. De Officiis was rendered by Robert Whit­
tington in 1534 and again, muc  h better, by Nicholas Grimald in 
1553. Grimald's version, accompanied by his remarkable Preface, 
which stresses Cicero's value for attaining self-knowledge, was re­
printed a number of times before 1600. John Dolman issued a trans­
lation of Tusculan Disputations in 1561, and in 1577 Thomas N e w  ­
ton added the small treatises in the octavo volume, that is, De 
Amicitia, De Senectute, Par adoxa, and S omnium Scipionis, under 
the title of Four Several Treatises. Newton, incidentally, is a witness 
to the humanists' scholarly versatility arising from a concern with 
self-knowledge; a divine, physician, and poet, he translated several 
theological and medical tracts, two of them of the nosce teipsum 
kind (Levinus Lemnius's The Touchstone of Complexions [1565] 
and Philip de Mornay's The True Trial and Examination of a 
Man's Own Self [1586]), and edited the influential translation of 
Seneca's ten tragedies (1581), contributing to it his o w n version of 
Thebais. 
Both Tusculan Disputations and Somnium Scipionis contained 
definitions of self-knowledge influenced by Plato, w h  o equated it 
with an understanding of the nature of the mind or soul. In Tusculan 
Disputations (1.52), Cicero said that to know oneself meant to know 
one's soul; in Somnium Scipionis, he put it more emphatically (I 
quote Newton's translation) : "Neither art thou that which thy out­
ward form and shape declareth; but the mind and soul of every 
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m a  n is he, and not that figure and shape which m a  y be pointed and 
showed with the finger." Newton's marginal gloss put it succinctly: 
"  A m a n is his mind." 10 This equation could be brought into har­
m o n  y with Christian theology, particularly with Paul's insistence on 
the hegemony of the spirit over the flesh. A s Bullinger asserted in 
his sermon " O  f the Reasonable Soul of M a n ,  " "Anima, the soul, is 
taken in the Scripture for the thing itself that hath life, yea, even 
for any, or rather for the whole, m a n .  " u William Shakespeare had 
good precedent in identifying m a n with his mind or soul, as he did 
repeatedly, often in order to underline man 's special claim to perfec­
tion : ideal m e n were for him "dear," "noble," "true," and "strong" 
minds or souls. In this sense, mind and soul were synonymous with 
"self," for which he used such epithets as "dear," "noble," "great," 
"high," "precious," and "worthiest." 12 
But both Tusculan Disputations and Somnium Scipionis gave 
self-knowledge a meaning that transcended the individual soul. Tus­
culan Disputations interpreted the injunction of Apollo as including 
the soul's contemplation of the divine essence: m a  n mediates on the 
world order and realizes that the psychic substance is part of the 
deity. Thus he can solve the problem posed by his destructive e m o ­
tions, cleanse himself of them, and acquire tranquillity and happiness. 
Cicero's First Book, which borrowed from Plato, gave instructions 
for overcoming the fear of death; the remaining four books, heavily 
indebted to the Stoics, presented rules on h o  w to conquer pain, dis­
tress, and other passions and to achieve the happy life of a virtuous 
m a n . Tusculan Disputations was influential in establishing control of 
the emotions as a priority for self-knowledge. In Somnium Scipionis, 
Cicero extended nosce teipsum to the political sphere by asking the 
statesman to strive for immortality through glorious service to the 
state. D r a w n into a Christian context, this demand appealed to the 
Elizabethan moralists, w h  o bid the prince or magistrate realize that 
to k n o w himself meant bringing his exercise of power in line with the 
divine plan. 
But it was Cicero's description of the humanitas ideal in De Officiis 
that became most influential. Whenever man 's place in the creation 
and his duties were invoked in the Renaissance, there was likely to be 
an echo of Cicero. Thus, when Hamlet asks the question " W h a t is 
a m a n , / If the chief good and market of his time / Be but to sleep 
and feed?" (I.iv.33 ff.), he reflects, as has long ago been noted, a key 
passage from the beginning of De Officiis (I.n).1 8 The resemblance, 
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I believe, becomes m u c  h closer whe  n Hamlet's argument is compared 
to that in sixteenth-century editions of De Officiis with the headings, 
marginal notes, and commentaries supplied by humanist commenta­
tors. (See Appendix A .  ) A s I have shown elsewhere, the debate in 
the Trojan camp in Troilus and Cressida (Il.ii) also uses arguments 
from De Officiis when it touches on man's moral role in society and 
the universe.14 
Cicero, following Plato, saw all moral action falling under the four 
cardinal virtues of justice, prudence, fortitude, and temperance. O  f 
these, temperance was most closely associated with self-knowledge. 
Temperantia was a comprehensive virtue which, according to De 
Officiis, included verecundia, modestia, sedatio perturbationum, and 
decorum. T h  e Renaissance commentators noted that in De Inventione 
(II.53-54), Cicero called continentia, dementia, and modestia quali­
ties of temperantia, and they added the testimony of other philos­
ophers and of Christian writers to Cicero's on the meaning of temper­
ance. In this fashion, Cicero's discussion was supplemented with 
Aristotle's doctrine of virtue as the temperate m e a  n between excess 
and defect, with the Stoics' warnings against all passions, with Saint 
Paul's demand for sobriety in word and deed, with the rhetoricians' 
notions of the moderation and control of the passions in speech, and 
with the physicians' analysis of temperance as the right mixture of 
the humors. 
This conglomeration of elements tended to m a k  e temperance a 
composite and an almost chaotic concept. W  e need to think of the 
Renaissance idea of temperance as a cluster of vaguely related virtues, 
most of them more positive than what w e have in mind w h e n w e use 
the term. It included not only the suppression of the appetites, partic­
ularly of desire and lust, but also the active use of reason in leading an 
orderly life; it encompassed the health of m a n in his entirety, body 
and soul. Intemperance thus meant all violations of virtue through 
the submission of reason to the lower forces of the soul and any dis­
order of body and mind; it was equivalent to lack of self-knowledge, 
and the moralists and theologians saw in it a threat to the God-given 
order of the universe. 
In Cicero's discussion of temperantia, the commentators and thus 
the writers of moral tracts after them were particularly attracted to 
the concept of decorum. T h  e term also played a considerable role in 
dramatic criticism, where it meant something rather different: the 
behavior of a character in conformity with the type, age, and charac­
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teristics of the person portrayed.15 But in De Officiis (I.93-151), 
Cicero expounded a theory of moral decorum, proper ethical be­
havior. O f this, he distinguished two major kinds, decorum generate 
and speciale. The decorum generate, he said, required m a  n to control 
his appetites; by observing it, m a n differed from the beasts. The 
decorum speciale allowed m a  n to develop his individual talents; by 
assuming it, m a  n differed from other m e n  . In order to observe the 
decorum speciale, Cicero declared, m a  n must watch himself and 
others. H e must make a balanced estimate of his o w n ability, show 
himself a critical judge of his merits and defects, and know his dis­
position in order to play the role most suited to himself: nothing that 
runs against the grain of one's nature can be right, and a man 's 
naturefits him best when it is the most characteristically his o w n . 1 6 
A  s Grimald translated the core of this argument, "In the pointing out 
the whole life, m u c h more regard thereof must be had that in the 
continuing of our life w  e m a  y agree with ourselves, and never halt in 
any duty." This stipulation was given special emphasis in Grimald's 
1556 edition by the marginal note " k n o w yourself." 17 Thus to know 
oneself became to be oneself or to be true to oneself, or, as Grimald 
put it in his Preface, to "use" oneself. 
However , it should be understood that the decorum speciale did 
not imply an invitation for m a  n to become an unrestrained individ­
ualist. Cicero modified his decorum speciale by the decora of circum­
stances and choice; that is, he asked that every individual be aware 
of the requirements of his profession, status, age, and other external 
conditions. Most importantly, he considered individual decorum 
limited by general decorum, which prescribed man's proper moral 
behavior as a rational being, fundamentally different from the ani­
mals. Thus the classical concept of decorum was a useful weapon in 
the Christian humanists' fight against theflesh and the devil, w h  o 
always took advantage of m e n w h o did not know what it truly meant 
to be m a n . 
Shakespeare knew exactly h o w to use the arguments on decorum 
in this fashion. In Lucrece, he made his heroine engage in a lengthy 
attempt to dissuade Tarquin from his nefarious intention by appeal­
ing to his "likeness" or identity as a m a  n and a prince. In the former 
role, she argues, he must control his appetites; in the latter, he must 
be a model to his subjects (568 ff.). She thus implores Tarquin to 
observe decorum. Quite properly she bases individual decorum on 
general decorum and sees it as modified by the circumstantial kind: 
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Tarquin cannot assume his likeness without behaving as he must as 
a human being and the son of a king. A n d Lucrece speaks very 
muc  h to the point because, as the wiser sort of Shakespeare's readers 
must have known, his Tarquin is not only a rapist but also a horrible 
perverter of decorum. W h e  n he tries to excuse his desire for Lucrece 
to himself, he claims the privileges of a young lover and declares "sad 
pause and deep regard" to be the qualities that 'beseem" an old sage 
(274 ff.). Tarquin thus injects a rule of artistic decorum into an 
argument that requires the application of moral decorum—it is 
symptomatic that he visualizes his situation as if it were that of young 
lover in a comedy w h o "beats these [i.e., sad pause and deep regard] 
from the stage." Shakespeare's moralizing in Lucrece m a  y be obtru­
sive, but it has the advantage of showing up a basic scheme that 
underlies the humanistic patterns of self-knowledge and demonstrates 
their indebtedness to the concepts of temperance and moral decorum 
based on Ciceronian ethics. (See Appendix B .  ) 
The preceding summary of the role that instruction on self-knowl­
edge played in grammar school will have shown that it provided 
Shakespeare with some basic patterns that, coming mainly from the 
ancients, were selected and given emphasis by the Christian human­
ists. Before Shakespeare ever read an English tract on the signifi­
cance of self-knowledge, he had been taught m u c h about it. Whether 
he had an ardent desire to read such English moral tracts m a  y be 
doubted, but it is reasonable to suppose that he would at least have 
dipped into some of them. H  e was, after all, a country boy with no 
university education, and it was for such as him that the authors and 
(since m a n y tracts were translated from Latin or modern foreign 
languages) the translators provided. 
A general account of sixteenth-century English nosce teipsum 
literature is thus in order. W  e m a  y begin it with works that, in the 
tradition of Cicero and Plato, equated self-knowledge with the soul's 
knowledge of itself. Foremost in this category was A Treatise of the 
Immortality of the Soul by John Woolton (1576). Woolton, a divine 
w h  o later became bishop of Exeter, claimed to be thefirst to write in 
English on the subject of the soul's immortality, a claim that is hardly 
tenable but is symptomatic of the humanists' conviction of doing 
something new even when, like Woolton, they were heavily indebted 
to the medieval moral and theological tradition.18 The humanistic de 
anima treatises, of which Woolton's book was a descendant, con­
tinued a medieval Christian genre, which in turn derived from Aris­
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totle's work on the soul. Like his predecessors, Woolton defined, 
divided, and subdivided the soul; he located it in particular parts of 
the body; he established a hierarchy of operational elements that 
subordinated the senses and the passions to reason and m a d  e the 
ultimate functioning of this system dependent on divine grace. A s was 
customary, Woolton saw the danger to man's physical, emotional, 
and spiritual well-being in the rebellion of the lower forces of the 
soul, a rebellion that had become endemic since the Fall. M a n ' s moral 
problem was the conflict of his reason with his passions; his hope 
for overcoming it lay in achieving, with the help of G o d  , control over 
himself. T h e key to this control was self-knowledge; as Woolton said 
in his Introduction, the greatest wisdom was to k n o w oneself, the 
greatest folly, not to k n o  w oneself. 
Woolton equated self-knowledge with the soul's knowing itself and 
therefore knowing other things, but most writers in the de anima 
tradition declared it to include an understanding of the body and its 
functions as well; in this case, too, soul and body were seen to be 
essentially different and the hegemony of the soul was thought to be 
divinely established. In the same year in which Woolton published 
his Treatise, T h o m a  s Rogers, admittedly using his university notes, 
sent to press a work making these points, A Philosophical Discourse 
Entitled The Anatomy of the Mind.19 Like Woolton, Rogers ex­
plained the nature of the passions, classified them, and gave instruc­
tions on their pacification. H  e added a brief treatment of the cardinal 
virtues so that Christians might learn from pagans to become more 
virtuous. Like m a n  y nosce teipsum writers, Rogers emphasized the 
significance of m a  n by describing him as a little world reflecting in 
himself the larger world of the universe. 
T h  e concept of the microcosm played as important a role in the 
humanistic thought of the Renaissance as it did in the Middle Ages. 
It was generally fathered on Aristotle, w h o was indeed, as far as is 
known , thefirst to use the term (iiKpbs K O O / ^ O S — h e used it only once 
—but w h  o neither invented the macrocosmic analogies, which are 
m u c  h older, nor stated the concept in explicit terms.20 Its formulation 
seems to have been the work of Philo and other neo-Platonists, from 
w h o  m medieval theologians appropriated it. T h  e Christian humanists 
liked the concept because it agreed with their emphasis by attracting 
attention to m a  n as both the epitome of the universe and its favored 
m e m b e r . M a n ' s recognition of himself as a microcosm was one of 
their basic postulates for achieving self-knowledge. Shakespeare's 
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Richard II is aware of this requirement; when he makes a final at­
tempt to understand himself and his situation, he tries to create in 
his "little world" an image of the greater one (V.v.i ff.)­
Next to theologians, doctors were most in evidence as nosce 
teipsum authors. According to what T h o m a s Wright, himself a di­
vine, said in the Preface to his The Passions of the Mind (1601), the 
subject of self-knowledge was the particular province of both the 
theologians, the curers of the soul, and the physicians, the curers of 
the body. Actually, the members of the two professions did not always 
confine themselves to their particular sphere of competence; there 
was m u c h about the body in the theologians' treatises and m u c h about 
the soul in the physicians'. T h e latter, however, were more apt to con­
cern themselves with the physiological humors, which had evolved 
from the microcosm concept. They ascribed to them man's diseases 
as well as his emotional disturbances and thought man's health and 
happiness to depend on the right mixture of the humors or crasis, 
although they were not unanimous on the exact nature of that state. 
A  s w  e have already noted, the moral aspects of this equilibrium were 
also called "temperance"; the humoral balance constituted the phys­
ical side of that cardinal virtue central to self-knowledge and self-
control. The ideal m a n of the physicians was of a temperament 
"exactly and perfectly temperate," as Levinus Lemnius described him 
in The Touchstone of Complexions (translated in 1565 and several 
times reprinted) ; he was the fortunate being in w h o  m the elements, 
as in Shakespeare's Brutus, were so mixed as to m a k e Nature stand 
up and say, "This is a m a n . " 
In basing mental stability and moral behavior on man's physical 
composition, the physicians were in danger of taking a materialistic 
position, which to the Elizabethans was equivalent to atheism; and 
indeed, the suspicion of harboring atheistic notions hovered about 
them as it did in the Middle Ages when Chaucer's Physician studied 
but little in the Bible.21 However, in their nosce teipsum tracts, this 
materialistic tendency was counteracted by theological references and 
arguments. T h e balanced m a n of Lemnius, for instance, was an ideal 
completely realized only in Christ. 
Although the ultimate effect of the constant admonitions that m a  n 
should k n o w himself m a y have been secularizing, the tracts them­
selves spread a strongly religious aura with occasional shadings of 
contemptus mundi. The seminal work of this tradition, the eleventh-
century De Humanae Miseriae Conditione of Pope Innocent III, was 
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still popular in sixteenth-century England; George Gascoigne incor­
porated a large section of this work in his The Drum of Doomsday 
(1576; reprinted, 1586), and there was a full English version by 
Humphrey Kerton, entitled The Mirror of Man's Life (1576; re­
printed, 1577, 1586). Pope Innocent described in gloomy colors the 
beginning, progress, and ending of life; the misery, presumption, 
vanity, and pride of m a  n on earth; and the uncertainty of existence 
contrasted with the certainty of death. Innocent took a much more 
pessimistic view of m a  n than did the Christian humanists; but since 
he too dwelt on the antithesis of body and soul, depicting the former 
in its horror and hideousness and the latter in its potential heavenly 
glory, contemptus mundi touched nosce teipsum on an important 
point. So, for that matter, did a related medieval convention, the 
consideration a penitential exercise. It took its cue from biblical pas­
sages in which the notion of "considering" m a  n is associated with 
repentance for evildoing.22 In works like Bernard of Clairvaux's De 
Consideratione, an examination of man's miserable state was pro­
claimed to be medicinal and purifying. This penitential strain of 
consideratio was continued in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
religious literature, where it was sometimes identified with self-
knowledge, as, for instance, in De Contemptu Mundi, by the Spanish 
Jesuit Diego de Estella, which was twice translated, once in 1584 
(Douay?) by Geoffrey Coulton and again in 1586 by none other than 
the Protestant clergyman and nosce teipsum author Thomas Rogers. 
In one of the book's most eloquent chapters, "The knowledge of our­
selves bringeth us to the knowledge of G o d ,  " Diego took his cue from 
Saint Augustine and argued that God was reflected merely darkly in 
the h u m a n mind; in order to see his image more clearly, m a n needed 
to humble himself by considering the misery of his body. The best 
glass for a m a n to see himself in was another m a n ; but this m a n had 
to be considered not in the uncertain glory of his life but in the 
misery of his death. The mirror of self-knowledge was not the flatter­
ing glass of life but the true image of death; m a n must prepare him­
self for the momen t of facing it. This idea is vividly illustrated by an 
early seventeenth-century emblem that shows death as a terminus 
figure, holding a mirror, and a man 's footprints tracing by him on 
the ground; a banner above reads: " H  e has considered himself and 
has departed." 23 
These somber tones sounded in Elizabethan and Jacobean times no 
less than in the Middle Ages. The dust into which man 's body disin­
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tegrated at death and the worms  , the inheritors of this decay, were so 
demonstratively evoked as to jar sometimes our modern sensibilities 
that would rather evade this aspect of self-knowledge. But w  e cannot 
escape its power in some of Shakespeare's great passages, such as the 
pessimistic speeches of the dethroned Richard II or the Duke's prepa­
ration of Claudio for death in Measure for Measure (III.i.5ff.). Even 
a character like Percy Hotspur, unreflective in nature, stammers a 
memorable memento mori in his last words, being mindful that he is 
nothing but dust. In the storm on the heath, as Lear strips himself 
and considers m a  n in his nakedness, the consideratio achieves its ulti­
mate expression; the thematic statement is accentuated by the king's 
violent gesture and fortissimo of pain. 
Even if, as seems plausible, Shakespeare was not an avid reader of 
contemptus mundi literature, he was affected by the religious tone 
and by the otherworldly implications given to nosce teipsum. His was 
an age of universal church attendance, and self-knowledge, as he must 
have been told in m a n  y a sermon, involved a combat against earthly 
pride and a preparation for salvation. In the official Elizabethan 
homilies, appointed to be read in churches, these points were repeat­
edly made in the two introductory sermons, dealing with the salva­
tion and the misery of mankind. Knowing oneself, the argument 
went, meant humbling oneself, acknowledging oneself to be but dust 
and ashes, and confessing to being a miserable sinner. W h e  n m a  n 
submitted himself to the will of God, he recognized his dependence 
on H i m and could thus hope to understand His nature: "The true 
knowledge of ourselves is very necessary to come to the right knowl­
edge of G o d . " 24 M a n was endowed with a mortal body and an im­
mortal soul in order to feel his sinfulness and misery and to be ad­
vised of the grace and goodness of God . His self-examination proved 
his capacity to choose between good and evil, between Go  d and the 
devil. 
The Calvinists, it is true, granted less to man 's power of choice 
and more to God's. Calvinism was a major ingredient in the religious 
climate of Shakespeare's time and must not be neglected in this 
review of the theological implications of nosce teipsum.25 It is, of 
course, impossible here to do justice to Calvin's philosophy of m a n  , 
but w e m a y at least note some of the main points in which it differed 
from the Erasmian synthesis as well as from the evolving Anglican 
theology as represented by Richard Hooker's Of the Laws of Ecclesi­
astical Polity. 
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Like the Elizabethan homily, which took a Christian-humanist 
point of view, John Calvin connected the knowledge of the self with 
the knowledge of God. There were only two kinds of knowledge, as 
Calvin said at the opening of the Institutes, and these were the knowl­
edge of the self and the knowledge of God. But for him, self-knowl­
edge had no independent value at all; one could k n o w the self only by 
knowing God. Self-knowledge, for Calvin as for Saint Augustine, 
was merely God's light shining upon m a n . It is true that, m u c h like 
the humanists, Calvin extolled the beauty of what he called "the phi­
losophers' microcosm," that is, the symmetric form and the organic 
function of man's body and the excellence and acuity of his mind.26 
But he referred here to prelapsarian m a n  , to m a  n as he might have 
been but no longer was. Calvin's concern was not with this ideal but 
with sinful and fallen mankind. Thus self-knowledge became for him, 
m u c h as with the contemptus mundi writers, a recognition of man's 
ignorance, vanity, poverty, infamy, depravity, and corruption; it was 
the condition for accepting G o d as the only true wisdom, solid 
strength, perfect goodness, and complete righteousness. Although 
m a  n was God's noblest work, his fall had made him a most lamentable 
ruin. M a n ' s endeavor must be to restore the divine image in himself. 
Calvin tended to disparage the role of reason in this process. H  e 
accused the philosophers of arrogance in prescribing rational rules 
for leading a virtuous and contented life. In unregenerated m a n  , rea­
son had been reduced to only a few weak sparks, insufficient to serve 
as a light to salvation. T h e self was not a balanced antithesis of body 
and soul,flesh and spirit, passion and reason, in which the latter ele­
ments could control the former. T h  e whole of fallen m a n  , body and 
soul, had become corrupt; not merely were the inferior appetites en­
snared by the devil, but abominable impiety had also seized the citadel 
of the mind (II.i.9). For Calvin, w e might say, m a n had already lost 
the warfare of life, which Erasmus thought he could win. His hope 
for regeneration lay only in the grace of God. But it was fortunate in 
this respect that G o  d had put m a  n in a turbulent, unquiet, and uncer­
tain world. Thus m a  n could realize that heaven and not earth was his 
real home  . Calvin, however, did not conclude that one should there­
fore withdraw from life; in fact, he argued that Christians could 
prove God's grace as effective in themselves by laboring in their voca­
tions and aiming at improvement. Thus contemptus mundi para­
doxically proved the need for activitas mundi. 
Calvinism's insistence that the whole m a n  , including his reason, 
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was corrupt might have led to a total rejection of traditional pre­
scriptions of self-knowledge. W h e  n reason and will are assumed to be 
as degenerate as the senses and the emotions, it will hardly do to 
establish rational rules for self-control. Yet nosce teipsum authors 
whose Calvinist leanings were like those of John Davies of Hereford 
drew no such conclusion. Davies's Microcosmos (1603) differed 
from similar works only through a somewhat more skeptical attitude 
toward the mind's ability to discern the truth and a greater emphasis 
on the misery of m a  n and the inscrutability of G o d  . A n  d the conduct 
books of the Puritans pursued the moral pulse-takings of the Chris­
tian humanists even more systematically than they.27 
The major influence of Calvinism on the meaning of self-knowl­
edge in Shakespeare's time appears to have been an emphasis on the 
dependence of m a  n on the grace of God, a dependence that was also 
recognized at least in some form by non-Calvinists. A s Berowne says 
in Love's Labor's Lost (Li. 148-51) concerning control of the e m o ­
tions, "every m a  n with his affects is born, / Not by might mast'red, 
but by special grace." According to Friar Lawrence in Romeo and 
Juliet (II.iii.27-28), there are "two opposed camps" in man's 
psyche, "rude will" and "grace," that is, the passions leagued with 
the h u m a  n will and reason aided by divine grace. T h  e problem of 
self-knowledge and self-control in Shakespeare is never the simple 
one of the use of reason. In the theological overtones in his plays, 
even Calvinists might have found m u c h to c o m m e n d . 
If it is likely that Shakespeare furthered his education by reading 
some books that propagated religious aspects of self-knowledge, it is 
also probable that he, w h o came to designate himself a gentleman and 
wrote plays about princes and noblemen, would seek to learn about 
the specific application of self-knowledge to the nobility. But whether 
he ever read aristocratic conduct books or not, he could not help 
observing the ideals and practices of the nobility with which he came 
in contact. His Christian-humanist education had taught him to 
expect that nosce teipsum applied to all classes and estates. T h o m a  s 
Wright, w h  o singled out divines and physicians as most apt to benefit 
by his Passions of the Mind, in typically humanistic fashion went on 
to generalize that also "the good Christian that attendeth to mortifi­
cation and the prudent civil gentleman that procureth a graceful con­
versation m a y reap some commodity touching their professions and, 
infine, every m a n m a y by this come to a knowledge of himself, which 
ought to be preferred before all treasures and riches." 28 It must be 
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said, however, that by and large the courtesy books written for the 
nobility did not provide much of the commodity Wright so highly 
acclaimed; those clearly in the tradition of Christian humanism were 
exceptions.29 The most notable in this respect was Sir Thomas 
Elyot's Governor (1531), which applied the Delphic max im to the 
gentleman's need to recognize that he had a body and a soul like any 
other m a n , and that of liberty of will as much or as little was given to 
an emperor as to a poor carter.30 Another humanistically oriented 
book, greatly influential in England, was Pierre de la Primaudaye's 
French Academy, the four parts of which were translated between 
1586 and 1618. Ostensibly written to record a conversation among 
four young noblemen engaged in founding a courtly academy at 
Anjou, The French Academy was actually a compendium of knowl­
edge radiating from the concept of self-knowledge. It has often been 
drawn upon for studies of the intellectual history of the Renaissance 
and for the background of Shakespeare's ideas, and I have also made 
considerable use of it. Yet it must be said that the Huguenot author's 
view of the aristocracy was colored by his Christian humanism and 
that his value system did not reflect that of the nobility in general. 
Even more of an outsider's view was that of Laurence Humphrey in 
The Nobles and of Nobility (1563), which teemed with demands that 
noblemen must rule themselves, consider themselves, solitarily rever­
ence themselves, and, above all, know themselves. But then, H u m  ­
phrey was a clergyman and university educator inclined to Calvinism, 
and he was not especially close to the aristocrats. The self-negation he 
demanded of the noblemen clashed with their desire for self-expansion 
and with the honor code. Elizabethan noblemen were certainly not 
generally reputed for patience and humility. 
In aristocratic circles, these restrictive virtues were thought to be 
more appropriate for the gentlewoman than for the gentleman, and 
the courtesy books recommended them as such.31 For instance, Gio­
vanni Bruto, in a tract translated in 1598, wanted a noble girl's edu­
cation to be primarily one in humility and piety: "For that humility 
is not only a Christian and civil vertue, but the foundation and pillar 
of all Christian and civil vertues; and, because it engendereth in us 
the knowledge of ourselves, as much as her weak mind m a y compre­
hend, she [the matron in charge of the girl's education] shall show 
her the wisdom of God, of his goodness and power." 32 Only the gen­
tlewomen w h o knew themselves, that is, humbled themselves, could, 
according to Bruto, be exalted. 
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Shakespeare's attitude in these matters owed as m u c h to observa­
tion as to theory. H  e had the advantage of seeing aristocrats at close 
range, and he knew that some of them thought that what in mean 
m e n was entitled patience was cowardice in noble hearts. But his 
humanistic education had also prepared him to understand deeply and 
sympathetically the democratic equality of all flesh. Clay and clay 
might differ in dignity, but their dust was all alike. A s to the noble­
w o m e n , some of his heroines are indeed endowed with the patience 
and humility that the courtesy books ordained for them, but they also 
are refreshingly more active and vital than one might expect those to 
have been w h  o had gone through the kind of submissive training pre­
scribed by Bruto. Here as elsewhere, Shakespeare's characterizations 
show, most of all, a sure sense for h u m a n values. 
A m o n  g the books from which an Elizabethan could learn the 
meaning and significance of self-knowledge, w  e shouldfinally not for­
get those that purported to address themselves to rulers. Since the 
princes were "the glass, the school, the book, / W h e r  e subjects' eyes 
do learn, do read, do look," as Shakespeare's Lucrece puts it (615­
16), they had a particular obligation to k n o w themselves thoroughly, 
and their subjects had a corresponding duty to study them as models. 
Although Machiavelli's portrait of the prince m a y have been more 
relevant to actual political practices in Tudor England than the moral 
tracts of the Christian humanists, the intellectual and spiritual climate 
favored the latter's theories. In drawing pictures of model rulers, the 
Christian humanists continued the tradition of medieval specula 
principis, adding their o w n educational programs. The seminal work 
here was Erasmus's Institutio Principis Christiani (1516). For 
Erasmus, the prince had to be,first of all, a good Christian and a 
good m a n , even though not every good m a n would necessarily make 
a good prince. But Erasmus believed that a balanced diet of classical 
and moral-religious instruction had a beneficial effect on the prince's 
ethical conduct of affairs. Similar, even if less urbanely phrased, ar­
guments were voiced in The Institution and First Beginning 0} a 
Christian Prince (1571), which Sir James Chillester translated from 
the French and dedicated to Queen Elizabeth. The prince'sfirst pre­
requisite, said The Institution, was self-mastery. The fourth chapter 
expounded, " H o  w that those which shall c o m m a n  d others ought first 
to master themselves and so to suppress and moderate their affections 
and passions that, by their good lives, they m a  y induce those that be 
subject to them to virtue and goodliness." Princes were asked to lay 
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away pride, insolence, and ambition and to acknowledge the c o m m o n 
condition of mankind. If they were subject to moral infirmities, they 
were to subdue their imperfections by reason and frame themselves to 
gentleness, modesty, and humanity. T  o do so, they must "enter into 
themselves and have good consideration of their o w n proper natures 
and withal continually remember that they are but m e n , formed and 
m a d e of the slime of the earth as others." 33 This is the same moral 
as that of the de casibus tragedies narrated in The Mirror for Magis­
trates and dramatized in the plaintive speeches of Shakespeare's 
Richard II; it echoes still in Lear's self-discovery. 
It would be tedious to examine all possible ways in which Shake­
speare could have learned the significance and meaning of self-
knowledge. T h  e preceding survey is sufficient to demonstrate that 
admonitions to self-knowledge and prescriptions on achieving it were 
his regular moral and religious diet and that they had a Christian-
humanist flavor. They were in the books he read in school and out 
of it, and they were in the sermons he heard. This moral indoctrina­
tion was lasting enough to have left impressions all through his 
works. Shakespeare was, and remained in some sort, a disciple of the 
Christian humanists. But his exquisite sense for what is truly h u m a n 
m a d e him realize that h u m a n nature was recalcitrant and unpredict­
able and that all theory was inferior to reality. S o m e of his early 
plays, particularly Love's Labor's Lost and The Comedy of Errors, 
give evidence of his ironic amusement about being told so insistently 
to k n o w himself. A n d the plays of his middle period give some in­
dications that he saw weaknesses in the Christian-humanist picture 
of m a n . But I think there is proof that he never completely disowned 
Christian humanism and that he thought of self-knowledge always 
in terms at least related to it. 
Although the Christian humanists' approach to self-knowledge 
was too theoretical and idealistic to lead to new discoveries about the 
nature of m a n , it offered, I think, some distinct advantages for dra­
matizing the h u m a  n condition, advantages that Shakespeare con­
sciously or instinctively realized. These fall into three major cate­
gories: first, the humanistic ideas of self-knowledge contained a 
method for self-examination; second, they provided a body of ideas 
on m a  n that balanced favorable and unfavorable traits; and, third, 
they presented a viable ideal for mankind. 
A s to the first advantage, Christian humanism established a 
method for asking certain questions about m a  n and his purpose that 
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Shakespeare could translate into dramatic terms. Although the nosce 
teipsum instructions were generally hortatory, they implied a pro­
gram of self-questioning and sometimes put it into catechistic form. 
O n e of the best examples of this program was Sir James Perrott's 
The First Part of the Consideration of Human Condition (1600), a 
short and, except for the form, quite traditional treatise.34 Sir James 
was stimulated by the Delphic m a x i m to dispense strong doses of 
contemptus mundi, consideratio, and memento mori. H  e presented 
this advice in a question-and-answer pattern by stipulating that a 
m a n w h o wants to k n o w himself must ask himself certain questions, 
which fall under three headings, that is, questions on what m a  n is, 
w h o he is, and what manner of m a n he is. T o answer these, he 
claimed, other questions must be asked. Thus the answer to what m a  n 
is requires an examination of what he is according to his creation, his 
life, and his death. Perrott's method made self-search a quasi-
dramatic event, a dispute of the soul with itself. In a general w a  y it 
thus provides a pattern for the struggle of Shakespeare's heroes for 
clarity about themselves in the crisis of their lives; it resembles 
Richard II's anguished introspection, Angelo's confrontation with 
his true character, Hamlet's existential probing of his mind, and, 
most of all, Lear's agonizing ruminations on the h u m a  n condition 
and his o w n . Of course, w e need not therefore assume that Shake­
speare read The Consideration; but certainly he was familiar with 
its general method of self-questioning, which reflects both Ciceronian 
prescriptions of decorum and the introspection of the medieval con­
sideratio and gives them a humanistic emphasis. 
A second advantage of the humanistic interpretation of nosce 
teipsum derived from its balance of optimism and pessimism concern­
ing man's earthly existence. Even a writer as m u c h addicted to 
contemptus mundi as Pierre Boaistuau felt evidently, after having 
written his Theatre du monde (1558), that he needed to counter­
balance the misery of m a  n with his greatness. H  e thus added to his 
book a Bref disc ours de I'excellence et dignite de Vhomme (1558), 
and it was this composite volume that, translated by John Alday as 
Theatrum Mundi (1566, 1574, 1581), attained a considerable popu­
larity in England. According to thefirst part of the work, m a  n is 
deplorably ignorant of himself: " H  e is so masked and disguised that 
he knoweth not himself; he is the beginner and foreshower of things 
contained in the circuit of this world, and yet he is blind and d u m  b 
in his o w  n doings." 35 According to the second part, however, he is 
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god-like in his erectness, endowed with a divine mind, and capable 
of greatness. T h e same paradoxical assessment of m a n is presented 
in a stanza, more morally edifying than poetically pleasing, added 
during one of the numerous augmentations of the ever popular 
Treatise of Moral Philosophy by William Baldwin (1564; first 
edition, 1547): 
M a n  , that consisteth of body and of soul, 
Is God's o w n creature, specially made 
T o know his maker, also to control 
Such lusts inflesh as elements persuade— 
A beast, if that his life be beastly trade, 
A  n earthly God, if void of hope and hate 
H e live content and know his o w n estate.36 
Here is the basic Christian-humanist paradox, which w e know 
best through Hamlet's splendid resume " W h a t a piece of work is 
a m a n ! " This piece of work, which Hamlet knows h o w to praise 
even if he does not like it, is a quintessence of dust that, in apprehen­
sion, is like a god. (See Appendix C .  ) Shakespeare's tragic heroes 
embody this precarious dignity of m a n  ; it is their main claim to 
h u m a  n greatness. 
Third, and perhaps most important, the Christian humanists' 
prescriptions for self-knowledge provided Shakespeare with a feeling 
that m e  n were, in essence, very m u c  h alike. A  n anecdote in the 
dedication of John Woolton's Immortality of the Soul illustrates this 
pervasive humanistic feeling. This is a story about a visit by the 
painter Apelles to the shop of his colleague Protogenes. Apelles 
found there only an old w o m a n w h o did not recognize him and 
asked him for his n a m e . In answer, Apelles drew an extremely fine 
and small line on the table, remarking that it would reveal his 
identity. A n d , indeed, on his return, Protogenes immediately realized 
w h o had been the caller. A modern reader of this anecdote would 
probably surmise that it demonstrates h o  w one m a  n differs from 
the other just as the line of one artist differs from that of another; 
but that, characteristically, was not Woolton's conclusion. Rather, 
Woolton moralized, the fact that Protogenes recognized the line 
shows that all creation testifies to its creator; the wonderful composi­
tion of m a  n is therefore proof of the greatness of God . M a  n is God's 
finest creation; if he knows himself, he sees himself as a little world 
that reflects the larger world, both created by God. 
Nosce Teipsum: Learning the Method -?5 
Obviously, such prescriptions for self-knowledge could not lead to 
psychological discoveries; they could not really demonstrate w h  y m e  n 
d r a w infinitely varied lines. Shakespeare, from his o w  n observation, 
k n e w better, and he also must have b e c o m e aware of other theoretical 
w a y s to consider m e n , w a y s that promised to s h o w t h e m as they 
really were. These n e  w approaches and their conflict with the tradi­
tional methods will be the subject of the following chapter. But it 
would be erroneous to think of the humanists' approach as a m e r e 
blind alley. T h  e general picture of m a  n that they established provided 
Shakespeare at the outset of his career with a feeling of n o r m s that 
he could use and imitate, just as he could use the figures of speech 
and other devices of rhetoric. W h e  n he w a s asked to hold a mirror 
up to himself, he w a s expected to see a double image, his o w n super­
imposed u p o n an ideal image of m a n , and to adjust his o w n features 
as m u c  h as possible to the ideal portrait. In such fashion, Shakespeare 
w a s given h u m a n n o r m s that helped h i m to classify and describe the 
bewildering variety of h u m a  n characters, to create deviations from 
the ideal pattern, like Richard II, or close approaches to it, like 
H e n r y V . A s Shakespeare c a m e to realize, the Christian humanists' 
explanation of h u m a n behavior w a s in need of revision, but their 
ideals remained admirable. 
CHAPTER TWO 
Nosce Teipsum: 
Charting N e  w Courses 
WH E  N J O H N D A V I E S of Hereford published in 1603 his didactic poem on m a n , Microcosmos, he gave it the auspicious subtitle "The Discovery of the Little World, 
With the Government Thereof." O n e of the minor poets w h o con­
tributed commendatory verses to Davies's learned and labored effort 
rose to this challenge by comparing him with Columbus and Sir 
Francis Drake; Microcosmos was the "paper bark" that would con­
vey the reader to the terra incognita of himself. 
Since Microcosmos was very m u c h in the tradition of Christian 
humanism, the promise of new discoveries with which the poem 
was launched was specious. Like other products of the nosce teipsum 
vogue, Davies's work was circumscribed by its theological view of the 
soul, confused by its inconsistent definitions and descriptions of psy­
chological faculties, and barred by the humors theory from giving 
a sensible account of the working of the body. Symptomatic of the 
reductive nature of Davies's approach was the redundancy of such 
reflexive constructions as the unwarranted promise that in his pages 
" w e ourselves ourselves m a y find." N  o new discoveries could be made 
by presumably looking into oneself but coming up with the same old 
commonplaces. Real progress could come only from charting courses 
different from those of the Christian humanists; and all the great 
artists and writers of the Renaissance w h  o sought to illuminate the 
condition of m a  n had to venture at some points beyond the familiar 
waters. Shakespeare was no exception. 
In the present chapter I should like to survey briefly the major 
directions taken by major Renaissance writers w h o were new and 
independent explorers of the self and to show the similarities and 
differences between their courses and Shakespeare's. I do not think 
Shakespeare was ever a disciple of these writers, but he was aware 
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of the intellectual currents they set in motion and took some cog­
nizance of them. These currents ran away from—occasionally, 
counter to—Christian humanism, although all of them can be said 
to have in some w a y originated in it. I shall not try to unravel here 
the mingled yarn of what one could call "counter-humanism" or 
"antihumanism"; I shall merely single out a few of its strands, those 
that contained new conceptions of the self and of self-knowledge.1 
I have in the preceding chapter simplified somewhat the formative 
influences on Shakespeare's conception of the self by treating the 
Renaissance and the Reformation as more closely related than they 
were. Although the Reformers appreciated Erasmus's criticism of 
religious formalism, few of them were pleased with his attempt to 
balance faith and reason. In one of his more virulent moments, 
Luther called reason a whore; and in another, he said that there 
was nothing that an Erasmus, that is, reason, would not ridicule. But 
it was Calvin's theology more than Luther's polemics that militated 
against the Erasmian balance. A  s w  e noted in the preceding chapter, 
Calvin declared fallen m a  n to be disastrously corrupted in mind as 
well as body. H o  w then could m a  n use the depraved instrument of 
his reason to achieve self-knowledge in the w a  y the humanists said 
he could? Interestingly, this very question did occur to a certain 
Robert Chambers, evidently an austere Calvinist, while reading the 
confident assertion in Sir John Davies's Nosce Teipsum that he knew 
himself as that proud and wretched thing, a m a n  , and had certainty 
about the composition of his body and soul and their respective func­
tions. Chambers felt compelled to write a poetic commentary on, and 
refutation of, Davies's poem, which is extant in a British M u s e u m 
manuscript. Chambers was incensed by Davies's claim that self-
knowledge could be gained by rational self-examination: 
The law writ in our hearts works not so high 
T  o teach ourselves in all to know ; 
That skill, to souls, grace only sure doth tie, 
And , to ourselves, ourselves doth plainly show. 
Chambers argued that the soul, when conjoined with the body, 
was too frightened to see its o w n image truly and that reason was 
too corrupt to separate itself from the senses and passions to make a 
correct estimate of the h u m a  n condition. T h  e soul could see clearly 
only when dissolved from the body, and then "manhood," that is, the 
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self, ceased to exist. Therefore, the hope of gaining self-knowledge in 
Sir John Davies's way was unchristian; as Chambers put it in a 
prose appendix to his uncouth verses, " K n o  w thyself was an oracle 
delivered by the devil to the heathens and infidels, of whose knowl­
edge he was so well assured." 2 
Even though Shakespeare surely did not think of m a n as the child 
of hell as did Chambers, it is worth noting that self-knowledge and 
self-disco very are never merely rational processes in his plays; 
"grace," as he repeatedly insisted, was needed to control the will and 
the passions. In the later plays in particular, reason appears as much 
a hindrance as an aid to self-knowledge. King Lear in or near m a d ­
ness learns more about himself than he ever knew before in full 
sanity. Conversely, Macbeth loses himself in spite of understanding 
his predicament and the danger to his soul well enough. Shakespeare 
gives us no comforting belief that m a n can perfect himself if he only 
uses his reason. 
In disparaging the role of reason as an aid to self-knowledge, the 
Calvinists were joined by the Renaissance skeptics, w h o  , like them, 
werefideists.3 But, while going even further than the Calvinists in 
showing the weakness of h u m a  n reason, they restored self-knowledge, 
although a differently oriented kind, to a high place in their argu­
ments. Calvin at least granted that the "philosophers' microcosm" 
described accurately prelapsarian m a n  ; Montaigne ridiculed the 
whole concept. In " A  n Apology for R a y m o n d Sebond," he attacked 
not only the medieval theologians (and thus R a y m o n d Sebond, 
w h o  m he purported to defend) but, with them, the Christian hu­
manists w h  o had put together their picture of m a  n from the philos­
ophers' fragments: "Verily they have thence had reason to name it 
microcosmos, or little world; so many several parts and visages 
have they employed to fashion and frame the same." 4 The nature 
of m a n was opaque and freakish, and "where I seek myself, I find 
not myself." Thus self-knowledge could not be achieved by method­
ical and theoretical exploration but had to be gained experimentally, 
even haphazardly, "and I find myself more by chance than by the 
search of mine o w n judgment." 5 Although he was an assiduous 
collector of commonplaces, he saw no such medicinal value in them 
as did the Christian humanists: "Should I have died less merrily 
before I read the Tusculans? I think not." 6 H  e preferred a prag­
matically acquired self-knowledge to a derived and doctrinaire one: 
"I had rather understand myself well in myself than in Cicero." 7 
 29 Nosce Teipsum: Charting New Courses
Obviously, Montaigne's experimental approach to himself and to 
mankind was very different from the humanists' methodology. M o n  ­
taigne saw the peculiar nature of the self emerging in the subjective, 
unpredictable, and even irrational moments that Erasmus disre­
garded. Although he was deeply concerned with self-knowledge, 
which he called his "supernatural metaphysics" and his "natural 
philosophy," the subject and object of his inquiry was not, as tacitly 
understood by the Christian humanists, a generalized m a  n but the 
individual, Michel de Montaigne. H  e proceeded pragmatically to 
explore this fascinating individual in all sorts of situations and catch 
him unawares and unexpectedly. It is true that Montaigne had still a 
humanistic picture of m a n in the back of his mind to which he com­
pared himself and seemed at times anxious to adjust, but he was 
motivated more by nostalgia than belief. H  e felt at odds with the 
picture, and he found m e  n in general too diverse to be classified 
satisfactorily. In viewing the whole h u m a n scene, he was struck by 
the discrepancies between act and effect and by events shaping them­
selves without, and counter to, h u m a  n agencies. 
Of course, this was only one side, the more disturbing one, of 
Montaigne's thought. A n  d at least he himself was not greatly dis­
turbed; the recognition of the insufficiencies of medieval and hu­
manistic pictures of m a  n did not induce in him a metaphysical anxiety 
but led him to develop a new and tentative ideal of the self, epit­
omized in the concept of the "honnete h o m m e ,  " a more personal, 
more versatile, and adaptable ideal. But it was the Montaigne of the 
"skeptic crisis," of "The Apology of R a y m o n d Sebond," whose in­
fluence was strongly felt in England. 
I shall, in Part III, argue that Shakespeare went through a similar 
phase of development as did Montaigne, a phase in which he took a 
skeptical view of the received portrait of m a n  . H  e seems from the 
outset to have been inclined to a gentle skepticism; a kind of ethical 
and historical relativism is notable even in some of his earlier plays. 
The self adopts the coloring of its environment and threatens to be­
come submerged in the shifting situations of The Comedy of Errors 
and A Midsummer Night's Dream. Even generally sympathetic 
figures like Antonio and Bassanio in The Merchant of Venice reveal 
tendencies that make us think of them at least on occasion as less than 
ideal when, for instance, the former spits at Jews and the latter m e n ­
tions Portia's legacy before her beauty and virtue. A n  d Shakespeare's 
moral judgments appear sometimes divided or suspended in situa.­
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tions where m e  n are as m u c  h victims as makers of political crises, 
such as in Richard II and King John. This relativism increased 
markedly in the plays of Shakespeare's middle period, from Julius 
Caesar on, reaching its height in Hamlet and in the "problem come­
dies," Troilus and Cressida, All's Well That Ends Well, and Measure 
for Measure, whereupon it subsided. But this relativistic phase must 
be judged not merely from a philosophical and moral point of view 
but also from an artistic one, since it brought with it aesthetic as 
well as ethical and psychological perplexities and appears to have been 
the result of Shakespeare's changing attitude toward his art as m u c  h 
as toward m a n . For this reason (on which I shall be more explicit 
later), I prefer to think of this phase as "mannerist." It is, I believe, 
best to consider the influence of skepticism on Shakespeare, an influ­
ence that is by no means restricted to Montaigne, when discussing 
the plays in which it is most prevalent. 
It should be said that the individualizing trend in the meaning of 
the injunction "kno  w thyself," which distinguished Montaigne from 
the earlier Christian humanists, did not begin with him. Actually, 
most humanists thought that the Delphic m a x i m contained the advice 
to play the role best suited to oneself, to observe what Cicero called 
individual decorum. Roger Ascham declared it the main duty of 
parents to recognize the special talents of their children and en­
courage them in using these.8 But such admonitions were not ac­
companied by helpful descriptions on h o w to develop individual at­
titudes, and they became submerged in traditional statements on the 
nature of the h u m a n soul and on the difference between m e n and 
animals. Individual decorum was circumscribed by general decorum, 
the demand to adjust to the humanitas ideal. 
However , in aristocratic conduct books this ideal often took 
second place or was ignored for class standards that favored a more 
individualized and greatly expanded self. The courtier was en­
couraged to examine his endowments and m a k e the most of them. 
Castiglione, whose // Cortegiano was translated in 1561, thought 
that a nobleman should try to win his prince's grace in the ways 
most natural to himself. A witty courtier would do well to use his 
h u m o r  ; a serious one, his gravity. T  o try an approach unsuited to the 
individual disposition was foolish and unsuccessful. A s Castiglione 
said, "It is meet each m a  n k n o  w himself and his o w  n disposition and 
apply himself thereto and consider what things are meet for him to 
Nosce Teipsum: Charting New Courses 31 
follow and what are not." 9 Castiglione, it is true, thought that the 
courtier would use the acquired grace to influence his prince morally. 
But the idea of extending the potentiality of the self lent itself to 
vulgarization and was vulgarized in m a n y aristocratic conduct books. 
Self-knowledge here served a purpose very different from that it had 
served for either Erasmus or Montaigne: it was not the condition 
for leading a pure and holy life or thefinal result of an inquiry into 
the individual psyche; rather, it had the utilitarian and sometimes 
arriviste function of achieving material gratifications. But even in 
its purer form, the ideal of the courtier emphasized the assertion and 
expansion of the self rather than its limitation, and it conflicted thus 
with the Christian-humanist attitude. T h  e Platonizing philosophy of 
love and beauty, expounded eloquently in the fourth book of // 
Cortegiano, advocated aflight very different from the flight on the 
wings of contemplation that Erasmus described in a passage of his 
Enchiridion. Romantic love and humanistic self-knowledge were in 
the final analysis irreconcilable, but their conflict animates some of 
Shakespeare's plays as it does m a n  y an Elizabethan sonnet. 
T h e book that did most to promote the Renaissance drive for 
egotistic self-assertion, Machiavelli's // Principe (1532), was also 
the one that most terrified the humanistic conscience. T h  e pseudo-
Machiavellian villains of K y d , Marlowe, Shakespeare, and others 
owed their existence to the horror of a generation educated in hu­
manistic and Reformation morality that saw its assumptions chal­
lenged. But the fact that characters w h  o recognized no limitations 
for their selves, such as Tamburlaine and Doctor Faustus, were 
created also proves that Machiavellian virtu appealed to the Eliza­
bethan imagination. W  e can n o  w safely discard the previously held 
belief that all this repulsion and attraction came merely from mis­
conceptions about Machiavelli's actual arguments through their dis­
tortions in hostile reactions such as in Innocent Gentillet's Contre-
Machiavel (1576; translated by Simon Patrick in 1602). Although 
there was no printed translation of The Prince until that of E d w a r d 
Dacres in 1640, the book was read in England, as extant Elizabethan 
manuscript translations testify.10 Moreover, Machiavelli's Art of War 
and his Florentine History, which in some points parallel The Prince, 
were available in English versions (1560 and 1595 respectively). T h  e 
dedications of these latter translations to Queen Elizabeth and Sir 
Christopher Hatton demonstrate that the n a m  e of Machiavelli 
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possessed a certain respectability in some circles. There is sufficient 
indication that at least from the last decade of the sixteenth century 
on Machiavelli was read and admired in England by a great m a n y 
advanced spirits, and the number of those w h  o were willing to say 
that he was right concerning politics and morals increased in the 
seventeenth century. 
In view of the present fashion of reading The Prince as a political 
tract for Machiavelli's time or a theoretical defense of Realpolitik in 
general, it is surprising that the Elizabethans seem to have thought 
of it as a treatise on ethics and psychology as m u c h as on politics.11 
It is only by realizing this fact that one understands the enormous 
emotional reaction as well as the growing influence it had on Shake­
speare's contemporaries. It was not for them an Italian historian's 
blueprint for achieving unity in Italy or a realistic assessment of 
the instruments available to absolutist governments, but a conduct 
book for m a n ' s life in the state. Machiavelli's w a y of presenting his 
arguments actually lent support to such interpretation. H  e said in 
his Epistle Dedicatory that his intention was to regulate, that is, give 
rules to, princely governments; and he generalized, often incisively, 
on h u m a n nature and behavior. Thus the book approached at least 
outwardly the pattern of the specula principis or institutiones prin­
cipis Christiani and therefore was liable to be read as proposing a 
model not only for princes but also for other m e n . Both Gentillet, 
w h o detested it, and Gabriel Harvey, w h o cherished it, read it as a 
general conduct book, the former to warn against the godlessness of 
its author, a devil incarnate, the latter to strengthen himself in the 
privacy of his study for the battle of life. 
A n d  , indeed, Machiavelli thought of life as a warfare, a funda­
mentally different one, it is true, from that in Erasmus's Enchiridion. 
For the Christian humanist, m a n had to fight his baser instincts, his 
vices and passions; for Machiavelli, he had to fight against other 
m e n , body against body, mind against mind. Only by preparing him­
self for this combat could the prince (and, by implication, any other 
m a n  ) hope to succeed: 
A prince then ought to have no other aim, nor other thought, nor 
take anything else for his proper art but war and the orders and 
discipline thereof; for that is the sole art which belongs to him that 
commands, and that is of so great excellence that not only those 
that are born princes it maintains so, but man  y times raises m e  n of 
private fortune to that dignity.12 
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Victory in the battle of life described by Machiavelli required self-
expansion rather than the self-limitation of Erasmus's militia Chris-
Hani. Physical force was an indispensable means for survival, and 
individual success depended on the conquest of other, antagonistic 
selves rather than on the control of one's o w n self. Rules could be 
stretched or broken in emergency. There were two kinds of fighting, 
said Machiavelli, the one by right of laws, the other by force. T h  e 
former was proper to m e n and the other c o m m o n to beasts, but "be­
cause the first m a n  y times sufficeth not, there is a necessity to m a k  e 
recourse to the second." 13 Machiavelli's view of life was not very far 
from the Hobbesian state of nature as a warfare of everybody against 
everybody. 
It was Machiavelli's attitude toward conventional moral virtues 
that most incensed his enemies, an attitude based on the premise that 
the prince must assert himself in a hostile world full of inconstant, 
ungrateful, and dissembling m e n  . Machiavelli treated with contempt 
the humanistic view that m e  n and princes were allied in the pursuit 
of virtue and goodness; the cleavage between h o  w m e  n live and h o  w 
they ought to live was unbridgeable. T  o assert himself in this tough 
world, the prince had to be a lion and a fox—metaphors that became 
immediately famous. Machiavelli still accepted the humanists' assess­
ment of m e  n as composed of a rational and a beastly part; but con­
trary to them he founded his political and ethical philosophy on the 
supposition that animal instincts guided man's moral and social be­
havior. "Conscience" and "soul" are not words to be found in The 
Prince; they would be out of place in arguments arising from a m a  ­
terialistic view of life governed by self-interest. Whenever Machia­
velli referred to self-knowledge, he gave the concept a utilitarian and 
egoistic meaning. Thus he argued that both cruelty and wiliness were 
necessary for a prince's success: "Those that stand wholly upon the 
lion understand not well themselves." 14 Such general m a x i m s en­
couraged the application not merely to princes but also to m e  n in 
general. 
Machiavelli's fox metaphor implied that knowing oneself was not 
equivalent to being oneself, as humanistic theory maintained. Since 
the prince was seen by m a n y , but intimately k n o w n only by few, the 
image he projected mattered more than the reality he represented. 
A  s Machiavelli generalized in another of those m a x i m  s that invited 
application to m e n at large, "Every m a n m a y come to see what thou 
seemest, few come to perceive and understand what thou art." 15 For 
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Machiavelli, knowing oneself meant, at least at times, not to be one­
self. 
Although Machiavelli's assessment of humanity m a  y strike one as 
more pessimistic than the humanists', it was more optimistic about 
men's chances for success in this world, and it was felt to be so by 
those w h o agreed with him. T h e world was a battleground on which 
one could hope to win victories if he adopted the proper strategy and 
tactics, as Harvey noted in a lengthy passage of his marginalia with 
repeated reference to Machiavelli. In the most telling phrases, he 
applied the biblical metaphor of the warfare of life in the new , M a  ­
chiavellian sense: 
Machiavel and Aretine [Pietro Aretino] knew their lessons by 
heart and were not to seek h o  w to use the wicked world, the flesh, 
and the devil. They had learned cunning enough and had seen 
fashions enough and could and would use both with advantage 
enough. . . . Vita militia, vel togata, vel armata. First cast to shoot 
right, then be sure to shoot home. 1 6 
Machiavelli's effect on his disciples was to bring about something 
of a Nietzschean transvaluation of ideals in which good was what 
contributed to power. In the exercise of force m a  n proves himself a 
m a n , as Harvey implied in adapting the R o m a n quality of virtus to 
the Machiavellian virtu: "Quicquid est in deo, est deus; quicquid est 
in viro, sit virtus et vis." 17 W h e  n the m a  n endowed with this quality 
—ironically Harvey was not—said that he knew himself, he did not 
mean , as did the Christian humanists, that he had probed his con­
science in order to improve himself morally or to earn the transcen­
dent glory of salvation; he meant that he had assessed himself criti­
cally in order to strengthen himself for a battle in which victory 
meant the enjoyment of material rewards, promotion, wealth, and 
authority. Marlowe's Tamburlaine fully accepts this Machiavellian 
view of the h u m a  n condition: 
Nature, that framed us of four elements

Warring within our breast for regiment,

Doth teach us all to have aspiring minds.

O u  r souls, whose faculties can comprehend

The wondrous architecture of the world

A n  d measure every wandering planet's course,

Still climbing after knowledge infinite,

A n  d always moving as the restless spheres,
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Wills us to wear ourselves and never rest, 
Until w  e reach the ripest fruit of all, 
That perfect bliss and sole felicity, 
The sweet fruition of an earthly crown.18 
Stripped of the soaring poetry and of the glittering symbolism of 
the crown, this Machiavellian philosophy could become the excuse 
of scramblers for office and rewards as well as of those w h  o sought 
to defend their tyranny over others. Self-knowledge in this sense was 
a different thing from what it ever had been before, as T h o m a s 
Hobbes well realized w h e n he said disapprovingly in his Introduction 
to Leviathan (1651): 
But there is another saying of late understood, by which they [those 
that think they can learn more from life than from books] might 
truly read one another if they would take pains; that is, nosce teip­
sum, read thyself; which was not meant, as it is n o w used, to coun­
tenance either the barbarous state of m e  n in power toward their 
inferiors or to encourage m e  n of low degree to a saucy behavior 
towards their betters. . . . 19 
This passage serves as a preamble to Hobbes's investigation of man's 
psyche; the true meaning of nosce teipsum, he claimed, was that self-
knowledge must begin with a rational examination of the nature of 
the h u m a n mind and the passions. Like the humanists, Hobbes 
thought that individual self-inquiry would lead to a general concept 
of m a n  ; but the concept he arrived at was totally different—it was not 
ethical or religious but materialistic and mechanical. A n  d Hobbes's 
view of the commonwealth as the result of a social contract that 
ended the state of nature in which life was solitary, short, and brutish 
indicates that he thought of m a  n as a political animal m u c  h as did 
Machiavelli. But then Hobbes, like the Machiavelli of The Prince, 
was an apologist of absolutism. 
Clearly, Shakespeare never adopted the vulgarization of self-
knowledge censured by Hobbes  ; the one character that represents it 
most is his darkest villain, Iago, and there are indications in his great 
tragedies, in Othello, Lear, and Macbeth, that he was disturbed about 
the change in the meaning of self-knowledge for some of his con­
temporaries. Although Jacobean pessimism left its traces on his 
major tragedies and is surely a prime reason for their gloom and 
ethical severity, Shakespeare never leaves us with the impression that 
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w e must accept the evil world as a given and unchangeable fact or that 
w  e ought to m a k  e the best of it. T h  e representatives of the world as 
it is at its worst are contrasted with those that show it as it ought to 
be. T h e Iagos, E d m u n d s , and Antonios are the antitheses of the Des­
demonas, Cordelias, and Prosperos, and our sympathies clearly lie 
with the latter. Thus Shakespeare reasserted the validity of the hu­
manistic search for an ideal humanity at a time when his artistic power 
had developed to its full strength. But this is a matter that must be 
dealt with later, in the discussions of the great tragedies and The 
Tempest. A  s is true for the second phase of Shakespeare's art, the 
conception of the self that emerges in the plays of this third period 
gains its configuration from a change in his artistic style, a change 
that, for reasons I shall give in Part IV, I think to be one toward the 
baroque. 
Although the inquiry into the patterns of self-knowledge in this 
greatest of Shakespeare's periods must be postponed, I think it will 
be instructive to glance at the patterns of one of his contemporaries 
w h o came to the fore during this time, Sir Francis Bacon.20 Of the 
great Renaissance writers w h  o charted n e  w courses for exploring 
the self, he is one of the most interesting to consider, not for the rea­
son that he influenced Shakespeare, which he almost certainly did not, 
but because he demonstrates the pervasive influence of Machiavelli 
and provides a contrast with Shakespeare's o w n course. It is cer­
tainly odd, for this reason and others, that Bacon should have become 
the main candidate of the "Anti-Stratfordians." 
Like Machiavelli, Bacon approached m a  n and society with tough­
mindedness, and his concept of self-knowledge drew something from 
the Florentine's utilitarian and egoistic emphasis. Bacon's statement 
that " w e are beholden to Machiavel and others that write what m e n 
do and not what they ought to do" is symptomatic of an intellectual 
kinship. But this was a cautiously acknowledged one, and it was 
never complete. In Advancement of Learning (1605), in which 
Bacon offered his tribute to Machiavelli, he hastened to accompany 
it with the proviso that the "serpentine wisdom" of a realistic assess­
ment of m e n must be joined with the "columbine innocency" of a 
virtuous disposition in the assessor.21 N o r did Bacon wish to abandon 
all humanistic recipes for self-knowledge. For instance, he acclaimed 
learning as a remedy to the diseases of the mind; the unlearned m a n , 
he said, did not k n o  w "what it is to descend into himself or to call 
himself to account, nor the pleasure of that suavissima vita, in dies 
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sentire se fieri meliorem" (p. 72) . Like the Christian humanists, 
Bacon thought that in the study of m a n a balance should be made of 
the positive and negative aspects, and he referred to "those delightful 
and elegant discourses which have been mad  e of the dignity of m a n  , 
of his miseries, of his state and life, and the like adjuncts of his com­
m o  n and undivided nature" (p. 102).22 O  n the relationship of body 
and soul, a central issue of nosce teipsum, Bacon had nothing new to 
add to the Christian humanists' analysis. 
It is in placing self-knowledge in relation to other h u m a n knowl­
edge that Bacon differed completely from Christian humanism. In his 
proposed universal system of sciences, nosce teipsum was no longer a 
general introduction and guidepost to all man's endeavors, nor was 
it associated with a knowledge of God . Instead of being the beginning 
of all science, self-knowledge was only the object of one of the "three 
beams of man's knowledge; that is, Radius Directus, which is re­
ferred to nature, Radius Rejractus, which is referred to G o d . . . , 
Radius Reflexus, whereby m a  n beholdeth and contemplateth himself." 
Although Bacon acknowledged that the self-knowledge resulting from 
this beam was "the end and term of natural philosophy in the inten­
tion of m a n , " he immediately added that it was "but a portion of 
natural philosophy in the continent of nature" (p. 101). For Bacon, 
the study of the self was subsumed in the study of nature. 
In spite of his nod to the pleasures of contemplation, Bacon did not 
really believe that self-knowledge could come from turning inward; 
withdrawal from the observation of nature and experience appeared 
to him a grievous error: " U p o n those intellectualists, which are not­
withstanding commonly taken for the most sublime and divine phi­
losophers, Heraclitus gave a just censure, saying M e  n sought truth 
in their o w  n little worlds, and not in the great and c o m m o  n world; 
for they disdain to spell and so by degrees to read in the volume of 
God's works" (p. 59) . 
If Bacon thus wanted to integrate the study of the self into the 
study of nature, he also sought to m a k  e a closer connection between 
the self and the social milieu. H u m a  n philosophy or humanity, he 
said, had two parts, "the one considereth m a  n segregate, or distrib­
utively; the other congregate, or in society" (p. 101). Although 
admitting some of the humanists' claims for the uses of self-knowl­
edge to m a n segregate, Bacon completely departed from the h u m a n ­
istic basis of a distinterested concern with virtue when turning to m a  n 
congregate. It is here that he paid his compliment to Machiavelli and 
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recommended studying the "conditions of the serpent." T h e advice 
of the old nosce teipsum tracts, he felt, could not stand the pressure of 
the actual world: "For m e n of corrupted minds presuppose that 
honesty groweth out of simplicity of manners and believing of 
preachers, schoolmasters, and men's exterior language" (p. 140). 
For Bacon, the mirror of self-knowledge rendered a picture totally 
different from that of the Christian humanists. For these, it showed 
a not too clearly individualized m a  n against the background of a 
timeless and idealized humanity; for Bacon, it presented a distinct 
psychological portrait of an individual against the sharp contours of 
his time. H e said that "the w i n d o w of M o m u s , " that is, the window 
to look into men's hearts, was to give a view not of the state of men's 
souls and their chances of salvation but 
of their natures, their desires and ends, their customs and fashions, 
their helps and advantages, and whereby they chiefly stand; so 
again, their weaknesses and disadvantages, and where they lie most 
open and obnoxious; their friends, factions, dependencies; and 
again, their opposites, enviers, competitors, their moods and times 
. . . ; their principles, rules, and observations, and the like; and 
this not only of persons, but of actions; what are on foot from time 
to time, and h o  w they are conducted, favored, opposed; and h o  w 
they import, and the like. (p. 155) 
Those that wished really to k n o w themselves must look into a "politic 
glass," that is, into "the state of the world or times wherein w  e live" 
(P. 158) . 
W h e  n Bacon was writing his Advancement of Learning, he looked 
deeply into this glass, a look to which he owed his subsequent mete­
oric career. T h e shrewd advice he had for others like him, "architects 
of their o w n fortune," was quite often a practical Machiavellism ap­
propriate not only for Bacon's age but for all times. H  e recommended 
taking an impartial view of personal abilities and virtues as well as of 
debilities and impediments and then considering the appropriateness 
of one's constitution and temperament for the times. With deliberate 
regard for both the self and the age, profession and course of life must 
be chosen, competitors observed, a wise choice of friends and ac­
quaintances m a d e  , successful models followed, strength displayed 
advantageously, virtues m a d  e out of weaknesses, and flexibility 
shown according to the occasion (pp. 158-67) . T h e long list of these 
sagacious recommendations could be supplemented and illustrated by 
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equally keen observations, weighted with shrewd self-interest, from 
his Essays. Bacon's prescriptions for self-knowledge are not as 
edifying morally as those of the Christian humanists, but they are 
more practical and, as one discovers with a shock, more modern. 
They make self-knowledge a means to an end and not an end itself, 
and they are totally secular and morally indifferent, advocating self-
expansion rather than self-limitation. 
Bacon thus had m u c h better reason than John Davies of Hereford, 
with w h o  m w  e began this chapter, to appropriate for himself the 
discovery metaphor, and he did so with his characteristic heraldic 
manner. H  e said in his Novum Organum (Aphorism 92) that the 
scientific method he had drawn up was analogous to the declaration, 
made by Columbus before crossing the Atlantic, of w h y and h o w new 
lands were to be discovered (p. 287) . This scientific method included 
rules for the study of m a n  , and here, as well as in those applicable to 
the study of nature, Bacon anticipated m u c h that was to come in the 
future. M a  n could not have increased his knowledge of himself unless 
he was willing to sail routes different from those charted in Micro­
cosmos, which led only to regions already k n o w  n and explored. 
But the analogy to discovery and exploration in the study of m a  n 
is in some ways misleading. Columbus did not leave a moral territory 
for a scientific one, but one continent for another. T h  e kind of venture 
on which Bacon set out meant to leave the old humanistic ground 
irrevocably behind even though, in caution or perhaps in sincerity, 
he paid his respects to some humanistic arguments. There could be no 
return of his Santa Maria. Serpentine wisdom cannot serve colum­
bine innocence without in the end swallowing it. 
It is not m  y purpose to moralize but to point up sharply the dis­
tance between Bacon and the Christian humanists and to see Shake­
speare in some relation to the two. This is not a simple matter, since 
Shakespeare was not a moralist or philosopher but a dramatist, and a 
rather impersonal one at that, w h o had no one system or truth to 
communicate. H  e had what Keats called "negative capability"; he 
could live with the uncertainties, mysteries, and doubts that surround 
the great questions of life. H  e could and did look at the world 
through the eyes of characters with the most diverse attitudes and 
philosophies. But he was also a moral artist with a deep sympathy for 
m a n  . It is surely significant that those a m o n  g his characters w h  o hold 
views that have anything in c o m m o  n with Bacon's definition of self-
knowledge are villains like Iago and E d m u n d  . T h  e equation of self­
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knowledge with self-interest, self-assertion, and self-expansion was 
and remained antipathetic to Shakespeare. 
There is in all his plays a residual humanism; it is as strong or 
stronger in the late Tempest as in the early Love's Labor's Lost. His 
contemporaries' espousal of the world as it is does not seem to have 
lessened Shakespeare's concern for the world as it ought to be. If he 
makes us feel the tension between the real and the ideal, he also makes 
us feel the pity of the tension. However, w e m a y consider it fortunate 
that he was born into an age in which this tension was sensed more 
acutely than at other times because, even though Baconian empiricism 
is n o w as m u c h behind us as Christian humanism, the conflict has 
proved archetypal for m u c h that was to come; it can be thought to 
have both historical and general significance. 
T T
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CHAPTER THREE 
Microcosm and Macrocosm: Framing

The Picture of M a n

TH E CHRISTIAN H U M A N I S T S were emphatic in their demand that a m a n w h o wishes to k n o w himself must real­ize that he is a little world that reflects on a smaller scale 
the larger world of the universe. Thus, for instance, said D  u Bartas 
in the influential account he gave of the Creation and the beginnings 
of m a n in The Divine Weeks (Sir Joshua Sylvester's translation) : 
There's under sun, as Delphos' god did show, 
N  o better knowledge than ourselves to know. 
There's no theme more plentiful to scan 
Than is the glorious, goodly frame of m a n  ; 
For in man's self isfire, air, earth, and sea. 
Man's , in a word, the world's epitome 
O r little map, which here m  y M u s e doth try 
By the grand pattern to exemplify.1 
The twin theme of microcosm and macrocosm was indeed scanned 
plentifully in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, whe  n poets and 
moralists were notoriously fond of drawing all sorts of parallels be­
tween the smaller frame and the larger. O  n the other hand, the whole 
idea of m a  n as a microcosm was questioned by those w h  o were not 
in sympathy with the medieval-classical synthesis created by the 
Christian humanists. Calvin found "the philosophers' microcosm" 
irrelevant to fallen m a n  ; Montaigne ridiculed it as a patchwork of 
brain-conceived illusions; and Bacon asked his contemporaries to 
turn away from studying the microcosm and apply themselves to 
unraveling the mysteries of external nature.2 Thu  s the concept of 
microcosm m a  y be taken as central for the humanistic Renaissance, 
and the attacks on it as symptomatic of a dissatisfaction with this 
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kind of Renaissance. I should like to go further and suggest tenta­
tively that this concept in its literal, humanistic form was central to 
the mentality that the art historians see behind the style they define 
as Renaissance and contrast with mannerism and baroque. However , 
I a  m not concerned with establishing absolute stylistic categories; I 
wish merely to explore the changing ideas about self-knowledge 
against the background of larger intellectual and artistic changes. 
At any rate, a study of Renaissance patterns of self-knowledge 
requires an examination of the implications of the analogies between 
microcosm and macrocosm. This means glancing at some books that, 
like The Divine Weeks, deal as m u c h or more with the universe than 
with m a n , and it means investigating the assumptions behind that set 
of medieval-Renaissance ideas that sometimes have been too exclu­
sively identified with the Elizabethan world picture. Conventional 
forms of thought about m a  n and the universe were being challenged 
in Shakespeare's time; yet certainly they were those that prevailed in 
his youth, and they provided him, at an impressionable age, with 
norms and standards. It is not amiss to investigate the assumptions of 
the traditional picture, provided that one remains aware that the 
picture was felt to be old-fashioned by some and irrelevant by others. 
D  u Bartas's verses are characteristic of what I think is the main 
feature of the humanistic appraisals of m a  n as a microcosm: they 
appear to heighten and expand the self, but, in a deeper sense, they 
actually limit and circumscribe it. They do, of course, m a k e m a n im­
portant in the whole pattern, and often, as is true for the context of 
the passage in ^The Divine Weeks, they depict him as the hero in the 
cosmic drama. But it is probably more significant that the analogies 
between m a  n and the universe visualize both as well-defined entities. 
T h e beauteous pattern of the universe was to inspire m a n with con­
fidence about the structure of his o w  n frame, and the proportioned 
composition of his body was to reassure him of the purposeful pat­
tern of the universe—the reasoning was circular, and therefore the 
desire for metaphysical assurance was bound to remain unfulfilled in 
the long run, the more so because the two frames were old models 
that n e w discoveries were making obsolete.3 A s the Renaissance 
skeptics observed, faith in merely verbal constructs could not be sus­
tained. 
But, for a while at least, the analogies did provide some assurance. 
It is, I believe, instructive to investigate the ubiquitous concept of the 
frame for the semantic associations that supported this faith. T h  e 
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word "frame" had not yet acquired—or was, at most, in the process of 
acquiring—its modern meaning of a border or case in which some­
thing is set; it generally denoted an underlying structure that upheld 
and shaped an object or idea.4 It thus reflected the Aristotelian notion 
of reality as matter given form and configuration by a spiritual 
design, a notion propagated by the medieval scholasticism that 
avoided the extremes of realism and nominalism. A  s a medieval-
Renaissance encyclopedia explained, the angels were pure form, that 
is, spirit; m e  n below them were both matter, that is, body, and form, 
that is, soul; the created world beneath them was arranged in a 
descending order of purity and strength of form d o w  n to the dregs of 
the universe.5 
O n  e w a  y to determine the connotations and denotations of "frame" 
in the meaning of "cosmos" for the Elizabethans is to investigate for 
what terms in other languages the word was used. O n e such term 
was machina mundi. In translations where "frame" was used in its 
place, the word sometimes conveyed the notion that the universe was 
an intricate engine in constant motion. So, for instance, in Ralph 
Robinson's translation of Sir T h o m a s More's Utopia; the Utopians 
study nature and expect from this endeavor the thanks and favor of 
God, " w h o  m they think, according to the fashion of other artificers, 
to have set forth the marvelous and gorgeous frame of the world 
[machina mundi] for m a  n with great affection intentively to be­
hold." 6 But more often, the foreign words translated by "frame" 
signified architectural structures. Sir Joshua Sylvester rendered 
D  u Bartas's bastiment as "frame," and as a look at T h o m a  s Cooper's 
Thesaurus (1565) shows, "frame," "framing," and "framer" were 
the words with which the Elizabethans translated the Latin fabrica, 
fabricatio, and fabricator. These were thus the English terms they 
chose for the corresponding Latin ones in accounts of the Creation by 
classical writers. They are, for instance, used in Arthur Golding's 
translation of Ovid's Metamorphoses; but in his preceding Epistle, 
Golding m a d e sure that the Christian G o d was properly credited 
with the "framing": it was "God, the Father, that / M a d e all things, 
framing out the world according to the plat / Conceived everlastingly 
in mind." 7 
The universe was often likened to a building. N o n e of these com­
parisons is more familiar to students of the drama than that between 
the world and the theater. The public theater, such as the Globe, was 
a frame, that is, a structure, that was enclosed by another frame, the 
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galleries of the spectators. A  s Nevill Coghill has noted, Hamlet's 
speech on "the goodly frame, the earth" had a direct relevance to the 
Globe Theater, name  d for the Renaissance topos that the stage is the 
world and the world the stage: the actor reciting Hamlet's speech 
could with a sweeping gesture draw in the circumference of the 
wooden O  , which symbolized the world; he could point up to the 
"heavens," represented by the star-spangled ceiling of the stage above 
him, and at the elevated platform, the "promontory," beneath him. 
W h e  n he then gestured toward himself as he turned to the "piece of 
work" that is a m a n , he had placed the microcosm in its macrocosmic 
context.8 
In descriptions of the earth itself, analogies to paintings prevailed. 
D  u Bartas took delight in the "landscape, various, rich, and rare," 
painted on a large canvas by God. In admiring this work, m a n ad­
mired G o d , w h o  m it reflected "as in a glass." 9 Castiglione waxed 
enthusiastic about "the ensign of this world that w  e behold with a 
large sky, so bright with shining stars, and, in the midst, the earth, 
environed with the seas, severed in parts with hills, dales, and rivers, 
and so decked with diverse trees, beautiful flowers and herbs—a m a  n 
m a y say it to be a noble and great painting, drawn with the hand of 
nature and of G o d .  " 10 T h  e divine achievement, Castiglione noted, 
reflected an indirect glory on the h u m a  n art of painting. In narrative 
descriptions of the earth as a landscape, the brushstrokes of the divine 
painter were generally m a d  e visible by borrowing terms from biblical 
and theological accounts of the Creation. This is true for Hamlet's 
appraisal of "the goodly frame, the earth." Although the speech must 
have evoked in Shakespeare's theater some architectural associations 
of the cosmic frame, its details are the pictorial ones of the Creation.11 
Related to pictorial and architectural conceptualizations of the 
universe were the geometrical ones. Renaissance art depended on line, 
perspective, and mathematical ratios. This geometrical m o d  e of vision 
encouraged some moralists to give m a  n a calculable place in the total 
design. In 0  / the Knowledge Which Maketh a Wise Man (1533), 
Sir T h o m a s Elyot based man's understanding of his position in 
nature on a kind of innate sense of perspective that enabled him to 
reconstruct the order of the universe. Self-knowledge, he argued, 
m a d  e it possible for m a  n to k n o  w others and, through his immortal 
soul, the essence of G o d and the working of His providence. Through 
the order in himself, which reflects God's purposes, m a  n could under­
stand the order of nature, which "like a straight line issueth out of 
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providence, and passeth directly through all things that be created." 
M a  n was set "in the highest degree of the line," and the place of 
things and creatures on it depended on their usefulness to him; a 
deviation from the line violated the divine order.12 
Geometrical principles were sometimes thought to determine the 
configuration of the microcosm similar to the w a  y they determined 
the proportions and outlines of the h u m a  n figure in Renaissance 
drawings. This visual m o d e was adopted, not surprisingly, by the 
mathematician and astronomer John Dee in his Preface to a transla­
tion of Euclid (1570). Dee demanded that geometrical and numer­
ological principles be applied to the study of m a  n and that thus a sci­
ence of "anthropography" be established, which is to provide "the de­
scription of the number, measure, weight, figure, situation, and color 
of every diverse thing in the perfect body of m a n . " Noting that there 
were several sciences to describe the universe, such as astronomy, 
geography, and cosmography, Dee asked w h y there was no single 
science of m a  n that was analogous to "the description of the whole 
universal frame of the world": " W h  y should not the description of 
him w h  o is the less world and from the beginning called microcosmus 
(that is, the less world) and for whose sake and service all bodily 
creatures else where created, w h  o participateth with the spirits and 
angels, and [who] is m a d e to the image and similitude of God, have 
his peculiar art?" All sciences could contribute to this n e  w science, an 
"art of arts," and testify to man's "harmonious and microcosmical 
constitution." Dee recommended to begin the study with Albrecht 
Diirer's De Symmetria Humani Corporis and with Noah's ark ( !) 
and then to proceed further: " R e m e m b e  r the Delphical Oracle, nosce 
teipsum (know thyself), so long ago pronounced, of so m a n y philos­
ophers repeated, and of the wisest attempted, and then you will per­
ceive h o  w long ago you have been called to the school where this art 
might be learned." 13 
Shakespeare's sonnet 24 gives evidence of his apprenticeship to 
the particular school of self-knowledge that attempted to establish 
the ideal proportions of m a  n and to place him in the perspective of a 
structured frame. According to the sonnet's opening conceit, the 
poet's eye "hath play'd the painter," delineating in his heart the 
beauty of the friend: " M  y body is the frame wherin 'tis held, / A n  d 
perspective is best painter's art." T h  e perspective, one might say, is 
less of the eye and heart than of the geometrical intellect. Here and 
in Hamlet's speech, Shakespeare adopted the Renaissance habit of 
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depicting m a  n as a symmetrically constructed figure placed in an 
orderly composition with coherent space. This placement gave him a 
prominent, firm, and significant position with a clear orientation to­
ward the universe, analogous to the manner in which the Elizabethan 
actor of Hamlet was poised in full view on the promontory platform 
surrounded by the frame of the theater. 
A very similar conception of man's cosmic position is symbolized 
by the early seventeenth-century emblem bearing the title nosce teip­
sum: the picture shows an erect h u m a n figure in the midst of a circle, 
representing the earth; his lifted arm almost touches the circumfer­
ence; two smaller circles above the larger one represent the sun and 
the m o o n  , which shed their lights on the center. Th  e motto draws the 
moral: " O m a n , you most worthy part of the world, do not diminish 
your exalted position by servile behavior; in you is apparent a per­
fect image of the heavens and the earth. Learn from that your glory 
and your endowments." 14 
Th  e humanists' prescriptions for self-knowledge posited an anthro­
pocentric universe, which it was man's duty to admire as divinely 
created. T h e world was cosmos or mundus, that is, an ornament 
glorifying the Creator but designed for man's reasonable use. Just as 
he was asked to contemplate the world's beauty, so he was held to 
admire the purposeful arrangement of the microcosm, Sylvester's 
epitome of the world or D  u Bartas's tableau racourci. Shakespeare 
properly commended these two frames; he used epithets like "fine" 
and "wondrous" for both. M a n ' s frame was for him a "composed 
wonder" and "framed in the prodigality of nature." 15 Even Hamlet 
calls the larger frame "goodly" and knows that he is supposed to take 
delight in both frames. His inability to do so can be attributed to his 
melancholy, but it should also be said that the play in which he is the 
hero belongs to a period in Shakespeare's work when the landscapes 
take on gloomier hues and when the Renaissance certainties inspire 
less confidence than they inspired earlier. W  e shall deal with this 
problem later; for the present w  e need to recall merely that the speech 
is constructed in the pattern of humanistic orations on the dignity 
of m a n  , a pattern with which the Elizabethans were familiar. 
I do not wish to imply that most Elizabethans were Panglossian 
optimists. Probably very few were. For one thing, the age was too 
conscious of original sin and of the confusion and death it was 
thought to have brought into man's life and into nature to indulge in 
pagan glorifications of m a  n and the world. Th  e analogies between 
Microcosm and Macrocosm: Framing the Picture of Man 49 
microcosm and macrocosm were in fact quite often given a somber 
turn by focusing on the misery of man's life. A  n early seventeenth-
century emblem, similar in appearance to that mentioned previously, 
symbolizes this darker view. In the picture, m a  n is framed not merely 
by the circle of the universe but also by angry clouds that surround 
it; the motto is Job 14: 1: " M a n that is born of a w o m a n is of short 
continuance and full of trouble." 16 All that was thought wrong with 
m a  n could be seen reflected in the universe just as well as everything 
thought to be right. Contemptus mundi pessimism propagated the 
idea that the world, like m a n , was shrinking and decaying and that 
the orbits of sun and m o o  n were drawing closer to the earth in a slow 
disintegration of the cosmic system.17 Natural catastrophes and 
strange occurrences were apt to be interpreted as signs of the ap­
proaching end, as, for instance, by A b r a h a m Fleming, w h o took them 
as "a token that the world was sick after the manner of m a n , w h o is 
therefore called a little world." 18 M a n ' s wickedness was thought to be 
a symptom of this fatal illness or even a factor in bringing about a 
speedier demise. In this vein, Hamlet sees his mother's corruption 
reflected in a universe destined to perish by fire, as it was generally 
believed it would perish: 
Heaven's face does glow 
O'er this solidity and compound mass 
With heated visage, as against the d o o m — 
Is thought-sick at the act, 
(III.iv.48-51) 
O n e cannot escape the feeling that Hamlet projects his o w n un­
wholesome mind into the universe. But if so, there were m a n y H a m ­
lets in the last years of Elizabeth and the early years of James, when 
the decay of the world was gloomily diagnosed by m a n y prophets of 
doom. 1 9 This metaphysical pessimism was abetted by the political and 
religious discords that threatened to break the frame of order. It is 
hardly accidental that in Shakespeare's later plays references to a 
microcosmic or macrocosmic frame occur generally in a context that 
suggests its being twisted or broken. A huge passion "shakes" 
Othello's "frame" (V.ii.47). Lear's "frame of nature" is "like an 
engine, wrench'd . . . F r o  m the fix'd place" (I.iv.267-68), and 
Macbeth swears that he will let "the frame of things disjoint, both the 
worlds suffer" rather than endure the terrible dreams that shake 
him nightly (III.ii.16). 
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But even those w h o preached the decay of the world asserted the 
significance of m a n . T h e process of decay had been caused by man's 
transgression; because of him nature had been corrupted and had, 
so to speak, become h u m a n . In A Discourse of the Felicity of Man 
(1598), Richard Barckley described, in spite of the book's misleading 
title, an almost Timonesque world—in fact, his account of Timon's 
life, which m a  y have been one of the sources of Shakespeare's 
tragedy, is one of the few that show some sympathy with the mis­
anthrope's pessimism. For Barckley, wickedness and misery domi­
nated the h u m a  n scene, and all striving for felicity through worldly 
means, even through virtue and contemplation, was vanity. Yet even 
he declared that G o  d had placed m a  n "as the end of the whole frame 
of the world in this goodly theater." 20 M a  n did not yet need to fear 
that what was happening to him was not tragic but merely absurd. 
It appears that the confidence in the significance of m a  n drew 
some support from the Ptolemaic system of the universe, which pre­
vailed in Elizabethan consciousness. M a  n was placed on the central 
body, the one sphere that was not turning but around which all the 
others, the m o o n  , the sun, the individual planets, and the fixed stars, 
turned in regular circular orbits. Yet there was no automatic connec­
tion between metaphysical confidence and the geocentric theory since 
m a  n also could be visualized as being farthest removed from God. 
Even in Shakespeare's beautiful evocation of the Ptolemaic system 
in Lorenzo's h y m  n to love (Merchant of Venice, V.i.54ff.), m a  n is 
depicted as being prevented from hearing the harmony of the spheres 
by his " m u d d  y vesture of decay." 21 Th  e geocentric theory at any rate 
encouraged looking for the key to the system of the universe in the 
earth. Here was "the center" where Polonius claimed he would dig 
out the truth no matter h o w deeply hidden (II.ii.157). But perhaps it 
is not fortuitous that in Hamlet, which shows m u c h influence of 
philosophical skepticism, this geocentric self-confidence is that of 
Polonius, whose sensitivity to truth is weak. T h e old system also 
encouraged geometrical analogies between the frame of the world and 
the circle (for that matter, "frame" was regularly used to translate 
sphaera), analogies which were also applied to the microcosm. These 
could be spun ad nauseam, as was done by John Davies of Hereford, 
for w h o  m m a  n was a circle in the larger circles of the earth and the 
universe; he had a body that was also a circle and a soul that was a 
circle in it. But God, being perfection, was also symbolized by the 
circle, the most perfect figure, and when H  e dwelt in man's mind, 
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H  e was the innermost circle.22 This geometrical madness was in­
tended to instill in m a  n a desire to achieve a perfection analogous to 
the symmetrical harmony of the universe; but by 1603, the date of 
Davies's Microcosmos, the nosce teipsum geometry was becoming an 
exercise in metaphor. M a n  y elements in Shakespeare's world, as 
William Elton has noted, "point towards the incipient disordering or 
breakdown of the analogical and pre-Cartesian tradition." 23 
T o this breakdown the spread of the Copernican theory was a 
contributing influence since it dislodged m a  n from his favored place 
in the center. But it was not so immediately. T h efirst acquaintance 
with the Copernican theory does not seem to have shaken the Renais­
sance belief in the anthropocentric order. S o m  e of the astronomers in 
the vanguard of the revolution advertised the ne  w cosmology as being 
so symmetrical and orderly as to inspire m a  n with even greater awe 
and humility than the old. Its acceptance would enable him to control 
his beastly nature and rise to the height of the angels.24 N e  w philos­
ophy called all in doubt only when, as in Donne, it became leagued 
with a skeptical epistemology and a contemptus mundi attitude. 
The analogies included not only m a  n and the universe but also the 
state. A  s Barckley had it, "There are three bodily worlds coupled 
together one with another as if it were with a chain of gold: the 
greater, the less, arid man's commonwealth between them both." 25 
The state could be looked upon as a microcosm of the universe or a 
macrocosm of m a n  ; or, for that matter, the universe could be viewed 
as a macrocosm, and m a  n as a microcosm, of the state. In Shake­
speare's political theorizing, the analogies between the state and the 
body prevailed; the sound state was a healthy body; the disordered 
state was a diseased one. T h e England of Henry V is a "little body 
with a mighty heart" (II. Prol. 17), that of his father a "foul" body 
in which "rank diseases grow" (2 Henry IV, III.i.39). Th  e organic 
conception of the state explained temporary and even continued 
breakdowns. 
Ultimately, the disorder in all organisms could be attributed to 
man's original sin and God's ensuing wrath. This was Barckley's 
explanation. God, he said, had originally created all things from 
heaven to earth "in such exact order and uniformity to the produc­
tion of things in their most perfection and beauty so as it might be 
likened to that aurea catena, as H o m e  r calleth it"; but after the Fall 
H  e withdrew his benign influence and cursed the earth so that it 
"doth so m u c  h degenerate from his former estate that it resembleth 
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a chain rent in pieces, whose links are m a n y lost and broken and the 
rest so slightly fastened as they will hardly hang together." 26 Here is 
one example of that elusive chain of being—the only example in 
Elizabethan literature I k n o  w in which the metaphor of the chain is 
used in this manner—but, alas, it happens to be a broken chain. 
Yet even to pessimistic viewers of the h u m a n scene like Barckley 
it appeared that God's original order was at least in some sort re­
flected on earth. It showed itself, for instance, in the w a y certain 
units were linked and yet clearly demarcated from each other. A  s 
Luciana says in The Comedy of Errors (ILL 16-17) , "There's 
nothing situate under heaven's eye / But hath his bound." It is a 
bound that, as she argues, links husband and wife but also separates 
them because m a  n is the superior of w o m a n  . Renaissance paintings 
express a similar m o d e of perception, one that entails what has aptly 
been described as an "harmonious adjustment of clearly bounded 
units with absolute clarity of statement." 27 This w a  y of looking at 
the world shows itself not only in the canvases of a Raphael or a 
Diirer, with their sharply outlined and proportioned details, but also 
in D  u Bartas's and Castiglione's descriptions of the world as a 
painting. A n  d it is also in evidence in Shakespeare's earlier plays. 
T h  e measured and limited units of the cosmic frame were governed 
in their relationship to each other by universal laws, the laws of G o  d 
and of nature, on which all other laws depended. Basic to this system, 
of which Richard Hooker was the great Elizabethan apologist, was 
the philosophical concept of the law of nature. It had evolved from 
classical philosophers, such as Cicero, and medieval theologians, par­
ticularly Aquinas. This law regulated the relationship of m e  n to each 
other and to nature on the assumption that G o  d had created a 
rational and harmonious system with m a  n as the centralfigure. O  n 
the psychological level, the law demanded the rule of passion by 
reason; on the governmental level, it sanctioned the rule of the queen 
and her officers; on the international level, it regulated the relation­
ship of states to each other. O r  , to put it from the perspective of 
m a n , the law asked him to curb his appetites; it demanded that he 
obey lawful authorities; and it enjoined him to respect the rights 
not only of m e  n of his o w  n nation but also those of other nations.28 
In short, it required him to "frame" himself to a moral and reason­
able design. T h o m a  s Cooper's Thesaurus quoted some of the per­
tinent key phrases from Cicero's De Officiis under "Dirigo: . . . to 
order, to direct: . . . Ad rationem dirigere aliquid. T  o frame or 
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rule according to reason. . . . Ad naturam leges hominum dirigun­
tur. Men's laws are framed and made agreeable to nature." 
The humanistic view of the state and the world demanded that all 
ranks and professions, from the lowest to the highest, adjust them­
selves to this rational design. B  y referring to Cooper again, one finds 
that English "to frame" was used for the Latin conformare and 
accommodare and, when education was meant, instituere. Eliza­
bethan society paid m u c  h attention to the framing of the upper 
classes, of the aristocracy and the royalty, and made some special 
stipulations for it; but the general process did include a son of a 
tradesman in Stratford-on-Avon, as was Shakespeare. W h e  n he went 
to grammar school, as one might expect from his father's status 
alone that he did, he faced a master w h o was hired to "frame" 
(formare) his pupils' manners and minds. The greatest effort, it is 
true, went into "framing" (componere) the young boys' Latin 
writing and speeches; but the Christian humanists' emphasis on 
grammar and rhetoric was connected with their moral and philo­
sophical goals. They believed that any kind of composition, a sentence, 
a question, an answer, a letter, an essay, or a drama had to be in­
vented, arranged, and structured to fit into the frame of a world 
ordered for the instruction of m a n . Shakespeare's Henry V knows 
this, even though his education is by no means orthodox; once a 
king, he knows h o w to frame his life (dirigere vitam) and his 
speeches (componere orationem) in the w a  y expected of him—for 
which some critics have not forgiven him. B y contrast, the melan­
choly and maddened Richard II does not k n o w h o w to put his dis­
course in some frame—for which some critics have declared him to 
be a great poet. 
The order to be achieved in all major frames—man, the state, and 
the universe—was not thought to be one of equals. It was assumed 
to be God's design that the head ruled the belly, the soul the body, 
the king the state; thatfire was above air, air above water, and water 
above earth; that the sun was enthroned above the m o o n ; and that 
beyond these spheres there was a heavenly region in which the angels 
kept their exemplary hierarchical order. The usual term for the su­
periority of one part of the created world over another was the 
biblical "preeminence." Shakespeare's Luciana uses it in her speech 
on the husband's control over his wife: he is preeminent over her 
just as m e  n are preeminent over animals. Elizabethan lawyers were 
apt to argue the subjection of w o m e  n in such fashion and to prove 
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male prerogatives by analogies to the preeminences at different levels 
of the cosmic system.29 
Yet it should be noted that the Elizabethans did not think of the 
cosmic system as static; they did not deny the presence of tension 
and strife. T h e harmony established by God, said Sir John Davies, 
included "disagreeing strings." 30 Palingenius had said similarly that 
The world in such a wondrous sort the almighty Lord did frame 
That many things do well agree as joined in the same. 
A n d many things do disagree and keep continual fight, 
Whereby some m e n have surely thought that strife and friendship 
might 
Be justly called beginnings chief, by which all things are wrought.31 
In a Platonic vein, Spenser in " A  n H y m  n of Love" allegorized the 
beginning of the world as the linking of the "contrary dislikes" of the 
four elements through the power of love. For the Renaissance as for 
the Middle Ages, the world was framed of opposites (conjunctus), 
physical, psychic, societal, and cosmic. These were tied together in 
a harmony that was often symbolized by a golden chain; of the 
varied uses to which the aurea catena was put, this was by far the 
most frequent.32 
Humanistic self-knowledge required that m a  n understand the 
universal conjunctio oppositorum, beginning with the discordia 
concors of himself, a creature of body and soul, so that he might 
lead a life that ratified God's harmonious design. A s L a Primaudaye 
said, "during this conjunction, as all things that m o v  e within this 
general globe are maintained by agreeing discords, even so, of neces­
sity, there must be such a harmony between the body and the soul 
that by the help of the one the other subsisteth and abideth, and that 
through their continual striving sometimes the one and then the 
other in the end be obeyed." 33 T  o be aware of the nature of the two 
opposites and to use them accordingly was a fundamental postulate 
of nosce teipsum. In his Epistle to the Reader of The Anatomy of the 
Mind, T h o m a  s Rogers declared it evident that 
he which thoroughly would know himself must as well know his 
body as his mind; the body to put him in mind of his slavery, the 
mind of his sovereignty; the body of his misery, the mind of his 
felicity, the body of his mortality, the mind of his eternity. For by 
the one w  e participate the nature of beasts; by the other, of angels. 
B  y the one w  e are for a time; by the other w  e continue for ever.34 
 55 Microcosm and Macrocosm: Framing the Picture of Man
O  n this confidence in a purposive antithesis of man's composition, 
a confidence anchored in a belief of a universal discordia concors, the 
Christian humanists founded their conviction that m a  n could k n o  w 
himself better than he could k n o  w anything else. Palingenius, for 
instance, was skeptical about man's ability to unravel the divine 
mysteries, but he was confident that m a n understood his exact place 
in the universal scheme of things: he was a conjunction of slime; 
m u d  , and earth with an invisible, immortal, and celestial substance.35 
A n  d Sir John Davies's Nosce Teipsum opens with an account of 
the vanity and uncertainty of knowledge, which leads up to several 
emphatic stanzas that overcome all doubt by the triumphant asser­
tion that he knows himself a m a n , that is, a linkage of body and soul. 
This realization was thought to imply the acknowledgment that 
the mind must rule over the body; to put this rule into effect was 
practical self-knowledge. T h e task was difficult because, since the 
Fall, when m a  n had permitted his body and the lower parts of his 
soul to dominate his reason, he inclined to disobedience. H  e had 
delivered himself to death through sin; preeminent above the ani­
mals, he had tried to rise even higher by attempting to become a god ; 
capable of ranging himself through his immortal soul with the angels, 
he had polluted it with thefilth of his body, and he was in constant 
danger of reenacting this rebellion. W  e k n o  w all this from Milton, 
whose concept of self-knowledge puts him in line with the Christian 
humanists as perhaps their last great representative.36 
That Shakespeare also based self-knowledge on the realization that 
m a n was a conjunctio oppositorum proceeds from the w a y in which 
some of his good and self-possessed characters demonstrate their 
knowledge of the doctrine. Viola in Twelfth Night, for instance, 
decides to trust the Captain's offer to help her although she is quite 
aware h o  w deceptive outward appearance is; the difference between 
the two substances joined in m a n , she knows, can be great: 
There is a fair behaviour in thee, Captain; 
A n  d though that nature with a beauteous wall 
Doth oft close in pollution, yet of thee 
I will believe thou hast a mind that suits 
With this thy fair and outward character. 
(I.ii.47-51) 
But Viola's brother, Sebastian, demonstrates his knowledge of the 
relationship of body and soul even more effectively than his sister. 
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W h e n he appears at the end of the play, Viola, w h o had thought him 
drowned, cannot believe her eyes: "If spirits can assume both form 
and suit, / Y o u come to fright us." Whereupon Sebastian properly 
identifies himself as a m a n  : 
A spirit I a  m indeed, 
But a  m in that dimension grossly clad 
Which from the w o m  b I did participate. 
(V.i.227-30) 
It m a  y not be amiss to point out h o  w very technical these few 
lines are in indicating Sebastian's knowledge of his composition as a 
m a n . In Tusculan Disputations (I.54ff.), Cicero had argued that 
self-knowledge, that is, the soul's knowledge of itself, depended on 
realizing that its beginning was different from a birth. A s Beroaldus 
commented on this passage, Cicero meant that one should examine 
such questions on the nature of the soul as the following: W a  s it 
physical or nonphysical? W a  s it simple or composed of several ele­
ments? W a  s it created from something or nothing? W a  s it trans­
mitted together with the body or did it come from the outside in 
finished form to be clothed with a body in the mother's w o m  b ? 3  7 
Sebastian chooses to reassure his sister on his identity as if she had 
asked some such question as Beroaldus. H  e affirms that he is pri­
marily a soul and thus an incorporal spirit, "clad" (induatur) with 
the body "from the w o m b " (inter visca muliebra). W h e n he says 
that he "did participate" the body from the w o m b  , he asserts the 
dominance and preexistence of the soul.38 H  e is theologically sound 
in knowing that the soul is infused in the body rather than inherited 
("traduced") from the parents. Moreover, Sebastian knows that, 
unlike other spirits, he has a body that has a "dimension" (and not 
"dimensions" as some would emend) ; Bartholomaeus Anglicus 
noted very similarly that incorporal spirits differed from m a  n by 
not having a "dimension." 39 
T h  e opposites in m a  n to be harmonized were not only body and 
soul but also the forces of the soul itself. Its lower elements tended 
to league themselves with the body and threaten the soul's immor­
tality. Although Shakespeare and the Elizabethans were familiar 
with the tripartition of the soul into rational, sensible, and nutritive 
parts, in c o m m o  n practice they reduced it to a bipartition in con­
formity with the Pauline dichotomy of spirit andflesh. Th  e rational 
 57 Microcosm and Macrocosm: Framing the Picture of Man
part, sometimes called "mind" and more often simply "soul," was 
contrasted with the irrational part, generally called "sense." 40 In the 
theological language of Friar Lawrence, the components are "grace" 
and "rude will"; in Brutus's R o m a  n idiom, they are "the Genius" 
and "the mortal instruments.41 Regardless of the terms chosen for 
these elements, strife between them was thought inevitable. T h e 
danger to man's stability lay in the lower elements, the senses and 
the passions, rebelling against the higher part, reason, and thus 
bringing about sin and damnation. Like m a n , the soul was a junction 
of opposites; its health depended on the organic cooperation of its 
discordant elements. But this harmony had to be achieved by the 
direction of the mind, and, because the soul was the vitalizing prin­
ciple of the whole h u m a n organism, the mind also was responsible 
for the total harmony of m a n . It was harmony, and thus it could 
not contain the disharmony that threatened the breakup of other 
substances. A  s Sir John Davies said, "what can be contrary to the 
mind, / W h i c h holds all contraries in concord still?" 42 This was one 
of Davies's arguments for the essential immortality of the mind or 
rational soul. 
Shakespeare was familiar with such reasoning and based on it 
his sonnet 146, his most explicit statement on self-knowledge as 
knowledge and control of the h u m a  n conjunctio oppositorum. In a 
sort of dramatic monologue, the poet addresses his "poor soul, the 
centre of m  y sinful earth," which is "arrayed," that is, dressed (and 
presumably also threatened with battle) by "these rebel pow'rs." H  e 
asks the soul w h y it has suffered internal want and painted its "out­
ward walls so costly gay." T  o prevent it from spending too m u c  h on 
the fading mansion of the body, he evokes the w o r m  s that will inherit 
"this excess" and contrasts the body's end with the survival of the 
soul after its servant's loss. H  e enjoins upon himself to feed his soul, 
which feeds on Death, w h o feeds on m a n . Thus, punningly, Death 
will be removed and only the immortal soul will remain: " A n d  , 
Death once dead, there's no more dying then." 
This sonnet is hardly a favorite of modern critics, w h o tend to 
read it as a relapse into a medieval commonplace and hurry on to 
the poet's passionate outcry in the next: " M  y love is as a fever." Yet 
sonnet 146 must have struck Shakespeare's contemporaries (and 
w h  y not Shakespeare?) as essential for the story. T h  e episode of 
the dark lady, to which it belongs, dramatizes and particularizes the 
discord between reason and passion, soul and body; it is a record of 
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the poet's failures to m a k  e the former prevail over the latter. Sonnet 
146 dramatizes and generalizes the ideal concord of m a n  ; it is the 
poet's assertion as a Christian and Renaissance humanist that m a  n 
must identify himself with his better part, his mind. T h e moral 
should not be missed. 
In summarizing this discussion of the cosmic and metaphysical 
implications of the humanists' concept of self-knowledge, w  e m a  y 
recall that this concept required m a  n to be aware of his central 
position and to acknowledge that he was framed according to prin­
ciples analogous to those of the universe. His health, character, 
success, happiness, even his salvation could in some sense be said to 
be determined by the effect these principles had on him or by the 
w a y he m a d e them work. It will be appropriate to restate them and 
characterize their role in Shakespeare's play worlds. 
T h  e principles that have emerged in the preceding pages can be 
grouped under four major headings: strife or tension, hierarchy or 
degree, measure or proportion, and balance or harmony. According 
to their predisposition and particular purpose, Renaissance writers 
tended to stress one or the other of these, with the result sometimes 
of breaking up the humanistic synthesis. All four principles occur in 
Shakespeare's play worlds, but which of them is dominant is a 
question not easy to answer. O n e must resist the temptation to answer 
it according to the relative regard in which these principles are 
held in one's o w n time, and one must not assume that Shakespeare's 
emphasis was necessarily the same from play to play. Yet I believe 
that a general answer can be given for Shakespeare's works and a 
more specific one for the earlier plays even when observing these 
precautions. A good w a  y of showing the relative importance of the 
structural principles of the frame of order is to compare Shakespeare 
with some signal exponents of each of the four. 
T h e first principle, that of strife or tension, was perhaps most 
boldly espoused by the French humanist Louis Leroy (Regius) in 
De la Vicissitude, which was translated by Robert Ashley as Of the 
Interchangeable Course or Variety of Things (1594). Leroy saw 
in nature a continuing conflict of forces. These had, throughout his­
tory, effected political and cultural changes, which Leroy welcomed 
as vicissitude or variety. T h  e greatest variety could be brought 
about by the utmost development of arms and letters, the two oppo­
site qualities that determined the excellence of a state. M a n  , by 
making himself an instrument of this change, could aspire to perfec­
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tion. His o w n age was for Leroy one of m a x i m u m change and 
variety because it flourished in arms as well as in letters. H  e con­
sidered Tamburlaine to have been the warrior w h  o ushered in this 
glorious period, and he described his career; therefore it has been 
plausibly argued that Marlowe evolved his character of the Scythian 
conqueror and particularly the speech on the warring elements in 
nature and m a  n from De la Vicissitude.^ But such glorification of 
the aspiring mind was, as w e noted, akin to Machiavellism. In its 
joyous affirmation of earthly warfare and its total disregard of 
h u m a n depravity, it led away from Christian humanism. 
The second organizing principle of the frame, that of degree or 
hierarchy, was, as noted, usually evoked by the Elizabethans w h e n 
they argued the subjection of w o m e n  . Its other frequent application 
was political. S o m e Tudor moralists and theologians, afraid of n e w 
political unrest and perhaps also eager to please their sovereigns, w h  o 
had good reason for fearing disorder, appealed to the principle of 
degree as forbidding revolt and usurpation. T h e sermons on dis­
obedience and rebellion in the official homilies proclaimed pre­
eminence as the rule of macrocosmic order. But it also should be 
noted that there was a rival to this Christian-Platonic conception of 
order in the pragmatic Aristotelian approach to politics that recog­
nized several constitutional models as justifiable and concerned 
itself primarily with their organic functioning and with changes 
from one political system to another.44 Also, too strong an emphasis 
disagreed with the humanistic premise of the basic equality of all 
flesh; in practice, of course, it led to out-and-out absolutism. This is 
what happened under James. Unlike her successor, Queen Elizabeth 
was wise enough not to evoke the royal prerogative too often to 
alienate those w h  o looked to Parliament for political, and to Puritan 
preachers for religious, direction. 
Richard Hooker m a  y be cited as a witness for the third principle, 
that of measure and proportion. His was afinite and limited world. 
It was full of "riches," but it did not achieve "plenitude" in the sense 
of being so full of objects and creatures as to m a k e a more compre­
hensive world inconceivable. Like other Elizabethan theologians, 
Hooker felt that a world of plenitude was irreconcilable with the idea 
of an all-powerful G o  d that could create as he wished—the advocates 
of plenitude had argued that a totally full world was the only possible 
one for an all-good G o d to create.45 A s Hooker discusses this matter, 
his Renaissance sense of measure and proportion asserts itself: 
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If it therefore be demanded w h y God, having power and ability 
infinite, the effects notwithstanding of that power are all so limited 
as they are, the reason hereof is the end which H  e has proposed 
and the law whereby His wisdom hath stinted the effects of His 
power in such sort that it does not work infinitely, but correspond­
ently unto that end for which it worketh even all things, xpyv™1*, 
in most decent and comely sort, "all things in measure, number, and 
weight." 46 
Hooker's admiration for the proportioned world contrasts with the 
contempt for it by those w h o saw nothing but universal decay; but 
it does not go as far as the uninhibited glorification of universal 
beauty one finds in some Platonizing tracts like Annibale Romei's 
The Courtier's Academy (translated by J. Kepler in 1598), where 
one of the discussants calls proportion the principal cause in creating 
and preserving the physical and the spiritual worlds.47 Hooker stayed 
with the humanistic mean . 
Hooker can serve also as an exponent of the fourth principle of 
Renaissance natural order, that of harmony. In a time that was 
growing more and more contentious, he sought to reestablish the 
Erasmian balance of reason and faith. Unlike Calvin, he did not see 
h u m a n reason as deeply corrupted by the Fall. Reason could still 
ascertain the laws of nature and determine their congruence with the 
laws of G o d . Hooker's concept of order, it is true, included a "grad­
ual disposition," but it was intended to produce an organic unity: 
"The very Deity itself both keepeth and requireth for ever this to be 
kept as a law that, wheresoever there is a coagmentation of many , 
the lowest be knit to the highest, by that which is interjacent m a  y 
cause each to cleave to the other, and so all continue one." 48 The 
principle of balance and harmony can be traced also in Hooker's 
ideas of political and ecclesiastical order: he saw the essence of the 
former in government by the sovereign in conjunction with Parlia­
ment, that of the latter in assent between the sovereign and the Con­
vocation. Although few of Hooker's contemporaries were willing to 
accept this kind of balance in church and state government, Hooker's 
general insistence on political and religious harmony places him in 
the mainstream of Christian humanism and Elizabethan thought. 
In assessing the relative importance Shakespeare gave to the four 
principles of order, it is immediately obvious that he did not glorify 
strife in the fashion of Leroy and Marlowe. H  e accepted it as a 
reality—in some plays, particularly the later tragedies, it m a  y appear 
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to be the dominant reality—but never as a joyful one. A n  d w h e  n he 
created an aspiring mind like Coriolanus, he took a critical attitude 
toward him. 
The second principle, degree or hierarchy, does appear occasionally 
in Shakespeare's theoretical formulations. H  e certainly was a m a  n of 
his time in being a royalist and in believing that nature had ordained 
some for commanding and others for obeying. But, a few humorous 
passages on the subjection of w o m e  n aside, he does not appear to m  e 
to have argued this principle strongly; and he certainly did not e m  ­
phasize it to the exclusion of other principles as did the homilies. T h  e 
reading of the history plays as apologies of the Tudor myth has be­
come suspect, and justly so, and the often-quoted apotheosis of degree 
and obedience by Ulysses in Troilus and Cressida (I.iii.78 ff.) has 
been shown to be suffused with ambiguities and ironies.49 Ulysses 
lacks credentials for being considered a mouthpiece of Shakespeare, 
and the satirical and skeptical tone of the play makes it difficult to 
evaluate the validity of any concept it examines. 
This leaves the principles of measure or proportion and balance 
or harmony, the principles most prominent in Renaissance artistic 
composition. M  y reader will not be unaware that I consider these 
strongly present in Shakespeare's early plays. I shall in the following 
chapters argue that the search for self-knowledge in these plays pro­
ceeds in a universe that by its proportioned measure and harmonious 
balance resembles Hooker's ideal model. I shall be concerned only 
incidentally with the ways in which these principles are reflected in 
the rhetorical and dramatic structures of the plays; m  y intention is 
to show primarily h o  w they support the search for self-knowledge on 
the part of their heroes and other characters by positing an intelligible 
universe in which m a  n can hope to find himself by properly framing 
the picture of m a n  . T h  e universe or—as I think w  e had better say— 
universes of the later plays are more opaque, and they do not offer 
the seeker for self-knowledge a readable cosmic m a p  ; they appear 
indifferent and even hostile toward this search. But this need not 
concern us at present. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
The Comedy of Errors: 
Losing and Finding Oneself 
VY I N G F O R T H  E C L A I M of having been Shakespeare's earliest comedies are The Comedy of Errors and Love's La­bor's Lost. Although both have had some success on the 
stage, neither can be counted a m o n  g Shakespeare's great comic 
achievements. Yet, I believe, the two plays warrant more than pass­
ing consideration because of the patterns of self-knowledge embedded 
in them, patterns that reappear, with variations, not merely in Shake­
speare's subsequent comedies but also in his histories, tragedies, and 
romances. 
The Comedy of Errors, the subject of the present chapter, is a 
boisterous farce full of buffoonery and horseplay, surely one of 
Shakespeare's happiest comedies; but it nevertheless contains inci­
dents and themes out of which more serious drama can be and has 
been made , that is, errors and misidentifications that, aggravated by 
unfortunate accidents, lead to disruptions of family relationships and 
to general social disorders.1 T h  e play's first scene casts an ominous 
shadow that does not fully vanish until the very end: Aegeon, a 
grief-stricken father in search of his son—the only family member 
remaining to him after the earlier apparent loss of his wife and first 
son—is condemned to die at sunset for entering hostile territory. 
This melancholy beginning was Shakespeare's invention; his basic 
source, Plautus's Menaechmi, had no such searching and suffering 
father. Shakespeare introduced him from another story, that of 
Apollonius of Tyre, and with him the idea of the storm and the 
shipwreck. T h e second scene, it is true, lightens the shadow by 
bringing on the stage the son for w h o  m Aegeon has been searching 
and, through the resulting confusion in Ephesus, indicates that the 
other son m a  y also be alive—a supposition soon to be confirmed. A  s 
the reader or auditor of the play senses that he is experiencing a 
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comedy, his anxiety about the unresolved fate of Aegeon lessens, 
but it is not removed totally until the very end. 
This grave beginning emphasizes the serious theme of searching 
and finding, which Shakespeare developed m u c  h beyond anything he 
found in Plautus. In The Comedy of Errors, there is not only a son 
w h o risks his life in search of a brother but also a father w h o en­
dangers it for his sons, and father and sons are subjected to m u c  h 
pain before they gain happiness in the end, a greater happiness than 
could have been imagined by any of them because it encompasses and 
unites the whole family. Further, the movement from initial disrup­
tion to final recovery affects in various ways all major characters: 
Adriana, wife of Antipholus of Ephesus; Luciana, her sister; the 
Dromios, twin servants to the twin masters; and it even touches 
some minor figures, such as the schoolmaster, the merchant, the 
goldsmith, and the sergeant. 
Before the happy turn of events occurs, the search to reestablish 
the severed family ties leads to one error and misidentification after 
another, each of which brings increasing pain and anxiety and loosens 
the natural bonds further. But with the help of Aegeon's wife, the 
Abbess, a kind of dea ex machina, the errors are explained, the 
identities restored, and a more meaningful order is evolved. W h e  n 
in the end she invites all to a "gossips' feast"—a celebration of bap­
tism—family and society are, as it were, reborn. Those w h o came 
into the world as brother and brother—so Shakespeare has Antiph­
olus of Ephesus sum up the meaning of the ending—now go hand 
in hand, not one before the other. The play thus moves from grief to 
joy, from disunity to unity, from loss of identity to reidentification, 
from the confusion of souls to the clarity of minds. 
This general movement from threatening self-loss to self-recovery 
is, of course, c o m m o  n to all of Shakespeare's comedies and tragi­
comedies. Yet, I think there are some differences in the degree of 
the danger and in the completeness of the recoveries between Shake­
speare's "happy" or "romantic" comedies and his "dark" or "prob­
lem" comedies, and there are differences in this respect between 
these two kinds of comedies and the tragicomedies. In the comedies 
from The Comedy of Errors through Twelfth Night, the threat of 
self-loss is m u c h less ominous and the efficacy of the final recoveries 
can hardly be questioned, but in Troilus and Cressida, All's Well 
That Ends Well, and Measure for Measure, the heroes come close to 
losing themselves irrevocably and find themselves either imperfectly 
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or mak  e us question their staying power. In the tragicomedies, from 
Pericles through The Tempest, the self-losses go even beyond the 
stage of these comedies, and it is not clearly apparent in the course 
of the plays that there will be recoveries; it takes extraordinary, in 
some cases supernatural, means to bring them about. O  n the basis of 
this theme alone, one could put Shakespeare's comedies into the three 
categories that have become conventional for them. 
Although in The Comedy of Errors self-loss is a relatively harm­
less matter, the theme is clearly struck. It is adumbrated by "the 
griefs unspeakable" of Aegeon, with which the play opens, and it is 
unmistakably formulated in thefirst soliloquy of Antipholus of Syra­
cuse, w h  o feels submerged in the strange and unhospitable city of 
Ephesus: 
I to the world a  m like a drop of water 
That in the ocean seeks another drop, 
W h o  , falling there to find his fellow forth, 
Unseen, inquisitive, confounds himself. 
So I, tofinda mother and a brother, 
In quest of them, unhappy, lose myself. 
(I.ii.35-40) 
This figure of the waterdrop is a memorable one since it echoes 
through the play. Shakespeare, as Professor Baldwin has shown, 
developed it from Plautus's image of looking for a needle; he gave 
it the maritime turn perhaps with Aegeon's story of the storm in 
mind or because of Plautus's remark that the two Menaechmi re­
sembled each other as water resembles water (1. 1089). It should, 
however, be noted that Plautus spoke only of seeking a needle, not 
of losing and finding one; the antithetical figure was Shakespeare's 
dilation. With it he gained an allusion to the paradox of salvation 
in Matthew 16: 25 : ' T o r whosoever will save his life shall lose it, 
and whosoever shall lose his life for m  y sake shallfindit" (similarly, 
Matthew 10:39, Luke 9 : 2 4 , John 1 2 : 2 5 ) . T h e side-note of the 
Genevan-Tomson version marked the paradox as a specific warning 
against self-loss, saying that those w h  o "would save themselves do 
not only gain that which they look for, but also lose the thing they 
would have kept, that is, themselves, which loss is the greatest of 
all. . . ." 
T h  e biblical formula is so simple and artless as to have induced a 
modern poet to say that it lacks poetic glamor; according to A  . E  . 
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H o u s m a n  , the paradox of salvation is "the most important truth 
that has ever been uttered, and the greatest discovery in the moral 
world; but I do not find in it anything that I should call poetical." 2 
But for Shakespeare, this most important of all truths belonged to 
the vocabulary of self-knowledge; just like the Christian humanists, 
he found it both significant and poetical, and he gave it to Antipholus 
of Syracuse, w h o is the more important of the two brothers, the 
hero of the play, if it can be said to have one, and the character most 
conscious of the identity problem. 
This focus on the searching brother was Shaksepeare's o w n idea. 
In Plautus, the citizen Menaechmus was the main character, the 
first to appear and the most frequently present of the two brothers. 
A n d not only is Shakespeare's stranger-brother a more important 
character than Plautus's, he also becomes a recognizable individual, 
capable of not merely drawing laughter but also of attracting some 
sympathy. H  e is a thoughtful, somewhat melancholy m a n , w h o would 
wander in the streets to "lose himself" (I.ii.30) with no idea as yet 
h o  w thoroughly this desire will be fulfilled. H  e is at first puzzled 
about the misidentifications and confusions and then becomes sin­
cerely worried about his identity. It is merely the belief that he is in 
a city of witches, as Ephesus was assumed to be, that prevents him 
from completely succumbing to his feeling of alienation. 
The strangers around him do their best to thrust on him an iden­
tity that he cannot recognize as his o w n and does not want. First it 
is the servant w h o treats him as if he were somebody else; then it is 
Adriana and Luciana w h o conspire to m a k e him into the former's 
husband. H e becomes baffled and uncertain: " W h a t , was I married 
to her in m  y dream ? / O r sleep I n o w , and think I hear all this ?" 
(Il.ii. 181-82) . H  e is shaken enough in his self-knowledge to accept 
the dinner invitation and to feel at least temporarily a stranger to 
himself, as m u c  h an alien on earth as one of Kafka's heroes: 
A  m I in earth, in heaven, or in hell ? 
Sleeping or waking, m a  d or well-advis'd ? 
K n o w  n unto these, and to myself disguis'd! 
(211-13) 
But he decides that in this case self-alienation has its compensation 
because it offers him not only an unexpected dinner but also a 
w o m a n , Luciana, w h o excites his amorous desire. W e r e it not for her 
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insistence that he is married to her sister, he would be willing to 
accept a kind of Pythagorean transformation into an Ephesian. A  s 
he says to Luciana, 
Transform m e  , then, and to your pow'r I'll yield. 
But if that I a m I, then well I know 
Your weeping sister is no wife of mine, 
Nor to her bed no homage do I owe. 
(III.ii.40-43) 
H  e is ready to drown his identity—one remembers the image of the 
waterdrop associated with him—but not through merging into 
Adriana: 
O  , train m  e not, sweet mermaid, with thy note, 
T o drown m e in thy sister'sflood of tears. 
Sing, siren, for thyself, and I will dote. 
(45-47) 
True love is the kind of self-loss he will accept even if it means death: 
"Let Love, being light, be drowned if she sink" (52). A n  d when 
Luciana attempts to redirect his ardors by asking him to turn his 
straying eyes to her sister, Antipholus waxes even more eloquent: 
It is thyself, mine ow n self's better part; 
Mine eye's clear eye, m  y dear heart's dearer heart, 
M  y food, m  y fortune, and m  y sweet hope's aim, 
M  y sole earth's heaven, and m  y heaven's claim. 
(61-64) 
W  e m a  y stop here for a m o m e n  t and consider Antipholus's terms 
of endearment because they are part of an image cluster evolving 
from the Platonic lore of self-knowledge as the knowledge of the soul. 
Antipholus identifies his beloved as his "better part," that is, his 
soul.3 She is dearer to him than he is to himself, a notion that Cicero 
in De Amicitia (xxi.8o) mentioned as a pardonable lover's exaggera­
tion and that became part of the convention "one soul in bodies 
twain." 4 Antipholus's amplifying epithets—eye, heart, and heaven— 
belong to the terminology of the soul as m u c  h as they do to lovers' 
language: the eye was held to be analogous to the soul;5 the heart, 
of course, was one of its organs in the body; and "sole" in " m  y sole 
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earth's heaven" puns on "soul." Antipholus knows h o w to identify 
himself with his most important substance, and he knows h o w to 
identify himself analogously with his beloved; rather than loving her 
sister as she demands, he asks her, "Call thyself sister, sweet, for I 
a  m thee" (66). 
But Luciana rejects him, and he is thus prevented from trans­
forming himself into her husband, a transformation he sees n o  w as 
dangerous; she "hath almost made m  e traitor to myself" (160). H  e 
recalls the reputation of Ephesus for witchcraft. A  s a melancholy 
m a n , he has the more reason to be afraid, for it was believed in 
Shakespeare's time that m e  n of this type were susceptible to being 
transformed by their exuberant imagination. John Woolton, among 
others, warned that a kind of Pythagorean metempsychosis could 
come to pass "by means of witchcraft and abundance of melancholy 
humors in man 's body, wherewith the devil conjoineth himself often 
times." 6 But the decision to depart from the bewitched city restores 
Antipholus's self-confidence; he suffers no more self-alienation al­
though the confusions continue. His and Dromio's departure, h o w ­
ever, is frustrated by their being taken for the other pair; they flee 
to the priory, where they take sanctuary—a fortunate circumstance 
because it will bring them face to face with the other set of twins, 
w h o are to arrive at the same location shortly. 
W h e  n w  e turn to examining the role of Antipholus of Ephesus 
and compare it to Plautus's citizen-brother, w  e note that it is both 
diminished and changed because of Shakespeare's emphasis on the 
theme of search. Antipholus of Syracuse does not appear until the 
third act and takes second place to his brother the searcher. But he 
is a better m a n than his Plautine counterpart, and he is more piti­
fully victimized. Antipholus does not plan to deceive his wife; when 
he goes to the courtesan for dinner, it is in pardonable anger: he 
has just been subjected to terrible treatment. H  e has been excluded 
from his o w  n house in the presence of a friend w h o  m he had invited, 
and his wife, while entertaining company inside, has denied being 
married to h im: "Your wife, sir knave! G  o get you from the door" 
(III.i.64). Everybody he meets acts as if Antipholus did not k n o  w 
himself. The goldsmith asks him for payment of a chain he ordered 
but did not receive and has him arrested; the courtesan thinks him 
insane and convinces his wife that he is; worst of indignities, he is 
exorcised by the odious Pinch. These cumulative irritations produce 
in Antipholus an understandable but excessive reaction. H  e "trem­
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bles in his ecstasy" (IV.iv.47) as he beats the servant and the 
schoolmaster and vehemently insults his wife. 
It is interesting to note that this passionate outbreak of the Ephe­
sian Menaechmus was Shakespeare's revision. In Plautus, it is the 
stranger-Menaechmus w h  o is characterized as a m a  n of ungovernable 
temper (1.269: "ego autem h o m  o iracundus, animi perditi") whereas 
the citizen-Menaechmus is and remains fairly even-tempered. W h e  n 
he plays the m a d m a n  , he does so merely to frighten his wife. B  y 
investing the Ephesian brother with the temper of Plautus's stranger-
Menaechmus, Shakespeare combined in the summa epitasis of his 
play both the climax of confusion and the climax of emotion. The 
Terentian five-act formula as evolved by Renaissance commentators 
favored such construction of the emotional curve because it de­
manded the highest of perturbations for this part of the structure.7 
Moreover and most importantly, Shakespeare thus created another 
m o m e n  t of threatening self-loss, the most dangerous of the play. 
Antipholus comes near to suffering the direst transformation of all, 
that from m a  n to animal through passion, a transformation against 
which the moralists never ceased to warn. Because anger was often 
denned as a "short madness," his being declared insane symbolizes 
the danger. Without their fair judgment, as Claudius says of the 
m a d Ophelia, m e n are "pictures, or mere beasts." But in a comedy, 
the summa epitasis, no matter h o  w turbulent, must bring forth the 
occasion of the catastrophe; and it does so in The Comedy of Errors: 
the violence of Antipholus of Ephesus makes it possible for him to 
break away from his captors and escape to the abbey, where the re­
union of all characters takes place and everybody finds unhoped-for 
joy-
In concentrating on the main plot, I have undoubtedly overstressed 
the serious aspects of the play. All through, the strand of the action 
involving the two Dromios neutralizes the potential dangers by re­
minding us that w  e are witnessing a farce, and an improbable one 
at that. T h  e servant subplot, it has been said with slight overstate­
ment, keeps The Comedy of Errors from becoming a tragedy.8 H o w  ­
ever, it is not generally noted h o  w beautifully this subplot echoes and 
varies the semi-serious themes of self-loss and self-transformation in 
a scherzo m o o d  . A  s one master suffers an identity crisis, so does his 
servant, and both comic convention and the wa  y in which these crises 
are expressed keep them from having the same weight as the masters' 
anguish. Just as Antipholus of Ephesus comes close to losing his 
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reason and thus to transforming himself into an animal, so his ser­
vant suffers a painful metamorphosis of his o w n  . First beaten by 
one master for inviting him to dinner, he is called an ass by the 
other and beaten again for merely truthfully claiming to have been 
beaten before. A  s he says, it appears he is becoming an ass, and thus 
he should be free to kick when being kicked so that "you would keep 
from m  y heels, and beware of an ass" (III.i. 15-18) . Mistaking and 
mistiming play another painful trick on him when the m a n he sup­
poses to be his master sends him for a rope; he delivers it only to find 
his master n o w asking for a sum of money of which he knows 
nothing since the other Dromio was dispatched for it. Beaten and 
called "senseless," Dromio protests: 
I would I were senseless, sir, that I

might not feel your blows.

E.Ant. Thou art sensible in nothing but blows,

and so is an ass.

E.	 Dro. I a  m an ass indeed; you ma y prove it by m  y long ears. 
I have served him from the hour of m  y nativity to this 
instant, and have nothing at his hands for m  y service but 
blows. 
(IV.iv.25-31) 
B y saying that Dromio is sensible in nothing but blows, Antipholus 
grants Dromio only a sensitive soul and denies him the distinctive 
mark of a h u m a n being. Antipholus thus degrades Dromio into an 
animal, just at the m o m e n  t he is in danger of becoming one himself. 
Both incidents derive their meaning from the Renaissance pride in 
human identity and from the Renaissance fear of h u m a n self-loss. 
However, the servant's travesty helps to lessen the serious implica­
tions in the master's change. 
Dromio of Syracuse too suffers a pseudo-Ovidian metamorphosis. 
Just after his master has declared that he is willing to change his 
identity if he can thereby gain Luciana, the latter, w h o  m he had 
never seen before, addresses him by his o w n name. W h a t else can 
he do except to believe in a metamorphosis: 
I a  m transformed, master, a  m not I ? 
S. Ant.	 I think thou art in mind, and so a  m I. 
S. Dro. Nay, master, both in mind and in m  y shape. 
5". Ant. Thou hast thine own form. 
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S. Dro.
Luc.
S. Dro.
 N o  , I a  m an ape. 
 If thou art chang'd to aught, 'tis to an ass. 
 'Tis true; she rides m e  , and I long for grass. 
'Tis so, I a  m an ass; else it could never be. 
But I should know her as well as she knows m e  . 
(Il.ii. 194-201) 
In an even more notable parallel to his master's plight, Dromio of 
Syracuse is claimed as a husband by a w o m a  n he does not know, 
and that by the spherical and unappetizing kitchen wench Nell! H  e 
cries out in despair: " D o you k n o w m e , sir? A m I Dromio? A m I 
your m a n  ? A  m I myself?" (III.ii.73). Although Antipholus tries to 
reassure Dromio, the latter feels he has lost his identity altogether: 
"I a m an ass, I a m a w o m a n ' s m a n , and besides myself" (76). 
The scene makes its point by itself; to elaborate on it is to run the 
risk of making an obvious joke a matter of great profundity. But one 
cannot escape the feeling that Shakespeare suggests here that such 
"errors" as happen in this play could on a more serious level bring 
about more dangerous transformations. The denial of man's identity 
can lead to self-loss in ignorance, passion, and madness. The Comedy 
of Errors, it is true, does not permit the characters to experience 
states of metaphysical anxiety as do the later dark comedies and the 
tragedies, but it does m a k e them visible in the distance. Dromio of 
Syracuse's amazed question, " D o you k n o w m e , sir? . . . A  m I 
your m a n  ? A  m I myself?" anticipates at least faintly the identity 
question asked by the tortured Lear: "Does any here k n o w m e ? . .  . 
W h o is it that can tell m e w h o I a m ? " (I.iv.225 ff.). But it is no 
accident that in The Comedy of Errors the identity question is asked 
in its most impressive form by a servant, w h o m  , according to comic 
convention, w  e cannot take altogether seriously. W  e never cease to 
laugh even whe  n w  e feel his plight. 
Both the Dromios' and the Antipholuses' identity problems are 
solved whe  n they are confronted with their mirror images, and they 
are solved in a w a y of which Plautus knew nothing. Shakespeare's 
happy comedies not only provide joyous endings but they also re­
assert social norms. It is presumably for this reason that The Comedy 
of Errors has an elaborate domestic-romantic setting. Shakespeare 
was not merely interested in the external confusions and their po­
tential threat to identity; he was also concerned with making his 
characters find themselves in the end in a proper h u m a  n and social 
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context. Self-knowledge is achieved only whe  n the positioning of 
each self toward the other selves has taken place. 
There are in The Comedy of Errors also some indications that 
such a reestablishment of relationships must proceed in the kind of 
framed and articulated Renaissance universe described in the pre­
ceding chapter. T h  e confusions have "tangled" the chain that had 
previously linked the characters to family and society and have even 
threatened to break the links, but the recovery brings about the kind 
of organic unity idealized by the Elizabethan moralists. Notably, 
Shakespeare chose a chain (rather than, as in Plautus, a coat) for 
the main prop of misidentification and reidentification; and images 
of tying, attaching, and fastening flowed from his pen.9 T h  e chain 
is delivered to the wrong Antipholus, and the rope is about to land 
on the back of one of the Dromios. But in the happy catastrophe, the 
chaos is avoided. T  o speak with the moralists, everybody is again 
properly linked to society, and the knot of friendship is retied. 
The theme of the individual's bonds with the larger units, with 
family and city, is developed primarily in the domestic-romantic 
subplot, which was entirely Shakespeare's o w n . Its central character, 
Luciana, has no equivalent in Plautus, and her part-time occupation 
as marriage counselor and nosce teipsum preacher m a k  e her into a 
figure inconceivable in R o m a  n comedy. But even Adriana assumes 
a more important role than does the Citizen's wife in Plautus. She 
is a loving spouse rather than a mere shrew, and she would like to 
make her husband cherish her. But by harassing him, she goes about 
it the wrong w a y and creates family disunity. Luciana serves as her 
confidante, as recipient of her laments, and as her adviser. Primarily, 
however, she is the object of the amorous attention of Antipholus of 
Syracuse, making a romantic love intrigue possible and offering an 
opportunity for the bachelor Antipholus to find himself in the haven 
of marriage. A n d  , like the princess in Love's Labor's Lost, she is an 
early, if slight, sketch of Shakespeare's later romantic heroines, of 
Rosalind and Viola, w h o  , though involved in the confusions, have 
enough self-knowledge to help others to find themselves. 
In a manner quite foreign to Plautus but resembling the debates 
of some Tudor interludes, Adriana and Luciana are introduced in 
a discussion about a marriage problem. Adriana is angry with her 
husband for not returning h o m e promptly after being sent for. She 
is something of a rebel against the social order that subordinates her 
to him. Luciana becomes her marriage counselor, a role in which she 
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must have seemed most competent to Shakespeare's audience, for she 
preaches the official Elizabethan position on marital order as given 
in " A  n Homily of the State of Matrimony" when she admonishes 
Adriana to let her husband be the bridle of her will.10 W h e  n Adriana 
perversely rejoins, "There's none but asses will be bridled so," L u ­
ciana lectures her on the duties of a true wife: 
W h y  , headstrong liberty is lash'd with woe. 
There's nothing situate under heaven's eye 
But hath his bound, in earth, in sea, in sky. 
The beasts, thefishes, and the winged fowls, 
Are their males' subjects, and at their controls. 
M a n  , more divine, the master of all these, 
Lord of the wide world and wild wat'ry seas, 
Indu'd with intellectual sense and souls, 
Of more pre-eminence thanfish and fowls, 
Are masters to their females, and their lords; 
Then let your will attend on their accords. 
(II.i.15-25) 
This is the same theory the remorseful Kate in The Taming of the 
Shrew proclaims unexpectedly in the end: the wife's duty to obey 
her husband is the divine law of the universe that prescribes a 
hierarchical order. Luciana appropriately evokes the subjection of 
animals to m e n as an analogy because it had established the general 
principle of subordination in the orderly Christian world: Go  d 
created m a  n to "have rule of thefish of the sea and the fowl of the air, 
and of cattle, and of earth, and of every creeping thing that creepeth 
upon the earth" (Genesis 1: 2 6 ) . Also, G o d "put all things in sub­
jection under their feet; all sheep and oxen; yea, and the beasts of 
thefield, the fowls of the air, and thefish of the sea; and whatsoever 
walketh through the paths of the seas" (Psalms 8 : 6 - 8 )  . Luciana 
properly refers to this triplicity of subjected animals: "the beasts, the 
fishes, and the winged fowls." 
Luciana takes a Renaissance view of the world that is theologically 
sound w h e  n she sees every creature's place in the universal order as 
allocated and circumscribed; each, she says, has its "bound." In a 
paraphrase of a passage in Cicero on the law of nature, Woolton 
noted similarly that all animals, "for that they cannot usurp the 
trade and conditions of other kinds, do contain themselves within the 
enclosures of their o w  n natures." n T h  e general argument that the 
subjection of female to male was the plan of Creation had formidable 
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theological and legal authority.12 Luciana expounds what generally 
passed for an account of order based on the Creation even though 
she m a  y be overdoing the praise of the masculine species by calling it 
"more divine," for that epithet (although certainly not the idea of 
greater divinity) seems to have been reserved for m a  n in the generic 
sense—Shakespeare m a  y well have been having his fun with the male 
chauvinists of his time. 
But for generic m a n it was quite correct to claim that he was, as 
Arthur Golding put it, "far more divine, of nobler mind," and that 
he was a creature that passed all others "in depth of knowledge, 
reason, wit, and high capacity, / A n  d which of all the residue should 
the lord and ruler be." 13 The greater divinity of m e n , according to 
Luciana, depends on their possession of "intellectual sense and souls" 
—a phrase that demonstrates a careful and technical terminology. 
Luciana appropriately divides the psychic apparatus by which m a  n 
excels into a superior sensory mechanism ("intellectual sense") and 
the strictly human and immortal soul. John Woolton similarly ex­
plained that "there was also in this image of G o d in m a n a pre­
eminence and superiority above all other inferior creatures, w h o  m 
he excelled in m a n y ways, both in reason and quickness of senses." 14 
A n d Luciana, like Woolton, knows the proper biblical term for male 
and human superiority when she speaks of "preeminence." Alto­
gether, her lecture is good advice to a wayward wife and a com­
petent disquisition on the Renaissance frame of the world in which 
the marriage unit was a clearly defined and bounded part of the 
structure. 
Even if one can, to some degree, sympathize with Adriana's re­
tort that, after all, Luciana knows about these matters only through 
theory, Shakespeare made it abundantly clear that Luciana points 
out a weakness in her sister. Adriana does not k n o  w herself and 
wishes to assume a hegemony in marriage that she cannot properly 
claim. W h e  n she lectures Antipholus (it happens to be the wrong 
one) on his "estrangement," she betrays that she does not really 
understand her place in the scheme of things: 
H o  w comes it now, m  y husband, O  , how comes it, 
That thou art then estranged from thyself ? 
Thyself I call it, being strange to m e  , 
That, undividable, incorporate, 
A  m better than thy dear self's better part. 
(II.ii.118-22) 
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In a way , Adriana is not wrong w h e n she seeks to identify herself 
with her husband; their marriage vows have m a d e them "incor­
porate," that is, oneflesh.15 She might even be forgiven for claiming 
to be his "better part," that is, his soul—a claim that is underlined 
by "undividable" and "incorporate," for indivisibility and noncor­
porality were c o m m o  n attributes of the soul. But Adriana says to 
Antipholus she is "better than thy dear self's better part"; she 
claims superiority, a reversal of roles particularly reprehensible in a 
society that believed, in Guazzo's words, that the husband was united 
with his wife to rule over her in the same manner as does "the mind 
over the body, which are linked together by a certain natural 
amity." 16 B  y making herself into the super-soul of the Antipholus 
family, she would establish a discordia discors; it is not he but she 
w h  o suffers from self-estrangement. 
Adriana goes on to depict herself as the soul of the Antipholus 
family in a metaphor that recalls Antipholus of Syracuse's earlier 
self-characterization as a waterdrop lost in the sea (I.ii.35 ff.)—the 
similarity should be enough to m a k e him wince: 
A h  , do not tear away thyself from m e  ; 
For know, m  y love, as easy mayst thou fall 
A drop of water in the breaking gulf, 
A n  d take unmingled thence that drop again 
Without addition or diminishing, 
A  s take from m  e thyself, and not m  e too. 
(II.ii.123-28) 
Here again, Adriana presumes; the "breaking gulf" toward which 
the "drop," that is, her husband, has fallen stands not only for her 
o w  n person but also metaphorically for the soul of the incorporate 
Antipholus family she fancies herself to be. Palingenius illustrated 
the indivisibility of the soul in very similar terms: 
But soul is indivisible and of no gross degree; 
But as a center does she seem, where many lines do meet, 
Which senses do convey to her, asfloods to seas do fleet.17 
Adriana's desire to fasten herself to Antipholus's sleeve (175), 
however, is evidence that her wish to be the soul of the Antipholus 
family is not based on independence and self-reliance. She resembles 
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more a body knitting itself to a soul than a soul to a body. H e r next 
metaphor emphasizes this weakness: 
Thou art an elm, m  y husband, I a vine, 
Whose weakness, married to thy stronger state, 
Makes m  e with thy strength to communicate. 
(173-75) 
Adriana here adapts a c o m m o n topos for the soul; in Sir John 
Davies's version, "She [i.e., the soul] is a vine which doth no 
propping neede / T  o mak  e her spread herself or spring upright." 18 
Clearly, Adriana lacks comprehension of her destined role in m a r  ­
riage. In the end, she finds herself; she is subdued enough even to 
accept responsibility for her husband's madness and to acknowledge 
the Abbess's harsh sermon against the "venomous clamours of a 
jealous w o m a n  " as justified: "She did betray m  e to m  y o w  n reproof" 
(V.i.90). A new Adriana has emerged. She understands her proper 
relationship to her husband just at the m o m e n  t whe  n Antipholus of 
Syracusefinallyfinds Luciana, the Abbess is miraculously revealed as 
the wife of Aegeon, and all self-estrangements and self-transforma­
tions come to an end. 
Thus the ending is something more than the happy resolution of 
classically conceived comedy. W e are m a d e to feel, as w e always are 
at the end of Shakespeare's happy and romantic comedies—my 
reader will be aware that I think of them as specifically his Renais­
sance comedies—that a benevolent world order has reasserted itself. 
The frame is rebuilt. The clearly defined selves are put into an equally 
clearly structured society that reflects the order of the universe. In 
the end, both masters recognize each other and so do both servants, 
but they go out hand in hand not only as brother and brother but 
also as masters and servants according to their proper role. A n  d be­
sides the restored relationships, in particular the restored marriages, 
a new alliance is soon to take place between Luciana and Antipholus 
of Syracuse. Thus the stability and continuity of m a  n and society are 
asserted. 
There is, I believe, in this respect a fundamental difference between 
The Comedy of Errors and the plays of Shakespeare's later periods. 
I shall be more explicit on this difference when discussing these 
plays; at present I wish merely to suggest it. It is not only that in 
watching them w e do not have the same kind of assurance w e have 
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in The Comedy of Errors that all will be right with the world even 
when a great m a n y things are temporarily wrong, but also that w e 
are never assured during and after the plays that the heroes' selves 
can find their proper places in a firmly structured societal and 
cosmic frame or could have found them if they or the circumstances 
had been somewhat different. After the Forest of Arden and Illyria, 
Shakespeare never returned to Ephesus. 
Actually, the skies m a  y already have been darkening during the 
time Shakespeare wrote his high comedies if I a  m correct in seeing 
in Julius Caesar signs of his distress about the incongruity between 
a hero's self-knowledge and the functioning of state and universe. 
A n  d the change is evident in Hamlet, which m a  y have been written 
no later than the high comedies. It takes, I think, some very strained 
interpretation of the play and particularly of its ending to attribute 
to the prince an insight into w h  o and what he is in the frame of the 
universe; and for us to be certain about the answer is hazardous— 
critics w h  o are certain use their o w  n assumptions and value systems 
for those of Hamlet and the play. If it be objected that Julius Caesar 
and Hamlet are tragedies and cannot be compared with comedies, it 
should be said that Shakespeare's early tragedies—we m a y  , for the 
purposes of this argument, disregard the artistically inferior Titus 
Andronicus—are quite different from the later tragedies but resemble 
The Comedy of Errors in providing a clear orientation of the main 
characters toward the societal and cosmic frame, even when, as in 
Romeo and Juliet, the frame is in temporary disorder. That the 
disorder is temporary w  e are told in the prologue to the play, and 
both prologue and ending carry explicit statements on the restoration 
of order and the improvement of life in Verona. In Richard II, which 
is both a history and a tragedy, Richard's road to self-knowledge is 
firmly entered on the m a  p even though he walks it only part of the 
way, and, as I shall argue, the play holds out a distinct hope of future 
harmony. B y contrast, the later comedies All's Well and Measure 
for Measure (not to speak about Troilus and Cressida) are distress­
ing and puzzling plays that, like Hamlet, pose questions on whether 
things will ever be right in the world. The heroes, Bertram and 
Angelo, as well as some of the other characters, are released in the 
end into a quite undeserved but also strangely conditional happiness. 
It is true that some of the later tragedies make the road to self-
knowledge clearer and the goal more desirable, but they also dis­
connect road and goal from the cosmic frame or draw into question 
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the existence of a design. It is obvious that Lear achieves some 
insight into himself, but it is quite difficult to say whether this in­
cludes an understanding of "the mystery of things" if by that is 
meant the way of God with m e n ; one cannot even be sure that God's 
in his heaven. Attempts at attributing a cathartic quality to the end­
ing of these tragedies seem doomed to failure. F e w critics are n o w ­
adays willing to accept Bradley's benevolent and, to some at least, 
comforting idea that Lear "dies into joy." A n  d although the ending 
of Antony and Cleopatra is often said to have a "transcendence," 
those w h o use this term generally mean by it an aesthetic gratifica­
tion rather than a reassurance about the universe or the future of 
R o m e and Egypt. The romances do indeed have joyful endings, 
brought about by more or less miraculous means, endings which 
like those of All's Well and Measure for Measure are more forced 
than those sanctioned by the comic convention and practiced in 
Shakespeare's earlier comedies. For this and other reasons, I do not 
think that the romances comfort us about the existence of a rational 
cosmic design as does The Comedy of Errors. If they make us be­
lieve in a design at all, it is because of a certain faith they create in 
the triumph of goodness—a faith, not an expectation stemming from 
a knowledge of h o  w things generally are. W h e  n at the end of The 
Tempest Prospero returns to Milan, it is to a city fraught with un­
certainties, and he is accompanied by a villainous brother w h  o gives 
no clear indication that he will, from n o  w on, walk in hand with 
him. Most of us trust that Prospero will succeed in Milan; but w e 
must take it, as in fact he does himself, on faith. Prospero does not 
return to a city, a state, and a universe that have reassumed their 
God-given order as has Ephesus. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
Love's Labor's Lost: 
Seeking Oneself 
A I T D O E S in The Comedy of Errors, the losing-finding an­tithesis forms the structure of Love's Labor's Lost. T h  e for­mula is clearly stated in the summa epitasis in Act IV, when 
the King of Navarre and his three courtiers have fallen in love and 
find it impossible to keep the part of their oaths that forbids them 
to see w o m e n . In their quandary, they turn to Berowne, their greatest 
wit, for a w a y out of the dilemma, and he responds with a masterpiece 
of oratory. W  e shall analyze it later in detail; w  e need to note here 
only the final paradox in Berowne's string of paradoxes, offered as 
excuses to giving in to the promptings of nature: "Let us once lose 
our oaths to find ourselves, / O  r else w  e lose ourselves to keep our 
oaths" (IV.iii.357—58). Even though Berowne's argument is fash­
ioned on the paradox of salvation, it is a piece of palpable sophistry. 
In this respect it resembles Proteus's attempt in The Two Gentlemen 
of Verona to rationalize his treachery toward his friend and his 
beloved into an act of self-discovery: 
Julia I lose, and Valentine I lose; 
If I keep them, I needs must lose myself; 
If I lose them, thus find I by their loss: 
For Valentine, myself; for Julia, Sylvia. 
(Il.vi. 19-22) 
Berowne's and Proteus's protests underline the danger of self-loss 
through disloyalty, but the comforting feeling that w  e are watching 
"happy comedies" reassures us that appropriate findings will take 
place in the end. Proteus will, after all, marry his Julia, and Valen­
tine will get his Sylvia just as Berowne will win his Rosalind (even 
though it happens that in the latter case marriage will have to be 
delayed). 
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Love's Labor's Lost adds to the movement from losing to finding 
a related theme that was n e w for Shakespeare and proved fruitful for 
his later patterns of self-knowledge, the theme of the quest for the 
self. King Ferdinand of Navarre and his courtiers have founded an 
academy devoted to the pursuit of learning; but it turns out that 
what they are most in need of knowing is themselves, and, in a con­
fused way, they set out to gain this knowledge. Theirs is an ill-
considered quest, demonstrating mainly h o w not to go about it; but 
through their errors and through some hints at h o w self-discovery 
can take place, the play gives us, as long ago E d w a r d D o w d e n noted, 
an insight into Shakespeare's ideas of self-culture.1 
The idea of a learned academy provides an appropriate context 
for the theme of self-quest. Although academies were in vogue in 
the Renaissance, it is tempting to think that Shakespeare was 
stimulated to write a play on this subject by reading Pierre de L a 
Primaudaye's French Academy.2 Shakespeare could have found in 
this book both the theme of the quest and the traditional humanistic 
recipes for achieving self-knowledge. L a Primaudaye quoted in an 
early chapter the saying of Heraclitus, "I have sought myself," and 
went on to point out h o  w m a  n could seek himself by studying his 
body and soul and their natures. Self-knowledge was for L a Pri­
maudaye as for Shakespeare the prerequisite for all other knowledge. 
But there are more differences than similarities in the behavior and 
goal of the four young m e n of Anjou and the four aristocrats of 
Navarre. Th  e former begin their enterprise with a sense of its diffi­
culty and with humility, the latter with overeagerness and over­
confidence (except for Berowne, w h o joins the others reluctantly 
and against his better knowledge). L a Primaudaye's courtiers are 
aware of the need for moderation in learning and interrupt their 
intellectual pursuits for a considerable time; Shakespeare's academi­
cians devote themselves immoderately to learning, seclude them­
selves, and attempt, unsuccessfully, to live ascetically. 
I believe that there was a more important source for the theme of 
the quest for self-knowledge in Love's Labor's Lost than L  a Pri­
maudaye, whose influence on Shakespeare must, after all, remain 
doubtful. This source was the general convention of the warfare of 
the Christian knight. W  e have noted earlier the seminal book of this 
tradition, Erasmus's Enchiridion Militis Christiani; and it m a y also 
be helpful to call to mind its most notable artistic product, Albrecht 
Durer's famous engraving Knight, Death, and Devil (1513). Eras­
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mus's book, be it recalled, strikes a characteristic balance of religion 
and philosophy and brings both under the heading of no see teipsum: 
self-knowledge is thefirst point of wisdom for the Christian knight. 
Equipped with the humility derived from it, the spiritual warrior 
m a  y hope to reach the castle of knowledge and faith, which in Diirer's 
drawing towers above the dim glen haunted by death and devil. 
But Shakespeare needed no direct acquaintance with either En­
chiridion or Diirer's engraving to k n o w the convention. H e was 
indoctrinated with it from his early youth, and he m a  y have asso­
ciated it, in particular, with the only academy he ever attended, the 
g r a m m a r school. Here he would have found it, for instance, in Palin­
genius's Zodiacus Vitae, the moral-didactic poe  m that appears in 
most Elizabethan curricula. In his poeticized version of the warfare 
of life in the sixth book, "Virgo," Palingenius specifically singled 
out the hardship of scholars: fasting, lack of sleep, and sexual absten­
tion. But even if Shakespeare should never have read Zodiacus Vitae, 
he was still intimately acquainted with the slogans and the strategy of 
the spiritual battle through Saint Paul's various exhortations, which 
the B o o k of C o m m o n Prayer had m a d e part of church ritual. F r o m 
birth to death, the Elizabethans were reminded that they needed to 
fight devil andflesh. At baptism, the minister received the child into 
"the congregation of Christ's flock" and signed him with the cross 
in order "manfully to fight under His banner against sin, the world, 
and the devil, and to continue Christ's faithful soldier and servant 
unto his life's end." T h  e Catechism in particular reminded the 
children of their duties as Christian soldiers. It informed them 
that their godfathers and godmothers had promised in their name 
that they would "forsake the devil and all his works and pomps, the 
vanities of the wicked world, and all the sinful lusts of theflesh." A  s 
the Preamble explained, they must be confirmed so that "they m a y 
receive strength and defence against all temptations to sin and the 
assaults of the world and the devil," for they had n o w come "to that 
age that, partly by the frailty of their o w  n flesh, partly by the as­
saults of the world and the devil, they begin to be in danger to fall 
into sundry kinds of sin." W  e can be assured that William Shake­
speare, w h o at a later time took the v o w of a godfather himself when 
his godson William Walker was baptized in 1608, was enrolled in 
the army of the combatants against the devil and the flesh. 
In Love's Labor's Lost, the spiritual warfare convention, of course, 
is m a d e subservient to the purposes of comedy as is everything else. 
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O n  e m a  y well suspect that in using so m a n  y of the slogans of the 
convention and showing their ineffectiveness, Shakespeare m a  y have 
had a satirical purpose. H e m a y have taken his revenge for some of 
the overdoses of moral advice he received. But he did not poke fun 
at this advice as such; he did not satirize the idea of spiritual warfare, 
only its inopportune, immature, and ill-considered application. B e ­
rowne, unprincipled as he is in joining an enterprise he recognizes 
as doomed to failure, points out well his colleagues' naivete in be­
lieving that the devil and the flesh can be easily conquered. Even the 
pedagogues in Shakespeare's audience could have taken some satis­
faction from the fact that the play proved one of their favorite 
axioms, that "the study of love letteth and turneth away every other 
study." 3 If they had looked on this development with a jaundiced 
eye, they would have missed, of course, that other, more important 
point of the play, that it is natural for young m e n to fall in love and 
that nature must not be suppressed by an unnatural asceticism. 
In order to fully understand the thought and the h u m o  r of Love's 
Labor's Lost, one needs some acquaintance with the strategy of 
spiritual warfare and a familiarity with its vocabulary. It forms a 
major part of the religious terminology with which, as critics have 
noted, the play is saturated.4 Only if one knows what is behind this 
saturation—a surprising phenomenon at first sight—does he under­
stand the irony in the courtiers' speeches at the turn of events: the 
disciples of philosophy merge their slogans of spiritual warfare, 
which sanctifies their pursuit of learning, into a pseudo-religious 
idiom of courtly love, which glorifies their pursuit of ladies. Shake­
speare's best verbal effects come from his clever juggling of the words 
and ideas of the two contradictory conventions. 
In the idiom of learning, the vocabulary of spiritual warfare is 
prominent from the beginning. It is unmistakable in the king's open­
ing speech, more a trumpet call than an inaugural address: 
Let fame, that all hunt after in their lives,

Live regist'red upon our brazen tombs,

A n  d then grace us in the disgrace of death;

W h e n  , spite of cormorant devouring Time,

T h  ' endeavour of this present breath m a  y buy

That honour which shall bate his scythe's keen edge,

A n d make us heirs of all eternity.

Therefore, brave conquerors—for so you are

That war against your o w  n affections
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A n d the huge army of the world's desires—

Our late edict shall strongly stand in force:

Navarre shall be the wonder of the world;

O u r court shall be a little Academe,

Still and contemplative in living art.

(I.i.1-14) 
Ferdinand calls for battle against enemies more dangerous than a 
mysterious "School of Night" or a dictionary maker and translator 
n a m e d Florio: his foes are the two waylayers of the Knight in 
Diirer's engraving, Death and Devil. Ferdinand pledges himself and 
his three followers to do battle for honor by overcoming the "scythe's 
keen edge" of death and time in despite of their allies, the "affec­
tions" and the "world's desires," that is, the fleshly temptations, 
usually symbolized in the spiritual warfare convention by the devil. 
Ferdinand's speech has a general resemblance to exhortations for 
spiritual warfare, such as, for instance, the opening of Erasmus's 
Enchiridion: 
The first point is: w e must needs have in mind continually that 
the life of mortal m e  n is nothing but a certain perpetual exercise 
of war, as Job witnesseth, a warrior proved to the uttermost and 
never overcome; and that the most part of m e  n be overmuch 
deceived whose minds this world, as a juggler, holdeth occupied 
with delicious and flattering pleasures, which also, as though they 
had conquered all their enemies, make holiday out of season none 
otherwise verily than in a very assured peace. It is a marvelous 
thing to behold h o w without care and circumspection w e live, how 
idly w e sleep, n o w upon one side and n o w upon the other, when 
without ceasing w e are besieged with so great a number of armed 
vices, sought and hunted for with so great craft.5 
Against these enemies, Erasmus enjoined never-ending watchfulness; 
he warned in the words of the heading of the first chapter, " W  e 
must watch and look about us evermore while w e be in this life." 
H  e found those particularly prone to defeat w h  o acted "as though 
they had conquered all their enemies"—men w h o have the over­
confidence displayed by Ferdinand. T h e Erasmian model warrior 
prayed for victory in the awareness that his o w n power and strength 
were insufficient and that he needed the help of G o d  ; he did not 
claim already to have conquered. 
In the context of the spiritual warfare convention the king uses in 
his opening speech, his sentiment on acquiring honor is incon­
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gruous. Erasmus thought that the Christian warrior should seek his 
reward in heaven; he expressly decried the quest of earthly glory 
("Against ambition or desire of honor and authority"). For Palin­
genius, the whole success of spiritual warfare hinged on the right 
attitude toward honor; he broached the subject by answering an 
imaginary gentleman's contention that all virtue aimed at gaining 
honor: "for her o w  n self is virtue sought, and not for honor's sake." 6 
Palingenius here opposed the Christian humanists' ideal of a humble 
and limited self to the expansive selves of the courtiers and gentle­
men. But King Ferdinand's heroic expansiveness bursts through the 
shell of the spiritual idiom when he proclaims that the academy will 
make him and his friends "heirs of all eternity"—the sentiment 
echoes rather immodestly the hope of the baptismal service that the 
infants enlisted in Christ's army "be m a d e heirs of everlasting salva­
tion." 
The more discerning in Shakespeare's audience also must have 
noted a basic confusion in Ferdinand's philosophic terminology 
when they heard him acclaim the academy as "still and contemplative 
in living art." "Living art" appears to be a translation of ars vitae 
or ars vivendi, the Stoics' and Cicero's terms for moral philosophy.7 
But as such it could not be "still and contemplative" since it be­
longed to the "active" part of philosophy that was distinct from the 
contemplative part. L a Primaudaye, like other Renaissance moralists, 
separated philosophy "into two parts only: into the contemplative 
part and into the moral, which some call active." A few sentences 
later, L a Primaudaye described this active part as the "art and mis­
tress of life"—a phrase similar to Ferdinand's "living art," but he 
also expressly associated with this art the rising above fortune "by 
despising glory and enduring contempt." 8 Ferdinand's confusion of 
basic philosophic terminology is symptomatic of his ignorance of 
the goals of both moral philosophy and Christian warfare. In seek­
ing glory through establishing an academy of warriors of the spirit, 
Ferdinand violates these goals; his lack of self-knowledge threatens 
to make him lose the labor of love from the very beginning. 
The oath-taking ceremony again evokes vividly the warfare con­
vention as Ferdinand charges his courtiers: "If you are arm'd to 
do as sworn to do, / Subscribe to your deep oaths, and keep it too" 
(I.i.22-23). Th  e very idea of taking oaths evokes the confirmation 
ceremony and perhaps also the v o w of the Nazarites, which Erasmus 
held up as exemplary (sig. D 8  T )  . But most important, the rhythm 
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in which the courtiers reaffirm their oaths is reminiscent of the 
baptismal service with its threefold vows of the godparents as well 
as of the exhortation-and-response method of the Catechism. S o m e ­
what like children repeating the promise their godparents had given 
in their steads about fighting the devil and the flesh, Ferdinand's 
subjects dedicate themselves to their oaths—Berowne, it is true, 
with some reluctance. First Longaville affirms his resolution for a 
three-year fast: 
The mind shall banquet, though the body pine. 
Fat paunches have lean pates; and dainty bits 
M a k  e rich the ribs, but bankrupt quite the wits. 
(25-27) 
This variation of the familiar proverb plenus venter non studet 
libenterfits into the warfare convention; in Erasmus's words, "The 
body waxeth lean, but the mind waxeth fat. T h e beauty of the skin 
vanisheth away, but the beauty of the mind appeareth bright" (sig. 
G 4 ' ) . 
W h e  n D u m a i  n adds to this renunciation a touch of humanistic 
contemptus vulgi by throwing "the grosser manner of these world's 
delights/. . . upon the gross world's baser slaves" (29-30), he 
agrees quite with Erasmus's demand to forsake the pleasures of the 
world, to change silver for gold, flint for jewels, and to please the 
fewer but the better (G3 V )  . D u m a i  n confidently declares himself 
"mortified": " T o love, to wealth, to p o m p , I pine and die, / With 
all these living in philosophy" (31-32). His "mortification" echoes 
Paul's orders to the Christian soldier to mortify the body and the 
affections.9 In dying to "love, to wealth, to p o m p ,  " D u m a i  n seems 
to answer the minister's question and prayer in the baptismal service: 
"Dost thou forsake the devil and all his works, the vain p o m p and 
glory of the world . .  . ? . . . All carnal affections m a  y die in 
them [i.e., the children], and . .  . all things belonging to the spirit 
m a y live and grow in them." In joining those "living in philosophy," 
D u m a i  n parallels this latter sentiment and also the minister's prayer 
at baptism that the child, "being dead unto sin and living unto 
righteousness, . . . m a  y crucify the old m a n .  " Ferdinand's courtier 
vies with him for the prize of all eternity. 
Only Berowne has sufficient self-knowledge to realize that "the 
old m a n  " cannot be so easily mortified. H  e understands the nature 
of his affections and of those of m a  n in general, and he knows that 
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the academy is doomed to failure. In the face of the altitudinal pro­
testations of the others, he plays the advocate of the devil, but he 
does so being very m u c  h aware of the purposes of philosophy and of 
the fine print in the contracts of spiritual warfare. It is almost as if 
the devil in Diirer's engraving had come to life and started citing 
scripture against the confident, armed knight. First, Berowne inter­
rogates the king about the aim of the studies to which the academi­
cians are pledged and elicits the answer that it is to seek ' 'things hid 
and barr'd . . . from c o m m o n sense" (57). T h e Elizabethans, like 
their teachers the humanists, no enemies of the sensus communis, 
were accustomed to judge such highly speculative endeavors in the 
light of the criticism by activist philosophers like Cicero w h o ob­
jected to those w h  o "devote too m u c  h industry and too deep studies 
to matters that are obscure and difficult and useless as well." 10 
W h e  n Berowne singles out book astronomers, the "continual plot­
ters" and "earthly godfathers of heaven's light," as examples of the 
aridity of mere theory, he sides with Cicero and the humanists. Palin­
genius ridiculed those w h  o "search the secret things" and "headlong 
fall, and prove themselves a laughing-stock thereby." u Astronomer­
astrologists were natural examples for the foolishness of a study that 
searches for things removed from c o m m o n sense; w e surely need 
not assume that Berowne aimed a satirical arrow at Sir Walter 
Raleigh's astronomer! Berowne's two references to astronomers as 
godfathers, w h o do no more than give names to stars (89, 93) , recall 
again the baptismal service; and when Berowne says that "Too m u c h 
to know is to k n o w nought but fame" (92), that is, nothing but ru­
mors, he needles the king for his glorification of fame, of honor. 
Berowne realizes the astral as well as the earthly weaknesses of the 
philosophic spirit. 
Berowne is, of course, quite the advocate of the devil w h e n he 
recommends study of such secret matters as where one m a y dine or 
find where "mistresses from c o m m o  n sense are hid" (61ff.), but 
he has a splendid answer from the pages of spiritual warfare w h e  n 
the king calls these pursuits "vain delight": 
W h y  , all delights are vain; but that most vain 
Which, with pain purchased, doth inherit pain, 
A  s painfully to pore upon a book. . . . 
(72-74) 
Even Palingenius admitted the masochism of scholarship: 
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The other part of virtue that doth search with studious pain,

A n d , for to know, the causes hid of nature doth obtain,

A n d truth to learn that scarce you can at any time come by:

H o  w hard and full of pain it is, they know that it do try . . .

B y which he many books can make, what good gets he thereby ?1 2

Obviously, both Berowne and Palingenius have glanced at Eccles. 
12 : 12: "there is none end in making m a n y books, and m u c h reading 
is a weariness of the flesh." In The Praise of Folly, Erasmus had 
Stultitia turn this reminder of the vanity of making and reading 
books against the scholars as Berowne does; awareness of the ulti­
mate vanity of one's o w n scholarly effort was the kind of folly that 
resembled saintliness. 
Berowne, however, becomes quite the sinner w h e n he advocates 
supplanting useless book learning by the study of ladies' eyes; yet 
the twist in which he equates the pursuit of truth with the pursuit 
of love is a clever application of a religious tradition that exalted 
heavenly love above study. A  s Erasmus put it, "Then prepare thy­
self unto the study of sciences, but no further than thou mayst think 
them profitable to good living. . .  . It is better to have less knowl­
edge and more of love than to have more knowledge and not to love" 
(sig. G 6  r ~ v ) . Berowne, of course, equates "love" with eros and not, 
like Erasmus, with caritas. T h  e interchangeability of the two, to 
which the courtly love tradition tended, later serves the courtier as 
an ingenious defense for oath-breaking: 
It is religion to be thus forsworn;

For charity itself fulfils the law,

A n  d w h  o can sever love from charity?

(IV.iii.359-61) 
In castigating the vanity of book learning, Berowne acclaims the 
superiority of love in a humorous conceit which also is evolved 
from the warfare convention. It is, he says, in vain for m a  n 
T  o seek the light of truth; while truth the while

Doth falsely blind the eyesight of his look.

Light, seeking light, doth light of light beguile;

So, ere you find where light in darkness lies,

Your light grows dark by losing of your eyes.

Study m e how to please the eye indeed,

B  y fixing it upon a fairer eye;
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W h  o dazzling so, that eye shall be his heed 
A n d give him light that it was blinded by. 
Study is like the heaven's glorious sun, 
That will not be deep-search'd with saucy looks. 
(I.i.75-85) 
The nucleus for this conceit is in Zodiacus Vitae. Palingenius said 
more prosaically than Berowne that, in reading, light beguiles light: 
"Of m a n y , whilst so m u c h they read, both sight and eyes decay." A n d 
like Berowne, he found the light of truth neither in the pages of books 
nor in the course of the stars: 
Like as the owl of night 
Can not behold the shining sun with clear and perfect sight, 
So fares the mind of m a n  ; as oft as it intends to fly 
Aloft to search the secret things, falls headlong straight from high.13 
For Palingenius, however, the sunlight of truth was not reflected in 
ladies' eyes but in "the inner eye" that saw G o d with the same 
spiritual certainty that brightened the eye of Durer's lonely knight in 
his ascent through the dark glen. Yet Berowne's ladies' eyes m a k e a 
nice contrast to the stars of the astronomers, and there was some 
warrant in the secular Platonism of the Renaissance to search for 
illumination in the beauty of w o m e n  . Castiglione's B e m b  o acknowl­
edged the admiration of feminine beauty as the first step in the stair 
of love by which the soul ascends until "it seeth in herself a shining 
beam of that light which is the true image of the angelic beauty 
partened with her." 14 Berowne's conceit proves so m u c h more in­
genious when seen against this background than if it were aimed at 
an alleged "School of Night," as it has been held to be. 
The sensible Berowne knows that his lord's ascetic rules cannot 
and will not w o r k ; the need to accommodate the French ladies that 
have come on embassy already points up the necessities that will 
vitiate the courtiers' oaths. A  s he puts it, slightly twisting a phrase 
in N  o well's Catechism, "Necessity will m a k e us all forsworn / Three 
thousand times within this three years' space" (147-148).1 5 A n d 
he backs up this prophecy by what is, I believe, one of the most 
fundamental tenets of self-knowledge held by Shakespeare: "For 
every m a  n with his affects is born, / Not by might mast'red, but by 
special grace" (149-50). 
Berowne here espouses the orthodox anti-Stoic position of the 
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humanists and theologians whe  n he insists that emotions cannot be 
completely suppressed. In Enchiridion, Erasmus sided in this ques­
tion with Aristotle and the Peripatetics, w h  o taught that the emotions 
were given to m a  n by nature and could not be destroyed, but merely 
controlled. Such conventional arguments against the Stoics offer 
close parallels to Berowne's argument on necessity; Beroaldus, for 
instance, defended the Peripatetics against Cicero's attack in Tus­
culan Disputations (IV.xix.42), asserting with Horace that "nobody 
is born without faults" and agreeing with the Peripatetics that the 
emotions are implanted in m a  n by providence and necessity.16 B  y 
attributing the final control of the emotions to "special grace," Be­
rowne echoes the Catechism as well as the literature of self-knowledge 
and spiritual warfare.17 
Thus, clearly, if assurance is needed, Berowne's insight into h u m a n 
nature does not actually derive from w o m e n ' s eyes—"How well he's 
read, to reason against reading!" the king comments appropriately 
(94). Berowne can claim that he has said more for barbarism than 
the others can say for that "angel knowledge" (113), the reason 
being that some of his best arguments use angelic vocabulary. It is 
therefore natural for the king and the courtiers to turn to him for an 
ideological defense when, defeated by the temptations of the flesh, 
they have broken their oaths: " O  , some authority h o w to proceed; / 
S o m e tricks, some quillets, h o w to cheat the devil!" (IV.iii.283-84). 
W  e are n o  w in a position to see h o  w Shakespeare structured 
Love's Labor's Lost on the losing-finding formula and the spiritual 
warfare convention, letting the language of the former gradually 
slide into the idiom of courtly love. It is on this plan that Shakespeare 
related the subplot to the main plot by making it into a scherzo vari­
ation of the dominant themes. T h  e fantastic Spaniard, A r m a d o  , on 
w h o  m the subplot centers, has come to provide "recreation" for the 
academicians by relating "in high-born words, the worth of m a n y a 
knight / F r o m tawny Spain lost in the world's debate" (Li. 170-71). 
But his first contribution to the academy is a literary masterpiece 
about a lost soul of a lower kind: his inimitable letter about the 
amorous transgressions of the clown Costard, caught with "a child 
of our grandmother Eve, a female" in the park (250). Even the 
clown, however, knows his enemy in the warfare of life; says Cos­
tard: "Such is the simplicity of m a  n to hearken after the flesh" 
(212). Amusingly w e learn promptly that Costard's accuser, A r  ­
m a d o  , too has lost himself in the world's debates: he also has fallen 
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in love with that female, Jaquenetta. In the manner of a miles glori­
osus, he tries to cover up this lamentable defeat by boasting his 
prowess: "If drawing m  y sword against the humour of affection 
would deliver m  e from the reprobate thought of it, I would take 
Desire prisoner, and ransom him to any French courtier for a new­
devis'd curtsy" (I.ii.58 ff.). But Armado at least knows that he has 
succumbed to a mighty enemy: "Love is a familiar; Love is a devil. 
There is no evil angel but Love." Unlike King Ferdinand, he does 
not underestimate the strength of the foe; and he rehearses, together 
with that "tender juvenal," the satirical page Moth, the fates of Her­
cules, Samson, and Solomon, famous conquerors conquered by Love, 
whose "disgrace is to be called boy, but his glory is to subdue m e n  " 
(176 & ) . 
Armado's resistance is from the beginning merely verbal. Shake­
speare may well have intended the name "Armado" to highlight the 
bearer's lack of military prowess and of philosophical resilience. Iron­
ically, Armad o is the least "armed" of the inhabitants of Navarre. 
His martial accomplishment is a legend, and he wears, quite literally, 
an inadequate armor: when Costard challenges him to a wrestling 
match in shirts, he has to admit that he wears none (V.ii.697)— 
surely because of poverty rather than for penitence! A n d how in­
gloriously Armado has succumbed to the enemy in his o w n chest is 
demonstrated graphically by Jaquenetta's condition at the end of the 
play. If the name Armado evoked the idea of the Spanish Armada in 
Shakespeare's audience, as has been suggested, it must have been by 
way of seeing him as a comic symbol of thisfleet's disaster. 
Thus the first act has introduced the argument in both main and 
subplots: the gentlemen of Navarre have foolishly founded an 
academy and dedicated themselves to it on the basis of ill-understood 
principles. The astute criticism of Berowne has exposed the weak­
nesses of the plan, and the defeats of Costard and Armad o by Cupid 
foreshadow its inevitable failure; the academy has begun to crumble 
at the edges. 
The second act confronts the knights with their temptations, the 
French maidens, and thus begins the action proper. The girls imme­
diately show themselves as formidable adversaries by their intellects 
as well as their charm. They have much more self-knowledge than 
the m e n  : the princess' first words in dispraise of beauty contrast 
favorably with the king's initial glorification of fame. Since the no­
w o m a  n rule forbids their entrance into court, they must pitch their 
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tents outside. T h  e scene becomes thus quasi-emblematic, contrasting 
the army of the world's desires with the beleaguered souls of the 
courtiers. But these do not quite hold to their resolved course like 
Diirer's constant knight; the end of the act shows that their resolu­
tion is breaking d o w  n w h e  n the ladies' counselor, Boyet, notices in 
Navarre's eyes the gleam not of philosophy but of love. 
T h  e suspiration of A r m a d o  , with which the third act opens, is the 
overture to the utter defeat and confusion of the philosophic army. 
Berowne, never a wholehearted combatant, is the first to defect, con­
fessing his overthrow by " D a n Cupid," the boy over w h o m he was 
erstwhile a "domineering pedant." T h  e former soldier of philosophy 
has become a "corporal" in Cupid's a r m y ; he has signed up in service 
of "a whitely wanton with a velvet brow, / W i t h two pitch balls stuck 
in her face for eyes" (III.i. 186-87) . Since Berowne's love letter gets 
crossed with Armado ' s , these two defectors are uncovered in the 
following act. 
T h  e fourth act increases the perturbations by the lamentable rout 
of the philosophers and the revelation of the sad state of their auxil­
iary forces. T h  e act opens with a report of the king's spurring his 
horse against the rising hill—an attempt, it appears, to sublimate his 
rising affections. T h  e maidens in turn practice archery, an appropriate 
occupation for an army ordained by Cupid to battle philosophers. The 
girls' half-serious, half-bantering conversation on salvation by merit 
or mercy, a subject important for spiritual warfare, shows them bet­
ter equipped than the courtiers. Unlike shrewish wives, whose desire 
to win glory over their husbands the maidens deride, and thus also 
unlike the courtiers, these amazons fight not for fame. 
A r m a d o is appropriately thefirst whose defection is revealed as the 
ladies receive his miscarried letter to Jaquenetta. His quixotic genius 
compares his attraction to her with King Cophetua's to the beggar 
maid; but not even his Caesarian boast of "veni, vidi, vici" nor his 
poetic roaring in the vein of the N e m e a  n lion can m a k  e this defeat 
into the victory he claims it is. T h  e parallel disaster of the philos­
ophers is delayed by a scene devoted to the intellectual extravaganzas 
of the pedant, Holofernes, and the curate, Sir Nathaniel, literary 
and spiritual advisers of the academy. Although their professions 
should have conditioned them to k n o w themselves, they are in their 
o w n ways subject to the weakness of the flesh that debilitates the 
spirit. Holofernes, in magisterial presumption, poses as a judge of 
good Latin and poetic taste; but in misquoting the beginning of an 
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eclogue by the familiar grammar-school author "good old Mantuan," 
he shows his Achilles' heel.18 A n  d Sir Nathaniel falls prey to arrogance 
when he dissects the ignorance of Dull and claims for himself and 
Holofernes superior sense and feeling (IV.ii.22). Exhorting the 
spiritual warrior to k n o w himself, Erasmus warned against such 
"swelling of the mind" and recommended that he use the reverse 
procedure by comparing himself with those w h o excel him and m a k e 
him look like a complete ignoramus (sig. S 2  r )  . If Nathaniel and 
Holofernes have no talent for humility, neither do they for fasting: 
both are strongly attracted to the pleasures of dining, a most notable 
weakness of theflesh that the academicians would like to eliminate. 
Before any actual combat between the courtiers and the ladies takes 
place, the former defect from philosophy's army. In the climactic 
scene of the play (IV.iii), the king, Longaville, and D u m a i  n enter 
successively, declaim their love sonnets, accuse each other of betrayal, 
and are promptly exposed to ridicule by the discovery of their o w  n 
treason. They are n o w truly lost. Confused as they are, they seek to 
endow their passion with the sublimity of their former aspiration. 
Longaville's syncretism is in this respect the most ludicrous whe  n he 
argues that his earlier oath against w o m e  n really did not apply to the 
lady of his present affection, w h o is a goddess: " M  y v o w was earthly, 
thou a heavenly love; / T h  y grace being gain'd cures all disgrace in 
m e  " (IV.iii.62-63). T h  e argument sounds like a travesty of Eras­
mus's injunction to compare "the two Venuses and two Cupids of 
Plato, that is to say, honest love andfilthy love, holy pleasure and 
unclean pastime; compare together the unlike matter of either other" 
(sig.  K r )  . Berowne comments appropriately that Longaville's sonnet 
is in "the liver-vein, which makes flesh a deity, / A green goose a 
goddess—pure, pure idolatry" (70-71). However , Longaville, w h o 
is blind to his o w n aberration, clearly sees his friend's : "Dumain , thy 
love is far from charity" (123). 
The fusion and confusion of love and charity provides for scintil­
lating wit as the renegade soldiers of philosophy repeat with only 
slight variations their earlier vows of service. But, alas, they carry 
n o w the frivolous banner of Cupid! In more serious times, they 
decried the darkness of ignorance and sought the light of truth. N o  w 
they quarrel merely on whether dark- or light-complexioned ladies 
are preferable. It is in this context that the king utters his m u c h  ­
commented-upon denigration of Berowne's Rosaline: "  O paradox! 
Black is the badge of hell, / T h  e hue of dungeons, and the school of 
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night" (250-51 ) . 1 9 Berowne, forced to defend his love, reminds the 
king of temptation—not, as formerly, by the flesh and the devil but 
—by light-complexioned ladies like the princess: "Devils soonest 
tempt, resembling spirits of light" (253). The allusion is to 2 Cor. 
11:14, which Erasmus also used as a warning. 
The quandary of the courtiers is that the demands of their natures 
prevent them from keeping their oaths. "As true w e are," says 
Berowne, "as flesh and blood can be" (211), recalling Eph. 6: 12, 
one of the passages of spiritual warfare ("for w  e wrestle not against 
flesh and blood . . . " ) . A n d , evoking the humor of blood, whose 
heating-up in the liver was thought to engender appetite, Berowne 
continues: "Youn g blood doth not obey an old decree. / W  e cannot 
cross the cause w h y w e were born" (213-14).20 Erasmus might even 
have agreed to this statement since he warned in Enchiridion against 
striving "with G o d and things more mighty than thou," and recom­
mended to every m a  n "that thou oughtst to abstain from such studies 
as nature abhorreth, and that thou shouldst set thy mind unto these 
things—if they be honest—whereunto thou art most apt naturally" 
(sig. H 6  v - H 7  r ) . 
It is at this point that the others demand from Berowne "some 
authority h o  w to proceed," and he comes forward with his ingenious 
"tricks and quillets" to cheat the devil. Berowne understands h o w to 
adapt the articles of self-knowledge to the new situation. A s in his 
earlier objections to the rules of the academy, he draws on the 
spiritual warfare convention, applying it to that very different one of 
the war of the sexes. H  e begins with a line that reminds one of the 
king's initial battle address to his spiritual warriors: "Have at you, 
then, affection's men-at-arms." (IV.iii.286). H  e goes on to repeat 
his earlier criticism of the rules of the academy—to fast, to study, and 
to see no w o m e n  : such rules are treason against the "kingly state of 
youth," and they mak  e true learning impossible. 
For when would you, m y lord, or you, or you, 
Have found the ground of study's excellence 
Without the beauty of a woman's face ? 
From women's eyes this doctrine I derive: 
They are the ground, the books, the academes, 
From whence doth spring the true Promethean fire. 
(295-300) 21 
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Love, says Berowne, contrasting it with the slow labors of book 
learning, 
Lives not alone immured in the brain, 
But with the motion of all elements 
Courses as swift as thought in every power, 
A n  d gives to every power a double power, 
Above their functions and their offices. 
(324-28) 
Berowne's opposition between "leaden contemplation" and the in­
vigorating speed of love resembles Erasmus's contrast in the four­
teenth chapter of Enchiridion between the absorption in the visible— 
that is, rules and empty rituals including merely mechanical obedience 
to monastic rules, such as fasting—and the devotion to the invisible, 
to love. Erasmus admonished m a  n not to be bound to the earth by 
unnecessary and aggravating labors, but to lift himself up, "always 
sustained with those wings which Plato believeth to spring ever 
fresh through the heat of love in the mind of m e n . " H  e w h o does 
ascends "from the body to the spirit, from the visible world unto the 
invisible, from the letter to the mystery, from things sensible to things 
intelligible, from things gross and compound unto things single and 
pure" (sigs. L 4  V - L 5 ' ) . Erasmus borrowed this image from the 
wingedflight of the soul in Plato's Phaedrus, an image that served 
both theologians and idealizers of love. Berowne's particular applica­
tion of this idea to love, racing "with the motion of all elements," 
traces back to ancient theories on the nature of the soul as being fire 
and air, carried by their lightness to higher regions.22 Berowne illus­
trates this power of love by a metaphor that m a y have been stimulated 
by Erasmus: "It [i.e., love] adds a precious seeing to the eye: / A 
lover's eyes will gaze an eagle blind" (229-30). Erasmus attributes 
to love, that is, to holy love, the same vision: "If it were so that thou 
hadst eyes m u c  h sharper of sight than hath a beast called lynx or 
m u c h clearer than hath the eagle, yet with these eyes, in the most 
clearest light that could be, couldst thou not behold more surely that 
thing which a m a  n doth before thee than all the privy and secret parts 
of the mind be open unto the sight of G o d and his angels" (sig.  R r ) . 
Yet in spite of Berowne's ingenuity, the courtiers have not w o n a 
battle but lost one, and they have not really found themselves but 
incurred new self-loss—one undoubtedly less perilous than their 
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immature asceticism, but a self-loss nevertheless, romantic love. Even 
more seriously, they have broken oaths. Shakespeare therefore saw 
to it that their self-loss is not remedied by the easy means in which it 
usually is in the comedies, that is, by quick marriage. First, the m e  n 
of Navarre are subjected to indignities; they w h  o ingloriously left 
Holy Philosophy for Saint Cupid prove to be no more successful 
under their n e w banner than they were under the old. At the begin­
ning of the last act they are routed by the ladies, w h  o easily outdo 
them in wit encounters. T h e ladies n o w refuse to take the love vows 
any more seriously than they took the philosophic oaths. The sub­
plot mirrors the courtiers' disaster w h e n the pageant of the Nine 
Worthies turns into a lamentable spectacle of great m e  n conquered. 
But considering the seriousness of the courtiers' offense, Shake­
speare evidently thought even these debacles not enough of a lesson. 
H  e introduced what I think is a brilliant ending, regardless of 
whether it was his original plan or, as is possible, an afterthought. 
T h e ending once more evokes the "scythe's keen edge" of death, 
against which Ferdinand had sought to erect his academy, forgetting 
that self-knowledge included a realization that there is no such 
stronghold. T h e news of the death of the princess' father makes all 
merrymaking impossible. Yet, ironically, this very change of condi­
tions also brings about the solution to the courtiers' dilemma and, for 
that matter, to that posed by the action of the play. T h  e period of 
mourning is ingeniously used to furnish the period of expiation for 
the courtiers. T h  e ladies, w h  o have proved conquerors in the battle 
against the stormy affections of their suitors, wisely decide that self-
knowledge decrees they too must obey the law of necessity: they will 
marry the knights after a year if these are still inclined to matrimony. 
But appropriately, the knights must do penance by obeying the laws 
of the spirit they have violated, although the penitential period of one 
year is more reasonable than the three-year term they had pledged 
themselves to live ascetically. T h  e knights, w h  o have lost themselves, 
have, after all, a chance to reach the castle that towers above the dark 
glen of Diirer's knight. A s Erasmus said, "The only w a y therefore to 
felicity is first that thou k n o  w thyself." But the path is not easy: 
"Nothing is more hard than that a m a  n should overcome himself; 
but then is there no greater reward than is felicity" (sig. T>yy). 
For Berowne, w h o  m w e have come to like so well, the path m a y 
seem to us unduly arduous. But his imposed task of entertaining the 
sick in a hospital is in keeping with his trespass. Although Shake­
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speare used Berowne partly to comment on the difficulty of trying to 
master the "affects" with which every m a n is born, he made him also 
an example of the need to do so; the merry-madcap courtier, w h o 
took the oath against his better knowledge and became the equally 
lighthearted apologist of love madness, must swear off the taffeta 
phrases and spruce affectation in which he so delighted. H  e will have 
to cheer the sick rather than confound the healthy by paradoxes. 
There is poetic justice in the special penitence imposed on the king, 
head of the bankrupt academy, w h  o must live in a hermitage to 
cure his mind through his soul. A n d equally appropriate is Armado ' s 
voluntary penitence in which he gives up his pseudosophistication in 
favor of holding the plow to sustain Jaquenetta and her expected 
offspring. All w h  o have lost themselves are given a chance to find 
themselves properly. 
Thus w e can see that even in one of his gayest comedies Shake­
speare was concerned with the problem of self-culture. The central 
theme of Love's Labor's Lost is the quest for the self, a quest in 
which m a n , with the best of intentions, can go astray. Every m a n is 
born with his passions and must in some w a y control them or risk 
being lost forever. O n  e cannot simply rule them out; nature will take 
its revenge. Yet dangerous as they are, they are part of the glory of 
being human. W  e delight in the courtiers' losing themselves in love; 
it springs naturally from their hearts and justly wins out over the 
merely brain-conceived devotion to study. T h  e ideal of conduct, h o w  ­
ever, does not lie in permanent abandonment to this most delightful 
of self-losses, but in a balanced, antipedantic, and humanistic w a  y of 
life. It is a path that Berowne sees clearly even if the w a r m blood of 
his youth makes it difficult for him to walk it steadily. But Love's 
Labor's Lost is not a problem play or a tragedy. W  e never really 
fear that the knights of Navarre will lose themselves so thoroughly 
as to make recovery questionable or impossible. Their asceticism, 
ostentatious as it is, is a temporary aberration and not the unnatural 
and deeply ingrained suppression of h u m a  n desires of an Angelo in 
Measure for Measure, and their self-abandonment in love is only a 
brief interlude and not the all-embracing and destructive passion of 
an Othello. 
Although Love's Labor's Lost is not a disturbing play, it does 
show that the m a n w h o wishes to k n o w himself has difficult choices to 
make and threatening dangers to face. The more formidable man ' s 
temptation, the harder his struggle through the valley of life; and the 
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less grace available to him, the more likely is his failure. T h e action 
of Love's Labor's Lost at least implies that a m a  n m a  y lose himself 
so thoroughly as to m a k  e full recovery impossible. A n  d this is the fate 
of Richard II, about w h o  m Shakespeare wrote a tragedy not too long 
after his gay comedy. Shakespeare's tragic heroes, different as their 
individual features are from those of the courtiers of Navarre, have 
yet a recognizable kinship with them; these heroes too are possessed 
of a h u m a  n nature that is tempted by the world, the flesh, and the 
devil. They fall, of course, more deeply; and their suffering is excru­
ciating, their defeat irredeemable. Their self-search is not granted 
success; they cannot escape the scythe's keen edge of death. T h  e pre­
dicament of the heroes of Shakespeare's later tragedies is the more 
painful because not only are they in a darker valley—this is true for 
Richard—but the region above it also is shrouded in mist or 
darkness. 
CHAPTER SIX 
Richard II: 
Looking into the Mirror of Grief 
OF A L L S H A K E S P E A R E ' S earlier tragedies and histories, Richard II has the most interesting and, for Shakespeare's dramatic progress, most significant patterns of self-knowl­
edge. The themes of losing and finding and of the search for the self 
are focused on a hero w h o shows a most conspicuous lack of self-
knowledge, but w h  o also elicits our tragic sympathy as no other hero 
does w h o  m Shakespeare created before him. 
W h e n  , probably in 1594 or 1595, Shakespeare decided to write a 
play about the reign of Richard II, he m a y have been drawn to this 
subject because he wished to depict the source of the troubles he had 
dramatized in the Henry V I plays. H e also m a y have thought the 
forced abdication of Richard II and the usurpation of the throne by 
Henry Bolingbroke topical because of the Elizabethans' interest in, 
and anxiety about, succession.1 But if Shakespeare was induced to 
write a play about the fall of Richard because of its political relevance, 
he underplayed this aspect when he actually came to write the play. 
Whether considerations of political prudence persuaded him to con­
centrate on the h u m a n side of the conflict rather than on the clash of 
forces or whether he was stimulated by the pathos of the tortured 
king in Marlowe's Edward II, he poured his poetic and dramatic 
powers into depicting the suffering of Richard. The weak king, w h o 
falls and suffers, is in the front of the stage; the strong m a n  , w h  o 
rises and conquers, is hardly more than a background figure, gen­
erally doing only what the occasion requires. 
T o acclaim this reticence in word and action as the master strategy 
of a Machiavellian schemer is to deny the requirements of the stage, 
particularly of the Elizabethan stage, according to which characters 
live by what they do, say about themselves, and what others say 
about them, not by what they fail to do and say, and what others fail 
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to say about them. T h  e interest of Richard II certainly does not de­
rive from seeing Bolingbroke outmaneuver Richard because, as has 
often been said, Richard really defeats himself. In a sense, Bolingbroke 
is not only Richard's conqueror but also his victim, as is England in 
general. Bolingbroke too suffers from the grief that Richard inflicts 
on his country and comes to feel, most of all, himself. Bolingbroke 
loses his legacy and is banished; he returns indeed to become king, 
but as such, he inherits fear of rebellion and, in the end, is left with 
sorrow and remorse. 
T h e early quartos and Francis Meres called Richard II (as well as 
other history plays) a tragedy, and the play has a better claim to the 
title as w e have come to apply it by abstraction from Shakespeare's 
later tragedies than any other of his early dramas. Richard II focuses 
on one passion, grief, and makes it the prime mover of tragic sym­
pathy. S o m  e characters, such as the Duchess of Gloucester, Gaunt, 
and Richard's queen, Isabel, have the primary function of showing 
the grief that comes to all, first to the victims of Richard's misrule, 
then to his family and adherents. Grief imagery penetrates the play, 
and the passion itself is constantly varied with fear and contrasted 
with joy and hope; no play of Shakespeare offers better illustration 
for his use of these four primary passions.2 
Lack of self-knowledge and intemperance are the roots of Rich­
ard's tragedy just as they are of Tarquin's in Lucrece, and the sub­
ject matter of the history play would have lent itself to a treatment 
very similar to that which Shakespeare accorded to the passion and 
disgrace of Tarquin. Shakespeare's sources presented a king w h  o did 
not k n o  w himself, or, as Holinshed had it, w h  o "forgot himself and 
began to rule by will more than by reason, threatening death to each 
one that obeyed not his inordinate desires."3 Shakespeare did not 
altogether deny this Richard; his guilt in the murder of his great-
uncle, Woodstock, is alluded to in the second scene and throws a 
shadow over his seemingly impartial effort to m a k e peace between 
M o w b r a  y and Bolingbroke. W  e also learn in the protasis of the play 
that Richard is "not himself, but basely led / B  yflatterers" (II.i.241­
42) ; yet the Richard w e remember most is that of epitasis and catas­
trophe: the m a  n intemperate in grief, w h  o loses himself in paroxysms 
of lament; the extraordinary sufferer, w h o knows the hollowness of 
the crown but cannot live a mere m a n ; the poet of pain, w h o in his 
deepest humiliation yet gains an inkling of the c o m m o  n condition of 
m a n  , a glimmer of tragic self-knowledge. Richard is not merely an 
Richard II: Looking into the Mirror of Grief 99 
exemplum of a bad ruler; he is also a m a n w h o comes, even if too late, 
to seek himself. 
In making Richard into this kind of character, Shakespeare could 
build on some hints in his sources, which depicted Richard's tragedy 
as a de casibus story, a fall from a high place in the manner of the 
examples in the Mirror for Magistrates, and which showed some sym­
pathy to him.4 Said Holinshed: 
This surely is a very notable example and not unworthy of all 
princes to be well weighed and diligently marked that this Henry, 
Duke of Lancaster, should thus be called to a kingdom and have the 
help and assistance almost of all the whole realm, which perchance 
never thereof thought or yet dreamed, and that King Richard 
should thus be left desolate, void, and in despair of all hope and 
comfort, in w h o m  , if there be any offence, it ought rather to be im­
puted to the frailty of wanton youth than to the malice of his heart.5 
At first Richard sees himself exclusively in the light of a victim of 
fortune's wheel; only very slowly does he accept the moral of the 
specula principis that kings must be virtuous or they m a  y be pun­
ished, even deposed, by the vengeance of G o d  . Richard sees his fall 
almost to the very end as primarily a de casibus tragedy, but w  e 
understand it from the beginning as a tragedy of character. 
For creating as sorrowful a king as he did, Shakespeare had little 
precedent. Holinshed recorded only that Richard, returning from 
Ireland and advised of Bolingbroke's progress, "became so greatly 
discomforted that, sorrowfully lamenting his miserable state, he 
utterly despaired of his o w n safety and, calling his army together, 
which was not small, licensed every m a n to depart to his h o m e . " 6 
The passage must have struck Shakespeare's eye by the marginal 
gloss: " K  . Richard in utter despair." Shakespeare m a d e , at any rate, 
this incident into the apex of Richard's emotional curve: up to this 
point he is a carefree youth; after it, he is a care-worn sufferer. 
This is not to say that there are two Richards as there are two 
Edwards in Marlowe's Edward II, from which Shakespeare appears 
to have learned both positively and negatively. Marlowe's E d w a r d is 
at first a pitiful, lascivious, and cruel boy, willing to hand over his 
kingdom, lock, stock, and barrel, to the patently immoral Gaveston; 
later, E d w a r  d is a suffering, tortured victim of his wife's and Morti­
mer's cruelties. T h  e earlier Richard never sinks as deeply as the 
earlier Edward, and the later Richard is still recognizably the same 
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m a  n as the earlier one. Richard before his fall is insolent and insouci­
ant ; he is callous to the exhortations of Gaunt and Y o r k ; he is irre­
sponsible, to say the least, in confiscating Gaunt's property. O  n the 
whole, however, he is a somewhat better m a  n than Holinshed's 
Richard; he threatens no death to others; he does not manifest his 
addiction to pleasure or to lust so patently as to lose our sympathy. 
H  e wears his crown with just enough dignity to m a k e his later con­
sciousness of its halo believable and pitiable.7 
Essentially, the predicaments of Marlowe's and Shakespeare's 
kings are alike: they both suffer for their h u m a  n inadequacies, and 
they suffer from their inability to separate the injuries done to them 
from the indignities inflicted on the crown. Like E d w a r d , Richard 
is ignorant of the meaning of the injunction " k n o w thyself" as Sir 
T h o m a  s Elyot applied it to the m a  n of authority: 
If thou be a governor, or hast over other sovereignty, know thyself, 
that is to say, know that thou art verily a m a n compact of soul and 
body and that all other m e  n be equal unto thee. Also that every m a  n 
taketh with thee equal benefit of the spirit of life, nor hast thou any 
more of the dew of heaven or the brightness of the sun than any 
other person. T h  y dignity or authority wherein thou differest from 
other is, as it were, but a weighty or heavy cloak, freshly glittering 
in the eyes of them that be purblind, where unto thee it is painful 
if thou wear him in his right fashion and as it shall best become 
thee.8 
A  s a king, Richard wears the robe of authority too lightly even if 
he does not wear it as unbecomingly as E d w a r d ; he never dreams 
that it can be taken away, as Elyot warned, if used negligently. Gaunt 
calls him "possess'd . .  . to depose thyself" (II.i.io8). A n  d York 
despairingly comments on his rash confiscation of Gaunt's property: 
"Be not thyself—for h o w art thou a king / But by fair sequence and 
succession?" (Il.i. 198-99) . 
Although Richard is unaware of the heaviness of his robe, he is 
dazzled by its glitter. H  e is obsessed with his "preeminence," with 
his privileged place in the hierarchy of being and with the symbolism 
of his divine stewardship, but he neglects to balance this awareness 
with a just understanding of his duties. In adversity, he intoxicates 
himself with vain hopes and illusions, such as that the native stones 
will prove soldiers on his side and that G o  d will provide a glori­
ous angel to m a k e up for each of Bolingbroke's followers. There is 
something extravagantly un-English about his imagination—possibly 
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Shakespeare thought of a remark of Holinshed's that Richard took 
pleasure in being addressed by one of his followers in the fashion of 
an oriental potentate. At any rate, his consciousness of his halo before 
and after the deposition transcends the conventional belief in the di­
vinity of kings. 
Although the earlier and the later Richard are recognizably the 
same m a n  , Richard does change under the impact of suffering, and I 
believe that Shakespeare conceived this change as being accompanied 
by an alteration of humor. F r o m reading Holinshed, he must have 
thought of the earlier Richard as of the sanguine complexion that 
turned into melancholy of the kind physicians thought to have come 
about by "adustion," that is, burning of the original humor. This 
melancholy was considered most serious, leading sometimes to m a d ­
ness and self-destruction.9 Holinshed's characterization of the young 
Richard contained features that the Elizabethans would have ascribed 
to the sanguine disposition, such as wantonness, extravagance in en­
tertainment and clothes, general good nature, and seemliness in shape 
and favor. The Richard of the beginning of the play shares with 
Holinshed's some general characteristics of the sanguine tempera­
ment as in The Touchstone of Complexions (1581) Levinus Lem­
nius described them: m e n of this type, Lemnius said, are easily drawn 
to folly and pursue what is worst; given to sensual fantasies, they are 
unconcerned about the state of their country; as rulers, they are sub­
ject to the influence of evil advisers. T h e sanguine humor was thought 
to afflict particularly the young; Lemnius compared the sanguine 
youths to calves that in spring "skip and leap up and d o w n , " 10 a 
phrase that recalls Bolingbroke's later speaking of Richard as "the 
skipping King, he ambled up and d o w n " (1 Henry IV, III.ii.60). 
Lemnius's description of sanguine m e  n as smooth-skinned, of ruddy or 
purple color, is paralleled in the Queen's characterization of Richard 
as a fair rose (V.i.8) and in Bolingbroke's as "a happy gentleman in 
blood and lineaments" until "unhappied and disfigured" by his fol­
lowers (III.1.8 ff.). Shakespeare's Richard resembles the m e  n of this 
humor w h o , as Lemnius said, although pleasant in company, k n o w 
no measure in their affections. It is probably sentimentality rather 
than political strategy that makes him remit four years of banishment 
from Bolingbroke's sentence. H  e claims to be affected by the tears in 
Gaunt's eyes (I.iii.208), and I see no reason w h y this explanation

(invented by Shakespeare) should be taken as hypocritical. But sen­

timentality is a different matter from goodness, and, a m o n  g his
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favorites, Richard can be quite callous about Gaunt's plight (I.iv.59­
60) . His almost clinical interest in watching the display of emotions 
shows itself also in the curiosity with which, on this occasion, he 
inquires "what store of parting tears were shed" at Bolingbroke's 
leave-taking (I.iv.5ff.). Richard remains an observer of the effect of 
grief on others even when it is his o w n grief that creates this effect: 
"thou weep'st, m  y tender-hearted cousin," he says to Aumerle at 
Flint Castle (III.iii.160). Melancholy, as Lemnius said, retains some 
traits of the faculty and nature from which it came; n the melancholic 
emoting of Richard evolves believably from that in his sanguine 
period. 
T h e transition occurs at Richard's landing (Ill.ii) when he 
"weeps for joy" and "weeping-smiling" greets his native earth, and 
when, overwhelmed by messages of misfortune, he alternates vio­
lently between despair and hope. A s Lemnius explained, such ups and 
downs are natural in the transition to melancholy, a humor that is not 
without heat: " A n d hereupon, in a manner all in one instant and with­
out any time betwixt, do w e see them suddenly changed from laughter 
and mirth into sorrow and pensiveness." 12 Richard's outward and 
inward change is repeatedly emphasized. O n e such instance is when, 
with his characteristic interest in his o w  n grief, he studies the "exter­
nal manner of laments" in his face during the mirror scene (IV.i. 
296). Another instance is the parting scene, when the Queen finds 
him "both in shape and mind / Transform'd and weak'ned" ( V.i.26­
27) . In the series of house-grave images, which precedes this obser­
vation, Isabel calls him "the model where all Troy did stand," a " m a p 
of honor," "King Richard's tomb," and a "beauteous inn" in which 
n o w grief is lodged. Interestingly, Lemnius illustrated his argument 
that one can still discern the former state of a body that has suffered 
alteration by grief by a very similar comparison to "great, huge, and 
sumptuous houses, being fallen d o w n and decayed, [which] show 
evidently . .  . of what hugeness and magnificence they erst were, 
h o w curious and busy the frame was, h o w skillful and industrious the 
architect and w o r k m a n was." 13 
In conceiving Richard as a victim of melancholy, Shakespeare ap­
pears to have had two purposes in mind. First of all, the symptoms 
of the h u m o  r as the physicians described them—such as doubt, diffi­
dence, distrust, morbid ruminations, indulgence in monstrous fictions, 
solitariness, weeping, sighing, and quick changes from indolence to 
mental activity—made Richard a dramatically interesting character.14 
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But, more importantly, melancholy meant a concern with the earth, 
from which it was thought to arise, with dust, graves, w o r m s , and 
death—in a word, with the contemptus mundi, and thus with the 
estate of m a n ; "Melancholy," said Sir James Perrott, "is fittest for 
consideration." 15 Shakespeare's use of the contemptus mundi con­
vention gave him an opportunity to endow Richard with an over­
powering rhetoric that displays his vanity but also brings with it an 
ingredient of self-knowledge. 
Richard'sfirst long lament strikes the characteristic note (IILii. 
144ff.). At the m o m e n t of danger, he loses his head; informed of 
the execution of Bushy, Green, and the Earl of Wiltshire, he rejects 
all comfort and wishes to talk only "of graves, of w o r m s  , and epi­
taphs." Nothing, he says, 
can w e call our own but death 
A n  d that small model of the barren earth 
Which serves as paste and cover to our bones. 
(III.ii.152-54) 
Richard's subject is, in terms of the title of the second chapter of the 
Elizabethan translation of Pope Innocent's De Humane Miseriae 
Conditione, "The Vile and Base Matter Whereof M a  n is M a d e . " It 
is a substance that determines his composition and his decay: "I a  m 
compared, saith holy Job, to clay and likened to embers and ashes. 
Clay is made of water and dust, both of them remaining, but ashes 
are made of wood andfire, both of them consuming and decaying." 16 
Innocent's reference to Job points to the biblical associations of 
Richard's speech: the ground to which Richard wishes to bequeath 
his deposed body is Job's "slimy valley" (xxi.33), the "water and 
dust" of Innocent, or as Richard has it, the "paste and cover to our 
bones." 17 The Genevan side-note m a d e the figure an appropriate 
reminder for royalty: " H  e shall be glad to lie in a slimy pit, which 
before could not be content with a royal palace." Richard'sfigure of 
the "model of the barren earth" recalls Job's elsewhere (iii.14) 
expressed desire to sleep and be "at rest with the kings and councilors 
of the earth, which have built themselves desolate places" ("barren 
places" in the variation of the Genevan side-note, which comes closer 
to Richard's words) . 
Richard sees himself as the epitome of "sad stories of the death of 
kings" that, de casibus fashion, he invites himself and others to tell, 
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sitting upon the ground; he comes to the conclusion that the crown of 
a king is a hollow crown, in which death keeps his court. T h e simi­
larity of this idea to Holbein's woodcuts of death, particularly to the 
one depicting the dying Emperor Maximilian, has been noted often:18 
a grinning Death, resembling Richard's "antic," his skeleton up-
reared behind Holbein's enthroned emperor, reaches for the crown. 
But Maximilian, unlike Richard, has not resigned himself to crying 
woe , death, destruction, and despair; although his sword is broken 
and his eyes are closing, he still metes out justice, turning severely 
toward the proud oppressor on the right and protecting the poor 
supplicant on the left: the Emperor, not Death, keeps his court. 
Richard's antic, w h  o allows the king "a little scene, / T  o m o n  ­
archize, be fear'd, and kill with looks" (164-65) recalls the c o m m o n ­
place that the world is a stage, whichfits into the contemptus mundi,1* 
but it is impossible not to associate the figure also with Richard's 
histrionics; his "self and vain conceit" (166) is infused into the 
image. A n d so it is w h e n Richard takes up the equalitarian strains of 
contemptus mundi and of consideratio. Chelidonius wished princes 
to "consider the c o m m o  n beginning of all, the first matter whereof 
w  e are m a d  e and h o  w w  e be all continued of like elements, bought 
with one blood, . . . nourished and fed all with like sacraments." 20 
But Richard, w h  o says more vividly that "I live with bread like you, 
feel want, / Taste grief, need friends" (175ff.)> does not really be­
lieve with Chelidonius that the consideration of his mortal body 
shows that "there is no difference between the vilest creatures of the 
earth" and himself; w h e n he asks his followers to "throw away re­
spect, / Tradition, form, and ceremonious duty," it is in a plaintive 
tone that highlights his perplexity about what he and the world have 
come to.21 
There is a similar mixture of true grief and "self and vain con­
ceit" in Richard's confrontation with Bolingbroke at Flint Castle. 
Desolate and bereft of friends, Richard takes consolation in the ex­
travagant hope that the wrath of God, which the contemptus mundi 
predicted for sinful mankind, will avenge the injustice done to Rich­
ard; G o d "is mustering in his clouds on our behalf / Armies of 
pestilence" (III.iii.85 ff.). A n  d whe  n Richard appears to turn in­
ward by offering to exchange his position with that of a hermit, he 
spoils the appeal to our sympathy with the theatrical effect of the idea 
of exchanging England with "a little little grave, an obscure grave—" 
an effect increased by the suggestion.that he be buried "in the king's 
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highway" (154 ff.)- O n e looks here in vain for a recognition of his 
o w n responsibility for his fall. There are, at most, occasional dim 
realizations of his insufficiency, as when, descending to the "base 
court"—the punning adds a histrionic accent to the symbolic m o m e n  t 
—he compares himself with "glist'ring Phaeton, / Wanting the m a n  ­
age of unruly jades" (178-79); it was Phaeton's presumption that 
made him want to drive his father's chariot, and it was his incom­
petence, not any particular unruliness of the horses, that brought him 
too close to the sun. Like Richard, Phaeton was responsible for his 
o w  n disaster. 
The abdication scene, the summa epitasis of the play, brings not 
only a significant turn of events but also an important stage in Rich­
ard's growth toward self-awareness. But if one m a y speak here of 
anagnorisis, it is in a sense different from Aristotle's; Richard's 
recognition is not really a "change from ignorance to knowledge." 
Hardly more than some glimmers of self-knowledge shine through 
Richard's display of vanity. Just before the symbolic transfer of the 
crown, Richard achieves a culmination in self-aggrandizement w h e  n 
he likens himself to Christ and degrades his enemies into Judases 
(IV.i.168 ff.). His public "undoing" of himself still betrays h o w 
deeply he "drinks" his griefs; it is a rhetorical showpiece with puns, 
antitheses, and anaphora, and even his announcement that he must 
"nothing be" is as m u c  h an appeal to the spectators' emotions as 
resignation; his feeling for the nothingness of m a  n is overshadowed 
by the feeling of his nothingness due to deprivation from kingship 
(216 ff.). W h e n Northumberland tries to force him to read the ac­
cusations against him and to confess to their truth, his eyes fill with 
tears; he cannot see, and he looks inward to find himself a "traitor 
with the rest" (245 ff.). H e feels a total loss of identity and knows 
"not n o w what n a m e to call myself" (259). 
This, the m o m e n  t of Richard's greatest self-loss, produces his first 
confrontation with the truth, which is given symbolic emphasis in 
the mirror scene. T h  e idea is imaginatively prepared for earlier in the 
play by glass or mirror images symbolic of grief. Thus in his days of 
happy kingship, Richard read grief in the "glasses" of Gaunt's eyes. 
A n d when Bushy attempted to console Queen Isabel, he compared 
the view of sorrow's eyes to perspective glasses that "rightly gaz'd 
upon, / S h o w nothing but confusion—ey'd awry, / Distinguish 
form" (II.ii.14ff-)- In looking into the mirror during the abdication 
scene, Richard for thefirst time distinguishes form. 
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In this scene, Shakespeare availed himself of the multifaceted sym­
bolism of the mirror. It was, first of all, the emblem of vanity and self-
love, often associated in Shakespeare's time, as n o w  , with femininity. 
T h  e moralists sought to combat the allurement of the mirror with 
ethical considerations. O n  e of the sayings in Disticha Catonis, the 
collection Shakespeare had in g r a m m a r school, recommended that m a n 
contemplate himself in the mirror and, if he appeared handsome, act 
in a w a  y that expressed this forma. If he appeared ugly (deformus), 
he was asked to compensate for the lack of facial beauty by good 
manners.22 T h e mirror was thus a medium for vanitas as well as 
veritas, as the Elizabethans often were reminded. In Diego de 
Estella's De Contemptu Mundi, translated by T h o m a s Rogers 
(1586), the Christian was told, "if thou have a desire to k n o w w h o 
thou art, take a glass and behold thyself in it. . .  . A n  d that thou 
mayst not be deceived, behold not thyself in a glass that is hollow, 
which maketh a show of the thing represented therein clean contrary 
to that which it is indeed, but take unto thee a glass that is plain, 
which setteth out m a  n according as he is in truth." T h  e hollow glass, 
Estella said, is the glass of life; it makes m e n look lusty and strong; 
but it is a glass of vanity and lies; the true glass is the glass of death, 
which shows m a  n his sinfulness and mortality.23 T h  e mirror of self-
knowledge thus became the mirror of death. A  s Sir John Davies said, 
"Then she [the soul] which hath been hoodwinked from her birth, 
/ Dothfirst herself within Death's mirror see." 24 
Richard's gaze into the mirror reveals all these symbolic facets. 
W h e  n he wishes to look into it rather than read the articles of abdi­
cation, he desires to study "the very book indeed / W h e r e all m  y sins 
are writ, and that's myself" (IV.i.274-75).25 It is thefirst mention­
ing of his sins—the mirror is to reflect Richard's "true" image. But 
a narcissistic self-fascination interferes momentarily; he sees a 
"brittle glory" in the face and wonders w h  y it has not become de­
formed. Yet Richard's grief is too great to m a k e him accept the 
image in the "flatt'ring glass"; the discrepancy between appearance 
and reality, between the outside of grief and its substance angers him, 
and he smashes the deceptive glass, quipping that his sorrow has 
destroyed his face—his face in the mirror, that is. Bolingbroke 
emends: "The shadow of your sorrow hath destroy'd / T h e shadow 
of your face" (292-93). Richard retorts that he is no longer inter­
ested in the outside look, in the "external manner of laments," which 
are "merely shadows to the unseen grief / That swells with silence in 
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the tortur'd soul" (294-98). But even at this m o m e n t of inward turn, 
Richard cannot resist the temptation of displaying his vanity; he 
"thanks" Bolingbroke for not only giving him cause to wail but also 
for "teaching" him to lament his cause (300-302). Whether Richard 
here actually finds the refinement of his rhetoric by his adversary 
worthy of imitation or, more likely, is piqued by being upstaged even 
momentarily, Richard's interest in self-expression wins out over his 
desire for self-knowledge. T h  e mirror of truth turns into a mirror of 
flattery. 
Richard cannot help dramatizing himself even in that scene of 
intense pathos when he takes leave of his queen. O n e m a y read repen­
tance into his exhortation to her and to himself that " O u  r holy lives 
must win a n e w world's crown" (V.i.24) ; but he is as m u c h as ever 
intent on audience effect w h e  n he asks her to tell others after his 
death the lamentable tale of his misfortune "and send the hearers 
weeping to their beds" (45). 
Only once before his death does Richard immerse himself in self-
consideration without such side-interest in the effect of grief: in his 
long soliloquy that compares his prison at Pomfret Castle to the 
world (V.v.i ff.). T h  e speech begins as an exercise in self-delusion 
and ends in near-maddening grief, but in the process Richard pene­
trates to some understanding of his condition as a m a  n and a king. 
Richard's soliloquy hinges on concepts of body and soul and forms 
in this respect a climax to this nosce teipsum imagery prominent in 
the play. In the earlier acts, the images are associated primarily with 
grief and suffering, but also with the notion that in this experience 
lies a way to truth. A s Bolingbroke accuses M o w b r a y of the treason 
that has its source in the king himself, he promises that " M  y body 
shall make good [the challenge] upon this earth, / O  r m  y divine soul 
answer it in heaven" (Li.37-38). W h e  n the king prevents the duel, 
Bolingbroke regrets that the issue cannot be settled; if it had been, 
either his or Mowbray ' s soul would have "wand'red in the air, / 
Banish'd this frail sepulchre of our flesh" (I.iii.195-96). T h e imag­
ery becomes associated with Richard's party whe  n the queen agonizes 
in his absence andfinds her apprehensions confirmed; as her soul has 
"brought forth her prodigy," she feels like a new-delivered mother 
that has joined woe to w o e and sorrow to sorrow (II.ii.64 #•)• F r o m 
the time of the king's return, the body and soul images characterize 
his o w n attitudes and are either used by him or refer to him. "All 
souls that will be safe, fly from m  y side," he says at thefirst m o m e n  t 
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of danger as he abandons all hope and begins to talk of graves and the 
decomposition of the body (III.ii.8o). But this morbid preoccupation 
demonstrates also that he understands n o w that kings are made of the 
same clay as other m e n . H e realizes the vanity of the belief that "this 
flesh which walls about our life / W e r e brass impregnable," when a 
little pin can bore through this "castle wall" (i66ff.). The house-
grave imagery the queen applies to his grief-wasted body at their 
parting adds further pathos to his o w  n ruminations on the fact of 
h u m a  n impermanence. 
Richard's last long speech at Pomfret Castle gathers this imagery 
into a magnificent finale. Hisfirst sentence, "I have been studying 
h o  w I m a  y compare / This prison where I live unto the world" 
(V.v .1 -2 )  , strikes a characteristic contemptus mundi note. Pope 
Innocent's tract devoted a chapter to "The Lamentation of the Soul 
Being in Prison," 26 which took its cue from the cry of the penitent 
sinner of Psalm 142, "bring m  y soul out of prison," the latter being 
interpreted as the body. W h e  n Richard despairs of being able to 
compare his prison to the world because "the world is populous/ 
A n  d here is not a creature but myself," he laments his loneliness 
m u c  h like the Psalmist: "I looked also upon m  y right hand and saw 
there was no m a n that would k n o w m e . " Richard's fantastic remedy 
of populating his prison world by begetting "a generation of still-
breeding thoughts" recalls the queen's earlier conception of melan­
choly, the "unborn sorrow, ripe in fortune's w o m b  " she felt coming 
toward her trembling soul (II.ii.10). A n  d as m u c  h as the queen 
brings forth a "prodigy," Richard's mental issue is unnatural. His 
plan for engendering thoughts analogous to the people of his king­
d o m is to make his brain "the female to m  y soul, / M  y soul the 
father" (6-7). But there is disharmony in the kingdom of m a n , said 
John Woolton, when "notices or seeds and, as it were, sparks of 
knowledge . . . are together engendered with the body and soul." 27 
T h  e conjunction of the soul with understanding, said Plutarch, 
makes reason, but with the body, passion.28 Richard's thoughts thus 
become microcosmic correspondences of the melancholy world he 
knows; his thoughts "people this little world, / In humours like the 
people of this world, / For no thought is contented" (9-11). A n d 
Richard's thoughts are at odds, like the people of his kingdom. Those 
thoughts "tending to ambition" plot "how these vain weak nails / 
M a y tear a passage through theflinty ribs / Of this hard world, m y 
ragged prison walls"—the prison of Richard n o  w becomes his body, 
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from which he would like to escape (18 ff.). T h  e idea recalls Rich­
ard's earlier realization of the vulnerability of kings whose "castle 
wall" can be pierced by a little pin (III.ii.169). T h e prison image 
betrays Richard's desire to be freed from the world and from his 
body; his murder thus becomes a kind of deliverance. 
Richard's speech is fancy in Coleridge's term, not imagination; it 
is chaotic as his mind is chaotic. But, in an erratic way, the speech 
does explore Richard's condition not only as a king but also as a 
m a n . For thefirst time, he realizes the value of "nothing," a word 
with which he had played whe  n he resigned his kingship. But then he 
still thought of nothingness as the state of non-kingship; n o  w he 
desires, like the just m a  n in "the lamentation of the soul being in 
prison" of Innocent's tract, to be released from life: "Suffer m  e that I 
m a y be refreshed before I go from hence and before I shall become 
nothing." 29 Richard knows n o w that, whether he is still king or not, 
Nor I, nor any m a n that but m a n is, 
With nothing shall be pleas'd till he be eas'd 
With being nothing. 
(39-41) 
A  s he hears music that does not keep time, he realizes fully the dis­
harmony in himself that led to his downfall: 
But, for the concord of m  y state and time, 
H a  d not an ear to hear m  y true time broke. 
I wasted time, and now doth time waste m e . 
(47-49) 
Thus, in the end, Richard gains an inkling of the cause and meaning 
of his tragedy. 
But Richard's self-discovery is clearly limited. H  e does not, for 
instance, ever admit his guilt in Woodstock's murder. Neither does 
his new humility displace completely his old vanity, as is evidenced 
in the incident that follows the soliloquy. W h e  n he learns from the 
G r o o m of the Stable that Bolingbroke rode on coronation day on 
Richard's o w  n roan, Barbary, he questions the servant about the 
behavior of the horse; and whe  n he learns that it strode proudly, he 
rails against the ungrateful jade that "hath eat bread from m  y royal 
hand" (V.v .85) . Even Richard's last words breathe as m u c h an 
exaltation of royalty as of the hope of heaven: "Mount , mount, m  y 
HO THEORY AND ADAPTATION 
soul! thy seat is up on high; / Whilst m  y gross flesh sinks d o w n ­
ward, here to die" ( V . v . i n - 1 2 ) . 
Richard is all of a piece. H  e is portrayed as a m a  n and a ruler w h  o 
does not k n o  w himself and lacks a sense of moral decorum, but w h o 
gradually grows toward a limited self-awareness. Through his o w n 
misrule, he loses his crown and thus the only identity he knows, that 
of a divinely ordained king. F r o  m sanguine lightheartedness, he 
changes to melancholic dejection. Plunged into excessive and histri­
onic grief, he is the first of Shakespeare's tragic heroes to be domi­
nated by an overwhelming passion, which is his undoing, the major 
reason for his fascination, and a stimulus to gain self-knowledge. In 
tasting, relishing, and exploring his grief, Richard assumes a con­
temptus mundi attitude, which is, at first, more of a posture than a 
conviction; but the attitude becomes increasingly sincere, and, though 
it drives him near to madness, Richard gains on the w a y some of the 
self-knowledge he so sadly lacked, but he does not totally lose his 
latent vanity. T h e particular charm of Richard II, as John Middleton 
M u r r  y has said, lies in the "nascent self-awareness" with which it is 
pervaded.30 
This nascent self-awareness, one might say, is not only Richard's 
but was also that of Shakespeare as a great tragic artist. In Richard 
II, Shakespeare found a w a  y of integrating into a tragedy the themes 
of self-search, self-loss, and self-finding he had depicted in his early 
comedies. A  s in Love's Labor's Lost, the self-search of the hero is a 
confused and ill-planned quest that does not lead to one particular 
crowning insight.31 If one can speak of self-discovery at all, it is in 
quite a different sense from Aristotle's anagnorisis. W h a  t Richard 
finds out about himself does not constitute a straight-line movement 
culminating in a peripeteia—Aristotle thought the connection be­
tween anagnorisis and peripeteia was the best solution—and Richard 
does not achieve a particular culminating discovery comparable to 
the full and devastating disclosure Oedipus receives of his true situ­
ation. Richard's self-discoveries are dispersed and even precede the 
first unmistakably tragic development, since they begin in the flashes 
of contemptus mundi that ignite when there is yet m u c h hope of 
rescue; the discoveries continue intermittently until his death, punc­
tuating both epitasis and catastrophe. Moreover, and most important, 
Richard's recognitions are m u c  h less intellectual than is Oedipus's 
anagnorisis. They include a confession of sins and are more often 
emotional than intellectual approaches to the truth, as in that m e m  ­
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orable scene when Richard sees his o w n features and those of hu­
manity more clearly by looking into the mirror of grief. Richard's 
slow, painful groping toward a sense of his character and situation 
reveals his potential worth as a h u m a  n being while not denying his 
lack of suitability as a king. Richard's self-search and partial self-
finding have moral and religious dimensions that Aristotle's anag­
norisis does not have and could not have had. 
Not for a long time did Shakespeare go beyond Richard II in the 
treatment of tragic self-loss and self-finding. T h e guilt-ridden Henry 
IV also lacks self-knowledge, but he never falls as deep or soars as 
high as Richard. Henry V  , it is true, comes closer to achieving com­
plete self-knowledge than any of Shakespeare's previous heroes, but 
he also never loses himself, not even as a prince, in the abyss of the 
soul, as does Richard. Only the great tragedies—in particular, Lear 
—provide parallels. A n  d indeed, then Shakespeare gave a greater, 
richer meaning to the "all" that m a  n has at stake in the struggle 
for self-knowledge, and of which Richard gains only an inkling; 
but he also m a d e it a more elusive goal. 
Like Shakespeare's earlier plays in general, Richard II delineates a 
road to self-knowledge and points .up its potential rewards. Self-loss 
and self-finding take place in a cosmic frame the purposes of which 
are fairly evident. T h  e play suggests not only a definable ideal of 
humanity but also of kingship—the ruler w h  o is legitimate, moral, 
and strong. A n  d though the play deals with disharmony, it shows 
harmony as attainable and indeed destined for England at a future 
time. 
In hinting at such attainable ideals lies, I think, the main signifi­
cance of two episodes that precede the catastrophe of Richard's 
death: the conspiracy of Aumerle, ending in pardon, and the n e w 
king's reference to his wayward but promising son. T h e small drama-
within-the-drama of the Aumerle episode finds its happy resolution 
in the same scene in which Bolingbroke is induced to inquire about 
the dissolute prince w h o , as Shakespeare's audience knew, became 
the healer and harmonizer of England. York's betrayal of his son 
(or should w e speak about York's loyalty to the only ruler w h o can 
rule?) points up the troubles of England in the frame of one family; 
but Bolingbroke's pardon of Aumerle turns a mother's grief to joy 
and moves, as do Shakespeare's early comedies, from confusion to 
its resolution, from disruption to unity. O n  e small link of the broken 
chain is restored. A n d in Bolingbroke's words about Hal, w e hear not 
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merely a father's distress but see also the son's "sparks of better 
hope, which elder years / M a  y happily bring forth" (V.iii.21-22). In 
evoking this future development and the concomitant rise of England 
surely lies the main interest of this speech and not in any reference 
to a play or plays about the life of the prince and king Shakespeare 
intended to write—of this intention Shakespeare's audience knew 
nothing. Thus the movement of grief is temporarily relieved by 
some, if muted, notes of joy and hope. Appropriately, even if one of 
these notes does come from Bolingbroke, it is struck before those of 
grief and fear associated with him in the end, notes that are the 
finale of the tragedy of Richard. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
Henry V: 
Patterning after Perfection 
TH E T H E S I  S of this chapter, that in Henry V Shake­speare portrayed what was for him at the time an ideal or nearly ideal character—that is, a m a  n and a king w h  o thor­
oughly knows himself—is by no means revolutionary; but in view 
of the coldness and even hostility with which in particular twentieth-
century critics have considered Henry, it is not a mere statement of 
the obvious.1 A n  d even if  m y main argument is not new, I believe 
some of the reasons I shall give in its support are; and, I hope, 
they will help to restore a badly needed objectivity about a character 
w h o is not as simple as some have thought but hardly deserves to 
be as controversial as he has become. 
It is eminently reasonable to assume that Shakespeare, w h  o in 
agreement with tradition had laid out the character of the future 
Henry V as developing from profligacy to reform in the two parts 
of Henry IV, wished to dramatize the triumph of this evolution in 
his new play. It is equally apparent that all of Shakespeare's previous 
history plays lead up to Henry V, which forms their culmination 
and, except for the afterthought of Henry VIII, their conclusion.  So 
far, Shakespeare had dramatized the lives and reigns of kings w h  o 
were, at best, partial successes as rulers and some of w h o  m were 
unmitigated disasters for England: the saintly but ineffective Henry 
V I  ; the sardonic Machiavellian and killer Richard III; the willful 
and larmoyant Richard II; the strong but guilty Henry IV, whose 
reign was troubled by the conflicts arising from his usurpation of 
the throne. In King John, Shakespeare depicted another ruler whose 
title was flawed by broken succession and w h o brought misfortune 
to his country. But in this play, there also appears a popular hero, 
Faulconbridge, w h  o becomes, in troubled times, the pillar and hope 
of England. A drama about a strong and victorious king w h o pos­
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sessed Faulconbridge's popular virtues and w h  o had not incurred 
guilt by obtaining the crown illegally, as had John and Henry IV, 
was the logical capstone of Shakespeare's history plays. 
It is surely also plausible that, after depicting such conspicuous 
exemplars of lack of humanistic self-knowledge as Tarquin, Richard 
III, and Richard II, Shakespeare wished to dramatize the life of a 
king w h o was what the moralists considered to be an ideal m a n , a 
"pattern of perfection," as Levinus Lemnius called it in The Touch­
stone of Complexions (trans. 1565). Lemnius devoted a whole chap­
ter to portraying just such a m a n , one w h o was, as he said in the 
physicians' terminology, "of a complexion perfectly and exactly tem­
perate." This ideal m a  n has a body "featly framed" and a mind 
"well settled and perfectly stayed"; he is balanced, quick-witted, in­
dustrious, cheerful, constant, but yet humane and gentle. In other 
words, he possesses both a Galenic crasis and a humanistic moral 
temperance. Lemnius admitted that absolute perfection existed only 
in Christ, but mortal m e  n might at least approach the ideal.2 Other 
theorists claimed that kings could come closest to it; their office, as 
Huarte said in Examen de Ingenios (trans. 1594), m a d e possible 
the greatest wisdom and knowledge in the world, an assertion he 
exemplified by Solomon and by Christ, the "King of the Jews"— 
both were physiologically and morally temperate according to 
Huarte.3 
A s w e have noted earlier, there was a substantial humanistic litera­
ture on the subject of h o w princes could imitate these patterns of 
perfection, a literature given direction by Erasmus's influential 
Institutio Principis Christiani (1516).4 Its premise was that the 
good king must be a good m a  n and a good Christian. Erasmus said 
it was quite possible to find a good m a n w h o would not make a good 
prince, but there could be no good prince w h o was not also a good 
m a n .  5 T h  e excellences of a king therefore derived largely from the 
excellences of m a n  . Just as a m a  n needed to possess the four cardinal 
virtues of fortitude, justice, prudence, and, in particular, temperance 
—the virtue central to self-knowledge—so did the king, and to a 
higher degree. 
In portraying Henry, Shakespeare showed himself cognizant of 
these humanistic requirements, as did the chroniclers on w h o  m he 
based the play. Both Hall and Holinshed conspicuously praised 
Henry as a pattern of perfection. Edward Hall, whose history of the 
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W a  r of the Roses Shakespeare appears to have consulted, called 
Henry "a blazing comet and apparent lantern in his days . .  . the 
mirror of Christendom and the glory of his country, . .  . the flower 
of kings past, and a glass of them that would succeed" 6—from which 
series of laudatory epithets Shakespeare probably derived the 
Chorus's praise of Henry as "the mirror of all Christian kings" 
(II.6). Like Hall, and borrowing from him, Raphael Holinshed 
appended to his account of Henry's reign a formal praise, a laus in 
terms of humanistic classical rhetoric, which emphasized the King's 
possession of the four cardinal virtues. Henry, said Holinshed, was 
"a justicer both loved and obeyed, . .  . a terror to rebels and a 
suppressor to sedition. . . ." H  e was "so manful of mind as never 
seen toflinch at a woun  d or to smart at a pain. . .  . O  f courage in­
vincible, of purpose immutable. . . ." N  o m a  n was "more moderate 
in eating and drinking. . . . Wantonness of life and thirst in 
avarice he had quite quenched in him." H  e possessed "such wit, 
such prudence, and such policy withall, that he never enterprised 
anything before he had fully debated and forecast all the main chances 
that might happen, which done, with all diligence and courage he set 
his purpose forward." 7 
Instances in which Shakespeare's Henry exemplifies these four 
cardinal virtues come easily to mind. H  e demonstrates his sense of 
justice through restraint as well as, whe  n necessary, through se­
verity: he pardons the drunken m a n w h o scorns him, and, in the 
same scene, he suppresses sedition by condemning the traitorous 
Scroop, Cambridge, and Grey to death—a punishment that they 
themselves unwittingly have declared appropriate for their crimes. 
In meting out this judgment, Shakespeare's Henry emphasizes that 
"Touching our person seek w e no revenge; / But w e our kingdom's 
safety must so tender, / . . . that to her laws / W  e do deliver you" 
(II.ii.174—77). Henry dispenses justice in the w a y Erasmus thought 
a prince should: he forgives most readily those crimes that affect 
him alone, and he seeks to punish rather than to take revenge.® 
The fortitude of the victor of Agincourt hardly needs proof. 
Neither does his temperance, which is so strong as to have irritated 
some critics w h o have called it priggishness. Henry's plea to the 
French ambassadors not to fear that he might take a personal ven­
geance on them for any insult contained in their official messages 
proves temperance to be central to his ideal of kingship: 
Il6 THEORY AND ADAPTATION 
W  e are no tyrant, but a Christian king, 
Unto whose grace our passion is as subject 
A  s are our wretches fett'red in our prisons. 
(I.ii.241-43) 
It is remarkable h o  w technically accurate Shakespeare's portrayal 
of Henry's temperance is in terms of the h u m o r physiology. Henry's 
appearance and behavior in the morning just before the battle of 
Agincourt approach so closely the description of the pattern of per­
fection in Levinus Lemnius's chapter " O f a Complexion Perfectly 
and Exactly Temperate" as to raise the suspicion of being modeled 
on it. Shakespeare had no warrant for this incident in his sources; in 
these, H e n r y had no need to show himself to his troops in the way 
he does in the play: the English, though outnumbered, were described 
as in good spirits. In the play, they sorely require the encouragement 
of the radiant king that walks a m o n g them: 
For forth he goes and visits all his host;

Bids them good morrow with a modest smile,

A n  d calls them brothers, friends, and countrymen.

U p o  n his royal face there is no note

H o  w dread an army hath enrounded him;

N o  r doth he dedicate one jot of colour

Unto the weary and all-watched night;

But freshly looks, and over-bears attaint

With cheerful semblance and sweet majesty.

(IV. Prol. 32-40) 
H e n r y here looks and acts quite like Lemnius's temperate m a n , w h o 
hath all his senses fresh and perfect, every of the faculties natural 
duly doing his office and function. . . . For in him plentifully ap­
peareth, and is evidently descried: humanity, gentleness, frugality, 
equity, modesty, and a continent moderation of all affections. . . . 
[He] suffereth all the discommodities of life with a mind stout, 
cheerful, and invincible, and such a one as will not at any hand be 
drawn away from his constancy and settled determination. . . . 
For in the countenance, which is the image of the mind, in the eyes, 
which are the bewrayers and token-tellers of the inward conceits, 
in the color, lineaments, proportion and feature of the whole body, 
there appeareth a kind of heroical grace and amiableness in so much 
that the very view and sight thereof allureth and draweth everyone 
by a certain secret sympathy or consent of nature to love it without 
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any hope or profit or commodity thereby to be reaped or received. 
The body is decently made and featly framed, containing an abso­
lute construction and comely frame of all the parts together. . . . 
The head . . . [is] greatly honored with a pair of amiable eyes, 
. . . the color fresh, sweet, and pleasant.9 
Henry has the magnetic attraction of Lemnius's ideal; he becomes, 
therefore, a pattern for imitation by his troops, w h o  , pining and 
pale before, "pluck comfort from his looks." In a "largess universal, 
like the sun," Henry gives "his liberal eye . .  . to every one, / 
Thawing cold fear." A s is true for Lemnius's ideal m a n , the tem­
perance of Henry rubs off on all, low and high, w h o behold "a little 
touch of Harry in the night" (41 ff*.). 
Henry also possesses an extraordinary prudence, which manifests 
itself both in peace and war. Before embarking on the invasion of 
France, he assures himself circumspectly of the justice of his claim 
to the French crown, and he takes the necessary precautions to pro­
tect his kingdom from the rapacious Scots. T h e initiative to these 
measures comes from him, not, as in the sources, from his counselors. 
H e can say justly that he has "all things thought upon / That 
m a  y with reasonable swiftness add / M o r  e feathers to our wings" 
(I.ii.305-7). In warfare, Henry's prudence shows itself in stern 
words when he convinces the people of Harfleur that they must sur­
render; at other times, it proves itself in stern actions and at least 
once in an order that appears to be so severe as to be cruel, that of 
cutting the French prisoners' throats during the battle of Agincourt. 
This action—adopted by Shakespeare from Holinshed, w h  o ex­
plained it as absolutely necessary—has cost Henry some sympathies; 
but w  e should note that it is not occasioned by willful ferocity: it 
comes at the m o m e n  t of greatest peril, w h e  n the endangered and 
outnumbered English are threatened by a n e  w attack just after the 
French, as Fluellen puts it, have "killed the poys and luggage." Both 
Gower and Fluellen think this action a cowardly violation of the law 
of arms, as did Holinshed and, one must assume, Shakespeare. At 
other times, when prudence permits it, Henry shows himself lenient, 
as when he forbids Harfleur to be sacked and pillaged—Shakespeare 
here directly contradicted Holinshed. Shakespeare's Henry, to say 
the least, is not unnecessarily cruel; he knows that "when lenity 
and cruelty play for a kingdom the gentler gamester is the soonest 
winner" (III.vi.108). 
Henry's practical calculations in politics and strategy have created 
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the suspicion that he is, at heart, a "Machiavellian." 10 O n  e might 
say, of course, that in Shakespeare's time, as well as before and after, 
every successful absolutist ruler, including so seemingly gentle and 
certainly popular a monarch as Queen Elizabeth, was something of a 
Machiavellian. But the epithet is as inappropriate for Henry as it is 
for Elizabeth if it is taken in the Elizabethan sense. For ordinary 
Elizabethans, although not for some advanced spirits, a Machia­
vellian prince was not merely shrewd, sometimes severe, and occa­
sionally devious; he was a monster in h u m a n shape. That Shake­
speare did not belong to the coterie of Machiavelli's admirers, I 
have argued elsewhere. A n  d a comparison of some essential features 
of Henry's portrait with what the Elizabethans considered the key 
chapters in The Prince shows that if Shakespeare read this book at 
all—and I incline to think that he knew at least the argument of 
these key chapters—he was motivated by it to m a k e his Henry 
different from Machiavelli's standard. 
For Machiavelli, prudence was the only one of the conventional 
humanistic virtues a prince needed to possess; he might, it is true, 
outwardly display others as long as they did not impede his success. 
In the famous eighteenth chapter of The Prince, Machiavelli con­
tended that what mattered for a ruler was not that he should be 
good but that he should be thought to be good—actual goodness 
could even be harmful. Machiavelli reacted adversely to the stereo­
typed praises of princes' virtues, such as their temperance, clemency, 
and justice, which in another famous chapter, the fifteenth, he crit­
icized as irrelevant. This chapter is entitled (in the seventeenth-
century translation of E d w a r d Dacres) "Of Those Things in Respect 
Whereof M a n  , and Especially Princes, Are Praised or Dispraised." 
Qualities of this kind, Machiavelli argued, were apt to bring about 
the ruin rather than the success of princes. But Henry V contains, as 
I shall show, a number of elaborate rhetorical praises of Henry's 
humanistic virtues. T  o assume that they are insincere would make 
the play a huge effort in irony—an irony that no Elizabethan could 
have understood. If rhetoric is to be equated with insincerity, Renais­
sance literature as a whole is insincere. 
But surely the conventional laudes in Henry V serve the function 
of delineating an ideal m a  n and king; praise and dispraise were, 
after all, the traditional ways of rhetorical characterization. It has 
been demonstrated that Shakespeare modeled his praises of Henry 
closely on patterns in Aphthonius's Progymnasmata, the standard 
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schoolbook for such exercises11—an indication that he was intent 
on creating a correct rhetorical frame for his portrait of perfection. 
The several Aphthonian praises in the play specify Henry's nobility, 
courage, temperance, knowledge, and piety, and they are not shown 
to be inappropriate by the action that they introduce or on which 
they comment. 
The most significant formal praises are: the bishops' accolade of 
Henry, preceding his first appearance; the Chorus's introduction 
to the climactic battle of Agincourt, which praise w  e have noted as 
primarily lauding Henry's temperance (IV.Prol.28 ff.) ; and Fluel­
len's comparison of Henry to Alexander (IV.vii.21), which is both 
a military compliment and, as w  e shall see, another testimony to 
Henry's temperance. 
Thefirst of these, the most elaborate laus and the one most re­
vealing for Shakespeare's conception of Henry, warrants detailed 
analysis. The bishops' conversation deals with " h o w things are 
perfected" (68) in the character of Henry; it is a praise in the A p h  ­
thonian form of narratio. Understandably, the bishops are concerned 
primarily with Henry's religious development into a "lover of the 
holy Church"; they approve of his acquisition of "grace," but they 
also acclaim his secular accomplishment, his "fair regard" (22-23). 
This introduction to the person and his attainment (persona faciens, 
in Aphthonian terms) is followed by an account of the time in 
which it occurred (24-27, Aphthonius's tempus circa quod), of the 
way in which it came about (28-37, modus quo pacto), and of the 
specific qualities of mind acquired (38-52, res gestas animi) ; the 
laus is concluded by a statement on the reason w h  y this development 
occurred (53-66, causa propter quam). T h  e Bishop of Canterbury 
determines the tempus circa quod as the time of Henry IV's death 
and stresses the suddenness of the modus quo pacto: "The breath 
no sooner left his father's body / But that his wildness, mortified in 
him, / Seem'd to die too" (25-27). Henry's transformation was a 
"reformation"; "consideration" came like an angel and whipped the 
"offending A d a m  " out of him. A listing of his res gestae animi 
shows the comprehensiveness of the change: the king is as good a 
debater in theology as he is in commonwealth affairs and discourses 
of war.12 Only on the causa propter quam do the bishops differ. T h  e 
Bishop of Canterbury considers Henry's sudden scholarship mirac­
ulous, although he cannot call it a miracle because theology has 
established that miracles have ceased; the Bishop of Ely thinks of it 
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as a hidden growth—and a typically English one at that: "The 
strawberry grows underneath the nettle . . .  " (60 ff.). Thus 
Shakespeare glanced at the chronicler's claim that Henry's change 
partook of the nature of a religious conversion; but he also reinforced 
the impression he created in the Henry IV plays that under the veil of 
wildness the prince prepared himself for his future role as king. The 
praises of the bishops form an important link between the earlier 
plays and Henry V and testify to Shakespeare's consistent view of 
Henry's development. 
T h  e second elaborate laus is in the form of a strange comparatio 
between Henry and Alexander perpetrated by the brave, if long-
winded and somewhat illogical, Fluellen (IV.vii.n ff.). After finding 
m u c  h relevance in the fact that both conquerors were born in cities 
with rivers, Fluellen mentions a famous episode: "Alexander . . . 
in his rages, and his furies, and his wraths, and his cholers, and his 
moods , and his displeasures, and his indignations, and also being.a 
little intoxicates in the prains, did, in his ales and his angers, look 
you, kill his best friend, Cleitus." O  n the protest of Gower that "our 
king is not like him in that," Fluellen continues with his "figures and 
comparisons": " A  s Alexander kill'd his friend Cleitus, being in his 
ales and his cups, so also Harry M o n m o u t h , being in his right wits 
and his good judgments, turn'd away the fat knight with the great 
belly doublet. . . ." But, ironically, what Fluellen conceives as 
similitudo serves to underline the dissimilitudo of Henry and Alex­
ander. Fluellen, although unwittingly, brings out the feature of 
Alexander the humanists thought objectionable, his intemperance, a 
feature which Henry does not share—witness his turning out that 
lovable embodiment of intemperance, Falstaff! Erasmus had ad­
monished Christian kings to imitate the Macedonian conqueror's 
commendable valor but not to slide back to his deplorable intem­
13 perance.
Only superficially does the situation in which Fluellen compares 
Henry and Alexander warrant the parallel. It is true that Henry 
has just given orders to kill the French prisoners and that he is 
about to enter the stage in fiery spirit: "I was not angry . . . / 
Until this instant" (IV.vii.52). A  s w  e noted before, the king's 
behavior is quite in accord with military prudence, Renaissance (and, 
deplorably, even modern) style, and his anger transfers itself to his 
troops as an incitement for renewed attack. Whenever Henry ap­
pears angry, as at Harfleur, it is to incite his countrymen. Whenever 
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Henry boasts, as before the battle of Agincourt, it is not to aggran­
dize himself but to glorify England. Outwardly, he m a  y seem as 
obsessed with honor as Hotspur: "But if it be a sin to covet honour, / 
I a m the most offending soul alive" (IV.iii.28-29). Henry's sense 
of honor, however, is not egotistic like that of Hotspur, nor does it 
demand the ostentatious reverence Richard II sought of his subjects. 
Henry rejects the idea of having his sword carried before him dur­
ing his triumphal return to London ; he is "free from vainness and 
self-glorious pride," as the Chorus says ( V . 2 0 ) . For him, the 
greatest glory is that of heaven, attained in the flight of man's better 
part, his soul, upward; he tells Mountjoy that the fallen English 
will be "fam'd; for there the sun shall greet them / A n  d draw their 
honours reeking up to heaven, / Leaving their earthly parts to choke 
your clime" (IV.iii. 100-102). Whatever one m a y think of Henry's 
warrior spirit—he would be doomed without it—it is not an illusion 
based on a glamorous view of war. For him as for the humanists, 
war is a fearful thing, and the greatest honor is not of the earth but 
of heaven. 
Whenever Shakespeare compares Henry to Alexander, he sug­
gests, sometimes quite subtly, a difference between the two. At the 
beginning of the play, the bishops say in their praises that Henry 
knows h o w to untie the "Gordian knot" of policy; but what they 
have in mind requires the word rather than the sword. A n d when 
at Harfleur Henry evokes the n a m e of Alexander, it is not to identify 
himself with the Macedonian conqueror but with his and his soldiers' 
ancestors: 
O n  , on, you noblest English, 
Whose blood is fet from fathers of warproof— 
Fathers that like so many Alexanders 
Have in these parts from morn till even fought, 
A n  d sheath'd their swords for lack of argument. 
(III.i.17-21) 
M o n m o u t  h and Macedonia m a  y be similar in that they have rivers, 
as Fluellen observes, but Henry and Alexander have little in com ­
m o  n besides courage and soldiership. T  o have said "we few, we 
happy few" would have been quite out of character for the Alexander 
described by Plutarch or Erasmus. 
Shakespeare, w h  o is likely to have read Plutarch's Life of Alex­
ander while composing Henry V, also appears to have glanced at 
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the Life of Caesar, set in parallel to that of the Macedonian con­
queror. W h e  n the Chorus of thefifth act describes Henry as return­
ing triumphantly to London, the mayor and the citizens are said to 
swarm around him like the senators and plebeians of R o m e , w h o 
"go forth and fetch their conqu'ring Caesar in." But here again 
Shakespeare was concerned with emphasizing contrast as well as 
likeness: the Chorus's immediately preceding observation on Henry's 
modesty in refusing to have his helmet and sword carried before him 
offsets any suspicion that he shares the burning ambition that Plu­
tarch and general tradition associated with Caesar. 
W h  y is it then that this glorious and yet modest king w h o  m 
Shakespeare extolled above all others—"praise and glory on his 
head" (IV.31)—has been so little admired by modern critics? A  n 
accolade like that of H u d s o n is a rare phenomenon indeed: 
Henry is the most complex and many-sided of all Shakespeare's 
heroes with the one exception of Hamlet, if indeed Hamlet ought to 
be excepted. . . . The character of Shakespeare's Henry m a y al­
most be said to consist of piety, honesty, and modesty. H  e embodies 
these qualities in their simplest form. H  e is honest in his piety, 
pious and modest in his honesty.14 
T h e scarcity of such wholehearted eulogies of Henry's character 
is, I believe, in large part due to the nature of the pattern of perfection 
Shakespeare embodied in him. A  n appreciation of any idealization 
depends on the viewer's sympathy with the ideals portrayed or at 
least demands his willingness to respond to them aesthetically, and 
w  e have grown far away from the ideals portrayed in Henry, those 
of moderation and balance, which the humanists derived from Chris­
tian ideas of sobriety as well as from classical concepts of harmony 
and self-control. Also, there are dramatic limitations to the portrayal 
of a perfectly stable temperament. T h  e king is in equilibrium; unlike 
the dauphin's horse, to which the owner devotes an unusual laus 
(III.vii.11 ff.). Henry is not just fire and air; but the "duller ele­
ments," earth and water, drag him, at times, d o w n . (Henry's fire, 
it must be said, also has proved bothersome to critics.) Even before 
attaining his later perfection, in the Henry IV plays, Hal already 
is weighed d o w n somewhat by the duller elements when, for in­
stance, his moderate attitude toward honor makes him look a little 
pale compared to the gloriously obsessed Hotspur and the funnily 
"discreet" Falstaff. There are elements of dullness in all moderation 
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even when it comes about, as in Henry's case, by control over a 
strong temperament. But to find fault with Shakespeare's portrait of 
him because he is not m a  d or insane or inspired with a divine afflatus 
is as foolish as to criticize a Holbein figure for not writhing in the 
agonies of El Greco's "Laocoon." 
In order to account for their discomfort with Henry, critics have 
been driven to contradictory explanations and, in the process, have 
furnished proof that his character cannot be summarized in a simple 
formula. O n e critic dislikes him for being too formal—"he is never 
off the platform" 15—and another finds him too brisk and folksy— 
"a hearty undergraduate with enormous initials on his chest." 16 T h e 
truth is that Henry can be either formal or folksy, and always at 
the right time. Generally, in speeches from the throne and in ad­
dresses to his troops, he speaks in a ceremonial and almost ritualistic 
language; but, as the Williams episode shows, he has not forgotten 
the idiom of the people he learned in the taverns of Eastcheap. 
The formal aspects of Henry's character are enhanced by Shake­
speare's casting him—in particular, through the praises of the 
choruses—in the role of a kind of epic hero.17 Henry is given some 
of the traits Virgil lauds in his vir perfectus, Aeneas—fortitudo, 
constantia, justitia, religio, pietas, industria, celeritas, prudentia, and 
ratio—traits that are not apt to w a r m modern hearts for either hero. 
Yet Henry is certainly m u c h less priggish than Aeneas; his self-
awareness has dimensions and subtleties with which Virgil did not 
endow his R o m a  n pattern of perfection. Henry knows the hollow­
ness of his crown and reflects on it in a great soliloquy. H  e realizes 
that the paraphernalia of kingship are nothing but "place, degree, and 
form, / Creating awe and fear in other m e n " (IV.i.242 ff.). Unlike 
Richard II, he is not blinded by the glitter of his robe; he has the 
self-knowledge that, as Sir T h o m a s Elyot said, makes a m a n of 
authority realize that he has a body and soul like any other m a n .  1  8 
W h e n  , incognito, he explains to the soldier that the king is but a 
m a n , his words have the concreteness of experience: "The violet 
smells to him as it doth to m e  ; the element shows to him as it doth 
to m e  ; all his senses have but h u m a  n conditions; his ceremonies 
laid by, in his nakedness he appears but a m a n  ; and though his 
affections are higher mounted than ours, yet, when they stoop, they 
stoop with the like wing." Like Lemnius's pattern of perfection, 
Henry is a m a n of feeling, not a m o n u m e n t of stone and marble. H e 
even knows fear; yet he will never show it, "lest he, by showing it, 
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should dishearten his army" (IV.i.102 ff.). In this sense of total 
outward control, Henry is always on a platform; by accepting his 
position and his duties as obligatory, he remains on a platform. 
Because the king's public persona is prominent, some critics have 
insisted that there is nothing left of the sophisticated and courtly 
irony that marked the prince.19 But I do not think this is a totally 
fair appraisal. T h e king betrays—just at the moments when he is 
most optimistic and approaches outwardly M r  . V a n Doren's expan­
sive undergraduate—a certain detachment from his role or, at least, 
an engaging lack of illusion about it. So he does when, before his 
troops on the morning of Agincourt, he breathes an infectious self-
confidence: 
There is some soul of goodness in things evil, 
Would m e n observingly distil it out; 
For our bad neighbour makes us early stirrers, 
Which is both healthful and good husbandry. 
Besides, they are our outward consciences 
A n  d preachers to us all, admonishing 
That w  e should dress us fairly for our end. 
Thus m a y w e gather honey from the weed, 
A n d make a moral of the devil himself. 
(IV.i.4-12) 
Henry expresses what must be one of the oldest of h u m a n consola­
tions, that nothing is so bad but some good can be found in it; he 
does so, however, in a w a y that points up the absurdity to which 
a rationalizing optimism can be driven and sometimes was driven 
in Shakespeare's time. Henry identifies the "outward consciences" 
not merely with the "preachers" but also with the "bad neighbour" 
w h o is responsible for making one rise early; thus, in effect, he 
identifies the outward consciences with the enemy. Indeed, by the 
quirk of the figure, the consciences—or, if one prefers, the preachers 
—become the devil. Shakespeare must have heard similar oratorical 
gems from the pulpit.20 Shakespeare-Henry continues, I think, this 
subtle parody into the immediately following "proof" that " 'Tis 
good for m e n to love their present pains": 
U p o  n example; so the spirit is eased ; 
A n d when the mind is quick'ned, out of doubt 
The organs, though defunct and dead before, 
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Break up their drowsy grave and newly move 
With casted slough and fresh legerity. 
(IV.i.19-23) 
These words form an odd echo to Renaissance doctors' recommen­
dations of "reasonable exercise and convenient motion." This latter 
phrase is Lemnius's, whose proof very m u c h resembles Henry's: 
"For by it [the exercise] the quickness and vigor of his mind is 
revived, the faint, drowsy spirits stirred up and awaked, the soul 
and mind cheered and exhilarated, all the parts of the body and all 
the senses both within and without m a d  e nimble, active, perfect, and 
ready to do their proper functions." 21 Henry's words, which re­
semble Lemnius's jargon, parody such advice on physical fitness. 
B  y applying it to readiness for deadly battles, the king demonstrates, 
not only that he knows what is expected of patterns of perfection 
but also that he can detach himself ironically from the means he 
must employ as a leader. 
H  e stops short of the frivolity he indulged as a prince; he feels 
too keenly his responsibility. H  e remains the shepherd and protector 
of his people that the Christian humanists demanded a king should 
be. But he does so in full awareness of the sacrifices his position 
entails. Erasmus said abstractly that a king must watch and spend 
sleepless nights over the welfare of his subjects,22 but Henry knows 
concretely what it means to face "horrid night, the child of hell." 
The m a n w h o cheerfully greets his troops on the morning of the 
battle of Agincourt has slept little. Henry is, of course, not neurotic; 
to expect him to be so is to wish him to be less effective and more 
imperfect—an understandable wish. Even though Henry knows the 
abyss of the soul, he does not probe it lest he plunge his nation into 
it. 
H o  w simple is that Henry, then, w h o calls himself a "plain king" 
when he woos the French princess in terms that are indeed prosaic 
and artless? In this role, Henry does appear to come close to the 
blunt and somewhat coarse king of the popular tradition and of 
Shakespeare's source play, The Famous Victories of Henry V. But 
what is one to think w h e n one critic finds him guilty here of "mili­
tary grossness" 23 while another castigates him for his clever " M a  ­
chiavellian" scheme of obtaining the inheritance of France through 
the hand of her princess ? 24 T h  e truth of the matter is surely that 
Henry's wooing has both a h u m a n and a political purpose and that 
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for him the two purposes are not at variance; he pursues them with 
his usual ingenuity, sobriety, and success. 
Henry's firm and unproblematic marriage to success is perhaps his 
greatest handicap for receiving sympathetic appreciation. W h  o could 
read without some uneasiness a statement such as that of H  . A  . 
Evans in the Old Arden Edition: "Conscientious, brave, just, ca­
pable, and tenacious, Henry stands before us as the embodiment of 
worldly success, and as such he is entitled to our unreserved ad­
miration." Evans m a y have felt some discomfort with his o w n 
boldness, for he continued with a slight lapse in logic, "Such a 
character he [the reader] will accept with its inseparable limitations 
as Shakespeare intended it to be accepted; he will not look for those 
finer touches of the intellect or of the emotions which mark the hero 
of another sort; he will miss, as has been well said, the light that is 
upon the brow of a Hamlet or an Othello." 25 Henry surely does 
have some of thesefiner touches; if he lacks a "light upon his brow," 
whatever that exactly means, is it not because he is gloriously suc­
cessful rather than radiantly doomed as are Hamlet and Othello ? 
O f course, Henry does not have the tragic heroes' penchant for 
passion; the very keys to his success are sobriety and temperance. 
W h e  n Shakespeare wrote Henry V, he is likely to have thought of 
these traits not only as fundamental for a pattern of perfection but 
also as conducive to success. So, for that matter, did the Puritans. 
But this Puritan ideal of a combination of morality and success, 
which after Shakespeare dominated the English middle class, owed 
something not only to Calvin but also to Christian humanism, 
which was the more powerful in its influence on life as it merged 
with a native piety. O n  e can think of none better to exemplify these 
pre-Puritan virtues than Sir T h o m a s More . Henry has them too: 
he is sober, temperate, prudent, self-controlled, pious, and practical. 
H  e thus embodies features that historically have been associated 
with the English national character. H  e appears, perhaps even more 
to a non-English observer, eminently English—and, after all, Shake­
speare conceived him as such. There is surely every reason to be­
lieve that it is a sympathetic portrait. Indeed, that side of Shake­
speare's o w  n character which led to his business success as a share­
holder of the Globe and landowner of Stratford must have had 
something in c o m m o n with Henry. 
T h e dissatisfaction of some modern critics w h o declare Henry to 
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be simple-minded derives not so m u c  h from the king's character 
as from his situation: he is not in the kind of problematic predica­
ment w e generally like our heroes to be in. But in Shakespeare's 
conception of the interplay of character and history, which underlay 
his Henry V as well as his other history plays, Henr  y could not be in 
such a predicament. Because he and England are in harmony, he 
cannot suffer the anguish of a Richard II that comes from dis­
harmony. Henry expresses the spirit of England somewhat as Tol­
stoy's Marshall Kutuzov expresses that of Russia; he cannot, like a 
Dostoevskian character, plumb the depth of his mysterious soul. H  e 
is a pattern of perfection put in a perfect frame; but, unfortunately, 
w  e are not well attuned to the pattern and the frame. Henr  y is an 
authentic hero w h  o challenges us in our age of anti-heroes; he is a 
military leader, whose acceptance of the conditions of war offends 
our pacifist leanings; he is a m a n of success, w h o makes us uneasy 
because w e have come to distrust success. W e are not used to plays 
that celebrate public figures of his kind. But it certainly will not do 
to make the play into something that it is not and cannot be, such 
as an accusation against war (it is, of course, not a defense) or an 
exposure of Machiavellian scheming. 
In the context of this study, Henry V and the portrait of its hero 
indicate a culmination of one phase of Shakespeare's development. 
If clear placement, compositional perspective, and a system of pro­
portions and balances that brings about a unified design can be taken 
to be characteristic principles of Renaissance art, as art historians 
say they can be, Henry V is a play that is most characteristic of the 
Renaissance. T h  e principles are evident in the texture and the struc­
ture of the play, such as in the careful gradation of language and 
style according to the principles of artistic decorum, in the oratorical 
patterns of speeches suitable for the occasion, and in the clear act 
divisions, marked by choruses whose epic tone sets the m o o d for the 
particular dramatic action that follows. T h  e play has the kind of 
"multiple unity" art historians discern in Renaissance paintings.26 
It celebrates the providential synthesis of character, nation, and des­
tiny at an ideal m o m e n t of English history. Henry V is placed in 
the structural and ideological center of this play comparable to the 
way Renaissance painters placed the h u m a n figure on their canvases 
and the Christian humanists described m a  n as the significant center 
of the harmonious cosmic circles. Henr  y is an ideal king according 
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to the design that makes him the soul of his nation; he is himself 
symmetrically constructed, a balanced m a n  , a pattern of perfection, 
the ideal creator and beneficiary of the ideal historical moment . 
But Henry V, which marks a kind of culmination of one phase 
of Shakespeare's developing patterns of self-knowledge, is also near 
the end of this phase. T h  e high comedies seem still to belong to this 
phase, to continue and perfect it in another genre. But whe  n Shake­
speare turned away from English histories and romantic comedies, 
he was subjected to the influence of different models and, at about 
this time, appears also to have felt the effect of n e  w currents of 
thought, as I shall argue in the next chapter. It is possible that he 
was already in doubt whether the pattern he adopted in Henry V 
and brought to a successful conclusion was really relevant to his o w n 
time. I do not think one should read an uneasiness or dissatisfac­
tion of Shakespeare with his subject into the apologies of the choruses 
for the inadequacies of the stage; the lines are poetic helps to give 
the viewer the feeling that he is watching what w e like to call an 
event of epic proportions, for the presentation of which w  e moderns 
have technically more adequate but less poetic means. Perhaps more 
remarkable, because not conditioned by artistic requirements, is the 
w a y Henry distances himself psychologically from the role he su­
perblyfills. A n  d there is a small note at the very end, in the epilogue, 
that draws attention to the precarious nature of the synthesis cele­
brated in the play. This is the passing reference to Henry's son, the 
child-king Henry V I , under w h o  m "the world's best garden" was 
brought again into disorder. This is not an orchestral movement 
that disturbs the present celebration; it is not comparable to the 
stronger and reverse effect noted in the discussion of Richard II: 
there a movement of joy in the form of the pardon of Aumerle and 
of the promise of hope in Hal preceded the finale of grief and pro­
vided some comfort. T h e celebration does not turn into anxious 
questioning; w  e are only reminded of fortune and the course of 
history. But the brittleness of all earthly achievements is at least 
implied. Perhaps for Shakespeare, too, the glory of kings had passed. 
In his work, at any rate, it was never again to shine as radiantly as it 
does in Henry V. 
PART THREE

Problems and Ambiguities


CHAPTER EIGHT 
The Real versus the Ideal:

Taking a Skeptic View

UNUSUALLY T R U S T W O R T H Y EVIDENCE points to Shakespeare's having written Henry V and Julius Caesar in the same year, 1599. Yet the two plays have marked dif­
ferences, which go beyond those that one expects between a history 
and a tragedy. Henry V is a translucent play that centers on the 
hero-king it celebrates; Julius Caesar, by contrast, is controversial in 
all its aspects: in its structure, its theme, its thought, and the quality 
of the major characters.1 But the relevance of the two plays to our 
time appears to be in an inverse ratio to their degree of clarity. 
Henry V, at least w h e  n presented as a national celebration of a 
heroic king, has seemed to m a n  y a twentieth-century critic peculiarly 
dated and has been strongly popular only in times of a consciously 
felt outward threat, such as existed in the forties, w h e  n patriotism 
and heroism were in men's hearts. Julius Caesar is quite a different 
case; its gripping account of power-play and its controversial major 
character are congenial to our problem-oriented age. A n  d so is the 
group of plays Shakespeare wrote soon afterward, Hamlet, Troilus 
and Cressida, All's Well That Ends Well, and Measure for Measure. 
Hamlet, of course, has always been popular. But the three other 
so-called problem plays have come into their o w n only in recent 
years, when it has been proved that they can be effective on the 
stage in spite of their complexities, ambiguities, and vexations and 
when they have attracted critical interest for these very features. 
They appear to have a special modernity that transcends whatever 
artistic defects they m a  y have, a modernity w  e do not quite experi­
ence in Shakespeare's earlier works. 
I believe w e do best to understand the plays of this group, the two 
tragedies and the three "problem comedies" (for simplicity's sake, 
Troilus and Cressida m a  y here be called a comedy) as constituting 
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in Shakespeare's creative work a special phase, one in which he 
became highly sensitive to changing intellectual and cultural tenden­
cies of an age that has a fascinating resemblance to our o w  n age of 
accelerated change. T h  e five plays are united by a c o m m o  n "style" 
in the art historians' sense of the word, that is, they share identifiable 
features that give them a certain likeness and that can be seen as 
responses to a particular mentality of an age. I would like to suggest 
that w  e label this style "mannerist" in order to distinguish it from 
the preceding, "Renaissance" period and the subsequent one, that 
of the "baroque." This is not to deny that some features I have 
isolated in the plays under discussion and called "mannerist" occur 
sporadically in earlier or later plays, that other characteristics I have 
considered "Renaissance" persist in the two later periods, and that 
some baroque traits appear occasionally before Othello, thefirst play 
that, I think, can be called "baroque." T h  e point is that the respec­
tive features are conspicuous in the plays I have labeled accordingly. 
All periodization of literature or art is the work of the classifying 
and categorizing h u m a n mind and, of necessity, involves a certain 
simplification. W  e are not bound to traditional groupings if they 
prove unsatisfactory or oversimplified, as, I think, has been the 
case with the use of "Renaissance" for that enormously long and 
diverse period from the fourteenth (or, in the north, sixteenth) 
century to the end of the seventeenth. T h e discussion on breaking up 
this period into more meaningful units is in process, but, unfor­
tunately, it has not yet led to generally accepted results. Moreover, 
the division into Renaissance, mannerism, and baroque, though 
widely used by art historians, is still controversial a m o n g literary 
historians. Yet it appears to m  e a sensible one, for it allows one to 
think of "style" as an artist's total response to the dominant con­
cerns of his age, a response that includes not only diction, but also 
structure, choice and treatment of subjects, preference of themes, and 
m u c h more. Shakespeare's o w n style is then an expression of his 
individuality within the period style or styles. It is by no means an 
attempt to limit his genius if one declares a particular play to be 
"mannerist." T h  e term is merely a shorthand symbol for certain 
identifiable features in which his artistic response resembled that 
of his contemporaries. I trust that m  y reader will not be impeded by 
m  y choice of labels, and, I hope, he will be helped if, for the sake of 
following m  y argument, he accepts them in the interpretation I shall 
give them. This interpretation has some currency a m o n g scholars, 
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particularly in continental Europe. W  e cannot enter here into this 
on-going discussion; ample, although sometimes quite divergent, 
treatments are available elsewhere.2 
The meaning of baroque and its application in this study will be 
discussed at a later point. A s to mannerism, the term appears to m e 
advantageous in denoting, as it does in the analysis of most art 
historians, a reaction to the classical Renaissance and, as such, a 
transitional phase as well as an authentic style that makes itself felt 
in the form and the content of a work of art. Changes in form are 
not a primary concern of this study, but w  e m a  y at least note the 
changes in structural patterns because they m a k e more obvious the 
differences between thefive plays under discussion and the preceding 
plays and because they also have a considerable influence on the pat­
terns of self-knowledge. There is something opaque or even unsatis­
factory about the structure of each of the five plays, a fact that con­
tributes m u c h to the difficulty of their interpretation, but, on the 
other hand, has also attracted modern readers and audiences, w h o 
find the well-made play artificial. T h  e structural opaqueness is least 
apparent in Julius Caesar, which connects in m a n y ways with the 
preceding "Renaissance" plays. But even it has a structural problem 
by suffering from what one could call a mannerist tension between 
the apparent theme and the content of the play. Although Caesar is 
in the center of its forces, he is not its protagonist or, in the conven­
tional sense of the word, the tragic hero; these designations fit only 
Brutus.3 It could also be said, of course, that Prince Hal is the real 
hero of the Henry I V plays; but these are histories that dramatize 
the events of a reign and are therefore appropriately named. In the 
case of Julius Caesar, w  e ponder whether to attribute greater signif­
icance to the personal tragedy of Brutus, or to the dramatic struggle 
for power, or to the revenge tragedy of Caesar. A s to Hamlet, Shake­
speare's audience must have expected it to be a revenge tragedy, as 
was its predecessor, the Ur-Hamlet; yet it erupts into a drama of 
character and thought. Brutus is as unusual a conspirator as Hamlet 
is an avenger; both speak highly reflective and analytical idioms that 
contrast with the turbulent climate of their plays. T h  e question of 
dramatic form is even more vexing in the case of the three comedies. 
W  .  W . Lawrence called them "bastard brothers of tragedy," 4 and, 
in fact, "tragedy" has seemed to some a better term than "comedy" 
for Troilus and Cressida.5 These discrepancies between general form 
and major subject are very similar to those noted by art historians 
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in mannerist paintings. T h  e problematic structures of all five plays 
m a k  e applicable the concept of the "gestorten form" (disturbed 
form) that Gombrich coined for mannerist art.6 
O n  e reason for their structural imbalance is their heavy burden 
of thought. Except for King Lear, no earlier or later plays contain 
more theoretical statements on self-knowledge, or, for that matter, 
theories in general. Professor Tillyard considered this incumbrance 
with ideas a major reason for calling them problem plays (he did 
not include Julius Caesar, as he might have done). H  e said that 
they showed "an overriding concern with religious d o g m a or ab­
stract speculation or both" and that these matters were "felt rather 
more for their o w n than for the drama's sake, as if, in this form at 
least, they were n e w and urgent to Shakespeare's mind, demanding 
at this point statement and articulation rather than solution and 
absorption into other materials." 7 Such preponderance of thought 
and theory in drama, which by conventional definition has its center 
in action and character, is comparable to the w a  y certain elements, 
such as ornamentation and psychological content, which were 
thought secondary in Renaissance art, became primary during m a n  ­
nerism. 
T h e best proof that change was in the air lies in the increased 
interest in the theme of change. In all five plays, Shakespeare, in 
varying degree, was concerned with the problem of innovation versus 
tradition. In Julius Caesar, Brutus's old-fashioned ideas of liberty 
are irreconcilable with the evolving n e  w order, that of a dictatorship. 
In Troilus and Cressida, Ulysses appears to apotheosize a moribund 
social order based on priority and degree; but he himself violates it 
by stirring up against each other Ajax and Achilles, and he becomes 
a foremost champion of a n e w spirit of craft and force that is about 
to destroy the sentimental chivalric notions of the Trojans. In All's 
Well, Bertram rejects his dead father's old-fashioned virtues and 
turns to n e  w habits and n e  w vices until Helena regenerates him. 
A major issue of Measure for Measure is the question of what form 
of government is best in a state that has become corrupt as its duke 
has grown older. 
But it is Hamlet, the play carrying the heaviest burden of thought, 
that concerns itself most explicitly with the theme of change. The 
prince cannot be categorized simply as a traditionalist or as an inno­
vator; he is both. Y o u n  g as he is, he is already rooted in the past, 
no longer at h o m e in Denmark , before even the ghost's c o m m a n d 
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pits him against the n e w order. T o the courtiers at Elsinore, Hamlet 
seems a dangerously wild spirit, and they are right in a sense that 
transcends their comprehension. T h  e very voice of the past assigns 
him to a role that requires him to abandon conventions. T h e n e w 
Hamlet, as w  e shall note, examines the whole range of traditional 
microcosmic and macrocosmic knowledge for its relevance to him­
self, and finds little. It is of interest in the present context that he 
takes a direct interest in Shakespeare's o w  n profession, acting, and 
that he proves to be a decided conservative in thisfield. T h  e matter 
is worth considering for indications of Shakespeare's attitude toward 
the one aspect of change that concerned him most. 
Hamlet's remarks on acting and the theater have a tinge of bitter­
ness one cannot help associating with Shakespeare. It is true, the 
only overt expression of irritation is Hamlet's response to the chil­
dren's companies that "are n o  w the fashion, and so berattle the 
c o m m o  n stages—so they call them—that m a n  y wearing rapiers are 
afraid of goose quills and dare scarce come thither" (II.ii.336 ff.). 
Shakespeare was concerned about the welfare of the children: he 
blamed the exploiters w h  o m a d  e the children "exclaim against their 
o w n succession," that is, caused them to satirize the profession they 
might later elect. But there is also a touch of professional dissatis­
faction here, a not negligible one in a dramatist reticent about per­
sonal matters, as was Shakespeare, and it is underlined by Hamlet's 
application of the incident to the situation in D e n m a r k  ; the chil­
dren's popularity reminds him of the adulation afforded his odious 
uncle since he became king. 
Hamlet's specific instructions on acting (Ill.ii.i ff.) also breathe 
an air of discomfort with the times. T h e prince bases his precepts on 
the rules of conventional Renaissance rhetoric;8 he enjoins the 
players to use good "pronunciation," that is, appropriate oral de­
livery ("speak the speech . . . trippingly on the tongue") and 
fitting gestures ("suit the action to the word, the word to the ac­
tion") ; and he instructs them to acquire "in the very torrent, tem­
pest, and, as I m a  y say, whirlwind of your passion . .  . a temper­
ance that m a  y give it smoothness." This is quite in the tradition of 
classical rhetoric, which demanded a temperance of TrdOo? by TJ^OS, 
of the vehement emotions by the lighter ones.9 Hamlet censures those 
w h  o do not practice moderation but tear the passions to tatters and 
strut and bellow so "that I have thought some of Nature's journey­
m e n had m a d e m e n , and not m a d e them well" (33). O n e should not 
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be misled by Hamlet's remark that these practitioners outdid Ter­
magant and out-heroded Herod; the actors Shakespeare had in mind 
surely did not attempt to reintroduce the style of the old mystery 
plays.10 Hamlet's annoyance points to Shakespeare's irritation with 
a new-fangled w a y of acting, a more impassioned, presumably a 
more naturalistic one than that in which he had been trained. The 
word "journeyman" is indicative: Shakespeare himself had as an 
apprentice or journeyman been taught to suit the action to the word 
and the word to the action. W h e  n he had Hamlet imply that the new 
style was against nature, he surely meant that it was against the 
theoretical norms of h u m a n nature as humanistic-classical theory 
had formulated them. 
Because the change in the style of acting was accompanied by a 
change in dramatic fashions, it is justifiable to read into Hamlet's 
strictures a reluctance of Shakespeare to adjust himself to a new 
style of drama in general. T h e plays of some of Shakespeare's 
younger contemporaries, such as Marston and, later, Beaumont and 
Fletcher, tended to satirical extravagances and to stronger, some­
times perverse emotions, for which the acting style censured by 
Hamlet is quite appropriate. Perhaps under the impact of these inno­
vations, Shakespeare rethought some of the principles on which his 
art was founded; Hamlet contains Shakespeare's one definition of 
drama in the prince's advice to the actors that the end of playing, 
"both at thefirst and n o w , was and is to hold, as 'twere, the mirror 
up to nature; to show virtue her o w n feature, scorn her o w n image, 
and the very age and body of the time his form and pressure" 
(III.ii.22-26). It must be said that the statement is vague; it reiter­
ates a classical commonplace on the imitation of nature and com­
bines it with a moralistic definition of drama as the humanists 
applied it generally to comedy; but in Hamlet's mouth, the remark 
that the players should show the "very age and body of the time his 
form and pressure" has a peculiar urgency. O n  e recalls h o  w the 
prince himself holds constantly the mirror up to others; the re­
former of the stage also would like to be the reformer of his time. In 
either role, Hamlet leaves something to be desired; he has not 
finished his thoughts, and, presumably, neither had Shakespeare. 
Hamlet's strictures on acting and drama are symptomatic of Shake­
speare's struggle with the problem of artistic change; they breathe a 
nostalgic addiction to a fading tradition and an acute awareness of 
a change. In practice, Shakespeare was already in the process of 
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adjusting himself to new fashions, particularly to the satiric m o o d . 
But he did not yet release the full power of passion in any of the 
characters he created. It is possible to pronounce the speeches of the 
tortured Hamlet in the mixture of passion and temperance he advo­
cates; but it is impossible to utter those of the jealous Othello in 
the same fashion. 
Hamlet's remarks on the theater point to a tension between theory 
and practice in Shakespeare, a tension characteristic of mannerist 
art, which sought to solve the problem of tradition versus innovation 
by rational means.11 There is here an attempt to cling to the balanced 
certainties of the Renaissance; but they fail to satisfy. T h  e heroes of 
the two tragedies of this period, Hamlet and Brutus, are confronted 
with tasks for which their theoretical training does not equip them. 
For them, what knowledge teaches differs from what experience 
shows, and Hamlet, at least, is pained by the discrepancy. T h e theme 
of seeming and being, of deception and truth, which always interested 
Shakespeare, is more strident in these plays. Troilus, even more un­
equipped to deal with reality than Brutus and Hamlet, fragments his 
psychological substance in a fruitless attempt to identify the real 
Cressida with the w o m a  n he seeks to idealize. Bertram and Angelo 
are m e  n of deceptive and even engaging outsides, but both are deeply 
corrupt underneath. 
A n d what is true of the characters is also true of their milieu. 
R o m e , Denmark, Troy, and Vienna are more insidiously and per­
plexingly vicious than the locations of Shakespeare's previous dramas. 
It is not merely that they are corrupt—so is the Venice of The 
Merchant of Venice and the court of As You Like It—but that the 
corruption is ingrained and unrelieved by convincing alternatives. 
There is no Belmont to balance Venice, no Forest of Arden in which 
to take refuge from D u k  e Frederick's court. A n  d it is not merely 
that much significant action takes place at night—so it does in 
earlier and later plays—but that darkness becomes a cloak for 
dubious and deceptive actions. Troilus's and Cressida's tryst, taking 
place under the aegis of the leering Pandarus, is a deliberate and 
satirical variation of R o m e o '  s and Juliet's wedding night. In All's 
Well and Measure for Measure, the happy solutions are achieved 
by acts of darkness and deceit, the bed-tricks by which Helena and 
Mariana claim their husbands. In Julius Caesar, the conspirators 
gather in stormy nights, and Caesar's ghost appears to Brutus in 
a dark tent at Sardis. In Hamlet, two nocturnal appearances of a 
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ghost open a play that is never perfectly lighted. A later tragedy, 
Macbeth, it is true, contains more night scenes than Hamlet, and 
they hold more terror, but they do not have the same atmosphere of 
uncertainty. There is in Hamlet and the plays of this period a fascina­
tion with night because it disguises the truth or makes it ambiguous. 
T h  e uncertainties, ambiguities, and unresolved problems that 
permeate these plays point to a shift in Shakespeare's world view 
away from the certainties of the Renaissance. T h e vision of reality 
that shaped his earlier dramas resembled that of a Renaissance 
painter w h  o depicted persons and things as solid, tangible bodies, 
clearly bounded, proportioned, and situated in intelligible space. N o  w 
reality becomes fluid and problematic as it is in mannerist art: the 
lines twist and curve; proportion and spatial arrangements are freak­
ish and vexing. Mannerist art, as Jacques Bousquet has noted, has 
sometimes a dreamlike quality: "In dreams, people and things are 
never exactly what they seem; they are either in contradiction with 
themselves, being one thing and its very opposite simultaneously; or, 
if they do achieve a m o m e n t of precise definition, it is only to change 
just as abruptly and become something else." 12 Hamlet's world ap­
proaches this oneiric state; he could be a king of infinite space if he 
had not bad dreams. 
But w h e n mannerist vision is awake and conscious, as it is gen­
erally in Shakespeare, the contradictions and ambiguities of the 
world are due to an eminently skeptic look at it: there is no clear 
demarcation of shadow and light, of truth and falsehood; opposites 
merge imperceptibly into each other and become indistinguishable. 
F r o  m being a comprehensive, structured frame, the world becomes 
a shifting semblance. A  s Justus Lipsius, a neo-Stoic touched by 
skepticism, said, acting prudently in this world was a very "diffused 
thing, confused, and obscure" because this world itself was very 
"diffused." 13 A n d Montaigne in " A n Apology of R a y m o n d Sebond" 
—although he purported to defend the Theologia Naturalis, an 
elaboratefifteenth-century defense of a rational universe—granted a 
little condescendingly to Sebond that it was likely "that this vast 
world's frame must bear the impression of some marks therein im­
printed by the hand of this great, wondrous architect, and that even 
in all things therein created there must be some image somewhat 
resembling and having coherency with the w o r k m a  n that wrought 
and framed them." Montaigne went on to say that "our imbecility" 
is the cause that w e cannot read or discover the marks imprinted 
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by G o d in the visible world.14 T  o a diffused world like that of 
Lipsius or an unreadable one like that of Montaigne, it is difficult 
to apply the existing standards. T h e nature of both macrocosm and 
microcosm, as well as their relation, are uncertain. W h e  n there are 
no longer definite answers to the question of what is true and false, 
right and wrong, it follows that there is no static system of values 
and that one must suspend judgment. Skepticism and mannerism 
come from the same world view and are interrelated. Montaigne has 
been called "the unofficial philosophic voice of mannerism" w h e n he 
asked: " W h a t do I k n o w ? "  1  5 
In all the plays of Shakespeare's mannerist period, there is a 
similar concern with questioning and even with rejecting the ability 
of the mind to see the truth. It was not a totally n e w interest for 
Shakespeare; it appeared, for instance, in Richard II, a play that 
anticipates some of the mannerist patterns. But n o w the heroes are 
not only ignorant of themselves and uncertain of the world in which 
they live; they also are placed in situations that m a k  e self-knowledge 
peculiarly difficult if not impossible. This begins with Julius Caesar, 
where already the story, as Shakespeare found it in Plutarch, turned 
on the irony that m e n m a k e decisions whose moral significance they 
cannot foresee. Brutus is a m a  n most studious of virtue; he ponders 
deeply whether to join the conspiracy or not; w h e  n he decides that 
he must do so if he is to remain himself, he, the selfless idealist, 
enters the world of political intrigue and assassination in alliance 
with the self-seeking Cassius, and, while he remains addicted to his 
high ideals, his actions become dubious and criminal. Hamlet's prob­
lem of determining the truth of the things he believes he knows is 
even more acute:first his mother's hasty and incestuous marriage, 
then the revelation of the ghost m a k e him a stranger to the world 
and to himself. H e loses his w a y more thoroughly than Brutus and 
can m u c  h less keep from doing so; he is astray in a universe of dis­
integrating and illusionary values, where an "uncle-father" murders 
his o w n brother, marries the latter's widow, and yet smiles; where 
school friends are enemy spies; and where it is impossible to say 
whether it is better to act or not to act, to be or not to be. A n  d he 
finds it difficult to say clearly whether anything is good or bad— 
thinking makes it so. Troilus believes he knows Cressida, but finds 
out differently; his idealism and chivalric code m a k e him incapable 
of understanding the real nature of his beloved. N o  r does he judge 
his o w n nature better; some weakness, difficult to diagnose but con­
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nected with an endemic relativism and with a Trojan obsession with 
honor, prevents him from asking the question whether he is not 
himself responsible for his delusion. In Measure for Measure, Vin­
centio undertakes a governmental and h u m a  n experiment that is to 
determine the best w a  y to govern and to test the moral nature of 
Angelo; but the dangerous situation of his state obliges him to take 
the direction of events in his o w  n hands to prevent misfortune. In 
the process, Angelo falls and asks the question " W h a  t dost thou 
and what art thou Angelo?" in a spirit of incomprehension about 
himself and h u m a  n nature in general. Angelo appears indeed to 
achieve self-knowledge through repentance, but m a n  y of the ethical 
and political questions posed by the duke's experiment remain un­
answered. 
Clearly, Shakespeare during this period was particularly con­
cerned with the problematic nature of knowledge and inclined to 
some sort of skeptical position. Of course, this is not, as such, proof 
of his interest in philosophic skepticism. Skepticism is an attitude as 
well as a philosophy, and one can be a skeptic without being a 
philosopher. In a sense, every dramatist must be something of a 
skeptic: he must be able to see more than one side of a question; he 
must take an experimental attitude toward the reality he wishes to 
dramatize; he must devise situations that m a k e his characters react 
at variance and create different characters that react variously to 
one and the same situation. T h e growth of a relativistic and skeptic 
spirit in Shakespeare was surely related to his development into a 
mature artist. 
It is also highly probable that personal experiences had some­
thing to do with Shakespeare's more skeptic look at the world from 
Julius Caesar on. W h e n he wrote Henry V, he looked forward ex­
pectantly to the victorious return of the Earl of Essex, "bringing 
rebellion broached on his sword" (V .32 ) . But soon after that, per­
haps w h e n Shakespeare was engaged in writing Julius Caesar, 
Essex's failure became apparent. In Henry V, Shakespeare had com­
pared Essex to the victorious king, but his debacle must have given 
him a heightened feeling of the dubiousness of all political action, 
a feeling that pervades not only Julius Caesar but also Hamlet, 
Troilus and Cressida, and Measure for Measure. 
Relativism and skepticism feed on the awareness of man's errors 
and contradictory actions, whether this awareness comes from life 
or theory. Plutarch's Lives, in which Shakespeare immersed himself 
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when writing Julius Caesar, must have sharpened his view of man's 
subjection to errors and of the baffling discrepancies between inten­
tion and execution. That Shakespeare took a more detached atti­
tude toward Brutus and toward Caesar than he had taken toward 
the characters of his history plays, can surely at least in part be 
attributed to his having graduated from the Tudor chroniclers to a 
wiser guide, one more sensitive to the weaknesses of h u m a n nature. 
A n  d the satire in Hamlet and Troilus and Cressida undoubtedly 
owes m u c  h to Shakespeare's seeing the relativistic and debunking 
plays of some of his contemporaries like Marston and Jonson. A s 
Shakespeare became acquainted with attacks on, and alternatives to, 
orthodoxy, his sense of the relativity of values grew even without 
any specific knowledge of skeptic philosophy. Relativism is encour­
aged by the realization of contradictions between world views, by 
the canceling-out of one supposed certitude by another. Hamlet's 
"nothing is either good or bad, but thinking makes it so" does not, 
as such, prove that Shakespeare was reading skeptic philosophy; the 
remark is symptomatic of the age's increasing disillusionment with 
norms and occurs in some form quite frequently. 
But it still appears to m  e likely that Shakespeare was reading 
skeptic philosophy at some time during this period, perhaps not yet 
when he was writing Julius Caesar, but at least w h e n he came to 
Hamlet and Troilus and Cressida. Hamlet tests some of the most 
cherished humanistic assumptions on the nature of m a  n in ways that 
owe something to skeptic ideas, and Troilus and Cressida is per­
vaded by these. 
This latter play also contains evidence that Shakespeare had a 
technical knowledge of the distinction between the moderate, aca­
demic skepticism of Cicero and its difference from the radical, 
"Pyrrhonic" school of which Sextus Empiricus's Hypotyposes was 
the classical model. T h e former skepticism was embraced by m a n y 
Christian humanists; the latter was gaining ground in Shakespeare's 
England, particularly after the translation of Montaigne's "Apology 
of R a y m o n  d Sebond." 16 T h  e proof of Shakespeare's knowledge of 
the two schools comes in the debate of the Trojans, when Hector 
assumes the moderate, and Troilus the radical, position. Hector, the 
mouthpiece of reason, proposes peace negotiations and the restora­
tion of Helen to the Greeks because of the uncertainty the future 
holds; "modest doubt," he says, "is call'd/ T h  e beacon of the wise, 
the tent that searches / T  o th' bottom of the worst" (II.ii. 15-17) . 
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Hector thus sides with the wise m a  n of Cicero's Academica w h o 
doubts to the degree of not giving too easy an assent to the phenom­
ena. Troilus, however, will have none of such caution, and puts his 
argument for passion and war on the relativity of all values; the 
Trojans can m a k  e Helen into a symbol of reward for their struggle 
because "What 's aught but as 'tis valued?" (52). Troilus here takes 
a Pyrrhonic view m u c  h like Montaigne's: "That our opinion en­
deareth and encreaseth the price of things . . . and w  e call that 
worth in them, not what they bring us, but what w e bring to them. 
According as it weighteth and is of consequence, so it serveth." 17 
Hector objects to this argument that "value dwells not in particular 
will:/It holds his estimate and dignity/As well wherein 'tis pre­
cious of itself / A  s in the prizer" (53-56). This is quite the moder­
ate humanistic position that things have value not only through the 
appraiser but also in their o w  n right.18 
Although Montaigne's popularity in early seventeenth-century 
England undoubtedly was great, the Essays were not the only source 
of philosophical skepticism, and one should not m a k  e the mistake 
of equating the influence of skepticism on Shakespeare with that of 
Montaigne. Neither should one equate philosophic and religious 
skepticism, although it is true that on the edges of philosophic doubt 
agnosticism and atheism were spreading.19 Skepticism in its simplest 
form as doubt in the mind's ability to attain to the truth was a 
respectable Christian attitude. Christianity, as the Elizabethans in­
herited it, contained m a n  y anti-intellectual, pietistic, and mystical 
elements that were antipathetic to the rationalists' claim for the 
efficacy of h u m a  n knowledge. T h  e skeptic passages in Shakespeare's 
plays do not give any indication of religious doubt, and some empha­
size that faith is superior to knowledge. Thus Hamlet reproaches 
Horatio, w h  o takes a rationalistic attitude toward the ghost and 
will not let belief take hold on h im: 
A n  d therefore as a stranger give it welcome. 
There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, 
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy. 
(I.v. 165-67) 
T h e remark echoes m a n y Christian objections to rationalism, be­
ginning with Paul's deprecation of "philosophy and vain deceit" 
(Col. 2:8) and his glorification of the mystery of G o d over human 
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wisdom (I Cor. 2:7). T h e Genevan side-note to the latter passage 
defines "mystery" as "that which m e  n could not so m u c  h as dream 
of" and thus uses the same metaphor as does Hamlet and, for that 
matter, as did countless Renaissance theologians.20 Another, even 
more pronounced fideistic declaration is in All's Well w h e n the 
king's old counselor, Lafeu, expresses his master's seemingly mirac­
ulous cure by Helena: 
They say miracles are past; and w  e have our philosophical persons 
to make modern and familiar things supernatural and causeless. 
Hence is it that w e make trifles of terrors, ensconcing ourselves into 
seeming knowledge when w e should submit ourselves to an un­
known fear. 
(Il.iii.i ff.) 
Lafeu here opposes the "atheistic" position, as it w a  s held for in­
stance by Cicero in D  e Divinatione (II.60) that all natural events 
have natural causes. Except for taking the opposite viewpoint, 
Lafeu's words c o m e close to Cicero's.21 
Like Montaigne, Shakespeare w a s open-minded and undogmatic 
when it came to natural occurrences. But w  e must not press this and 
other affinities of thought even if they are occasionally combined 
with verbal resemblances; the arguments about truth developed often 
on classical and theological commonplaces that were all cultured 
men's property. It would be equally hazardous to assert on the basis 
of Hamlet's and Lafeu's words that Shakespeare had a sudden up­
surge of faith or to claim h im as being radically relativistic on the 
basis of the rampant skepticism in Troilus and Cressida. Positions 
taken in these plays are generally subjected to questioning through 
ironies, ambiguities, and paradoxes. T h u s Lafeu's espousal of fideism 
occurs in a bantering conversation with Parolles, w h  o echoes, apes, 
and contradicts the old counselor. W  e are left in doubt where Shake­
speare stands because whatever seriousness Lafeu's words lose by 
the travesty, they regain in part by the fact that Parolles is an ex­
ample of the "seeming knowledge" that the old counselor castigates. 
Shakespeare generally did not let his philosophic interests d a m a g  e 
his dramatic designs; yet these very designs breathe a conception of 
life as a hazardous venture. M o r  e noteworthy than the skeptic atti­
tudes taken by Hamlet and Lafeu are the ways in which their state­
ments highlight the dramatic uncertainties from which the actions 
of the two plays arise. T h e speeches, spoken in a w e about most 
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unusual occurrences, draw attention to the difficulty and dubiousness 
of the tasks that are central to both plays. In Hamlet, the ghost 
demands a course of action from the prince for which the latter has 
no m a p or plan; he must act on the c o m m a n d of a questionable 
agent, w h  o m a  y be his father's spirit or the devil. In All's Well, the 
healing of the king is the achievement on which Helena has staked 
her hope of winning and regenerating Bertram, a hazardous enter­
prise, considering the young count's nature. 
T h efideistic position with its low opinion about the mind's ability 
to decipher microcosm and macrocosm often entailed, as it does in 
Hamlet's and Lafeu's words, an attack on man's pride in his reason. 
T h e main thrust was aimed at such idealistic or rationalistic meta­
physics as that of Plato and Aquinas, but fideism-skepticism also 
contradicted the mor  e moderate Christian-humanist position as ex­
emplified by Erasmus and Hooker. Not that either Aquinas or the 
Christian humanists neglected to list pride as a sin detrimental to 
self-knowledge—Erasmus castigated pride strongly in Enchiridion 
—but they did not direct their castigations at man's attempts to come 
to some rational conclusions about his role in the universe. M o n  ­
taigne's sarcasm about such presumption was uninhibited: 
Is it possible to imagine anything so ridiculous as this miserable 
and wretched creature, which is not so much as master of himself, 
exposed and subject to offenses of all things; and yet dareth call 
himself master and emperor of this universe in whose power it is 
not to know the least part of it, much less to command the same? 
A n  d the privilege, which he so fondly challengeth, to be the only 
absolute creature in this huge world's frame perfectly able to know 
the absolute beauty and several parts thereof, and that he is only of 
power to yield the great architect thereof due thanks for it, and 
keep account both of the receipts and layings-out of the world! 
W h  o hath sealed him this patent? Let him show us his letters of 
privilege for so noble and so great a charge.22 
Montaigne, however, did not push this position to the logical con­
clusion that m a  n could say nothing about the universe and his rela­
tionship to it. H  e was not averse to accepting the idea of a universe 
shrinking and degenerating like m a n w h e n it could be m a d e to show 
up man' s absurd pride, the pride of an animal living on a shrinking 
planet "farthest from heaven's cope." 23 
For the mannerist-fideist, self-knowledge implied a realization of 
the absurdity of man's proud claim to rationally k n o w himself and 
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God. This fideistic article is reflected iconographically in an early 
seventeenth-century emblem, mannerist in its paradoxical subtlety. 
Entitled Nosce Teipsum, it shows a peacock—symbolizing m a n  — 
rearing a pearl-studded tail—symbolic of reason—proudly toward 
the sky; but the bird turns its crest toward its ugly feet—meditation, 
as the punning motto explained, bows m a  n (homo) to the earth 
(humus).24 
The exposure of man's pride in his reason was not a subject new 
to Shakespeare in his mannerist period—we m a  y recall Richard III 
—but it becomes n o w more explicitly associated with the patterns of 
self-knowledge, as, for instance, in Brutus's persuasion by Cassius 
(I.ii.51 ff.) and in Ulysses's appeal to Achilles to rejoin the battle 
(III.iii.95 ff.). This exposure appears also in a m u c  h subtler form 
than in Richard III as the hard-to-discern defect of an essentially fine 
and sympathetic mind like that of Brutus. A n d , I think, there is a 
similar dram of pride in D u k e Vincentio and Isabella; as I shall 
argue, it is, by implication, acknowledged by them in the end. A n  d 
Hamlet, metaphysically, although not psychologically, the humblest 
of m e n  , deflates the intellectual certitude of the Danish court, as 
when, most amusingly, he exposes Polonius's presumption in con­
ceiving of himself as sane and of Hamlet as m a d . 
In their varied ways, all of Shakespeare's plays of this period 
demonstrate man's inability to discern rationally w h o he is and 
where he belongs. T h  e plays take problematic attitudes toward the 
self, toward m a  n in general, and toward society and the universe. 
The various frames of existence are shown to havefissures, and the 
possibility of harmonious relationships between them is drawn into 
question. Brutus, essentially harmonious m a  n that he is, becomes 
disharmonious in a R o m  e that is changing from republic to dictator­
ship. Hamlet's agonized spirit cannot break through the prison bars 
of his D e n m a r  k even though he sees a light beyond. Troilus's 
debilitated idealism is deflated by the brutal sexual and military 
realities of Troy and Greece. D u k e Vincentio never finds the answer 
to what it takes to be an ideal ruler in the corrupted currents of 
Vienna. A  s the characters' world becomes problematic, they turn 
inward to find other insoluble contradictions: Hamlet comes to a 
point where he questions the very possibility of self-knowledge, and 
Troilus thinks of himself in the end as being just as contradictory 
and fragmented as Cressida and the Trojan war appear to him. 
W h e  n conventional ideas associated with self-knowledge are in­
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voked, their relevance becomes sometimes ambiguous or disappears. 
T h e old humanistic conviction is lacking when Hamlet asks himself 
the question what m a  n is if the chief goods and markets of his time 
are but to sleep and feed. A n  d when, as in Troilus and Cressida, 
ethical norms are proclaimed, their application to the present situa­
tion is questionable, as is instanced by Ulysses's advocacy of degree 
that he conspicuously fails to translate into action. T h  e old c o m m o n  ­
place becomes a euphemism for power politics and for shoddy 
intrigue. There is here and elsewhere a cleavage between what was 
once and what is n o w as well as a contradiction between what there 
should be and what there is. Theory and practice, ideal and reality 
have a problematic relationship to each other. 
T h  e discrepancy between the humanistic theory and the reality of 
the self is expressed in Shakespeare's ambiguous attitude toward the 
"pattern of perfection," the ideal m a  n he had embodied in his ideal 
king, Henry V  . There is no character in Shakespeare's plays of this 
period w h o can be said to k n o w himself in the manner of Henry. 
Brutus is indeed a m a  n of virtue, but he falls prey to an appeal to his 
awareness of himself as a virtuous R o m a n  ; his errors and failures 
prove that it is not enough in this world to be a well-balanced m a n . 
Hamlet admires Horatio as a kind of pattern of perfection, a just 
m a n  , w h  o is neither the slave of fortune nor of passion; but Hamlet's 
attraction to the ideal appears an aesthetic and nostalgic aspiration 
that is drawn in question by the paleness of Horatio's actual charac­
ter as it appears in the play. In this respect, Hamlet's attitude resem­
bles that of Montaigne, w h o still was fond of patterns of perfection 
and flirted with the idea that they could be found a m o n g the poor. 
(Hamlet, too, notes Horatio's poverty w h e n he commends him.) 
Montaigne also admitted that he was pleased w h e n others said of 
him, " L o , there a pattern of true fortitude; lo, there a mirror of 
matchless patience." 25 But the pinch of his kidney stone kept him 
from keeping up the pose, and he admitted that "there is nothing I 
so hardly believe to be in m a  n as constancy and nothing so easy to be 
found in him as inconstancy." 26 
Inconstancy and inconsistency are characteristic of the heroes of 
four of thefive plays under discussion. Brutus is the one exception; 
but his republican constancy is a corollary to his lacking sensitivity 
to the moral ambiguity of his action. Hamlet, whatever else he m a y 
be, is the spirit of inconsistency; the shallower Troilus, although he 
chants absolutes, is corroded by a pervasive relativism. Bertram has 
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not enough psychic substance for us to expect constancy from him; 
that of Angelo, thought spectacular, proves an illusion. Even D u k e 
Vincentio, the stablest of the major characters, has troubles in 
deciding what his actions should be. H  e has let the law lapse for 
many years, then experiments with restoring it through the agency 
of a deputy stricter than himself; but finally he takes the reins in his 
hands again. Although he is the most exemplary of Shakespeare's 
rulers after Henry V  , he is far from being a signal pattern of perfec­
tion ; but then, he also has to contend with more difficult psychologi­
cal problems. 
With the problematic moral orientation of the major characters 
is connected a disorientation of the minor ones. In Shakespeare's 
earlier plays, the heroes put themselves in a context of either moral­
ity or immorality and take the others with them in the one or the 
other direction. Henry V is a perfect king, and his follower Fluellen 
an admirable m a  n and soldier; Richard III is a villain, and his 
friend and supporter Buckingham a traitor. Henry and his ad­
herents opt for a moral world, Richard and his for an immoral one ; 
but both sets act according to the choices offered to them in a world 
that they understand. For Brutus and Hamlet, there are no clear 
moral options; the world is an uncertain and hazardous place. 
This is not to say that the characters in the earlier dramas are 
merely static. Prince Hal, for instance, is placed on a middle ground 
between evil and good and grows morally in each of the two parts of 
Henry IV. H  e is atfirst attracted to the fun-loving but duty-eschew­
ing Falstaff and cold toward the political world of his father to 
which one day he must belong fully. But Hal's position does not have 
the baffling uncertainties of the call to political action Brutus receives 
or the soul-harrowing terror of the demand to avenge his father 
that comes to Hamlet. It is indeed clear from the beginning in which 
direction Hal will go; he will become England's hero-king rather 
than end in a tavern brawl in Eastcheap. Hal's attitude to others, to 
his father, to Falstaff, and to Hotspur, is at any time k n o w n to us 
even if not always to them. Hamlet's oddities and antics, as m u c h 
as they fascinate us and as m u c h as w e accept them as part of his 
character, sometimes bewilder us as m u c  h as the characters on w h o  m 
he practices them. H  e and some of the other heroes of this period 
seem to need a psychological disguise in a world which, like that 
portrayed by mannerist painters, is one of doubt and secret anxiety, 
which therefore requires an armor instead of a body, a mask instead 
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of a face.27 Brutus wears the armor; Hamlet and D u k e Vincentio 
wear masks, the one a psychological one, the other an outward one; 
Troilus tries both the mask and the armor but is successful with 
neither. 
In Shakespeare's mannerist plays, the feeling of uncertainty cre­
ated by the characters' lack of direction carries through the dramatic 
designs from the beginning to the end. It is true that the hope of 
R o m e  o and Juliet to find themselves is as precarious after the death 
of Tybalt as is Hamlet's endeavor to restore his o w n and Denmark's 
health after the killing of Polonius; but the two lovers' certainty 
about themselves lessens our feeling that it is so. Also, they are 
placed in a symmetrical design between the hostile Montagues and 
Capulets, a design that allocates the tragic responsibility to fate and 
the hostile parties. They never lose themselves as inextricably as does 
Hamlet in the labyrinthine worlds of his soul and the universe. Al­
though R o m e o and Juliet die, they win a victory for Verona and 
humanity: this is a better world for their having lived and loved. It 
is not so in D e n m a r k or in R o m e : Hamlet's wounded n a m e m a y be 
healed, but D e n m a r k will be in the hands of the unknown Fortinbras, 
and the ideal of liberty is certainly not advanced by the death of 
Brutus. T h  e endings of Troilus and Cressida and the two comedies 
are so dubious as to have m a d e some critics attribute them to Shake­
speare's artistic uncertainty. Nothing is really concluded in Troilus 
and Cressida except Troilus's love for Cressida. A n  d there is some­
thing conditional about the happiness of the characters at the end of 
All's Well and Measure for Measure: w e must trust in the sustained 
efficacy of the astonishing conversions, and more than one critic has 
found such trust difficult. 
T h e complexities and ambiguities of these plays go deep, deeper 
than this and the following brief discussions can indicate. For in­
stance, one m a y read the endings of some of the plays more positively 
than I have done. Hamlet's decision to abandon his attempts to 
analyze himself, his situation, Denmark  , and the world is accom­
panied by his declaration that, from n o  w on, he will trust in the 
providence that is present even in the fall of a sparrow. Similarly, 
the ending of Measure for Measure can be read as an apotheosis of 
faith.28 Certainly, an appreciation of these endings requires more 
than the customary acceptance of improbable accidents at the end of 
conventional comedies; it does require faith, faith in the miraculous 
moral regeneration of a scoundrel like Bertram and a hypocrite like 
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Angelo. A n  d Measure for Measure does m a k e the point of the 
Sermon on the M o u n t that one should not mete out to others what 
one does not mete out to oneself. Admittedly, fideistic elements are 
present in these plays although, contrary to some theologically 
oriented critics, I believe that Shakespeare used them tentatively, 
hesitatingly, and with some mental reservations, not yet, as for 
instance in The Winter's Tale and in The Tempest, with force and 
artistic assurance.29 Yet, the quality and role of fideism and, for that 
matter, m a n  y other problems of form and thought in these plays are 
difficult to evaluate. O n  e m a  y arrive at divergent, at times even op­
posite, conclusions if one chooses a perspective different from the one 
I have adopted in making the issue of man's knowledge of himself 
the focal point. 
Shakespeare's mannerist plays are vexing and disturbing, and 
they make self-knowledge a more puzzling and hazardous quest than 
do any of his other works, but they also speak to us in a particularly 
provocative voice. W  e feel a keen and probing mind at work in an 
age that resembles so m u c  h our o w n  . These tragedies and comedies 
point to a conflict in Shakespeare's mind and art between humanist 
and counter-humanist ideas; they are the product of an age that 
felt tentative, torn, and self-conscious in exploring m a  n and the 
universe independently. T h  e plays reflect Shakespeare's struggle 
with the ideas of the world in which he was brought up. At times 
they affirm them, at other times they reject them; but more often 
they probe and question them. Whatever blemishes some of the 
plays m a  y have, they all render fascinating insights into extraordi­
nary h u m a n predicaments. They have a quality of improvisation, of 
attempting statements that are not definite but demand revision and 
perhaps total restatement. Agitated by the winds of a cultural crisis, 
they strike a sympathetic chord in us, makers and victims of another 
cultural crisis. 
CHAPTER NINE 
Julius Caesar: 
Taking an Uncertain Road 
SH A K E S P E A R E ' S R E F E R E N C E S to Alexander and Caesar in Henry V m a k e it appear likely that he was reading Plutarch while writing the English history play that he followed up 
very shortly with his second R o m a  n tragedy, thefirst to t)e based 
on Plutarch.1 But whether Shakespeare was reading the Life of 
Brutus while he wrote Henry V or soon after it, he must have felt 
that Brutus, no less than Caesar and Alexander, resembled his ideal 
king in some important respects but differed from him in others. 
Brutus was Plutarch's pattern of perfection as m u c h as Henry was 
Holinshed's; but in Holinshed, the pattern was equated with suc­
cess, in Plutarch, with failure. Brutus was a m a  n of moral excel­
lence; yet he murdered the greatest m a  n of the world.2 In making 
him into the protagonist, Shakespeare could not take a simple and 
absolute approach; he had to accept the relativistic position that, 
under certain circumstances, ethical strength becomes ineffective and 
that what is good from one point of view is evil from another. H e 
must have felt at this time, if not before, that neither m a n nor the 
universe was quite what, on the basis of his humanistic education, 
he had thought they were, and he must have been struck by the 
baffling discrepancies in h u m a  n life between intention and execution, 
character and motive, action and result. 
At any rate, to dramatize the story of the assassination of Julius 
Caesar meant for Shakespeare to take a n e w and uncertain road. In 
the present chapter, I shall examine Shakespeare's difficulties and 
his solution; in particular, I shall review in some detail h o w he 
created Brutus from Plutarch's facts and appraisals and what changes 
he made , changes that had considerable influence on the patterns 
of self-knowledge not only in Julius Caesar but also in Hamlet, 
which was to follow. 
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Plutarch characterized Brutus as an ideal personality, R o m a  n 
style; but, since m a n  y features of this type were taken over by the 
humanists, Plutarch's Brutus resembled the humanists' pattern of 
perfection. Examples of his courage, magnanimity, constancy, gentle­
ness, and justice abound in the Life of Brutus. H  e was for Plutarch, 
particularly in contrast with Cassius, a model of temperance, that 
virtue central to self-knowledge: Cassius, although skillful in war, 
was too choleric, too familiar with his friends, and too cruel with his 
enemies. Brutus, however, was esteemed by everybody, "because he 
was a marvelous lowly and gentle person, noble-minded, and would 
never be in any rage, nor carried away with pleasure and covetous­
ness, but had ever an upright mind with him and would never yield 
to any wrong or injustice, the which was the chiefest cause of his 
fame, of his rising, and of the good will that every m a  n bare h im: 
for they were all persuaded that his intent was good." Plutarch certi­
fied this portrait by the testimony of Caesar's closest friend and 
Brutus's conqueror: "For it was said that Antonius spoke it openly 
diverse times that he thought that of all them that had slain Caesar 
there was none but Brutus only that was moved to do it as thinking 
the act commendable of itself, but that all the other conspirators did 
conspire his death for some private malice or envy that they other­
wise did bear unto him." 3 
F r o  m this passage Shakespeare fashioned Antony's famous epitaph 
of Brutus: 
This was the noblest R o m a  n of them all. 
All the conspirators save only he 
Did that they did in envy of great Caesar; 
H  e only in a general honest thought 
A n d common good to all made one of them. 
(V.V.6&-72) 
T  o this paraphrase from Plutarch, Shakespeare added a characteriza­
tion of Brutus in terms of Renaissance h u m o  r physiology by taking 
up the cue of temperance: 
His life was gentle; and the elements 
So mix'd in him that Nature might stand up 
A n d say to all the world "This was a m a n ! " 
(V.v.73-75) 
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W  e could have no better authority and no clearer formulation: 
Brutus is a harmonious, balanced m a n , a m a n w h o knows himself.4 
Yet it is remarkable h o  w little of this Brutus w  e ever actually see 
in the play. W h e  n hefirst appears, he is a deeply unhappy m a n  , a 
lonely figure w h o takes no "gamesome" interest in the public compe­
tition at the feast of Lupercalia. H  e is absorbed with his o w  n prob­
lems, "vexed . . . with passions of some difference . . . with him­
self at war" (I.ii.39-46). A n  d this conflict in his soul grows as he 
ponders whether to join the conspiracy. H  e disquiets his wife by his 
musing and sighing, his "ungentle looks," his angry gestures, and 
his walking at night (II.i.237). After he has m a d  e his decision, it is 
true, he is resolute; but w  e still have indications, such as his irritabil­
ity toward Cassius and his restlessness in the dark tent at Sardis, 
that all is not well with him. 
Not that w e ought to write off Antony's tribute to Brutus's 
internal harmony as posthumous glorification. W  e see sufficient 
vestiges of the earlier, balanced Brutus to accept the notion that he 
was once a completely harmonious m a n . This is most apparent in 
his private life. His tender care for his friends and servants shows 
him to be a m a  n of exceptional humaneness. But, most of all, he has 
in Portia a companion w h o  m he trusts and w h  o in return enters into 
his life and gives it completion. T h  e episode in which she proves her 
constancy by wounding herself in her thigh presents a picture of a 
marriage of two souls, w h o yet—in an image of which Shakespeare 
was fond—become one self. She implores him gently, 
By all your vows of love, and that great vow 
Which did incorporate and make us one, 
That you unfold to m e  , your self, your half, 
W h y you are heavy . . . 
A  m I your self 
But, as it were, in sort or limitation ? 
T  o keep with you at meals, comfort your bed, 
A n  d talk to you sometimes ? 
(II.i.272-85) 
Brutus's subsequent revelation of his plans to her shows that there 
are no impediments to this marriage. 
Even in his public life, Brutus evinces something of his earlier 
harmony. His firm leadership of the conspiracy points to his basic 
stability and equanimity. Divided and disharmonious as he is inter­
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nally, he braces himself outwardly and exerts a vivifying effect on 
the conspirators similar to that which Henry V has on his troops 
before Agincourt. Like the English king, he exhorts his followers to 
look "fresh and merrily" and to bear their burdens "with untir'd 
spirits and formal constancy" (II.i.224-27). His example has an 
inspirational effect on Caius Ligarius, w h  o arrives at the conspira­
torial meeting in the guise of a sick m a n  : 
I here discard m  y sickness. Soul of R o m e  !

Brave son, deriv'd from honourable loins!

Thou, like an exorcist, hast conjur'd up

M  y mortified spirit.

(321-24) 
Like Henry, Brutus can conjure up mortified spirits, but—the 
difference is essential—he cannot sound in harmony with the state, 
whose soul Caius thinks him to be. In the English history play, an 
harmonious king is in tune with an essentially harmonious kingdom; 
in the R o m a  n tragedy, a potentially harmonious statesman is placed 
in a commonwealth which does not "keep in one consent, / Congree­
ing in a full and natural close, / Like music" {Henry V, I.ii.181­
83)­
A  s Brutus prepares himself for his deed, the microcosmic-macro­
cosmic analogy he draws suggests that the discord of the state is 
reflected in the dissonance of his soul: 
Between the acting of a dreadful thing 
A n  d thefirst motion, all the interim is 
Like a phantasma or a hideous dream. 
The Genius and the mortal instruments 
Are then in council; and the state of m a n , 
Like to a little kingdom, suffers then 
The nature of an insurrection. 
(II.i.63-69) 
The psychological lore on which Shakespeare drew for this passage 
is the organic and hierarchical conception of the microcosm as he 
used it in the history plays. T h e harmony of Brutus's soul is dis­
turbed because the natural order has ceased to function; the king-
like mind no longer rules; the psychic instruments refuse to play 
their proper advisory and executive functions. Instead, "the mortal 
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instruments," 5 that is, the lower parts of the soul, the senses and 
passions, arrogate seats in the royal council to which they are not 
entitled. T h  e soul of Brutus is in a state of crisis. 
W  e should not be oversubtle and diagnose Brutus's "aristocratic" 
psychology as reflecting a subconscious desire to be king instead of 
Caesar. Shakespeare psychologized in the terminology of his time, as 
w  e do in ours, and the political analogy was natural to him. H o w  ­
ever, the passage is symptomatic of his general lack of interest in 
Brutus's republicanism and of his concern with a larger issue, that 
of the interaction between the order of the state and the individual's 
self-fulfillment. T h  e psychological problem of Brutus is analogous to 
the political problem of R o m e  ; it turns on the question of h o w to 
establish a legitimate and functioning order, and Brutus's psyche is 
affected by the perplexing situation that order in R o m  e is repre­
sented by the detestable system of Caesarism. There can be no such 
simple solution for him as there is for the heroes of the history plays, 
w h o realize their self by bringing it in harmony with a monar­
chical and organic conception of the state. In this respect, Shake­
speare's choice of the unusual, Latinate word "Genius," meaning 
the mind, is of interest; it is a reminder that the particular mind n o w 
ruling R o m  e is Caesar. A n  d in Elizabethan English, "Genius" de­
noted not only the rational soul but also the daimon, a spirit, good 
or evil, with which m a  n had an inseparable and fateful connection.6 
Shakespeare used the word in this latter sense at the end of The 
Comedy of Errors when the duke wonders whether one of the 
Antipholuses is "genius to the other" (V.i.331). T h e clever Antony 
alludes to the same superstition w h e n he calls Brutus "Caesar's 
angel" (III.ii.181), hinting ambiguously that Brutus was beloved 
by Caesar but turned into his evil spirit. But for the Brutus that 
ponders the conspiracy, the designation of "genius" applies to Caesar, 
and it does so in an even more sinister manner: Caesar is the evil 
angel that has usurped the state, and this usurpation is reflected in 
the disturbed order of Brutus's microcosm. T h e image of Caesar 
becomes the "genius" of the mind of Brutus. But, as he sees his 
problem, it is not the simple one of restoring harmony in the state 
and order in the soul by removal of the corruption in the former and 
the conquest of the passion in the latter; it is the task of liberating 
state and soul from the danger of being dominated by a demonic 
spirit. T  o say that Brutus invents the spirit of Caesar would be an 
exaggeration, for w  e see the spirit manifested in Caesar's frail body 
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and later in his m u c  h stronger ghost; yet only Brutus a m o n  g the 
conspirators conceives the issue in terms of a fight against an evil 
force rather than a tangible person or a definable system. Brutus can 
be said to exorcise the spirit that defeats him. 
The dissonance in the soul of Brutus was altogether Shake­
speare's idea. Plutarch's Brutus suffered no anxiety until he joiried 
the conspiracy, and he was nervous then merely because of the 
danger of discovery. N o r was Plutarch's R o m e as turbulent as 
Shakespeare's; although in transition from republic to monarchy, it 
was competently ruled and not particularly dissonant. In the play, 
the political atmosphere is as stormy as the nights in which the 
conspiracy gathers force; the transition that threatens is not one 
from a republic-—it has ceased to exist—into a monarchy but from a 
dictatorship into a tyranny based on the low instincts of the crowd. 
This, I believe, is the main point of the opening scene, in which 
the tribunes, Marullus and Flavius, oppose the populace by pulling 
the trophies off Caesar's images. T h e anecdote was in Plutarch's 
Life of Caesar, but its occasion and meaning were quite different. 
The incident followed rather than preceded the Lupercalia, and the 
people sided with the tribunes, w h o were adherents of Brutus rather 
than of Pompey . In the play, the opening conveys a feeling of a 
loosening order: the "mechanicals" are in the streets without the 
signs of their trades and m a k e a holiday where none is called for. 
They have lost their sense of what is due to R o m  e and what to 
Caesar; they are sheep running after their leader. A  s Marullus point­
edly reminds them, it was for Pompey's victory over external ene­
mies that they cheered earlier; n o  w they hail Caesar for triumphing 
over a personal, internal foe, this very P o m p e y  . A n  d Shakespeare's 
crowd is particularlyfickle and shifty. Scolded by the tribunes, the 
people appear ready for another turnabout and "vanish tongue-tied 
in their guiltiness" (I.i.63). 
This is the disturbing prelude to the intricate second scene in 
which Cassius accosts Brutus while Caesar takes part in the feast of 
Lupercalia, is offered the crown, and refuses. This scene is most 
important for an understanding of the character and situation of 
Brutus; but w e will do well to turnfirst to Caesar, whose words and 
actions—partly presented on the stage and partly reported by the 
blunt and cynical Casca—are intertwined with the probing of Brutus 
by Cassius. In this play of conflicting personal and political loyalties, 
it is particularly difficult to isolate onefigure from the other. O n  e is 
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forced to piece together his opinion about a character from words 
and actions that are partisan; sometimes these are spoken by some­
one bound to this character by friendship or separated from him by 
enmity; at other times what is said subtly involves one's o w n political 
bias. W h a  t one thinks of Brutus, in particular, rests very m u c  h on 
what one holds of a Caesar and Caesarism. 
I cannot attempt here to do justice to Shakespeare's subtle portrait 
of Caesar. H  e is neither simply a hero nor clearly a villain. But I 
think that in the second scene an unpleasant fact about Caesar 
emerges, which, at this point, would have influenced favorably the 
Elizabethans' attitude toward Brutus: Caesar shows himself as " a m ­
bitious"—a word they uniformly took in a bad sense. H  e wants 
the crown, but does not dare to claim it yet because the people cheer 
his feigned reluctance. Hisfirst words are almost all orders, and they 
are promptly obeyed by the sycophants around him. A s Antony puts 
it euphemistically, " W h e  n Caesar says ' D  o this', it is perform'd" 
(I.ii.io). These and other features, such as his appeal to crowd 
instincts and prejudices, his boastfulness, and his capricious insistence 
that his every w h i m be gratified, would have m a d e an Elizabethan 
audience conclude that Caesar is, or aspires to be, a tyrant.7 A n  d that 
is exactly what Plutarch said he w a s : when the R o m a n s chose him 
to be perpetual dictator, they chose "plain tyranny." 8 In Elizabethan 
English, this word had strong emotional associations; it evoked fear 
of misrule and of the vengeance of God. Shakespeare's audience would 
transfer to Caesar some of the apprehension they felt about a tyrant 
like Richard III. 
But the second scene depicts also a curiously frail Caesar w h o 
suffers from epilepsy and is deaf in one ear. T h  e contrast between 
his physical infirmity and his unquestioned political power is ironic, 
and so is that between the sterility of his marriage and his attempt 
to reach for the crown. In a way, Caesar's frailties serve to humanize 
him. Although in that m o m e n t of hybris before his downfall he 
sees himself as above the ranks of m e  n of flesh and blood, he is 
h u m a n enough to m a k e one believe that Brutus loves him or loved 
him once. But he is also the instigator of a new, tyrannical order, 
which is ominously evoked by Casca's laconic report that the two 
censorious tribunes "are put to silence" (284)—a m u c h more sinister 
remark than Plutarch's comment that they were deprived of their 
tribuneship. This is the same order as that instituted after Caesar's 
death, w h e  n m e  n are "pricked to death" without trial—an order 
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triumphant in the coolly effective Octavius, w h o has no h u m a n handi­
caps. If Brutus has reason to love Caesar, he has even more reason 
to fear him; the behavior of the crowd, of Caesar, and of Caesar's 
entourage all support his apprehension. Shakespeare's ambiguous 
portrait of Caesar gives Brutus a cause to oppose him that 
is subtler and more difficult to define than the solid republicanism 
embraced by Brutus in Plutarch; he is a m a  n of divided feelings w h  o 
requires an internal struggle and clever outside persuasion before 
he joins the conspiracy. 
The Cassius w h o approaches Brutus in the play is a m u c h more 
skillful intriguer than Plutarch's. H  e uses even Machiavellian tech­
niques : he has letters thrown into Brutus's window, reminding him 
of his noble ancestor w h  o defeated tyranny (whereas in Plutarch, the 
friends of Brutus spontaneously urged him to oppose Caesar). Caesar 
judges Cassius shrewdly as a dangerous m a  n w h  o sees through the 
deeds of others and envies those greater than himself. Cassius's 
arguments to make Brutus join the conspiracy are artful and decep­
tive : they appeal astutely to Brutus's self-image and distort cleverly 
a text from the book of self-knowledge. 
The cue for Cassius's appeal was in Plutarch, w h o had him 
demand that Brutus prove worthy of his n a m e : " W h a t , knowest 
thou not that thou art Brutus?" T h e R o m a n s , said Plutarch's Cas­
sius, would suffer any hardship for Brutus's sake "if thou wilt show 
thyself to be the m a  n thou art taken for and that they hope thou 
art." 9 Shakespeare's Cassius couches this appeal in a figure tradi­
tionally associated with self-knowledge, that of the eye's inability 
(analogous to the soul's) to see itself.10 Cassius's opening gambit— 
"Tell m e  , good Brutus, can you see your face ?"—produces Brutus's 
expected answer: " N o  , Cassius; for the eye sees not itself / But by 
reflection, by some other things" (51-53). Cassius n o w offers him­
self as the convenient med iu  m by which Brutus m a  y look into his 
soul or, to use Cassius's conventional figure, as the glass, which 
"Will modestly discover to yourself / That of yourself which you yet 
know not of" (69-70). Brutus recognizes the drift of this argument 
even before it is m a d e : 
Into what dangers would you lead m e  , Cassius, 
That you would have m  e seek into myself 
For that which is not in m  e ? 
(63-65) 
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But by the end of the scene it is evident that Brutus will search his 
soul. 
T h e persuasion of Brutus by Cassius introduces a problematic 
quality into Shakespeare's patterns of self-knowledge. In a way, it 
is true, the use of the mirror image has some resemblance to that in 
Richard II; the mirror is ambiguous, it is simultaneously one of 
truth andflattery. But truth andflattery become n o w inextricable. 
Caesar's power is dangerous; the freedom-loving, noble Brutus must 
oppose Caesar and Caesarism if his soul is to see itself clearly. But 
Cassius appeals covertly to the pride of Brutus in his honor and 
strength; Cassius's account of Caesar's weakness is surely not 
merely evidence of his envious nature but also a subtle blandishment 
of Brutus's self-conception as a strong m a  n w h  o fears the loss of 
honor more than death—unlike the Caesar w h o dared Cassius to a 
swimming match and then had to implore him for help. Brutus's 
sense of honor, justified by his reputation, provides an opening for 
Cassius to demand that Brutus take his fate into his hands and 
show that the n a m e of Caesar is no more than that of Brutus 
(139 ff.). W  e are not told h o w m u c h this argument influences Bru­
tus; but certainly his attempt at gaining self-knowledge is polluted 
by elements of deception: byflattery and by an evil insinuation. 
Cassius's Iagoesque sneer that noble minds should ever be with their 
likes is a grim comment on the ambiguous image of Brutus as a 
virtuous seeker and a deluded victim. 
It is worth noting that in the passage in Plato's First Alcibiades 
(132 ff.)—the locus classicus for the eye-mirror analogy—the com­
parison illustrates the argument of Socrates that the statesman re­
quires self-knowledge. I wonder whether Shakespeare knew the 
passage, perhaps through some commentary on Cicero's Tusculan 
Disputations; if not, certainly he was familiar with the ubiquitous 
idea of the mirror for princes and magistrates. In direct contrast to 
these precedents, the mirror of Brutus promises no clarity. If Brutus 
is to seek in his soul "what is not there," he must seek to establish 
order, a different one from Caesar's, in himself and in the state. 
Yet the traditional self-examination advocated by the Renaissance 
moralists provided no help for a situation like his. W  e cannot say, 
as w  e can with Richard II, that disaster would have been avoided 
if he had considered himself in time; had k n o w n himself as a com­
posite of body and soul; and had realized the presumption and weak­
ness of the former, and the strength and glory of the latter. T h  e kind 
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of questions that Brutus should ask himself are m u c h more practical 
and particular than those asked in the conventional nosce teipsum 
tracts. H  e should concern himself with his role in politics, with the 
suitability of his temperament and character for political leadership, 
with the justification of using questionable means to achieve desir­
able ends, and with the chances of predicting the outcome of violent 
action. 
Brutus does examine himself, and he has no choice but to do so 
in uncharted ways. Nothing is more characteristic of his lack of con­
venient precedent than his great soliloquy, "It must be by his 
death" (II.i.10 ff.), which examines the motives that have m a d  e 
him decide to murder Caesar. T h e soliloquy follows that ominous 
scene of thunder and lightning and miraculous happenings, a scene 
that orchestrates the uncertainty in which the decision has to be 
made. In the words of the coolly skeptical Cicero, this is "a strange-
disposed time." T h  e conspirators, m e  n of action, interpret without 
qualms the portents in a sense favorable to them; Brutus, m a  n of 
action as well as of reflection, finds taking a position m u c  h harder. 
But three parts of him, w e learn from Cassius during the storm, 
already are persuaded to join the conspiracy. T h e soliloquy shows 
that n o  w the whole m a  n is convinced. Rising before daybreak after 
the tempestuous night in which he has not slept, he goes over the 
reasons w h y Caesar must be killed. They are reasons of great sig­
nificance for Brutus's attempt to assess his relation to Caesar, an 
attempt that begins with his fateful conversation with Cassius. Al­
though they have been often examined by critics, w h o have come to 
diverging conclusions on the bearing these reasons have on the 
character of Brutus, w e must look at them again. M u c h of what one 
thinks of Brutus depends on them. 
Shakespeare's Brutus does not object to Caesar's becoming king 
as such; he seems in fact reconciled to this prospect. A n  y reference 
to the motivation of Plutarch's Brutus, that of restoring the repub­
lic, is avoided. Shakespeare's Brutus fears what Caesar, crowned, 
m a y become: " H o  w that might change his nature, there's the ques­
tion" (II.i.13). A n  d he answers this question by finding Caesar's 
coronation potentially dangerous: it would "put a sting in h i m  / 
That at his will he m a y do danger with" (16-17). H  e bases his 
hypothesis that Caesar m a y turn into a tyrant on the axiom of the 
corrupting influence of power: " T h ' abuse of greatness is, when 
it disjoins / Remorse from power" (18-19). Admittedly, Brutus 
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has not observed that Caesar's "affections sway'd / M o r  e than his 
reason" (20-21). However, he fears that Caesar's incipient ambi­
tion will grow. This surmise is based on another axiom, a " c o m m o n 
proof" of the danger of the upstart's reach for power: "lowliness 
is young ambition's ladder" (22). Brutus admits that this is all 
hypothetical, founded on what Caesar may become rather than what 
he is. A n  d since the quarrel cannot be based on what Caesar is, 
Brutus will kill him "as a serpent's egg, / Which , hatch'd, would 
as his kind grow mischievous" (32-33). 
These are highly theoretical reasons, but they are surely not 
invented to support a foregone conclusion, as M  .  W . McCallum 
claimed, nor are they symptomatic of the muddleheaded idealism to 
which, according to John Palmer, all liberal politicians are given.11 
Brutus's soliloquy clearly follows a pattern of inner struggle; it is 
not a declaration of political principles, but a recapitulation of the 
reasons w h  y Caesar must be killed. In his later speech to the people, 
Brutus's tone is decisive, his attribution of ambition to Caesar cate­
gorical. In the soliloquy, he goes out of his w a  y to take the most 
favorable opinion of Caesar possible. It is worth noting that Plu­
tarch (in the comparison of Dion and Brutus, the two conspirators 
paired in the Lives) spoke of the skillful w a  y in which Caesar 
established his dictatorship so that, to well-meaning R o m a n s  , he 
appeared a benevolent healer of the state: "For there never fol­
lowed any tyrannical nor cruel act, but contrarily it seemed that 
he was a merciful physician, w h o  m God had ordained of special 
grace to be governor of the empire of R o m  e and to set all things 
again at quiet stay the which required the counsel and the au­
thority of an absolute prince." 12 Having seen Caesar and his en­
tourage in Shakespeare, w  e find it difficult to accept this estimate, 
and Brutus's benevolence appears akin to naivete. But, although 
Brutus does not see or want to see fully the progress R o m  e has 
m a d  e toward tyranny, he does not engage in fantastic theorizing 
w h e n he sees Caesar as a threat. After the experience of our own 
age, it would be hard to deny that such "lowliness" as Caesar's— 
h o w his fawning to the crowd contrasts with his usual presump­
tion!—is "ambition's ladder" and perilous to any nation. Caesar 
and Caesarism, as J. Dover Wilson has well argued, represent 
perennial dangers.13 
Brutus fails to satisfy us not so m u c  h in what he says but in 
what he omits to say. H  e should ask himself such questions as the 
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following: Can I really cleanse the state by making c o m m o n cause 
with an envious and selfish m a  n like Cassius ? Will not the act that 
I wish to make one of liberation become soiled by the hands of 
Machiavellian conspirators ? A n d , most of all, he should ask: Does 
m  y cause justify murdering a m a  n ? Brutus does not ask these ques­
tions, and thus, scrupulous as he tries to be, he misses the mark. 
Brutus's soliloquy foreshadows the several overly analytical solilo­
quies of Hamlet, which, searching as they are, somehow do not go 
to the heart of the matter. 
W  e should say, of course, that to ponder such questions as the 
above would have made Brutus an even more problematic leader 
of a conspiracy. A n  d w  e must also say that the answers are not so 
simple as they appear. This is a difficult and confusing moral terri­
tory. All political action involves means over which the politician 
lacks full control. T o adapt a m a x i m of Henry V , battles cannot be 
won with clean soldiers only. If Brutus's analysis of the political 
situation in R o m  e is accepted, as I think it must be, the state is in 
an emergency that requires an extraordinary solution. A n  d most of 
us, as much as w e deplore murder, sympathize with those w h o risk 
their lives to free their country from oppression. W  e rejoice in the 
fall of a tyrant and m a  y even condone his killing if it appears the 
only wa  y of his removal. 
Brutus m a y not think hard enough; but that at least absolves him 
from the accusation of being too theoretical a m a  n for leading a 
conspiracy. H  e is, admittedly, not the stock type of a conspirator; 
but that makes him, up to Caesar's death, not less, but more effec­
tive. H  e is an idealist, but he is also a m a  n w h  o can inspire others. 
Plutarch admired his leadership, and I see no reason to think that 
Shakespeare did not. Brutus injects fervor and a sense of purpose 
into what otherwise would be a merely brutal enterprise. W h e  n he 
takes the high road, he takes the best one—provided of course that 
we think he should go forward. W h e  n he dissuades the plotters 
from taking an oath and asks them to trust in "honesty to honesty 
engaged," he chooses a practical as well as a noble course: to as­
sume loyalty is a good w a y to achieve it. Brutus's leadership up to 
and including the murder of Caesar is superior; by contrast, the 
others are nervous, and even Cassius turns to Brutus for reassurance 
and instruction when, at the last moment , he believes the plot be­
trayed. 
But, good as Brutus's direction is, he cannot prevent the moral 
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ambiguities of his action from asserting themselves at the murder. 
In his last minute, Caesar wins, as it were, a victory over Brutus. 
"Et tu Brute! The  n fall, Caesar!" is the most brilliant utterance of 
that effective phrasemaker and steals the thunder from Cinna's simul­
taneous cries of liberty and freedom. T h  e great actor Caesar under­
stands h o  w to m a k  e himself into a martyr and a victim of ingrati­
tude; he does not accept the role of sacrificial lamb for the gods 
assigned to him by Brutus. A n  d Caesar's murder also proves the de­
lusion of Brutus's claim that " W  e all stand up against the spirit of 
Caesar, / A n d in the spirit of m e n there is no blood" (II.i. 167-68). 
There is m u c h blood in Caesar, as is manifest in the rite in which 
the conspirators wash their hands in this blood. T h e hands of Brutus, 
too, are n o  w soiled. W h a  t he did, he did in honest thought; but he 
used the unclean hands of the others, and no more than they will he 
escape the consequences of the act. H  e was wrong when he believed 
that he could be a sacrificer without being a butcher. Yet in an ironic 
sense he was right when he said that the conspirators stood up 
against the spirit of Caesar. A spirit cannot be laid to rest through 
murder. Brutus's uncertain road has led to a certain crime that will 
be avenged. 
Shakespeare's Brutus falls, as does Plutarch's, through a series of 
errors. Shakespeare was bound to have Brutus commit them, but he 
could and did create intellectual contexts that m a d e them more 
plausible. T h e worst of these mistakes is to let Antony live and to 
permit him to m a k e the funeral oration. O  n both counts, the con­
spiratorial instinct of Cassius, w h o opposes him, are right even 
though Brutus's is the nobler attitude. But it is an attitude abetted 
by the delusion that a man's spirit can be killed by killing his body. 
Antony m a y be but a limb of Caesar, but the limb becomes mighty 
indeed whe  n directed by Caesar's spirit. 
This spirit of Caesar was Shakespeare's most brilliant addition to 
the story. Plutarch had almost all the elements of which it is com­
posed—Caesar's tremendous popularity, outlasting his death, the 
desire of the people to be ruled by a strong m a n  , Caesar's magnetism, 
the adoption of his methods by his inheritors, and an evil spirit that 
appears to Brutus—but he had no spirit of Caesar. B y creating it, 
Shakespeare read sense and purpose into the facts of history Plutarch 
recorded, and he established a dramatic counterforce to Brutus, 
which prevents the play from losing its balance in the last two acts. 
T h  e conspirators' failure evolves logically and consistently from the 
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murder and is presided over, from this very m o m e n  t on, by Caesar's 
spirit* 
W  e can go further and say that Caesar's spirit is actually the 
presiding genius from the beginning of the play whe  n the disorderly 
crowd hangs trophies on Caesar's images. Brutus is up against an 
evil genius, in the modern and in the Elizabethan sense of the word, 
w h  o exploits the disharmony in the state to create a n e  w political 
system that mocks any kind of order in which m e  n can live freely. 
Significantly, the one appeal to the principle of subordination on the 
basis of a universal order in the play is m a d  e by Caesar w h e  n he calls 
himself "constant as the northern star" (III.i.6o), and it is conspicu­
ously perverted by his claim of being far above humanity, "unshak'd 
of motion." T h e inhuman spirit of Caesar is in his people. A s M a x 
Liithi has noted, it is in the seeds of violence Cassius sows in the 
mind of Brutus; the letter Cassius has thrown in Brutus's window 
incites him to "speak, strike, redress!" (II.i.47), which in its 
rhythm anticipates the crowd's later turn against the conspirators: 
"Seek! Burn! Fire! Kill! Slay!" (III.ii.204).14 It is this spirit that 
makes Brutus's listeners shout "let him be Caesar," w h e n he wins 
their approval for his action (49)—even this m o m e n  t of his greatest 
triumph really belongs to Caesar. A n  d the spirit of Caesar infuses 
strength into Antony when, left alone with Caesar's bleeding body, 
he prophesies that "Caesar's spirit, ranging for revenge, / W i t h Ate 
by his side come hot from hell" will "let slip the dogs of war" (Ill.i. 
271 ff.). Antony can turn the crowd against Brutus not merely be­
cause of his well-appreciated oratorical skill and Brutus's prosaic 
deficiency but also because he is carried along by the Caesarism 
around him. W h e n , at the opportune m o m e n t , he removes the cover­
ing mantle from the body of his master, the populace roars for 
revenge. T h  e living Caesar caters to, and espouses the spirit of, 
violence that sets in motion currents that ignite and that, after his 
death, destroy the conspirators. 
The spirit of Caesar, living and dead, prevents the essentially 
harmonious Brutus from recovering the stability he has lost. There 
is one m o m e n t in the play w h e n it looks as if he might become fully 
himself again, in his tent at Sardis, w h e  n he is reconciled to Cassius; 
he feels that he has a chance of changing his fortunes for the better: 
"There is a tide in the affairs of m e n / W h i c h , taken at the flood, 
leads on to fortune" (IV.iii.216-17). W h e  n his friends depart, he 
asks for music, that harmonizer of souls. T h  e lute-playing boy falls 
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asleep; Brutus gently takes the instrument from him and meditates, 
book in hand. Just then the ghost appears and announces that he will 
return at Philippi. T h e hope for harmony is gone. 
Brutus does not concern himself here or later with the question of 
whether his decisions are and were morally right; after his soliloquy 
in the second act on the reasons for murdering Caesar, he has put 
this question aside. T h e m o m e n t he comes closest to asking it again, 
or perhaps w  e should say the m o m e n  t at which w  e feel most that he 
ought to ask it, is during the quarrel scene with Cassius. H  e does 
here question his friend, "Did not great Julius bleed for justice' 
sake ?" But Brutus's uncertainty—if there is uncertainty in his voice 
—comes only from his realizing the smaller contamination of his 
cause through Cassius's weakness for bribery, not from understand­
ing the more serious wholesale contamination of the cause by the 
egotistically-motivated conspirators. Neither does he examine the 
question whether political assassination is ever justified. This lack of 
a sufficient self-examination goes far toward making us lose our 
tragic sympathy for him. 
Not that w e really expect him to voice regret about having killed 
Caesar or to realize fully the fallacies of his actions; w  e understand 
his motives well enough and, if w e do not approve them, w e take 
satisfaction in our wider view of his predicament (although our 
wider view is facilitated by our not really being in his predicament). 
Regardless of h o  w w  e feel about the crime he has committed, w  e take 
him for a m a  n w h o  m fortune has treated most harshly; his hopes for 
a free R o m  e have proved an illusion, he has become an exile, he is 
disappointed in his main friend and ally, and he faces the possibility 
of being defeated in battle. Yet, w e are disappointed when he gains 
no insight into his condition and remains almost totally immutable 
while his world crumbles. W  e can hardly expect Shakespeare to have 
m a d e him into a neurotic victim of a harrowing ghost-spirit as he 
m a d  e Hamlet—the conception of Brutus's character in Plutarch and 
in Renaissance consciousness prevented this possibility—but, had he 
wished, he could surely have given him some awareness of the irony 
of committing an act whose consequences completely contradicted his 
expectations. H e could have given him a realization of the cleavage 
between intention and execution, character and events, and he could 
have given him something of a momentary shudder. T h e absence 
of any such reaction is remarkable. Brutus's tragedy, as Ernest 
Schanzer has noted, is that of a denied anagnorisis. 
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In seeking for an explanation as to w h  y Shakespeare did not give 
Brutus as least an inkling of his tragic situation, critics often at­
tribute to the R o m a  n hero a rigid Stoicism and m a k  e its insuf­
ficiency as a guide to h u m a  n conduct responsible for his lack of 
insight. Brutus, w  e are told, has steeled himself against fate and 
refuses to fret about it; the training of his will has atrophied his 
sensibilities.15 But I do not think that this is a fair judgment, and to 
the extent that it is based on Brutus's alleged Stoicism, it is quite 
false. Shakespeare did not characterize Brutus as a Stoic if the word 
is to be understood in any technical sense. M  y reader, I trust, will 
bear with m  e if I examine this matter in some detail; it is significant 
not only for the character of Brutus but also for Shakespeare's at­
titude toward Stoicism and philosophy in general. 
Plutarch's Brutus was certainly not a Stoic. H  e had studied, as 
Plutarch noted at the beginning of his Life of Brutus, all sorts of 
Greek philosophers and liked them, "but above all the rest he loved 
Plato's sect best and did not m u c h give himself to the N e w or M e a n 
Academy, as they call it, but altogether to the Old A c a d e m y . " 16 
Like Plutarch's Brutus, that of Shakespeare criticizes the Stoic Cato 
for his suicide (V.i.101 ff.). But the clearest indication that Brutus 
is not to be taken as a Stoic is in the quarrel scene with Cassius, 
when he proves incapable of suppressing the emotions in the w a y 
the austere members of this school demanded. 
This is a remarkable and pivotal scene that brings into focus the 
contrast between the idealistic and righteous Brutus, for w h o  m a 
war fought for justice' sake must not be tainted by private corrup­
tion, and the pragmatic Cassius (philosophically he is an Epicurean), 
w h o fails to see w h y a little bribery can hurt the war-effort. But 
while the scene demonstrates that Brutus is a stranger to the thought 
of selfish plotters, it shows that he is no stranger to the inner life, 
the life of feelings. H e is, in E d w a r d D o w d e n ' s phrase, "studious of 
self-perfection," 17 but he is not inhumanly so. In the quarrel scene, 
he is close to losing his emotional control, and the real reason for that 
is not Gassius but Portia. 
It is significant that Shakespeare connected and combined the 
quarrel scene with the news of Portia's death. In Plutarch, it came 
at a later juncture and produced no reaction from Brutus beyond 
making him write letters that reproached his friends for not having 
prevented her suicide. In combining the quarrel with the news of 
Portia's death, Shakespeare motivated Brutus's reaction not merely 
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by his irritation about Cassius but also by his personal grief—a 
motivation, it appears, that was important enough for him to make 
it clearer by revising the scene as he had originally written it. 
A s the scene stands in the Folio and in modern editions, there are 
two mentions of Portia's death. In the first instance, Brutus himself 
breaks the news to Cassius w h e n the latter accuses him of not making 
use of his philosophy (IV.iii.144 ff.). Cassius immediately apologizes 
for crossing his friend, calling the loss "insupportable" and "touch­
ing." The  n Messala enters, and, in the course of questioning Brutus 
concerning other matters, asks him whether he has news about 
Portia (179). Strangely, Brutus answers in the negative, and M e s ­
sala n o  w announces hesitantly that Portia is dead. T h  e reaction of 
Brutus is to assert his o w  n patient readiness. 
It has long ago been argued that in all probability the duplicate 
report of Portia's death was due to Shakespeare's revision of the 
scene, and that the canceled passage, presumably the messenger's 
report and Brutus's second reaction, remained accidentally in the 
text.18 In what appears to be the original version, Brutus takes 
refuge in his philosophy—the strain is evident—as he is apprised of 
Portia's death. In the presumable revision, Brutus is aware of it 
from the beginning, and his irritation with Cassius is partly moti­
vated by the sorrow he finds hard to master. In either version, but 
more poignantly in the revision, Brutus shows signs of strain. A n d , 
after he has settled his quarrel with Cassius, he freely admits that he 
was ill-tempered. Emotions, as he knows, do at least temporarily 
affect h i m : 
O Cassius, you are yoked with a lamb, 
That carries anger as theflint bears fire; 
W h o  , much enforced, shows a hasty spark, 
A n  d straight is cold again. 
(IV.iii. 109-12) 
In admitting that he was affected by passion, Brutus gives a 
characteristic twist to an image the Elizabethans associated with 
Stoicism. For claiming that the wise m a  n is impervious to all emo­
tion, the Stoics were, since Cicero, called m e  n of w o o  d or stone.19 
Antony, w h o surely knows that Brutus is no Stoic—-as m u c h as he 
knows that men's souls have not fled to beasts—seeks yet to attach 
to him the opprobrium of being one when he suggests in his funeral 
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oration that Brutus has a heart of stone. Antony does not exactly 
say that Brutus is devoid of h u m a  n emotion—after all, he had 
promised not to blame the conspirators—but he does say that every­
body else has feelings. Dead Caesar, he says, was a m a  n of compas­
sion : " W h e  n that the poor have cried, Caesar hath wept; / Ambition 
should be m a d e of sterner stuff" (III.ii.91-92). Antony himself 
chokes with emotion, an affliction he exploits oratorically: " M  y heart 
is in the coffin there with Caesar, / A n  d I must pause till it come 
back to m e  " (106-7). H  e cleverly alleges that he does not wish 
the people to see Caesar's will: 
Y o u are not wood, you are not stones, but m e n ; 
A n d being men, hearing the will of Caesar, 
It will inflame you, it will make you mad. 
(142-44) 
The insinuation that Brutus and his conspirators are m e n of wood 
and stone—and thus for the Elizabethans the worst of austere Stoics 
—is clear. T  o emphasize the contrast between Brutus and the 
Romans in general, Antony approvingly notes the "gracious drops" 
of pity on his listeners' faces. Ironically, however, these are the same 
people w h o m Marullus called for good reasons " Y o u blocks, you 
stones, you worse than senseless things!" (I.i.36). It is equally ironic 
that the one character w h o feels that his constancy exempts him 
from the ranks of m e n w h o "are flesh and apprehensive" and makes 
him "unshaked of motion" is Caesar. In view of his previous waver­
ing on whether to go to the Capitol, he does not appear to be totally 
immobile; but he sees himself at any rate as a super-Stoic. Brutus, 
w h o knows himself aflint that occasionally strikes a hasty spark, 
does not. A n d by giving w a y somewhat to grief and anger, he be­
comes indulgent with the h u m a  n limitation of the boy Lucius in the 
next scene; he is gently protective whe  n Lucius falls asleep. W  e 
should not succumb to stereotype notions about the R o m a n  s and 
R o m a n philosophy or to Antony's insinuation and call Brutus a 
Stoic. 
If Brutus fails to satisfy in the end, it is not because he is a Stoic 
but because he does not experience his situation existentially enough. 
This, I think, is both an emotional and an intellectual failing, but of 
a different order from Stoic "apathy." If there is a shortcoming in 
Brutus's philosophy, it is not his failure to feel deeply enough in 
l68 PROBLEMS AND AMBIGUITIES 
general but his failure to react to the events in some w a y that makes 
one think that he understands h o w insecure m a n is and h o w much 
he sometimes becomes the prisoner of events he cannot control. 
T h e failure of Brutus to examine his situation in some such 
fashion is the more notable as the characters in the play comment 
on man's inability to foresee the consequences of his actions. Even 
the generally unreflective Cassius shows an awareness of man's pre­
dicament w h e n he questions Brutus on what to do in case of defeat: 
"But, since the affairs of m e  n rest still incertain, / Let's reason with 
the worst that m a y befall" (V.i.95-96). Cassius also has something 
of a metaphysical shudder w h e  n he gives w a  y to fear about un­
favorable omens and "partly" credits them. This fear even makes 
him give up his Epicurean philosophy, which denied their meaning 
(V.i.76ff.). Cassius, one might say, becomes afideist. B  y contrast, 
Brutus declares himself capable of judging the "tide in the affairs of 
men"—although the wave images he uses should m a k e him aware 
of the erratic nature of the events on which m a  n floats (IV.iii.216­
22). 
But the most explicit statement by any character concerning man's 
susceptibility to misjudging the tides is m a d  e earlier, during the 
crucial period w h e n Brutus is in the process of coming to his fateful 
decision of murdering Caesar, and it is m a d  e by a character whose 
role in the play is secondary, although it was primary in R o m a n 
life: Cicero. In the tempestuous night full of strange happenings that 
frighten the previously cynical and blunt Casca and m a k e him believe 
that they are portents of the events to come, the philosophic Cicero 
comments: 
Indeed, it is a strange-disposed time; 
But m e  n m a  y construe things after their fashion, 
Clean from the purpose of the things themselves. 
(I.iii.33-35) 
Cicero's ensuing question, " C o m e s Caesar to the Capitol to-morrow?" 
associates his generalization in our minds with the plan of murder­
ing Caesar—of which Cicero knows nothing. But one m a y apply 
what he says to all the erroneous judgments m a d e in the play, those 
of Caesar, of the conspirators, and particularly of Brutus. A  s Liithi 
has shown, Cicero's statement characterizes the intellectual climate 
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of the play; its significance is enhanced by being assigned to the m a  n 
w h o  m the Renaissance recognized as its philosophical father. 
The failure of Brutus, measured by Cicero's skepticism, lies in his 
taking a positive, idealistic attitude toward h u m a  n actions in prefer­
ence to a pragmatic and skeptic one. Rather than to incline toward 
the Old A c a d e m  y (as Plutarch said Brutus did), he should favor the 
more skeptical N e  w A c a d e m y (to which Cicero's Academica be­
longed and which, according to Plutarch, Brutus did not like). 
Instead, he remains an idealist; the world is his will and idea, not 
in the crude sense of his being arrogant, but in the sense of his 
believing that he can transform the world according to the ideal 
pattern of his mind. There m a y , of course, be a subtle sense of h u m a n 
pride in all philosophical idealism—at least, the skeptics thought so. 
The skeptic andfideistic atmosphere of the play is one reason more 
that w e find the grave and sober words he continues to speak inap­
propriate to the occasion. In this respect, he resembles the h u m a  n 
figures on mannerist canvases that include details that conflict with 
and contradict the proportions and the postures of these persons. 
Mannerist painters, as has been noted, often did not give to their 
major figures the same psychological language as that which they 
gave to the surroundings.20 
Thus, in thefinal analysis, Brutus offers more of a contrast than 
a parallel to Henry V  , of w h o  m Shakespeare must have been re­
minded when he created him. Both, it is true, are m e n in w h o  m the 
elements are mixed in perfect proportions. But, in the situation in 
which Henry finds himself, this temperance provides a sufficient 
basis for the kind of self-knowledge that leads to the deployment of 
the self for m a x i m u  m success; in the situation of Brutus it does not. 
If m  y argument is accepted that the failure of Brutus lies in not 
considering sufficiently the baffling uncertainty between intention 
and execution, character and event, one must say that the pattern of 
perfection cannot escape some blame for this deficiency; it had no 
built-in provisions for considering such uncertainty. Intentionally or 
not, Shakespeare's treatment of the pattern in Brutus shows up its 
insufficiency and even irrelevance to actual life; and it does so in a 
manner like Montaigne's and the skeptics', for w h o  m the self had 
to adapt itself to the changing h u m a  n environment. A constancy 
and self-consistency like Brutus's seemed to Montaigne particularly 
inadequate. In Julius Caesar, Shakespeare appears to have felt the 
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winds of skepticism that are blowing m u c h stronger in Hamlet. If 
so, Montaigne hardly is responsible; not even the most fervent ad­
vocates of the influence of the essays have discovered parallels in 
Julius Caesar. There were, after all, native fideistic sources of skepti­
cism, and there was the moderate N e w A c a d e m y of Cicero, w h o in 
the play becomes a spokesman for the skeptics' position of suspending 
judgments. A n d , there was Plutarch, whose dispassionate treatment 
of the events m a  y have suggested to Shakespeare a need for rethink­
ing his ideas on the connection between character and fate, between 
h u m a  n agency and historical development. 
But I must confess to a lingering doubt about m  y interpretation. 
If, as I have claimed, Brutus's lack offlexibility and his idealistic 
rigidity are fundamental flaws of his character and motivating 
themes of the action, it must be said that they are not given alto­
gether convincing dramatic expression and are, to say the least, 
difficult to convey on the stage. W h a  t one does notice in performances 
is that the later Brutus becomes more withdrawn and taciturn. As 
Granville-Barker put it, "Having lifted his heroic R o m a  n to this 
height, . . . [Shakespeare] leaves him to stand rather stockishly 
upon it." 21 Barker blamed Brutus's Stoicism for his "stockishness." 
I believe that the explanation I have given of his inappropriate 
"idealism" accords better with Shakespeare's intentions as they can 
be ascertained from close reading of the source and the play. But to 
m a k  e this philosophy of Brutus responsible for his lack of self-
discovery requires more arguments about what he does not do or say 
than what he does or says. For an audience or reader to feel that the 
tragic hero is denied an anagnorisis, they must expect one, or be told 
by the dramatist that they should. T  o see a hero's self-certitude as 
a failure to adopt a skeptic attitude, one must not only understand 
that the other characters take such an attitude but he must also 
sympathize with it (unless, of course, the hero himself confesses his 
failure in an anagnorisis). M  y reader must judge for himself on 
these points. In his tragedies, Shakespeare generally does seem to 
provide some kind of anagnorisis, but it is sometimes a very rudi­
mentary one, such as R o m e o '  s " O  , I a  m fortune's fool!" and occa­
sionally, as in Hamlet, it is so questionable as a diagnosis of the 
hero's flaw and situation that the term does not appear appropriate. 
But one can speak with greater assurance of a missed anagnorisis 
w h e  n he analyzes himself wrongly than w h e  n he says nothing 
at all. A n d w e certainly do not k n o w the percentage of skeptic­
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fideists in Shakespeare's audience, people w h  o would have been condi­
tioned to interpret the play in the fashion I have suggested. 
Perhaps our curiosity as to w h  y Brutus is uncommunicative about 
what w  e consider the great psychological issue of the play is merely 
the result of an unhistorical and oversubtle approach to character 
interpretation. Perhaps m  y explanation that Brutus fails because he 
faces the world with philosophic certainty comes from too m u c h read­
ing of Montaigne. Perhaps Shakespeare wished merely to suggest 
that Brutus is isolated and lonely. But the fact remains that w  e are 
baffled about his behavior. So w e are, of course, about Hamlet's; but 
in his case, w  e accept a m u c  h stranger behavior—although not verbal 
reticence—as dramatically right. In Julius Caesar, there is some­
thing dramatically not quite right. But if the play is—it seems a 
presumptuous judgment—something of a failure, it is an explicable 
one and one most beneficial for Shakespeare to have suffered. I k n o  w 
of no real precedent Shakespeare had for exploring the internal struc­
ture of a m a  n like Brutus. T h  e conventional no see teipsum theories 
on which he had drawn for the anagnorisis of his earlier tragic heroes 
gave him no help; they were even hard to acclimatize to R o m e . W h a t 
he needed he could only obtain in the school of the skeptics and in the 
school of experience, and he had, perhaps, not yet progressed suf­
ficiently in either. That he learned from Julius Caesar is evident in 
Hamlet, where the constraint of the source material and the complex­
ity of issues created by Shakespeare himself are never allowed to 
detract from our fascination with, and belief in, Hamlet as a tragic 
human being. Shakespeare walked Hamlet's uncertain road with 
dramatic certainty. Shakespeare m a y have learned more from the 
relative artistic failure of Julius Caesar (it was an audience success) 
than from his previous triumphs. A n  d only in comparison with his 
later and greater tragedies can one speak of a failure at all. 
CHAPTER TEN 
Hamlet: 
Probing a Restless Self 
IT IS A P P R O P R I A T E that Hamlet, the play that poses so m a n  y questions, begins with one, Bernardo's challenge to Francisco: " W h  o is there ?" This is thefirst of the m a n  y iden­
tity questions, and it is one that originates in a confusion, for not 
the sentry at guard, Francisco, but the relieving officer, Bernardo, 
asks for the watchword; he is immediately corrected by Francisco: 
" N a y  , answer m e .  " A dozen lines later, the confusion repeats itself 
w h e  n the relieved Francisco, rather than Bernardo, challenges the 
newcomers, Horatio and Marcellus: " W h  o is there?" 
T h  e slight irregularities with which the play opens are sympto­
matic of the sinister threat to order in D e n m a r  k that gradually re­
veals itself in other questions of identity. T h  e appearance of the 
ghost on the dark platform of Elsinore throws an ominous shadow 
over the beginning action. This ghost, being as like to the dead King 
Hamlet, Horatio says to Marcellus, "as thou art to thyself," yet 
defies Horatio's attempt at identification: 
W h a  t art thou that usurp'st this time of night 
Together with that fair and warlike form 
In which the majesty of buried Denmark 
Did sometimes march ? 
(I.i.46-49) 
Apprehensions about the ghost's identity and purpose carry over 
from thefirst scene to the second, from the dark platform to the 
lighted room of state, where the n e w king, Claudius, evokes the 
m e m o r y of "Hamlet, our dear brother's death" with a "dropping 
eye," and his marriage to his brother's wife with an "auspicious" 
one. Claudius appears suave, efficient, and benevolent. T h  e marriage 
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occurred with the approval of the counselors, but Shakespeare's 
audience, like Hamlet, would have considered it incestuous. There 
appears n o w  , almost as disturbing as the ghost, the dark figure of 
the prince in all the warmth, color, and light. W h e  n Claudius, having 
attended to urgent external and domestic problems, turns to him in 
apparently fatherly concern, "But n o w , m y cousin Hamlet, and m y 
son—," the uncomfortable young m a  n sets himself apart from the 
kindness and complacency around him in a riddling aside: "  A little 
more than kin, and less than kind." H  e rejects the identity Claudius 
wishes to impose on him; he declines to be related to his "uncle­
father." W h e  n his mother asks him to cast his mourning garments 
off because, as she innocently says, w h y should what is c o m m o n seem 
so particular to him, Hamlet takes offense. H  e refuses to be identi­
fied with his garments or, indeed, with any observances of grief that 
merely seem and, by implication, with all that is c o m m o  n and merely 
seeming in Denmark . H  e is nauseated by the identities that the 
others assume and by that which they wish to thrust on him, and he 
thinks of suicide. In hisfirst soliloquy, he betrays a desire to leave 
the unweeded garden of a world possessed by things rank and gross 
in nature. H  e is prevented only by the religious injunction against 
self-slaughter. 
The subject of identity arises in a different key in the following 
scene, as in a narrower room the members of the family of Polonius 
lecture each other on their proper roles in family, society, and state. 
At the brink of his departure for France, Laertes warns Ophelia not 
to show favor to Hamlet: the prince's identity as designated heir 
to the throne will put him out of Ophelia's reach. Ophelia offers 
some reciprocal advice on her brother's virtuous conduct in France. 
Polonius then enters and dispenses to his son a string of max im s on 
morals and manners, capped with the admonishment to be true to 
himself. Such has not been the case with Ophelia, the loquacious 
counselor argues as he is left alone with her: " Y o u do not under­
stand yourself so clearly/As it behoves m  y daughter and your 
honour" (I.iii.96-97). Ophelia must give up Hamlet and isolate him 
further. 
Hamlet's crisis of identity reaches its first climax whe  n he con­
fronts the ghost. Its relationship to him is even more problematic 
than that of Claudius; but whether or not it is "a spirit of health or 
goblin damn'd" he will call it king, father, and royal Dane. Hamlet's 
disposition is horribly shaken; his already restless mind is set into 
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violent turbulence. H  e accepts the challenge with the same overheated 
reaching for the ultimate with which he earlier protested his devo­
tion to truth above appearances. H  e will stir in this revenge, but, 
strangely, he will do so by putting on an antic disposition. Whatever 
Shakespeare m a y have thought was the reason for Hamlet's psychor 
logical self-disguise, and even if he had no particular reason at all, 
the device of playing the m a d m a  n gives Hamlet's restless mind some­
thing to do. H e can put this antic disposition on and off like a maskj 
play fast and loose with his enemies, and take time to explore his 
o w  n identity and that of the others. 
Hamlet's actions and behavior proceed from a highly agitated and 
complex state of mind, which, from the beginning of the play, makes 
him uncertain about his place in the world. His melancholy, his bitr 
terness and disillusionment, his feigned madness and real nervous 
shock give additional impulses to his churning intellect that cannot 
identify itself totally with anything—not with the state of Denmark, 
not with the world, not with his revenge, not with his grief. Hamlet 
is thus driven not only to avenge his father, but also to explore the 
basis on which all actions, good and evil, rest. H  e becomes con­
cerned with self-knowledge.1 
That Hamlet considers self-knowledge an ultimate goal, w e have 
his o w n words. T h e remark comes very late in the play, in the final 
scene whe  n Osric invites the prince to the duel with Laertes (V.ii. 
136 ff.).2 T h e foppish courtier professes to give Hamlet a fair warn­
ing: " Y o u are not ignorant of what excellence Laertes is—." Hamlet 
cuts him short: "I dare not confess that, lest I should compare 
with him in excellence; but to k n o w a m a n well were to k n o w him^ 
self." T h e remark is somewhat cryptic, and thus D r . Johnson tried 
to straighten out its syntax and meaning. Hamlet, D r . Johnson said, 
means "I dare not pretend to k n o w Laertes lest I should pretend to 
an equality; but no m a n m a y completely k n o w another but by know­
ing himself, which is the utmost of h u m a n wisdom." 
But this paraphrase is not quite correct, for it ignores the inver­
sion that gives the statement a more conditional turn: what Hamlet 
really says is that "to k n o  w Laertes were to pretend to kno  w that I 
a m as excellent as he; but I could do so only if it were possible to 
k n o  w myself." It will be said, of course, that this statement is part 
of Hamlet's g a m  e of puncturing Osric's turgid rhetoric, and it is; yet 
the phrasing of the interchange between Osric and Hamlet points to 
its having a philosophical significance worth recovering for the 
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thoughtful reader of the play. T h e key words of Osric's invitation 
that excite Hamlet's rejoinder are "ignorant" and "excellence." They 
were c o m m o  n in Renaissance moral tracts dealing with self-knowl­
edge; Pierre de la Primaudaye, for instance, began the first chapter 
of his French Academy by marveling at the "excellence of m a n  " and 
by warning that "ignorance of ourselves [is] the cause of m u c  h 
evil." 3 Reacting as he does to Osric, Hamlet shows his sensitivity 
to the idiom of self-knowledge and proves himself aware of the im­
portance and difficulty of the subject. 
Hamlet's struggle for self-knowledge is a subject of utmost im­
portance in this play, which, unlike any other of Shakespeare's, 
forces us to approach it through the hero's baffling and baffled con­
sciousness. T h e pragmatic test of theater and of criticism proves that 
in Hamlet it is not, as in Aristotle's Poetics, plot before character but 
character before plot. A n  d the greatness of the play does not derive 
from having as its hero a character most appropriate for the action, 
but rather one most inappropriate. Hamlet, the play, exhibits a m a n  ­
nerist tension between its form, that of a revenge tragedy, and its 
content* that of a drama of ideas. A n  d Hamlet, the hero, suffers 
stresses and conflicts between one part of his nature and another, 
between himself and his task, between the real and the ideal. H  e is a 
much more deeply divided m a  n than Brutus; his internal tensions are 
heightened beyond the normal scale. Eliot's observation that Hamlet 
is dominated by an emotion that is in the final analysis inexpressible 
was well m a d e ; Hamlet's passion is in excess of the facts as they 
appear.4 But it does not follow, therefore, that the play is a failure; 
rather, the very incongruity between the facts and Hamlet's e m o ­
tions is one of the reasons for its success. If Aristotle will forgive 
m e  , I shall say that one reason for the appeal of Hamlet is that 
through the actions and reactions of its unique hero it purges us of 
the guilt feelings w  e have about our o w  n maladjustments to this 
inadequate world by magnifying them. 
In no play of Shakespeare's have the hero's soliloquies greater im­
portance for getting a feeling of its quality; yet from the point of 
view of action, they are almost negligible, and the plot can be s u m  ­
fliarized with very little reference to them. Hamlet's soliloquies, 
which have been the focus of most critical interpretations of the play, 
are fascinating and perplexing exercises in self-analysis. Without 
them, Hamlet, the play, would not rise as far above Elizabethan re­
venge tragedies as it does. Without them, Hamlet, the hero, would 
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look more like certain other characters and types w e k n o w from the 
stage. T h e soliloquies are surely a major reason w h y descriptions of 
him as an average young m a  n fail to satisfy. N  o mere "young man's 
unreasonable disgust w h e  n he discovers that elders are as strongly 
sexed as himself" 5 accounts for the almost late-Tolstoyan sex nau­
sea of Hamlet's first soliloquy, " O  , that this too too solid flesh would 
melt." A n  d surely, the self-flagellation of the second soliloquy, " O  , 
what a rogue and peasant slave a  m I!" goes beyond the customary 
self-reproaches of a typical avenger.6 Hamlet's most famous solil­
oquy, the third, which has been thought to show that he is a descen­
dant of the medieval Everyman, 7 does not deal merely with the re­
ligious question of death and immortality, to be and not to be, but 
also with the existential question, to act or not to act and thus to be 
or not to be, and with the speculative question on the state of the 
soul after death. Hamlet's fourth and short soliloquy " 'Tis n o w the 
very witching time of night" betrays no Christian conscience and 
makes him outwardly appear a typical bloodthirsty avenger; but the 
action it introduces is not the killing of the king, but Hamlet's moral 
lectures to his mother. T h  e fifth soliloquy, " H o  w all occasions do in­
form against m e ,  " is hard to reconcile with any of the three m e n  ­
tioned abstractions—the average young m a n , the Everyman, and the 
avenger—and to designate him on its basis as a typical Elizabethan 
nobleman contradicts his hatred of code and court. 
Hamlet is extraordinary, and he possesses an extraordinary mind. 
T h  e quality and fascination of the play lie to a large degree in his 
strange and complex mental states that take in and simultaneously 
deny typical forms of experience. Whatever one m a y say about 
Hamlet, he is not static; restlessness is a major ingredient of his 
searching and suffering spirit. 
Since the romantics at least, critics of very different persuasions 
have found Hamlet agitated by a spirit of this kind even though they 
have diagnosed his problem as due to divergent underlying causes. 
Although the descriptions themselves are often astute, the alleged 
causes are more indicative of cultural and critical climates than of 
the roots of Hamlet's behavior. W e realize n o w that the romanticists' 
aversion to dramatic action, which m a d e them incapable of writing 
actable plays, also distorted their view of both Hamlet the play and 
Hamlet the m a n . Coleridge's image—a kind of self-image of the 
prince's enormous intellectual activity, accompanied by a propor­
tionate aversion to real action—is irreconcilable with the Hamlet of 
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the stage, w h o is constantly in motion, most of the time in actions 
that have at least something to do with his revenge or with his plan 
to baffle and evade the king. But although the romanticists were 
unduly concerned with Hamlet's inaction, they did recognize his 
intellectual restlessness. Even though Goethe put the emphasis on 
Hamlet's shrinking from his task, he observed h o  w he winds, turns, 
torments himself, advances and recoils. Although Schlegel thought 
Hamlet's power of action crippled, he noted his calculating con­
sideration, which exhausts all the relations and possible conse­
quences of the deed. Hazlitt, w h  o believed Hamlet's capacity to act 
was eaten up by thought, yet granted him high enthusiasm and quick 
sensibilities. 
The diagnosis of Hamlet's problem as melancholy—whether in a 
general sense or in that of the Elizabethan h u m o  r disease—has 
similarly produced engaging descriptions of a Hamlet that is un­
stable, emotionally unhinged, gyrating between fits of energy and 
spells of lassitude. N o b o d y has given a finer account of a Hamlet 
whose mind totters and reels under the blows to his existence than 
A . C . Bradley.8 A n d even attempts to formulate Hamlet into a 
sterile prototype of a malcontent avenger have produced astute de­
scriptions of the scintillating and contradictory nature that m a k  e 
him, as E  . E  . Stoll has it, "both vindictive and high-minded, active 
and reflective, ironic and pathetic, merry and melancholy, indecent 
and decorous, insolent and courteous, cruel and tender, both sus­
picious and crafty and also (as Claudius himself has noted) 'most 
generous and free from all contriving.' " 9 
Hamlet's mind is in restless agitation; he is propelled by a turbu­
lent spirit, one w e feel to be very m u c h akin to our o w n . But this 
conception of the spirit was by no means u n k n o w n to the Renais­
sance.10 T h e particular form it took in Hamlet owed, I believe, very 
much to a prevailing climate of mannerism and skepticism. T h e 
Renaissance skeptics described m a n as moved and distracted by a 
violently active spirit that is both his glory and his perdition. Pierre 
Charron, Montaigne's disciple, said that there was nothing so great 
in m a n as his spirit. Yet this precious gift was also "both to itself 
and to another a dangerous instrument, a ferret to be feared, a little 
trouble-feast, a tedious and importune parasite, and which, as a 
juggler and player fast and loose, under the shadow of some gentle 
motion, subtle and smiling forgeth, inventeth, and causeth all the 
mischiefs of this world; and the truth is, without it, there are 
17$ PROBLEMS AND AMBIGUITIES 
none."1 1 "Irresolution on the one part and afterwards inconstancy 
and instability," said Charron elsewhere, "are the most c o m m o n and 
apparent vices in the nature of m a n . " 12 A n d Montaigne: " W h a t w e 
even n o  w purposed, w  e alter by and by and presently return to our 
former bias; all is but changing, motion, and inconstancy." 13 The 
player-king in Hamlet puts it similarly: 
Purpose is but the slave to memory, 
Of violent birth, but poor validity; 
W h a  t to ourselves in passion w  e propose, 
The passion ending, doth the purpose lose. 
The violence of either grief or joy 
Their o w  n enactures with themselves destroy. 
W h e r  e joy most revels grief doth most lament; 
Grief joys, joy grieves, on slender accident. 
(III.ii.183-94) 
It is tempting to think that these lines belong to the mysterious 
"some dozen or sixteen" of his o w n composition Hamlet instructs 
the actors to insert in the performance of the "Mousetrap." But 
whether they do or not, they characterize not only Gertrude's be­
havior, as they are intended to do, but also, and more appropriately, 
Hamlet's. A n  d the view of m a  n expressed in them is that of the 
skeptics. 
T h e confident G e r m a n critic w h o claimed that Hamlet was M o n ­
taigne had, I believe, an inkling of the truth. Not that the prince is 
an impersonator of the skeptic philosopher; rather, he is the kind of 
m a  n Montaigne described himself as being. Montaigne, as subjective 
as he seems, really displays himself as the true, not idealized, speci­
m e n of general m a n . Like Montaigne's self-portrait, Hamlet is both 
extraordinary and yet has most of the features the skeptics consid­
ered characteristic of all m e n  . Self-contradictions, hesitations, and 
changes of opinion are a m o n g the most notable features of M o n ­
taigne's portrait, as they are of Hamlet's character. "If I speak 
diversely of myself," said Montaigne, "it is because I look diversely 
upon myself." 14 A m a  n of the kind portrayed by the French essayist 
is driven to examine all things; he possesses a restless spirit and is 
often possessed by it. Thu  s again and again, he is derailed from his 
present purpose, particularly if he is a m a  n of keen intellect. A  s 
Charron explained, 
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It is easy to see h o  w rash and dangerous the spirit of m a  n is, espe­
cially if it be quick and vigorous. . .  . it will undertake to examine 
all things, to judge the greatest part of things plausibly received 
in this world to be ridiculous and absurd, and, finding for all an ap­
pearance of reason, will defend itself against all, whereby it is to 
be feared that it wandereth out of the way and loseth itself.15 
Hamlet is endowed with a vigorous and restless spirit that drives 
him to exertions that change their purpose and direction. His 
thoughts and actions, far-reaching as they are, often become periph­
eral or else lose all relation to the task of revenge. 
It is not that Hamlet loses himself in passion. It is rather that, un­
like other tragic heroes, such as Richard II and Othello, he cannot 
lose himself in passion, or at least not in the kind of passion that 
escapes the control of reason. Hamlet's passion and reason cannot be 
easily distinguished; both drive him on to be the speculative, analytic, 
restless, and tortured figure he is. T h  e conflict between reason and 
passion, as D . G . James has well said, is not joined in him. 1 6 Hamlet 
speaks of the excitements of his reason and his blood that drive him 
to revenge (IV.iv.58). His adoption of the antic disposition, his self-
comparisons with the actors and with Fortinbras, even his staging of 
the mousetrap, all serve at least in part the purpose of putting him­
self in the right—that is to say, passionate—frame of mind for his 
revenge. But these devices succeed in this purpose only temporarily, 
if they succeed at all. His meddling intellect interferes; he remains 
too conscious of himself, too m u c h aware of the psychic resources 
and the immediate stimuli from which his efforts come, and he loses 
all spontaneity. H  e overshoots the m a r k or falls short of it. His first 
soliloquy is limitless in its metaphysical despair, and the queen is not 
altogether wron  g w h e  n she claims that its occasion, the death of a 
father, is " c o m m o n .  " In comparing himself with the actors and with 
Fortinbras, he thinks his passion too weak, although, in thefirst case, 
w e find it too strong, even if not properly focused, and, in the second, 
too improperly related to the stimulant, Fortinbras's territorial ambi­
tion. Hamlet's whole design of producing passion intellectually is 
unworkable: at best, it produces pyrotechnical discharges; but these 
never give Hamlet relief from his tensions. 
In all this self-conscious fretting about technique, there appears to 
be a concern that is not only Hamlet's but also Shakespeare's. 
Hamlet suffers and studies passion, and so does Shakespeare through 
him. N  o other Shakespearean character examines so closely the 
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cause, nature, and expression of emotions, obeying in this and other 
respects the demands of the nosce teipsum writers—but with a 
vengeance! It is significant that the word "passion" occurs more 
often in Hamlet (eleven times) than in any of the other tragedies, 
even Othello (eight occurrences), in which a gigantic passion is 
dramatized but not analyzed. Even more significant than the quan­
tity of references to passion are the shifting connotations of the 
word. Hamlet gives "passion" two meanings quite n e w in the time, 
that of a sudden, violent emotion and that of the expression of this 
emotion in speech.17 In these senses, the word becomes equivalent 
to "ecstasy," as it frequently does in the later, baroque tragedies. 
Hamlet, however, w h  o can give "passion" this meaning, finds it 
difficult to supply the substance. Notably, "ecstasy" also occurs more 
often (five times) in Hamlet than elsewhere. This too was a word in 
the process of intensifying its meaning; in the earlier plays it denotes 
a fairly light transport of emotion, whereas from Hamlet on, it is a 
serious, violent derangement of the spirit, akin to madness, as when 
Ophelia finds the form and feature of Hamlet's youth "blasted with 
ecstasy" (III.i.i6o). T h e word is used on one of the two occasions 
in which Hamlet's passion rises most vehemently, during his re­
proaches of his mother, w h e  n he protests that he is not afflicted by 
"ecstasy" in the sense of madness (III.iv.139). During his second 
most passionate explosion, in the grief contest with Laertes at 
Ophelia's grave, the word as such is not mentioned, but the prince 
seems to define the passion he evinces at this time as "ecstasy" when 
he later explains to Horatio that he feels sorry that "to Laertes I 
forgot myself; /  . . . the bravery of his grief did put m  e / Into a 
tow'ring passion" (V.ii.76 ff.). In Cooper's Thesaurus, ecstasis is 
translated as "an astonying, a d a m p  , a trance, w h e  n one forgetteth 
himself." 
But even on this occasion Hamlet does not really forget himself in 
an uninhibited and spontaneous outbreak. T h e cause of his passion is 
curious; it is certainly not the death of the unfortunate Ophelia. 
Rather, Hamlet is annoyed with Laertes's hysterical ranting that 
piles Pelion on Ossa. It is almost as if he were hurt that the young 
m a  n can achieve such a volume of passion—Hamlet's vanity about 
his acting ability seems involved. At any rate, he sees in Laertes's 
Herculean outbreak a histrionic effort that he himself must overtop 
—this surely is implied in the seemingly cryptic words with which he 
abandons his o w n effort: "Let Hercules himself do what he may , / 
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The cat will m e w  , and dog will have his day" (V.i.285-86). H a m  ­
let's attempt to rival Hercules, the Renaissance model for hyper­
bolic passion, leaves him in the end with a feeling of absurdity. H e 
uses an incident that has nothing to do with his revenge action in 
order to test his capacity for passion. His subsequent explanation to 
Horatio and his apology to Laertes show that he worries as m u c h 
about his emotional reactions to the situations as he does about the 
situations themselves. 
Whenever Hamlet concerns himself specifically with self-knowl­
edge, his probing, restless mind involves itself as m u c h with the 
technique of the process as with the goal. N  o Shakespearean hero 
uses more constantly the methods traditionally thought helpful for 
the attainment of self-knowledge. W h e  n he says to Osric "to k n o  w a 
m a n well were to know himself," he shows that he knows the most 
important of these methods, that of comparing oneself with others. 
Cicero, the philosophical mentor of the humanists, recommended in 
De Officiis (1.114, 146) that the virtuous m a n  , w h  o wishes to fulfill 
his duty to m a n and God, closely observe other m e n , and the Renais­
sance no see teipsum literature propagated the idea that one's fellow 
m a  n is the glass into which one must look in order to see oneself.18 
Hamlet uses this method to madness: he lets no opportunity go 
by to measure himself by others. W h e n  , to Osric, he modestly com ­
pares his fencing skill with that of Laertes, he does so in the presence 
of Horatio, w h o is not only his confidant but also his avowed mirror 
and model. In comparing himself with Horatio, Hamlet follows the 
idea—dating back to Aristotle's Magna Moralia (II.15, 1213a)— 
that, in order to kno  w himself, a person should study a friend w h o  m 
he admires. Hamlet sees in Horatio the balanced m a  n whose blood 
and judgment are well commingled; Horatio is Hamlet's pattern of 
perfection. H  e is "as just a m a  n / A  s e'er m  y conversation cop'd 
withal" (III.ii.52—53). It is for Hamlet surely as significant that 
Horatio is a man as it is that he is just. T h e word man is for 
Hamlet a title of honor that he bestows sparingly; besides his friend, 
only his father qualifies: " ' H e was a m a n , take him for all in all" 
(I.ii.187). A m a n is for Hamlet more than a father and a king. In 
comparing himself with Horatio and with his father, Hamlet is put 
in mind of general manhood. 
But in spite of Hamlet's glowing tribute to the concept of ideal 
humanity in Horatio and in his father, these two representatives of 
the ideal remain strangely pale and indistinct. A good ghost, as 
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Shakespeare, but not some of his fellow dramatists, knew, must be 
elusive and mysterious, and the old king is a true specter of this 
kind.19 H e is a gigantic hero of the past, walking in armor; he is an 
emissary from some outer region, come to tell a horrible story and 
incite his son to revenge; yet, in housegown, he is gently protective 
of his guilty wife. This is about all one learns of him from his ap­
pearances in the play; in Hamlet's affectionate recollection, he is, it 
is true, m u c h more. His father, says Hamlet, had Hyperion's curls, 
the front of Jove, the eyes of Mars , and the stature of Mercury 
(III.iv.55). But this does not bring the m a n to life. Hamlet's 
montage of excellences resembles the technique of some mannerist 
painters admired by Vasari, w h  o copied "the most beautiful objects 
and afterwards combined the most perfect, whether the hand, head, 
torso, or leg, and joined them together to m a k e one figure, invested 
with every beauty in the highest perfection." 20 Hamlet's father is 
something of a mannerist picture puzzle; the conglomeration of his 
excellences in his son's description blurs the portrait. N o  r does it 
become more distinct w h e n Hamlet sets himself and Claudius in 
relationship to it. Claudius, says Hamlet, is "no more like m  y 
father / T h a  n I to Hercules" (I.ii. 152-53) . W h a  t exactly does this 
say about any of the three persons compared ? 
If, in spite of his high praises, Hamlet does not m a k e his father 
into a clear and distinct figure, he distorts even more the image of 
Claudius, the n o n - m a n , w h o is for Hamlet a king of shreds and 
patches from everything he finds odious and despicable: he is a 
satyr, a moor , a "bloat king," a cutpurse of the empire, a vice of 
kings. Murderer and villain that Claudius is, he does not really 
deserve these epithets. 
Perhaps it m a y be thought natural for Hamlet to brighten his 
father's image, w h o  m he loves, and to blacken his uncle's, w h o  m he 
hates, and thus to blur both. But it is certainly strange that there is 
so little in the play to bear out Hamlet's admiration for his living 
ideal m a n , Horatio. It is not in the play but in Hamlet's words that 
Horatio becomes the m a  n w h o  , in suffering all, suffers nothing and 
takes fortune's buffets and rewards with equal thanks (III.ii.65 ff.). 
T h e Horatio w e k n o w is merely the prince's shadow and mirror, a 
servant w h  o goes no further than to advise his master against inquir­
ing too curiously and to m a k  e the futile gesture of attempting to join 
him in death. 
Hamlet, it will be said, aggrandizes Horatio in order to lower 
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himself. It is indeed true that Hamlet's friendship with the "poor" 
Horatio ennobles the prince and makes him less an egotist than he 
would otherwise be. A n  d it will be said that Hamlet sees in Horatio 
a master over passion and fortune because he feels himself to be 
their slave. But Hamlet's character does not reveal itself so simply 
and clearly by his obsessive comparisons with others w h e  n w  e ex­
amine these in their context and with reference to his behavior. 
Hamlet is not exactly passion's slave. It will not do to saddle him 
with the "vicious mole of nature" of which he speaks to Horatio 
(I.iv.24) and call it melancholy. Hamlet's censure arises from a 
specific occasion, the addiction of the Danes to drink; what corrup­
tion of individual m e n by particular faults he has in mind is a puzzle; 
but it is m u c h more natural to apply the remark to Claudius's gross­
ness and Gertrude's sensuality than to Hamlet. A n  d even if Hamlet 
thought of himself, the words still would leave the question whether 
the vicious mole is an "o'ergrowth of some complexion" or a "habit" 
that "o'erleavens the form of plausive manners." A n  d in the latter 
case, the possibilities are infinite. It has even been suggested that the 
vicious mole, the "dram of eale," is the effect of the original sin that 
affects all m e n .  2  1 Surely this is not a very helpful passage for an 
analysis of Hamlet's character. 
A n d just what is the effect of the ghost's c o m m a n d on Hamlet? 
Is it really, as Bradley and Miss Campbell thought, that, were it not 
for his melancholy, Hamlet would have no problems ? Hamlet never 
says so; he only asserts that the task is uncongenial to h i m : "The 
time is out of joint. O cursed spite, / That ever I was born to set 
it right!" (I.v. 189-90) . If Hamlet here accentuates the "I," as is 
likely, the question arises w h y he, in particular, feels out of sympathy 
with the task. W h a  t kind of m a  n was he born ? It is not sufficient, I 
think, merely to refer to Ophelia's testimony that the Hamlet before 
his father's death was an ideal nobleman, that he had "the courtier's, 
soldier's, scholar's, eye, tongue, sword" (III.i.151). Ophelia's char­
acterization is quite unsatisfactory for the Hamlet of the play; it is 
quite unsatisfactory, that is, if one associates, as is natural and 
presumably intended, the tongue with the courtier, the sword with 
the soldier, and the eye with the scholar. If, however, one associates 
the epithets with their referents in Ophelia's order, the characteriza­
tion becomes m u c h more appropriate: the Hamlet w e k n o w moves 
through the court with the critical courtier's eye rather than the 
polite tongue; he measures himself against Fortinbras with a soldier's 
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tongue rather than with the sword, and he reaches for the life of 
Claudius with a scholar's sword, searching for the truth even more 
than for the king's life. I do not mean to say that Ophelia's inversion 
of epithets is a Freudian slip rather than a rhetorical figure, but I 
suggest that Shakespeare could hardly have wished his audience to 
think that the obedient little Ophelia ever looked into the recesses of 
the heart of her enigmatic lover. Hers is at best a partial truth, that 
of Hamlet's outside. C a  n one really imagine him, w h  o in his first 
speeches characterizes himself as a fanatic of truth and as a m a  n w h  o 
knows not seeming, to have ever been merely the "glass of fashion 
and the mould of form" ? 
T h e Hamlet of the play is not a glass of fashion but a frustrated 
seeker for an ideal h u m a n mould. H e has a passion, a passion much 
stronger than his grief or his thirst for revenge, to seek for this form 
in himself and in others and to note its presence or absence. H  e 
compares and contrasts himself incessantly, with his father, with 
Claudius, with Horatio, with Laertes, with Fortinbras, with Polo­
nius, with Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, with the player-king, with 
the gravediggers, and with dead Yorick. But wherever Hamlet gives 
w a y to this passion, his overactive mind introduces a subjective 
distortion. In Fortinbras, Hamlet admires the m a n w h o "greatly" 
finds "quarrel in a straw, / W h e  n honour's at the stake"—yet 
Fortinbras's particular quarrel is not even an argument of honor, 
but merely an expedition to Poland, arranged to take the place of 
that against D e n m a r k . Fortinbras's bellicose energy hardly demon­
strates by contrast Hamlet's lack of divine ambition. 
Hamlet similarly misjudges Laertes. H  e takes a properly cautious 
attitude toward him as a fencer, but he throws discretion to the 
winds w h e n he calls him a "noble youth" and never suspects him of 
being capable of using a poisoned sword. W h e n Hamlet does see a 
parallel between himself and Laertes, the occasion and the subject 
are odd. At Ophelia's grave, he cannot stand Laertes's passionate 
protest of grief, but must outrant him to assume the role of next-of­
kin himself: "This is I, / Hamlet the D a n e ! " In spite of the emphatic 
self-identification, Hamlet assumes here a role that does not fit. 
His protest that the love of forty thousand brothers cannot make up 
the s u  m of his love contrasts oddly with his earlier cruelty toward 
Ophelia. A n  d his later explanation to Laertes that it was not Hamlet 
but Hamlet's madness that cried out at Ophelia's grave appears to 
be another instance of inappropriate role-playing. 
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Yet role-playing as such was a recommended procedure in ac­
quiring self-knowledge. In De Officiis (1.113), Cicero said that each 
m a n , like an actor, should choose the part in life most suitable to him­
self. This, as w  e noted earlier, is the doctrine of individual decorum, 
on which the humanists founded their ideas of h u m a  n individuality. 
Hamlet, a greater individualist than they, violates this doctrine; 
rather than choosing the role that suits him best, he tries, as Cicero 
said one should not do, whether other men's rolesfit him. 
Hamlet is by avocation an amateur actor w h  o frequently mistakes 
the world for the stage. H  e feels compelled to vie with the actors; 
he begins to recite the speech about "rugged Pyrrhus" from the play 
that was "caviary to the general." O n e is somewhat puzzled as to 
w h y he admires this elaborately wrought speech. It has the vexing 
quality of making one scan it for parallels to Hamlet's predicament. 
Is the hellish Pyrrhus perhaps to evoke the murderous Claudius ? O  r 
is he Hamlet's wishful image of the avenger he himself would like 
to be? Neither identification seems quite appropriate. T h  e cruel 
Pyrrhus, the "painted tyrant," gored with the blood of fathers, 
mothers, and sons, is wholly unlike the subtle and smooth Claudius. 
Pyrrhus, it is true, is like Hamlet an avenger for a father killed; but 
unlike Hamlet, Pyrrhus is the destroyer of hostile Troy, not the 
would-be reformer of his o w n state. A n d Hamlet's cruelty to Ger­
trude, unlike that of Pyrrhus to Hecuba, is not meant to go beyond 
speaking daggers. T h e actor's recital of the murder and bloodshed 
at the fall of Troy—a subject famous as an example of tragic irdOo? 
in the Renaissance—ought to strike a listener with horror and pity 
rather than, as it does Hamlet, with self-reproach for delay in 
revenge. A n  d Hamlet's subsequent soliloquy, which in its nervous 
and introspective complexities contrasts effectively with the balanced 
Renaissance turgidity of the actor's speech, begins, as noted, with 
Hamlet setting himself into quite a false relationship to the actor. 
Hamlet's comparison of the actor's passionate recital to his o w  n 
situation is quite irrelevant. Hamlet's problem is not that he can 
say nothing. H  e knows the words and gestures of passion very well. 
Hamlet's self-comparisons generally lead to self-laceration and 
self-humiliation. His keen, restless mind fails to strike the balance, 
and prevents him from becoming the impartial judge of his o w n and 
others' merits and defects that Cicero said the m a  n of self-knowledge 
should be. But at least he does not overassess himself as Polonius 
does. It is ironic that the emphatic demand for proper self-identifica­
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tion—that is, in Renaissance terms, for "individual decorum"— 
should come from this humorous-pathetic conformer to court cus­
toms: " T o thine o w n self be true." Hamlet's situation belies the 
assumption that the m a  n w h  o is true to himself cannot be false to 
any m a n . Hamlet must play the role of the avenger in order to be 
true to himself, and therefore he must hide and dissimulate, be false 
to almost everybody. 
For Hamlet, role-playing does not provide the reassuring acquisi­
tion of decorum Cicero demanded it should have. A n  d his failure can­
not be merely blamed on improper methods. H  e tries to be true to 
himself; but he finds it hard to reconcile this attempt with the more 
important injunction to preserve general decorum, which, according 
to humanistic ideas, directed and limited individuality. T h  e m a  n w h  o 
wishes to be true to himself—so general decorum decreed—must 
regulate his behavior not by his o w  n nature only; he must also act 
in his proper character as a m a n  , that is, as a moral being. H  e must 
live in awareness of his fundamental difference from the animals. 
But, for Hamlet, this easy and comforting back-reference to general 
decorum is problematic. N  o Shakespearean character tries harder to 
act according to the precepts of moral philosophy than Hamlet; none 
seeks so m u c  h reference and support in the general condition of a 
humanity ideally conceived. His admiration for Horatio as a m a n of 
balance and virtue conforms to this tendency. A n  d so does his 
making Fortinbras's Polish expedition a reminder of the duties im­
posed on m a  n by his privileged place in the universe: " W h a  t is a 
m a n  , / If his chief good and market of his time / B  e but to sleep and 
feed?" (IV.iv.33 ff.) This question and Hamlet's answer, that m a  n 
has a "capability and godlike reason" that must not "fust . . . un­
us'd," paraphrase a significant passage from the beginning of Cicero's 
De Officiis (1.12; see Appendix A )  . Whether Shakespeare had it 
from Cicero or elsewhere, the fact remains that he gave Hamlet an 
authoritative humanistic statement of the doctrine of general deco­
rum, of the demand that man's actions must come from his conscious­
ness of being m a n  . Yet this reference to the general duty of m a  n 
proves irrelevant as Hamlet questions whether the violation of this 
duty is really the reason for his inaction: " N o w  , whether it b e  / 
Bestial oblivion, or some craven scruple / O f thinking too precisely 
on th' event. . . ." H  e also questions this second alternative: "I do 
not k n o w / W h y yet I live to say This thing's to do . '" Hamlet is 
enough of a skeptic to realize that the roots of actions or inactions lie 
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often too deep for thoughts. T h  e traditional picture of m a n  , at any 
rate, does not reveal them. Whenever Hamlet tries to draw on philo­
sophical wisdom about m a  n and on moral commonplaces of consola­
tion in order to reconcile himself to this world and the world to 
come, he fails. 
His most conspicuous effort and failure is his "to be or not to be" 
soliloquy. It is a variation in a different key of Montaigne's rhetori­
cal question "Should I have died less merrily before I read the 
Tusculans?" and of his assertion that "I had rather understand 
myself well in myself than in Cicero." 22 T h  e dramatic situation sug­
gests that Hamlet in this scene enters book in hand—in Quarto 1, 
the king actually says: "See where he comes, reading upon a book." 
The particular book from which Hamlet takes the theme of his 
soliloquy, as Professor Baldwin has plausibly argued, is Cicero's 
Tusculan Disputations, or, in its customary Elizabethan title, Tuscu­
lan Questions; Hamlet ponders the first of these questions, that of 
death and immortality.23 But even if Hamlet's book should have 
been not Cicero's Tusculans but Cardanus's Comfort24" or M o n ­
taigne's Essays,25 or if there was no book at all, the fact remains 
that he seeks consolation in a standard passage of moral philosophy. 
Like Socrates in Plato's Apology, he ponders his and man's fate in 
relation to death and the afterlife; but for him there can be no calm 
acceptance of his destiny: the question of mortality versus immortality 
becomes hopelessly entangled with the questions of action versus in­
action, of death in struggle or death by suicide, of the sufferings of 
life on earth compared with the risks of the unknown, of the 
desirability of a dreamless sleep as against the horrible vision of 
tortures in the hereafter. Hamlet's soul-searching only heightens his 
feeling of self-loss, and he proceeds to agonize Ophelia as m u c  h as 
he agonized himself. 
Hamlet's probing into the existential situation, as searching as it 
is, ends in dissonance, incongruity, irrelevance, and absurdity. H a m  ­
let is not satisfied merely to assume a contemptus mundi pose as does 
Richard II. H  e deeply "considers" man's corruptible body, but, as 
Horatio says, he considers too curiously. In metaphysical clownery 
he makes the dead Polonius into an object lesson on the dietary habit 
of worms—the method is the same as that by which Montaigne de­
flated the claim of m a  n to constancy: "Touching strength, there is no 
creature in this world open to so m a n y wrongs and injuries as m a n . 
. . . Th  e heart and life of a mighty and triumphant emperor is but 
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the breakfast of a silly little w o r m .  " 26 In the churchyard, as he 
"reads" the skulls, Hamlet takes again this ironic view of meta­
morphosis; he pierces the absurdity of the h u m a  n existence that 
transforms an Alexander into dust, earth, loam, and finally into the 
plug of a beer-barrel. Hamlet turns the graveyard into an excavation 
ground and a debating hall, and, in a final twist, into a wrestling 
arena where he grapples with Laertes over the cere-clothed body of 
Ophelia. It is a bizarre dance macabre in the style of mannerist 
painters like Tintoretto and El Greco. 
Besides comparing himself to the general image of m a n  , Hamlet 
also follows the nosce teipsum writers' recommendation to examine 
his proper place in the universe. A n  d again, the theories Hamlet 
tests are orthodox even if he examines them under strange circum­
stances. O n  e occasion is that in which Rosencrantz and Guildenstern 
attempt to extract from him the reason for his strange behavior 
(II.ii.221 ff.). H e evades them by philosophical arguments on the 
prison that is D e n m a r  k and the world, on the reward that is an 
active imagination, on the curse that comes from bad dreams, and 
on the shadow that is ambition. Then, with one stab, the prince, 
w h  o can be as brutally direct as frustratingly indirect, elicits from 
the courtiers the reason for their coming: they were sent for by the 
king. Whereupon Hamlet diverts them with another philosophic 
disquisition, this time on his present unhappiness about the ideal 
picture of the world and of m a n  . 
His appraisal is concocted by the best Renaissance recipes on how 
to write a commonplace on homo and mundus, and it is framed in 
the proper rhetorical balance. A n  d yet, Hamlet dissociates himself 
from it. T h e picture has lost its attraction for him although, he says, 
with a touch that is surely not intended merely to confuse Rosen­
crantz and Guildenstern, he does not k n o  w w h y  : "I have of late— 
but wherefore I k n o  w not—lost all m  y mirth, forgone all custom of 
exercises; and indeed it goes so heavily with m  y disposition that this 
goodly frame, the earth, seems to m  e a sterile promontory." After 
thus disclaiming any joy in the ideal macrocosm, Hamlet assesses 
the microcosm: " W h a t a piece of work is a m a n ! h o w noble in 
reason! h o w infinite in faculty! in form and moving, h o w express 
and admirable! in action h o w like an angel! in apprehension, how 
like a G o d  ! the beauty of the world! the paragon of animals!"27 
Hamlet finds this paragon as little to his liking as the frame that 
surrounds him: " A n d yet, to m e , what is this quintessence of dust?" 
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O n e need not go so far as a G e r m a n scholar w h o sees in Hamlet's 
speech a renunciation of the Renaissance 28 to find this a disturbing 
picture. B  y itself, as w  e have noted, the speech is quite traditional in 
subject and structure, and, in Shakespeare's theater, it had an ap­
propriate setting; but it becomes disturbing—its very orthodoxy con­
tributes to that—by the acutely felt tension between the ideal and the 
actual. The picture is beautiful; but it has lost its relevance. Hamlet's 
agitated mind, swaying from earth to heaven, from heaven to earth, 
from soul to body, and from body to soul, finds no assurance and 
resting place. Everything is a shifting semblance, a diffused world. 
Hamlet's restless spirit is guided and incited by a glorious but 
heated imagination. In general humanistic thought, the imagination 
was an ambiguous gift, both a divine force and a danger to man's 
happiness.29 For the skeptics, it was primarily the latter; its straying 
turbulence, which sidetracks both passion and reason, served them as 
a major argument that m a  n was unstable. Intelligence and reason 
offered no protection: the more agile the mind, the greater the 
danger of derailment. " F r o  m the rarest and quickest agitation of our 
souls," said Charron, "[come] the most desperate resolutions and 
disorderly frenzies." 30 A n  d so it is for Hamlet. W h e  n hefirst sees 
the ghost beckoning to him, he turns "desperate with imagination" 
(I.iv.87). H  e ceaselessly conjures up his task, his inadequacies for it, 
his father's greatness, his uncle's villainy, and his mother's sexuality. 
Yet he also knows the potential rewards of the imagination. H  e could, 
he says to Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, be bounded in a nutshell 
and count himself king of infinite space were it not that he has bad 
dreams (II.ii.255). H  e is acutely conscious of what the imagination 
does to him, awake and asleep, and h o w it both conjures up an ideal 
existence and prevents him from reaching it as he becomes oppressed 
with the sordid realities of his demanding task and uncertain life. 
It is perhaps the most astonishing turn of the play that from his 
knowledge of the working of the imagination, observed on himself, 
Hamlet forges his most purposeful action of the play, that of catching 
the conscience of the king. Hamlet's self-awareness becomes, as it 
were, the design of his revenge. This is a most ingenious device, 
based on ancient theories about the imagination, specifically concern­
ing the transfer of the power of the imagination from the poet 
through the actor to the audience. It seems to have been Shake­
speare's o w n idea to have Hamlet use this stratagem; in the Ur-
Hcmlet, if it was Kyd's , the function of the play-within-the-play is 
PROBLEMS AND AMBIGUITIES 
not likely to have been different from The Spanish Tragedy, where 
it served the avenger to kill the criminal without exciting suspicion.31 
Hamlet's w a y of staging the play is characteristic of the w a y he con­
ceives revenge as an intellectual and artistic problem. 
T h  e stratagem is so Hamletian as to m a k  e one forget that it is 
based on theories that enjoyed philosophical and rhetorical respect­
ability. They go back to Plato's Ion (334-36), where Socrates asks 
the professional reciter of poetry whether he is in his senses or in 
ecstatic empathy with the events w h e n he narrates incidents from 
H o m e r ' s epics, such as Odysseus's unmasking himself to Penelope's 
suitors or Achilles's attacks on Hector or one of the pitiful passages 
about Andromache, Hecuba, or Priam. Ion admits that in reciting 
tales of pity and horror his eyes arefilled with tears, his hair stands 
on end with fear, and his heart leaps. Socrates elicits from him the 
explanation that he is divinely inspired; a spirit has entered the poet, 
and then, through the reciter or "actor," is conveyed to the audience. 
T h  e poet is the "inner ring," the actor the "middle ring," and the 
audience "the outer ring"; the deity draws the spirit of m e n from 
the center toward the outside. Quintilian (VI.ii.34ff.) and Cicero 
in De Oratore (II.xiv.189) applied the theory to the orator, 
comparing his task to that of the actor, w h o  , as Quintilian said, 
leaves the theater still drowned in tears after the performance of a 
moving role.32 
F r o  m Quintilian and Cicero, directly or indirectly, Shakespeare 
provided Hamlet with the theory for his plan. It is characteristic 
that the idea occurs to Hamlet at a m o m e n t w h e n he observes the 
effect of the imagination and is himself most strongly oppressed by 
it. H  e has just noted h o  w the "passionate speech" he requested puts 
its speaker, the actor, into the appropriate m o o  d observable by out­
ward signs. Just as Quintilian said, the actor grows pale, has tears in 
his eyes, speaks with a broken voice and suits his whole function "with 
forms to his conceit" (II.ii.50). Hamlet gives his o w n peculiar twist 
to this tradition when , by an act of the imagination, he puts the actor 
in the actual role of an avenger by asking what the actor would do if 
he had Hamlet's motive and cue for passion. 
In reproaching himself for his lack of passion, Hamlet uses argu­
ments that parallel Cicero's statement on the superiority of true to 
feigned grief.38 Hamlet's particular application of the idea of emo­
tional transfer to the unmasking of the king also has precedents. 
Notably, on this occasion Hamlet remembers having heard that 
"guilty persons at a play" were driven to confess their crimes. M o n  ­
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taigne, a m o n  g others, reported just such an incident, an anecdote 
from Plutarch according to which Alexander, tyrant of Pheres, had 
to give up seeing tragedies for fear his subjects might see him sob 
at the misfortunes of Hecuba and Andromache.3 4 Although Hecuba's 
tears did not stop Pyrrhus, they were effective enough to touch some 
hard hearts from the time of the ancients to the Renaissance! 
The theory on which Hamlet bases catching the conscience of the 
king is founded on good authorities, and it works. W  e should note, 
however, that it arises from an act of self-analysis that is quite prob­
lematic and that the success of the device does not change Hamlet's 
attitude toward his task. In the soliloquy in which he concocts his 
stratagem, Hamlet applies a rhetorical argument to a psychological 
and moral situation with which it is not commensurate. W h e  n 
Hamlet asks himself what the actor would do if he had the motive 
and the cue for passion he himself has, he puts the problem of re­
venge in the wrong perspective. It is not that Hamlet lacks articulate­
ness of word and gesture, "pronunciation" in Renaissance terms. It 
is rather that he has too m u c h , and the unmasking of the king makes 
it no more possible for him to suit his actions to his words than it 
was before he sprang the mousetrap. 
Hamlet's identification with his role as avenger is closest during 
and immediately after his stratagem. His imagination and his pas­
sion appear n o  w synchronized with his spirit: here isfinally an action 
that will directly promote his revenge. H  e succeeds temporarily in 
recovering the excitement with which he pledged himself to the 
execution of his task immediately after the appearance of the ghost. 
H  e anticipates with sarcastic elation the demasking of Claudius, and 
when the latter rises in horror, Hamlet triumphs and sings satirical 
verses to Horatio. With wild words he harries Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern, w h o come to invite him to attend his mother; he pulls 
Polonius's leg, and, left alone, feels that he could drink blood. 
Hamlet then proceeds to what he considers hisfirst bitter business 
of the day: to convert his mother to virtue and abstinence. That, on 
his way, he should come across Claudius attempting to pray and fail 
to execute his major business is a supreme irony in which fate and 
Hamlet's character interact. It is not a failure due to passion; Hamlet 
rapidly scans the situation—no scene better demonstrates h o  w 
rapidly he can look at a situation from several angles. H  e decides not 
to take the easy revenge that offers itself to him n o w because it 
would not be perfect retribution. H  e will fulfill the revenge code to 
the last letter and dispatch Claudius w h e n he is engaged in some 
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odious occupation. But ironically, Hamlet has thought too curiously; 
the king finds it impossible to pray and rises after Hamlet leaves. 
Hamlet's probing, circling thoughts have missed their target as much 
as Hamlet's hand, just at the m o m e n  t whe  n he is most in sympathy 
with his role. 
T h e closet scene has the same air of futility. Although Hamlet is 
n o w at his most passionate in his role of reformer of Denmark—a 
role he cannot separate from his role as avenger—he is also at his 
most ineffective. For thefirst time he holds up the glass of self-
recognition to somebody else, that is, to his mother, but his zeal 
makes it into a magnifying glass. His feverish imagination evokes 
such details as Claudius's and Gertrude's "rank sweat of an en-
seamed bed" and their "honeying and making love / Over the nasty 
sty" (III.iv.92-94). But while he is m u c  h concerned with "the black 
and grained spots" on his mother's soul, he forgets that the ghost 
warned him not to taint his o w n mind by conceiving aught against 
his mother. H e is carried away by passion, an excessive passion for 
truth and moral reform, and he comes close to killing her; both 
Polonius and the ghost fear for her safety. Ironically, it is Hamlet's 
excited reaction to the appearance of the latter that convinces Ger­
trude of Hamlet's insanity. If Hamlet's stab at his mother's con­
science fails, that which he directs at the m a  n w h o  m he mistakes for 
Claudius succeeds. A n d from n o w on the king is in ascendance, and 
Hamlet's moves are countermoves. 
According to one school of interpretation, the Hamlet w h o re­
turns from England is a ne  w m a  n w h  o has learned to master his 
problems. H  e certainly does accept providence and fate as he de­
scribes his action in sending Rosencrantz and Guildenstern to their 
d o o m : 
Rashly, 
A n d prais'd be rashness for it—let us know, 
Our indiscretion sometime serves us well, 
W h e  n our deep plots do pall; and that should learn us 
There's a divinity that shapes our ends, 
Rough-hew them how w e will. 
(V.ii.6-11) 
But as a guideline to action the principle Hamlet proclaims does 
not serve him well. T h e same "indiscretion" in which he will kill 
Laertes and the king did not serve Hamlet so well when he killed 
Polonius, and his success at sea owed something to an admixture of 
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deliberation. Hamlet's acceptance of providence does, however, ad­
vance the tragic solution. In this spirit, he accepts the invitation to 
the fencing match that proves both a trap and a deliverance. But the 
exact nature of this spirit of acceptance is something of a puzzle. O n  e 
finds it hard to call it Christian fortitude, or Stoic resignation, or 
a pragmatic acceptance of the skeptics' world in which all things 
are relative and uncertain. T h  e special providence that is in "the fall 
of a sparrow" is biblical, the "readiness" that is all is stoical, and the 
concluding sentence is skeptic, at least in the preferable Quarto 2 
version: "Since no m a n of ought he leaves knows, what is it to leave 
betimes?" (V.ii.216).35 
This is a particularly interesting sentence because it is fashioned 
on the losing-finding antithesis, which since Love's Labor's Lost and 
The Comedy of Errors was for Shakespeare associated with the 
search for identity. But in the early plays, there was the promise that 
the search would be rewarded, that self-discipline would bring felicity 
and that brother would embrace brother in the end. N o  w the h u m a n ­
istic certainty is gone. Hamlet's search is vain; his mellowing in 
the end consists only in taking a somewhat calmer attitude toward 
what remains, in thefinal analysis, inscrutable. T h  e best one can say 
is that Hamlet learns to adapt somewhat more easily to the restless 
behavior prescribed by his mind. H  e realizes that his situation is not 
quite as unique as it appeared to him, and he accepts—fideistic fash­
ion—a providence that transcends rational explanations of his be­
havior and of h u m a n actions in general. But it is hard to think of 
this realization as self-discovery because it does not bring any 
particularly illuminating insight. 
A n  d it cannot be different. In the diffuse and corrupt world in 
which Hamlet lives, it is impossible for him to find his identity. In 
such a world, nobody knows what he leaves behind. A n  d there m a  y 
even be doubt about what he finds hereafter. It is anybody's guess 
whether, his task accomplished in the random action in which 
"indiscretion" serves him well, Hamlet sinks into silence or ascends 
to heaven. Shakespeare has left us even wondering whether Hamlet's 
silence is Stoic or Christian. Ironically, it is Horatio, the professed 
rationalist, and not Hamlet, the self-acknowledgedfideist, w h  o hopes 
for the chorus of angels to sw.eeten it. 
The situation of the survivors appears no less problematic. T o say 
that in the end all is well with the world and with D e n m a r k is to 
substitute the conclusions of Richard III or Henry IV for that of 
Hamlet. W h a  t w  e actually witness in the end is not the supplanting 
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of a tyrant by a m a  n w h  o has legitimized himself before G o  d and the 
nation, as in Richard III, or the succession of a son w h  o has over­
come his fathers' handicaps, as in Henry IV. In Hamlet, it turns out 
quite unexpectedly that Fortinbras, only so far k n o w  n as the foreign 
leader of a "list of lawless [F: landless'] resolutes" (I.i.98), will sit 
on the throne of D e n m a r k . Somebody, one assumes, has to take over. 
O n  e finds it hard to believe that Hamlet's last wish to clear his 
wounded n a m e and to have his story told to the unsatisfied will pro­
vide D e n m a r k with a legend through which it can become sane and 
healthy. Horatio's outline of Hamlet's story, at any rate, does not 
promise a very illuminating tale: it speaks of "carnal, bloody, and 
unnatural acts; / O  f accidental judgments, casual slaughters;/ Of 
deaths put on by cunning and forc'd cause; / A n d  , in this upshot, 
purposes mistook / Fall'n on th' inventors' heads" (V.ii.373-77). 
T h  e subsequent history of Hamlet criticism proves that Hamlet's 
story cannot be told so easily. 
Hamlet is Shakespeare's most problematic hero, and it is impos­
sible ever to pluck out his last mystery. But the mystery does not 
come from lack of self-explanation. Hamlet is aware, or overaware, of 
himself; but ironically, for this very reason he does not attain even 
the kind of self-knowledge that, on the level of evil, Claudius has, 
w h  o is properly conscious of his villainy. Hamlet is profoundly dis­
turbed by the discrepancies between what he is and what he would 
like to be, between what he purposes and what he accomplishes. His 
is the tragedy of a problematic self, a tragedy the more harrowing 
because it lacks a reassurance that is capable of any solution. It is not 
a tragedy of lack of self-knowledge so m u c  h as a tragedy of the 
problematic nature of the quest for self-knowledge. 
T h e theme as such was not n e w to Shakespeare, w h o stated it in 
comic terms in Love's Labor's Lost and at least adumbrated its tragic 
possibilities in lulius Caesar. T h  e fascination of its treatment in 
Hamlet arises in part from its use in the apparently incongruous 
setting of a revenge tragedy but even more from the fact that the 
hero in search of himself is a m a  n of quick and wide sensibilities and 
of a keen and probing intellect. His restless spirit cannot separate 
the duty of being himself, which necessitates being an avenger as 
well as a h u m a n being, from the passionate desire of knowing him­
self. Although hefinally fulfills his task of revenge, his search for 
himself leads nowhere. 
CHAPTER ELEVEN 
Troilus and Cressida: 
Fragmenting a Divided Self 
A L T H O U G H SHAKESPEARE SEEMS to have written 
/ - % Troilus and Cressida very soon after Hamlet, the play does 
-*- -*- not atfirst sight appear to concern itself greatly with ques­
tions of identity and self-knowledge. T h e hero does not torture him­
self with the relationship of his self to others and the universe as does 
Hamlet. Yet he does ask the identity question once, in the first scene 
of the play, when he enters, sighing with love for Cressida. T h e un­
gracious clamors of the war emphasize the disharmony in his heart: 
Peace, rude sounds! 
Fools on both sides! Helen must needs be fair, 
W h e  n with your blood you daily paint her thus. 
I cannotfight upon this argument; 
It is too starv'd a subject for m  y sword. 
But Pandarus—O gods, how do you plague m e ! 
I cannot come to Cressid but by Pandar; 
A n d he's as tetchy to be woo'd to woo 
A  s she is stubborn-chaste against all suit. 
Tell m e  , Apollo, for thy Daphne's love, 
W h a  t Cressid is, what Pandar, and what w  e ? 
(Li.88-98) 
Troilus addresses himself here to the god w h  o was reputed to 
have demanded that m a n k n o w himself, but obviously he does so 
with very special pleading when he asks the question in the manner 
of a courtly lover, "for thy Daphne's love." There is a curious mix­
ture of skepticism and self-deception in these lines. Troilus cannot 
fight for Helen, or so he says, because she has no absolute value 
for him; he finds her fairness gored with blood. But at the same 
time, he elevates the value of the unpleasant and bawdy Pandarus 
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and even more, in the subsequent lines, that of Cressida, w h o be­
comes a pearl, whose bed is India. F r o m this hyperbole, Troilus 
descends to absurdity whe  n he calls the space between her and his 
domicile "the wild and wand'ring flood," Pandar the sailing bark, 
and himself the merchant. W  e k n o  w about Pandar by now , w  e 
wonder about Cressida, w h o  m Pandar's pleasantries have compared 
to Helen, and certainly most of all, w  e question Troilus's assessment 
of the world and of those around him. W  e distrust his taste when he 
says to Pandarus in an atrocious metaphor "Thou . . . / Pourest in 
the open ulcer of m  y heart— / H e  r eyes, her hair, her cheek, her 
gait, her voice . . ." (Li.52-53). 
Not only are his judgments strange and false; they also are 
inconsistent as when, later in the debate of the Trojans, he bestows 
on Helen, w h o  m he devalued earlier, the title of pearl he deemed 
appropriate for Cressida. For Troilus, values fluctuate; they are 
dependent on time and on subjective needs: "What's ought but as 
'tis valued." Troilus is a shallower m a  n than Hamlet, but his skepti­
cism is more apparent, and so is the skeptic strain that runs through 
the play. Hamlet has no brothers in spirit in his play; Troilus does. 
H  e is, of course, not as dominant a figure; w  e are not asked to view 
the action through his eyes and mind. T h e statement the play makes 
about self-knowledge depends almost as m u c  h on Ulysses, on Cres­
sida, and on other characters as it does on him; and it depends more 
on the plot and on the discussion of ideas than it does in Hamlet. 
T h  e one character w h  o appears to k n o  w himself and others clearly 
is Ulysses. A n  d it is he w h  o uses the most explicit pattern of self-
knowledge in the play whe  n he excites the vanity and jealousy of 
Achilles in an attempt to get him back to battle. Ulysses does so 
by reminding Achilles of the familiar comparison of the eye to the 
soul, by which the Renaissance liked to demonstrate the need and the 
difficulty of the soul's knowledge of itself. In Julius Caesar, Cassius 
transforms this comparison into a bait for Brutus; in Troilus and 
Cressida, Ulysses gives it an even more ironic and deceptive twist. 
That his purpose is not to enlighten Achilles about his true identity 
would be clear to anybody but that conceited and obtuse athlete. 
Ulysses enters, reading a book, in which, he says in answer to 
Achilles' question, a "strange fellow" claims that, no matter what 
man's qualities, he "cannot make boast to have that which he hath, / 
N o r feels not what he owes, but by reflection" (III.iii.98—99). The 
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position is not strange to Achilles, w h o , like any Elizabethan with 
a modicum of education, knows that the eye cannot see itself: 
The beauty that is borne here in the face 
The bearer knows not, but commends itself 
T  o others' eyes; nor doth the eye itself— 
That most pure spirit of sense—behold itself, 
Not going from itself; but eye to eye opposed 
Salutes each other with each other's form; 
For speculation turns not to itself 
Till it hath travell'd, and is mirror'd there 
W h e r e it m a y see itself. 
(III.iii.103—n) 
But Ulysses' author gives this familiar position an unusual drift, 
one that appeals to Achilles because it explains w h  y he is slighted by 
his former admirers. This author proves 
That no m a  n is the lord of anything, 
Though in and of him there be much consisting, 
Till he communicate his parts to others; 
Nor doth he of himself know them for aught 
Till he behold them formed in th' applause 
Where th'are extended; w h o , like an arch, reverb'rate 
The voice again; or, like a gate of steel 
Fronting the sun, receives and renders back 
His figure and his heat. 
(115-23) 
In Ulysses' Circean words, the mirror of self-knowledge becomes the 
glass of self-love into which Achilles gazes amorously. Ulysses's un­
expected revelation that he actually refers to "the u n k n o w n Ajax" 
comes thus as a shock to him. 
T h  e "author" in w h o  m Ulysses alleges to have read his reflection 
simile is a minor puzzle. I k n o w of no ancient writer w h o used the 
image similarly, certainly not Plato, w h  o has been claimed to be the 
source. Ulysses gives a distinctly skeptical turn to the commonplace: 
m a n is only what he is valued, subject to the vagaries of public w h i m . 
N  o Renaissance skeptic is likely to have gone so far; this author is 
indeed a "strange fellow," apparently invented by Ulysses to stir 
Achilles into seeking the approval of his peers by rejoining the 
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battle. T h  e pattern of self-knowledge thus turns into a persuasio of a 
narcissistic egotist; the alleged mirror of self-knowledge is merely a 
deceptive trick. 
H o w e v e r  , it is noteworthy that one English nosce teipsum book, 
Thomas Wright's The Passions of the Mind in General (1601), 
used the eye-mirror analogy in order to illustrate man's tendency 
to mistake self-love for self-knowledge and that it did so together 
with other images that play a role in the stultification of Achilles. 
Says Wright : 
The reason w e judge more quickly other men's faults than our own 
partly proceeds from self-love, which blindeth us in our actions, 
partly because w e see other men's defects directly and our o w n by 
a certain reflection; for as no m a  n knoweth exactly his ow  n face be­
cause he never sees it but by reflection from a glass, and other 
men's countenances he conceiveth most perfectly because he vieweth 
them directly and in themselves, even so by a certain circle w  e wind 
about ourselves whereas by a right line w  e pass into the corners of 
men's souls, at least by rash judgments and sinister suspicions.1 
If this argument does not completely parallel that of Ulysses' author, 
it does explain w h  y for m e  n like Achilles the mirror of self-knowl­
edge is the mirror of self-love. Interestingly, the supposition that 
Shakespeare derived Ulysses' argument from \The Passions of the 
Mind is m a d e more attractive by Wright's marginal note to the 
passage: " N o  n videmus id manticae quod in tergo est." This is 
exactly the sententia by which Ulysses explains w h  y Achilles is 
being passed by and neglected: 
Time hath, m  y lord, a wallet at his back,

Wherein he puts alms for oblivion,

A great-siz'd monster of ingratitudes.

Those scraps are good deeds past, which are devour'd

A s fast as they are made, forgot as soon

A  s done.

(145-50) 
Shakespeare gave the sententia, which Wright used in an abridged 
form, a meaning closer to its original source, Persius: "Ut n e m o in 
sese temptat descendere, n e m o / Sed praecedenti spectatur mantica 
tergo." 2 But Shakespeare put the wallet on the back of time rather 
than on that of a person; what in Persius and Wright is a figure that 
illustrates m a n '  s delusions about himself, his unwillingness to descend 
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into his o w n soul, becomes in the words of Ulysses an illustration of 
the subjection of all worth and honor to "envious and calumniating 
Time" (174). Here again is a skeptical twist; the changes wrought 
by time have always been one of the skeptics' favorite proofs for the 
relativity of judgments and for the instability of m a n  . A  s Charron 
put it, 
the greatest part of our actions are nothing else but eruptions and 
impulsions enforced by the occasions. . . . Our spirits also and our 
humors are changed with the change of time. Life is an unequal 
motion, irregular, and of many fashions.3 
The touch of nature that, as Ulysses says, makes all m e n kin in 
their forgetfulness is also a touch that makes some m e n very obtuse, 
as he shows by his treatment of Achilles. T h e possibility that this 
touch came from Wright's palette is enhanced by Shakespeare's 
using at the end of the scene another figure associated with self-
knowledge that occurs in The Passions of the Mind. Achilles, 
thoroughly shaken by Ulysses' clever commonplaces, laments finally, 
" M  y mind is troubled, like a fountain stirr'd; / A n  d I myself see 
not the bottom of it." But Thersites has sounded the depth of this 
fountain: " W o u l d the fountain of your mind were clear again, that 
I might water an ass at it. I had rather be a tick in a sheep than 
such a valiant ignorance" (III.iii.303—8). Wright depicted the foun­
tains of men's minds, deeper fountains than that of Achilles, as waters 
of ignorance: "Only I will infer our extreme ignorance that few or 
none of these difficulties which concern us so near as our souls and 
bodies are thoroughly as yet in m  y judgment declared even of the 
profoundest wits; for I k n o  w not h o  w their best resolutions leave 
still our understandings dry, thirsting for a clearer and fresher 
fountain." 4 
Thus a case can be m a d e that Ulysses' "strange author" is 
Thomas Wright, the only English nosce teipsum author I k n o w of 
that was m u c h affected by skepticism. O n e must then assume that 
Shakespeare gave Wright's arguments a few still stranger twists. 
But regardless of whether Shakespeare followed Wright when he 
made Achilles' glass of self-recognition one of self-love and his 
fountain of the mind one of ignorance, the images he used are indica­
tive both of his continuing interest in the patterns of self-knowledge 
and his skeptical look at humanistic "truths" about h u m a  n nature in 
Troilus and Cressida. 
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If Ulysses is one character in the play w h  o knows himself and 
others, he is also one of the least amiable. His knowledge of the souls 
of others is a realization of their lies, pretenses and self-deceptions. 
A n d that goes even for what he calls "the soul of state." A s he says 
grandiloquently to Achilles: 
There is a mystery—with w h o  m relation 
Durst never meddle—in the soul of state, 
Which hath an operation more divine 
Than breath or pen can give expressure to. 
(III.iii.201-4) 
A s it turns out, this mystery comes from a good spy system, which 
Ulysses calls the "providence" of a watchful state. Thus, not so 
mysteriously, Ulysses knows about the motivation that keeps Achilles 
away from battle: his love of Priam's daughter Polyxena. In Ulysses, 
a skeptic attitude toward values is combined with an eminently 
practical, Machiavellian view of furthering the aims of the state. 
There is perhaps a contradiction between his theoretical skepticism 
and his practical espousal of the state as an absolute value, but that 
wa  s an inconsistency c o m m o  n to Renaissance skeptics. 
T h  e contradictions, disjunctions, and paradoxes with which the 
skeptics illustrated the ignorance and instability of m a  n are ingrained 
in the texture of the play. F r o m the chorus's words to the audience, 
"Like or find fault; do as your pleasures are; / N o  w good or bad, 
'tis but the chance of war," the play takes a problematic attitude 
toward values. Good or bad, success or loss, truth or falseness, buy­
ing and selling are some of the oppositions that become relative. 
W h a  t is good m a  y depend on the viewer, what is true, on the speaker. 
T h  e validity of a statement is negated by its opposite. "Bifold au­
thority," the phrase in which Troilus expresses his utter disbelief 
that Diomed's Cressida is the same w o m a n w h o , a few hours before, 
swore to be eternally faithful, could well be the motto of this play 
with its peculiar dualism in plot, character, thoughts, and themes 
that leads to division andfinally to dubiety and impotence.5 
It is, of course, natural that the plot should be divided into two 
parts, the love intrigue and the war story; but Shakespeare went 
beyond necessity in creating a structural bipartition by making 
them nearly equal in length and, presumably, significance—or per­
haps w e should say insignificance. Each of the war parties is inter­
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nally divided, although the Greeks are more deeply so. B y and large, 
the Trojans are more sympathetically portrayed than the Greeks, 
but they too have flaws that soil their virtues. The  y espouse and 
partly embody the aesthetically pleasing ideals of chivalry, but they 
vitiate them by turning the pursuit of honor into an obsession. T h e 
Greeks, w h o are m u c h coarser, have a more realistic view of war, 
but they tend to brutality and stupidity. Not even the best of heroes 
are totally sympathetic. It is as if Shakespeare endeavored to show 
them occasionally at their worst. W h a  t w  e first learn about Hector, 
as m u c  h a character of heroic stature as there is in the play, is that 
he has struck his armorer and scolded his wife although he is said 
to be generally a m a  n "whose patience / Is as a virtue fix'd" (I.ii.4-5). 
Ulysses is certainly the shrewdest of the Greeks, yet his major ac­
tions are the perpetration of a hoax on Achilles and a rather unkind 
exposure of Troilus to the truth about Cressida. 
Shakespeare's method of playing out favorable against unfavor­
able traits is most schematic in the characterization of Ajax, w h o , 
early in the play, is described as a bundle of contrarieties: 
This m a n . . . hath robb'd many beasts of their particular addi­
tions : he is as valiant as the lion, churlish as the bear, slow as the 
elephant—a m a n into w h o m nature hath so crowded humours that 
his valour is crush'd into folly, his folly sauced with discretion. 
There is no m a  n hath a virtue that he hath not a glimpse of, nor 
any m a n an attaint but he carries some stain of it; he is melancholy 
without cause and merry against the hair; he hath the joints of 
everything; but everything so out of joint that he is a gouty Bri­
areus, many hands and no use, or purblind Argus, all eyes and no 
sight. 
(I.ii.19-29) 
O n  e would be hard put to find any of the few glimpses of virtue here 
attributed to Ajax borne out by his actions in the play. Evidently, 
Shakespeare's mannerist view of m e  n as composites of shreds and 
patches worked in favor of Ajax, providing him with a somewhat 
better reputation than he deserves. T h e m a n w e get to k n o w is mere 
joints and no brain, but it could be said that the joints have their 
duality; he is half-made of Hector's blood, a compositional fact to 
which he owes his survival—Hector would kill some of his single 
parts if he could identify any that are clearly and distinctly Greek. 
The war plot proper begins with the debate in the Greek camp 
(I.iii), which leads to Ulysses' scheme against Achilles. This debate 
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is paralleled by another one a m o n g the Trojan leaders (Il.ii), in 
which Hector's challenge of a Greek hero to single combat is ratified. 
These debates and their consequences form, except for the inconclu­
sive battle in thefifth act, all there is to the war plot. It is a story of 
frustrations and missed opportunities. T h e decisions taken in the 
debates prove utterly pointless. It is not Ulysses' ruse that brings 
Achilles back to the field, but the death of his friend Patroclus, 
dubbed by Thersites his "masculine whore." N o r does Hector's hero­
ism and chivalry help the Greek cause, for, in what Troilus calls his 
"vice of mercy," he refuses to fight Ajax. Purpose is but slave to 
m e m o r y  , of violent birth, but poor validity. 
Yet the debates and their consequences are of significance for the 
thought of the play; they highlight the conflict between orthodox 
theory and refractory reality, as important a theme here as it is in 
Hamlet; they give us a feel for the intellectual and the moral qualities 
of the combatants; and they provide an important perspective on the 
hero, Troilus. In the Greek debate, A g a m e m n o n '  s opening speech 
clearly strikes the theme of the incongruity of theory and practice: 
"The ample proposition that hope makes / In all designs begun on 
earth below/Fails in the promis'd largeness" (I.iii.3-5). T h e sub­
sequent speeches of the Greek leaders breathe a similar frustration 
and disillusionment. But Ulysses succeeds in restoring the faith of 
his compeers in the high road of theory w h e  n he diagnoses the 
troubles as due to the neglect of "the specialty of rule." 
This much-analyzed speech need not detain us long. Ulysses, as 
w  e have noted in examining his patterns of self-knowledge, is not 
addicted to humanistic principles. H  e is philosophically a skeptic, 
politically an absolutist. His clever manipulation of others has its 
equivalent in the specious w a y in which he makes ideas, even old 
humanistic commonplaces, subservient to his purposes. A  s Professor 
Elton has shown in detail, his degree speech is not a straightforward 
defense of hierarchical order but reflects the multiple ironies, ambiv­
alent attitudes, and the skeptic tone of the play. For Ulysses, values 
have no purpose per se; they are subject to their daily quotation by 
the opinion brokers: " N  o m a  n is the lord of anything . . . / Till he 
communicate his parts to others" (Ill.iii.i 15—17). In the degree 
speech, he does not defend the intrinsic values of an aristocratic 
hierarchical order—he would be no skeptic if he did. T h e external 
signs of this order, as he says in an ironic theatrical simile, must be 
maintained: "Degree being vizarded, /Th' unworthiest shows as 
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fairly in the mask" (I.iii.83-84). T h e paraphernalia of degree must 
be maintained, or the system will collapse. T h  e negative aspects of 
this defense of external values is highlighted by the unimpressiveness 
of A g a m e m n o n , the "med'cinable" sun, on whose display of "priority 
and place" the maintenance of Ulysses' order depends. W h e  n 
Aeneas enters immediately after the Greek debate, he fails notably 
to recognize that the "god in office, guiding m e n , " A g a m e m n o n , for 
w h o  m he asks, is actually the person to w h o  m he addresses his ques­
tion (I.iii.224ff.). Subsequently, Thersites, not unjustly, d e m o n  ­
strates h o w foolish it is w h e n one fool obeys another higher up the 
hierarchical ladder (II.iii.40 ff.). Ulysses' theories are proved to be 
shoddy most signally by his o w  n action. His rhetorical effort is 
merely an introduction to his attempt to get Achilles back to the 
battlefield by stirring "the envious fever / O  f pale and bloodless 
emulation" between Achilles and Ajax. Here and elsewhere, the 
actuality of men's behavior belies their references to idealistic prin­
ciples that in themselves are shown to be flawed. T h e ironies of 
Troilus and Cressida, as Professor Elton has shown, go deep.6 
A s a diagnosis of the reasons for the stagnation of the war and 
the flaws of Greek society. Ulysses' speech is inadequate and one-
sided, and it does not agree with any philosophy of order Shake­
speare expressed in the history plays or elsewhere. Ulysses attributes 
the dragging out of the war to "oppugnancy," the conflict and ten­
sion in the Greek camp. But, as w  e noted in discussing the structural 
principles of the Renaissance macrocosm, Shakespeare seems to have 
thought of the tension of opposing forces as creative, at least up to a 
point. Of course, these forces were those of well-organized layers of 
society, not selfish cliques. Achilles' private grudge is as sterile as is 
Ulysses' skeptic authoritarianism, and the conflict between the two 
can bring no organic order. Neither does the mainspring of the 
philosophical and political dislocation lie in what Ulysses calls "appe­
tite, an universal wolf" (I.iii.121)—this m a  y be one of Achilles' 
problems, but it is certainly not one of Ulysses'. T h  e stagnation of 
the Greeks is not oppugnancy but intellectual and moral inadequacy. 
It looks atfirst sight as if the debate of the Trojans presented an 
alternative to the Greeks' sterility. T h e Trojans do discuss a more 
fundamental question, and they do so apparently in a spirit of greater 
seriousness, the question whether to continue a war that appears to 
some of them pointless. T h e opposing positions are clearly drawn 
up: Hector, seconded by Helenus, argues that reason decrees that 
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Helen should be returned to the Greeks and the war be ended; 
Troilus, supported by Paris, attacks this argument with the claim 
that such action would violate the national honor. 
A  s w  e have noted earlier, Hector begins the debate with an an­
nouncement of his philosophical position as a moderate skeptic who 
uses reason cautiously in determining the all-important issue of war 
and peace; all calculations suggest that Helen must leave (II.ii.8­
25) . H  e is passionately interrupted by Troilus, whose arguments are 
enthusiastic, novel, and seemingly idealistic. W  e shall examine them 
first. 
Troilus's main point is that the king of the country and a foreign 
queen w h o has become a national symbol (no matter h o w obtained) 
cannot be evaluated rationalistically. Priam's honor and worth can­
not be put on a "scale of c o m m o  n ounces" with reasons and fears 
about war and peace (22-32), and Helen's value has been estab­
lished as "inestimable" by the national effort of abducting and keep­
ing her (69-96). Troilus, w e say, is romantic and idealistic about 
kingship and w o m e n  . H  e does, of course, quite clearlyflout the hu­
manistic position of reasonable action when, like Tarquin in Lucrece, 
he wafts away "reason and respect" as fit only for cowards (49-50). 
If one defines "idealism" in its popular meaning (not to speak about 
the philosophical one) as the desire to see the world as it should be 
or as the attempt to create such a world, Troilus is merely an illus­
tration of the inadequacies and fallacies that often lurk behind this 
vision or endeavor. Idealism demands a belief in intrinsic values, in 
absolutes, and Troilus is even less capable of such belief than Ulysses. 
His ingrained skepticism shows itself best in his pivotal argument 
on the value of Helen. For him, it is not, as in Marlowe, her "face" 
—which he had earlier declared to be gory—but her "price"—that 
of a "pearl"—which launched the thousand ships. T h  e commercial 
simile, one of the m a n  y in the play, here demonstrates his need of 
values but also his habit of affixing variable prices to them. His odd 
example of the m a  n w h  o "distastes" later the wife he has chosen 
(61-68) is characteristic of him. Troilus, of course, argues that 
honor demands that one must keep such a wife, just as the Trojans 
must keep Helen—we shall not comment on the aptness of the ana­
logue—but this example and his figure of the pricing of Helen show 
that Troilus's value system is a shifting and changing one in which 
pearls can be marked up and d o w n according to the dictates of the 
will, an instrument very m u c  h subject to envious and calumniating 
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time; the strongest love can become boredom and aversion. Troilus 
espouses absolutes because of what Hector calls "the hot passion of 
distemp'red blood" (169). A  s Derek Traversi has said, his "dis­
embodied idealism covers a sensual impulse which he refuses to 
recognize." 7 
But the pseudo-idealism of Troilus is even more disintellectualized 
than disembodied. His need to have ideals, contradicted as it is by 
his skepticism about absolute values, leads him to embrace fervidly 
those that his will elects. O n  e could speak here of a pseudo-fideism. 
Troilus, rejecting all measurements of his ideals, acclaims them as 
intuitively apprehended by his faith in an analogous w a  y to that 
which the fideist said was the only method to k n o w G o d . O n e might 
compare Troilus's ridicule of the idea that Priam's worth and honor 
can be measured and his acclaim of the "past-proportion" of the 
king's "infinite" (26-29) with Montaigne's rejection of the idea 
that G o  d is measurable (from the stronglyfideistic ending of " A  n 
Apology of R a y m o n d Sebond") : 
It were a sin to say of God, w h o is the only that is, that he was or 
shall be; for these words are declinations, passages, or vicissitudes 
of that which cannot last nor continue in being. Wherefore w  e must 
conclude that only God is, not according to any measure of time, 
but according to an immovable and immutable eternity.8 
Montaigne's call to "vile, abject m a n  " to "raise himself above 
humanity" not by his reason but by faith in an infinite G o  d has its 
secular analogue in Troilus's rejection of reason and adoption of 
faith in honor, king, and national symbol. Troilus's chivalry, patriot­
ism, and glorification of the divinity of kings are articles of a pseudo-
religion. Ironically, he, whose hot blood no "discourse of reason" 
can reach, mocks the "high strains of divination" of his sister Cas­
sandra (101 ff.). 
But even Hector, w h  o analyzes his brother well, turns out to be 
less consistently reasonable than his initial position indicates. It is 
true that he does defend humanistic rules of social and political action 
that Shakespeare had elsewhere shown to be basic to civilized life; 
he evokes the traditional moral virtues and asks that they be applied 
to the law of nations. His argument is so technical as to seem 
fashioned on Cicero's De Officiis, the most authoritative source.9 
W h e  n he says that the law of nature and of nations demands that 
Helen be returned, he espouses the same moral-psychological prin­
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ciple of temperance as did Cicero, w h  o noted the inadmissibility of 
theft on a private as well as an international scale (III.21-74). Like 
Ulysses, Hector is an apologist of reason and order, and like Ulysses 
he loses his credibility for us by his actions. In a surprising switch 
during the debate, Hector abandons his theoretical principles and 
adopts Troilus's hawkishness. O  n the intellectual issue, he does not 
retract; what he has said is "in w a y of truth." But in practice, he will 
side with Troilus and advocate keeping Helen because she represents 
a cause "that hath no m e a n dependence / U p o n our joint and several 
dignities" (192-93). T h e cleavage between what m e n know to be 
right and true and what they actually do, which opens up in Hamlet, 
here becomes even wider. Shakespeare gave it dramatic emphasis by 
the entrance, in the middle of the debate, of Cassandra, that symbol 
of truth for which m e n have no ears. H e r prophecies and tears are 
not enough to keep Hector on the course of rational action; to 
Troilus, they are merely brainsick raptures. But the raptures really 
dangerous to Troy are those of Troilus, and even the more prudent 
Hector is infected by the irrationality that is in the air. T h  e Trojan 
debate manifests not only an external division, that between hawks 
and doves, but also more subtle and serious internalfissures between 
one part of a disputant's nature and the other, between Hector's 
rationality and obsessive sense of honor, and between Troilus's skep­
ticism and hisfideistic pseudo-idealism. 
T h e scenes of battle (V.iv-x) that conclude the war plot and 
the play (except for Pandarus's epilogue) are fragmentary, but they 
are right for this play. T h  e camera shifts, as it were, from one brief 
individual action to the other. T h e glorious war dissolves into a 
number of private feuds that give vent to personal jealousies and 
grievances, but do not end them. W h e r e h u m a n character might be 
strong enough to execute intentions, the shadow of fate falls between 
the conception and the execution. Those w h o have reasons for deadly 
hatred of their opponents are denied the satisfaction of killing them. 
Menelaus cannot slay Paris; Troilus cannot take his revenge on 
Diomedes. Hector is indeed killed, but not in fair battle. W h e  n he 
and Achilles confront each other, the cowardly Greek withdraws be­
cause his arms are "out of use." W h e  n Hector falls into his enemy's 
hands, it is ironically just after he has succumbed to greed, an emo­
tion that little suits his chivalry, by hunting and killing a Greek be­
cause of his sumptuous armor. Achilles, w h  o does not have any 
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sense of chivalry, has him murdered by the cruel Myrmidons just 
when, unarmed, he takes a rest from the battle. 
Hector's murder and the subsequent indignity inflicted on his 
body is a commentary on the ironic brutality of war. A warrior 
with the reputation of nobility becomes, just at the m o m e n  t whe  n 
his hands are stained, the victim of a gang led by a cowardly, con­
ceited, and brutal half-wit. T h e episode is an illustration of the hu­
manists' belief that war was the product of man's ignorance of him­
self, a belief shared by some skeptics. In his chapter " O f the military 
Profession," Charron neatly balanced the stereotype of war as the 
breeding place of nobility, ardor, glory, vigor, manliness, and courage 
with its horrible effects—hatred, fury, madness, destruction, and 
death. " A n  d all this," Charron concluded, "to serve the passion of 
another, for a cause which a m a  n knows not to be just, and which is 
commonly unjust." 10 
The battle scenes and m u c h else in Troilus and Cressida lead one 
to a conclusion like Charron's about w a r  ; they use the skeptics' 
favorite method of negating man's illusionary ideals by pragmatic 
and brutal realities. A n d as if glimpses w e get of the war action were 
not disillusioning enough by themselves, w e see Thersites scouting 
the battlefield like an ubiquitous war correspondent, giving us sordid 
inside information not intended for the homefront. Those that have 
thought that these final scenes were written by Shakespeare in a 
hurry or added by somebody else are surely wrong; they are a 
powerful, if satiric and bitter, commentary on m e n at war. They 
pulverize the lie of war. 
The war story is intertwined with the love plot, and the juxta­
position makes some ironic points about the congruity of the two 
most absorbing occupations of m a n .  1  1 In the one scene in which 
Helen appears—a scene difficult to assign to either the war plot or 
the love plot—she, the inadequate issue of the war, is also debunked 
as the queen of romance. She proves to be merely a sex-obsessed girl, 
entertained by Pandarus with what must be the most inane love 
songs in Shakespeare. Helen, it is true, had lost m u c  h of her ro­
mantic glamor for the Elizabethans; in Lucrece, Shakespeare called 
her "the strumpet that began this stir" (1471). But just before her 
appearance in Troilus and Cressida, he conjured up her old romantic 
value, ironically by the Clown, w h o introduces her as "the mortal 
Venus, the heart-blood of beauty, love's invisible soul" (III.i.31). 
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T h e Clown's pun on "stew" adds an obscene touch that contributes 
to the absurdity of Pandarus's seven-times repeated "fair" in his 
greeting of Helen. In the Platonizing language of the courtesy books, 
the "First Fair" was the highest kind of beauty, spiritual and invisible, 
the permanent and divine Idea.12 Pandarus's play on "fair" accentu­
ates the obtrusive visibility and earthiness of Helen, the "Nell" of 
the Trojans. T h  e scene is thus a sardonic introduction to the love 
tryst of Troilus and Cressida, which follows immediately. 
There would obviously be no place in this disintegrating moral 
climate for a hero like R o m e o  ; youthful purity here would be merely 
incredible naivete. There would also be no place for a tortured 
seeker of values like Hamlet; no such m a  n could fall in love with 
Cressida. T h  e Troilus that Shakespeare actually created is different 
from either and undoubtedly of smaller stature. But he is not a 
totally simple m a n , and one could argue that he is as modern, per­
haps more modern but uncomfortably so, as these two tragic favor­
ites have proved to be. His characterization of himself and those of 
him spoken by others contrast oddly with his actual character. Even 
the two seemingly conventional laudes of his person, the one by 
Pandar (I.ii.244 ff.) and the other by Ulysses (IV.v.96ff.), are 
puzzling and unsatisfactory. Ulysses' appraisal comes via Aeneas and 
thus has a distancing quality that, by itself, is vexing; but even taken 
at face value, Ulysses' balanced antitheses leave one with some doubts 
about the young m a n . H e is a "true knight," but "not yet mature"; 
he is "not soon provok'd," but, if provoked, not "soon calm'd." 
Other features given by Ulysses are untrue; his remark that Troilus 
does not dignify "an impair thought with breath" denies his volup­
tuous remarks to both Pandar and Cressida and can be understood 
only from the perspective of Aeneas, his fellow Trojan. Most dis­
turbing is the statement that Troilus is as manly as Hector, but 
"more dangerous." T h e relative absence of "danger," of vindictive­
ness, is, after all, Hector's most amiable feature. 
T h e other portrait, that drawn by Pandar, is a playful build-up 
intended to endear Troilus to Cressida; but it m a  y contain some 
hidden truth. " D o you k n o w what a m a n is?" Pandarus asks his 
niece—and w e wonder h o w he should know. In Pandarus's culinary 
analogy, a man's "spice and salt" are birth, beauty, good shape, dis­
course, manhood, learning, gentleness, virtue (a term Pandarus can 
understand only imperfectly), youth, liberality, and so forth. A m a  n 
with these spices, as Cressida wittily rejoins, is a "minc'd m a n .  " 
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A n d Troilus is divided and fragmented, even more deeply so than 
the other characters. His seasoning leaves m u c h to be desired, and, by 
the end of the play, he has lost most of the moral qualities in Pan­
darus's recipe of manhood and become what one might call a minced 
m a n  , a very imperfect m a  n indeed, hitting blindly right and left, 
wildly attempting to take revenge for a slight he thinks the world 
has given him. 
Shakespeare kept Troilus from becoming sympathetic even in m o  ­
ments when w  e could identify most clearly with him. His sensuous 
anticipation of the love tryst makes him a junior voluptuary. Pan­
darus becomes for him, in one of his juvenile lapses of taste, a 
Charon that wafts him to the Elysian fields where he will "wallow in 
the lily beds" (III.ii.12 ff.). H e shows himself almost as m u c h a 
devotee to sensations as Cressida w h e  n he fears that "th' imaginary 
relish" might prove so sweet as to m a k e him "lose distinction" in 
his joys.13 Troilus's anticipation is not only slightly soiled by an 
earthy ingredient but is also m a d e subtly ironic by a skeptic aware­
ness of the cleavage between desire and fulfillment, between the 
infinity of the will and the limitations of the act.14 H  e knows that 
"we taste nothing purely," as Montaigne said in the title of one of 
his essays. H  e lacks the spontaneity of youth and love that radiates 
from R o m e o  . H  e cannot really lose himself totally in love before he 
loses Cressida by fate. 
It is by an exercise of the will he acclaimed as the supreme arbiter 
of values that he makes Cressida a symbol of ideal love. W  e have 
seen the real Cressida in bawdy pleasantries with Pandarus, and w e 
have heard the latter mistaking the Clown's effusions about Helen 
as applying to Cressida—the two are sisters in spirit, and their value 
is out of proportion to the price m e n pay for them. Yet in the tryst, 
Cressida attempts to rise to Troilus's ideal conception of her. It is 
a superb touch of Shakespeare's artistry w h e n he makes her effort 
conspicuous as she tries to put her amorous technique aside in order 
to enter into the spirit of the m o m e n t  . It is a violation of her strategic 
principles to admit that she only seemed hard to win (III.ii.114) 
and that, perchance, she m a y be using more "craft" than she feels 
"love" (149)—there is a double irony here, for she wishes Troilus 
to reject these absolutely true statements. But the most ironic of her 
remarks is when she divides herself into two selves, thus parodying 
Troilus's split personality: "I have a kind of self resides with you; 
/ But an unkind self, that itself will leave / T  o be another's fool" 
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(144-46) . She is not really so deeply split; her ideal self is very 
largely that of Troilus's imagination, which she feebly tries to re­
create. H e  r actual self is the unkind self that acts deceptively as if 
she were reluctant to embrace Troilus, the self that will later act 
similarly toward Diomedes. 
Here and elsewhere, m u c h of what Cressida says forms a satiric 
commentary on the ironies of Troilus's exertions. If his protests of 
truth and faithfulness are immature and hyperbolical, hers are 
hysterical and theatrical: she enjoys "tasting" the grief of her sepa­
ration from Troilus as m u c  h as she did their union. A n  d if Troilus 
can be a skeptic andfind man's will directed by his deceptive senses 
(II.ii.61 ff.), by the same token she can excuse her fickleness: 
Troilus, farewell! O n  e eye yet looks on thee;

But with m  y heart the other eye doth see.

A h  , poor our sex! this fault in us I find,

Th  e error of our eye directs our mind.

W h a  t error leads must err; O  , then conclude,

Minds sway'd by eyes are full of turpitude.

(V.ii.105-10) 
This climactic scene, in which she reveals flagrantly her true 
nature, that of a "daughter of the g a m e ,  " is one of Shakespeare's 
most complex dramatic exposes. T h eflirtatious Cressida, the direct 
Diomede, the wily Ulysses, the deflating Thersites, all contribute to 
showing that not only has Troilus been deceived by Cressida but that 
he also has deceived himself and will continue to do so. It is the 
m o m e n t w h e n Troilus most nearly rises to the stature of a tragic 
hero; it is his greatest passion as well as his closest approach to self-
discovery. Yet it also shows him incapable of the full dignity and the 
passion that characterize Shakespeare's great tragic heroes. In some 
ways, the scene foreshadows the later over-hearing scene in Othello, 
w h e  n the M o o  r watches Iago and Cassio and then Cassio and Bianca 
in the belief that they ridicule his cuckoldry. Troilus, of course, has 
an ocular demonstration of Cressida's unfaithfulness, which Othello 
does not; yet he is m u c  h less passionate. O n  e m a  y compare, for in­
stance, Othello's wild protestation of patience, "I will be found most 
cunning in m  y patience; / But—dost thou hear ?—most bloody" 
with Troilus's feeble "I will be patient; outwardly I will" (V.ii.68). 
If Troilus does not have the temperament to rise to the passion of an 
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Othello, neither has he the intellectual strength of a Hamlet to hide 
pain by wit and sarcasm. 
It is symptomatic of his self-deception that his immediate reaction 
is to try to cling, in spite of all appearances, to the romantic image 
of Cressida. H  e would like to listen to 
a credence in m  y heart, 
A  n esperance so obstinately strong, 
That doth invert th' attest of eyes and ears; 
A  s if those organs had deceptious functions 
Created only to calumniate. 
(118-22) 
Troilus displays here the same inconsistent idealism as w h e n he 
sought to revalue Helen on the basis of the price the Trojans paid 
for her. A s he was then inflamed by the subjective need of having 
absolute ideals (although his skepticism should have denied such 
possibility), so n o  w again his desperate need for them rings in his 
cry: "Let it not be believ'd for w o m a n h o o d . / Think, w e had moth­
ers" (127-28). H  e even tries to refute the idea that the Cressida 
he has just observed is the real Cressida. 
His pathetic attempt to reject the attest of eyes and ears parallels 
Cressida's excuse of being led by the error of the eye, according to 
her a congenital one with w o m e n  . A n  d in both cases the claim is 
deflated by Thersites, w h  o calls Cressida's argument a proof of 
strength she could outdo only by claiming that her mind has turned 
whore and w h o wonders whether Troilus will swagger himself out 
of his o w n eyes. Troilus is here no closer to real self-knowledge 
than he was at the beginning of the play w h e n he asked Apollo w h o 
he, Pandar, and Cressida were. H  e deceives himself with picturesque 
and unilluminating metaphors. 
But even if Troilus's reaction to the great disillusionment of his 
life lacks in self-awareness, it leads to a supreme rhetorical exercise 
that draws on humanistic patterns of self-knowledge. T h e confused 
and pathetic speech in which he explains his state and feeling is, 
together with Ulysses' eye-soul analogy, symtomatic of the twist 
Shakespeare gave to these patterns in this deeply disturbing play. 
Troilus characteristically begins with another attempt to deny that 
the actual Cressida is the true one: 
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If beauty have a soul, this is not she; 
If souls guide vows, if vows be sanctimonies, 
If sanctimony be the gods' delight, 
If there be rule in unity itself, 
This was not she. 
(136-40) 
Troilus expresses the impossibility that his Cressida is disloyal by 
making her into a "soul," a familiar enough identification for a 
lover. A s a soul, she is, in Renaissance terms, the most cohesive and 
unalterable of unities; Cicero called it a semper idem, and the Renais­
sance commentators insisted that its unity was self-evident—"plain 
to anybody w h o knows anything about physics," as Camerarius put 
it.15 Troilus reaffirms this unity by logical demonstration; but he 
finds himself unable to deny what reality presents, and his o w n soul 
suffers a "madness of discourse, / That cause sets up with and 
against itself! / Bifold authority!" H  e thus tortures himself with 
a logical contradiction that a skeptic should be able to accept; as 
Charron put it, there is no reason, but has a contrary reason.16 But 
Troilus's projection of the ideal unity, the "soul," into Cressida 
makes this position untenable for him. T h e split in this supposed 
soul becomes n o w a deepening split in his o w n : 
Within m  y soul there doth conduce a fight 
Of this strange nature, that a thing inseparate 
Divides more wider than the sky and earth; 
A n  d yet the spacious breadth of this division 
Admits no orifex for a point as subtle 
A  s Ariachne's broken woof to enter. 
(145-50) 
T h e seeming division of Cressida into two beings opens for him 
a macrocosmic cleavage: 
Instance, O instance! strong as Pluto's gates: 
Cressid is mine, tied with the bonds of heaven. 
Instance, O instance! strong as heaven itself: 
The bonds of heaven are slipp'd, dissolv'd, and loos'd. 
(151-54) 
This cosmic extension of disintegration still arises from the soul 
concept with which Troilus identifies his ideal Cressida. T h e Renais­
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sance commentators on the semper idem anchored its unity in that of 
the macrocosmic spirit; Troilus quite appropriately sees Cressida's 
"disunity" as well as his o w n reflected in the heavens. Yet with all 
this rhetorical effort, in the end he has to resign himself to the 
undeniable reality: 
A n  d with another knot, five-finger-tied, 
The fractions of her faith, orts of her love, 
The fragments, scraps, the bits, and greasy relics 
Of her o'er-eaten faith, are bound to Diomed. 
(155-58) 
Troilus has thus fragmented his supreme value, Cressida, and, in 
the process, his inner fragmentation finds its outward expression. 
H e is n o w truly Cressida's "minc'd m a n . " W h a t comes from n o w 
on is of no real consequence to him. A n  d what happens to him 
is of little consequence to us; it is dramatically significant only 
by showing that his subsequent life is inconsequential. H  e continues 
to live, seeking with "careless force and forceless care" some kind of 
revenge (V.v .40) . But the action does not give him this satisfaction; 
it would be m u c  h too absolute an ending for this play of impotence 
and sterility. Death would restore Troilus from fragmentation to 
some kind of wholeness; therefore, it would be inconsistent with the 
relentless disintegration of m e  n and values. 
The general finale of futility is thus appropriate both thematically 
and dramatically. Inconclusive and seemingly irrelevant as the ac­
tions in the disrupted battle scenes are, they emphasize the theme of 
the fragmentation of the self in a twilight world. A n  d the concluding 
episode, in which Pandarus enters in the throes of the Neapolitan 
bone-ache he wishes to bequeath to the audience, is just the right 
touch. Everything, like the bee in the pathetic little song of that 
former troubadour of love, has lost its honey and its sting. Pan­
darus's insult is a final, futile, and unpleasant gesture, but it is 
dramatically right. 
The patterns of self-knowledge in Troilus and Cressida turn out 
to be patterns of ignorance, deception, and self-deception. They are 
imbued with a skeptical and satirical look at humanity. But I think 
that for this very reason they are not as deeply disturbing as those 
of Hamlet. They have a kind of built-in reductio ad absurdum. 
W h e n all men and values are shown to be defective, w e sense the 
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author's satirical intention and are apt to attribute some of the 
implied social and philosophical criticism to the formal requirements 
of a satire. Also, the low intellectual and moral stature of the Greeks 
and Trojans lessens the significance of their ideas. Hamlet's skepti­
cism has the ring of search and suffering; it is not the congenital 
inconsistency of a fragmented Troilus. 
This lessening of the sting seems to m  e to have a considerable 
effect on the role skepticism plays as a philosophical theme. It is 
difficult to say which of the expressed skeptic attitudes are to be 
taken seriously; and Troilus's use of skeptic ideas is satirized, Cres­
sida's is burlesqued. T h  e humanistic position, theoretically taken by 
Hector, although in practice denied by him, comes off a little better. 
It is not deflated as such and has a somewhat better spokesman. 
Troilus and Cressida seems to indicate that Shakespeare was be­
coming more skeptic of skepticism and somewhat more tolerant of 
the humanistic absolutes he had questioned, ironically and sometimes 
bitterly, in Hamlet. 
That this m a y have been so is m a d e more likely by the w a y the 
play's greatest skeptic, Thersites, is portrayed. His skepticism about 
values and h u m a n nature has none of the inconsistencies of Troilus's. 
But Thersites is also one of the most unsympathetic characters. W  e 
cannot help accepting his comments on the degeneracy of the other 
characters and the rottenness of Greece and Troy as true even if they 
are unpleasant. It is Thersites w h  o puts into words the overwhelm­
ing impression created by the play: "Lechery, lechery! Still wars 
and lechery! Nothing else holds fashion" (V.ii. 194-95) . Yet he, the 
deadly accurate fragmenter of m e n  , is also a parasite and as such 
less than a full m a n ; Achillesfittingly calls him a "fragment" (V.i.8). 
T h e character of Thersites shows that a presumed self-knowledge 
that questions all values, and does so in a spirit that reveals a lack 
of sympathy with humanity, is barren and odious; and it is also 
false because it denies the truth of the h u m a  n condition that makes 
m e n dependent on one another. 
CHAPTER TWELVE 
Measure for Measure: 
Looking into Oneself 
IN THEIR W A Y S , All's Well That Ends Well and Measure for Measure have proved to be as perplexing to critics as has Troilus and Cressida. It is true that, unlike the latter play, they 
do not pose a problem concerning the genre to which they belong— 
comedy, comical satire, tragedy, or history—since they are clearly 
comedies. But in exchange they offer even greater resistance to 
critics in search of their design; there is always some refractory 
detail that does not fit into the proposed scheme. But these plays 
appear more unified as well as deeper in their significance, I believe, 
if one understands them as being concerned with a subject that 
fascinated Shakespeare during the period in which they were written: 
the difficulty of gaining self-knowledge in situations unusually c o m  ­
plicated and distressing. 
It must be granted, however, that the perplexities of All's Well 
are not quite of the same order as those of Measure for Measure. T h e 
former play, although somewhat simpler, has something undeniably 
inadequate in its dramatic conception and execution; it m a  y well be 
an insufficiently revised play of Shakespeare's earlier period, perhaps 
the mysterious Love's Labor's Won.1 If so, Shakespeare m a  y have 
decided to take up the story of Measure for Measure for dramatiza­
tion because it allowed him to treat more successfully a pattern of 
self-knowledge he had attempted in All's Well. T h e two plays cer­
tainly do have similarities beyond their resistance to totally satisfy­
ing interpretations. Both have heroes w h  o present to the world 
deceptive outsides, Bertram in his handsomeness, noble lineage, and 
martial accomplishment, Angelo in his judicial strictness and ethical 
rectitude. They are put in unusual and perplexing situations that 
test their moral fiber, and they fail, Bertram byfirst agreeing to 
marry and then rejecting the beautiful and deserving but socially 
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inferior and poor Helena, Angelo by first enforcing an unnaturally 
strict law, then violating it by his lust for Isabella and compounding 
his failing by hypocrisy and villainy. Bertram and Angelo prove, 
in the words of Shakespeare's sonnet 94, that "lilies that fester smell 
far worse than weeds." 2 Just as in this sonnet apparently ideal men, 
w h o "inherit Heaven's graces," are slowly and subtly revealed to be 
unsympathetic, so with mannerist indirection and irony Bertram and 
Angelo are shown to be inwardly rotten and corrupt. Both are re­
generated, largely through their interaction with heroines w h o  , al­
though apparently superior to them morally, are yet difficult to evalu­
ate. T  o some critics, they have seemed to be less than the unspotted 
lilies they appear. It is true, their virtue is tested in more dubious 
ways than is that of Shakespeare's earlier and later heroines—in 
particular, their involvement in the "bed-trick" has offended some 
critics—but they also have character traits that have been found un­
attractive, such as the persistence of Helena—"predatory" it has been 
called—in pursuing her m a n  , or the "coldness" of Isabella in being 
willing to see her brother die rather than surrender her chastity. 
I shall not try to list all the similarities of the two plays that have 
been pointed out,3 but in m  y subsequent discussion of Measure for 
Measure I should like to glance n o  w and then at All's Well, for its 
indirect and ironic approach to the patterns of self-knowledge consti­
tutes a significant n e  w departure for Shakespeare. All's Well, at 
least in the form w  e have it today, which m a  y be a revision, appears 
to be an experiment in a dramatic m o d  e that Shakespeare developed 
further in Measure for Measure.4" A n  d what he did in the latter play, 
particularly by creating the characters of Angelo and the duke, points 
forward to the dramas of self-loss and self-discovery that were to 
come, most of all to Lear and to The Tempest. 
Although self-knowledge is an issue in All's Well, particularly 
through the education of Bertram—which is the central theme, if the 
play can be said to have one—the issue is only imperfectly developed. 
It is true Bertram does learn something about himself and his decep­
tions in the end as his friend and trusted advisor, Parolles, is re­
vealed as a coward and traitor and as he comes to recognize the 
strength of Helena's affection. But all this is rather perfunctorily 
handled. Bertram never sees himself, in the w a  y w  e see him, as a 
young cad w h o m a y become a very odious old lecher and snob. W  e 
have to trust to Helena's continuing strength and will power, of 
which w  e have had formidable demonstrations, that he will remain 
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on the right path. Angelo, however, does look into himself deeply 
once, even though he turns his eyes away too quickly. But this look 
makes a great deal of difference. 
If, as a very competent student of the play has suggested, it was 
the problem of self-knowledge inherent in the story of the corrupt 
judge that induced Shakespeare to write Measure for Measure? he 
decided to emphasize it by putting Angelo's failure and regeneration 
in a larger frame. Angelo's need to k n o  w himself is reflected in the 
similar, though less glaring, need of Isabella; it is paralleled, I should 
like to suggest, by a subtly hinted-at deficiency of the duke. At the 
end, not only is Angelo a better m a n , but Isabella is also more 
feminine and h u m a n e ; and even the duke m a y have learned some­
thing about himself, although it is not what he set out to learn. A n  d 
these patterns of self-knowledge evolve in a climate that poses funda­
mental questions, such as those of the price of chastity, the roots of 
self-discipline, the ethical bases of the law, and the ruler's obligations 
to punish and to be merciful. Only in King Lear are there more 
far-reaching implications in the ethical imperative " k n o  w thyself." 
Shakespeare's Angelo is, to all appearances, a m a  n of honor and 
rectitude. But he is a puzzling, contradictory character, quite differ­
ent from the uncomplicated judge in Whetstone's Promos and Cas­
sandra, on w h o  m he is based. Promos is an ordinary, essentially 
decent, and apparently mature m a  n with a clean record, w h  o just 
happens to be overcome by lust; Angelo, though young, is reputed 
to be of such spectacular virtue and knowledge that everybody ac­
cepts him as a most appropriate substitute during the absence of the 
duke and as fit to translate the virtues he possesses into action. There 
is no sign that he assumes his great office with the excusable over­
eagerness of his prototype in Cinthio's novella, which formed the 
basis of Whetstone's play and was probably k n o w n to Shakespeare. 
Cinthio's young governor, appointed to administer Innsbruck, was 
"more pleased with the office to which the Emperor called him than 
sound in the knowledge of his o w n nature." 6 Angelo, by contrast, 
accepts his responsibility with apparent humility and even diffidence: 
"Let there be some more test m a d e of m y metal, / Before so noble 
and so great afigure / B e stamp'd upon it" (I.i.49-51). 
In the slow, gradual disclosure of Angelo's nature, Shakespeare 
adopted a strategy quite contrary to his usual dramatic practice of 
firmly establishing the outlines of his major characters early, often 
immediately. Angelo's heart of darkness, like that of Kurtz in C o n  ­
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rad's famous story, is, atfirst, no more than hinted at. There is an 
irony, hardly suspected by the subtlest of first-time readers of the 
play, in the duke's seeming commendation: "Angelo, / There is a 
kind of character in thy life / That to th' observer doth thy history / 
Fully unfold" (I.i.28-30). T h  e duke, w h  o has observed this history, 
does not disclose it until he tells, in the third act, the story of Angelo's 
perfidy to Mariana; but questions about the true nature of Angelo 
begin in the second scene, as Claudio wonders what the reasons for 
his judicial severity m a y be: whether it be the "fault and glimpse of 
newness," or whether Angelo intends to let people k n o w that he can 
c o m m a n d by making them "straight feel the spur" (Lii.150 ff.). 
In the following scene, the duke reveals that he expects severity 
from Angelo, "a m a  n of stricture and firm abstinence" (I.iii.12), and 
has purposely installed him as deputy to bring about a change from 
his o w  n lax administration of the laws. D u k  e Vincentio, on this 
occasion, calls Angelo "precise"—the regular term for Puritan—and 
a m a  n that "scarce confesses / That his blood flows" (51-52). Lucio, 
in the next scene, joins in by calling Angelo 
a m a  n whose blood 
Is very snow-broth, one w h  o never feels 
The wanton stings and motions of the sense, 
But doth rebate and blunt his natural edge 
With profits of the mind, study and fast. 
(I.iv. 57-61) 
T h e general impression created by the Angelo of thefirst act is that 
of a virtuous, extremely disciplined m a  n w h  o is convinced that 
h u m a  n nature can be controlled and that the affections can, Stoic 
fashion, be mastered by might. H  e is not the stage Puritan of the 
Elizabethans, murmuring pious phrases while pursuing a lustful or 
avaricious course of action. However , he does have some of the 
symptoms of the more dangerous, more inhuman elements of the 
Puritan syndrome, elements that, ignited, can lead to a dangerous 
explosion. 
Angelo's legal absolutism arises from his conviction that his own 
mind is superior to that of others and can easily control his course 
of action. H  e has the kind of intellectual pride censured by M o n  ­
taigne and the skepticalfideists. H  e thus rejects the argument of 
the older and wiser Escalus that mercy be applied to Claudio because 
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of man's general vulnerability to temptation: " 'Tis one thing to be 
tempted, Escalus, / Another thing to fall" (ILi. 17-18) . T h e cool 
and studious Angelo does not convey the impression of ever having 
been really tempted; he never understood, as he later says, w h  y m e  n 
could be so foolish as to fall through passion. Angelo can therefore 
feel quite safe when, with dramatic irony, he declares himself willing 
to die should he ever commit the same fault as Claudio. 
A  n audience trained to listen for dramatic ironies, as the Jacobeans 
must have been, m a  y have sensed a significance on this occasion in 
Escalus's request that Angelo ask himself whether he would not 
have erred like Claudio at some time if circumstances had been 
similar. Th  e irony of the hint becomes clear in Isabella's later plead­
ing that Angelo imagine Claudio's fault his o w  n (II.ii.136ff.), for 
by n o w Angelo has fallen prey to lust. But not until the third act is 
the past deed revealed that counts most against h i m : his desertion of 
Mariana. Outwardly, this action resembles Claudio's failure to marry 
Juliet. But Angelo's breach of promise was a real act of villainy 
whereas Claudio's was not: Angelo abandoned his betrothed, Claudio 
merely delayed marriage. O  n the other hand, Angelo could think 
himself legally justified; his contract with Mariana was evidently not 
the stronger de praesenti contract of Claudio and Juliet, but the 
weaker de futuro agreement, thought binding only w h e n consum­
mated, as is done later in the play.7 Despicable as his abandonment 
of Mariana was when she lost her dowry, he can reason that the 
conditions on which his promise was based have changed, and he 
can rationalize his villainy into an act of prudence. This exactly is 
his later defense (V.i.218). That he cast aspersions on her character 
when he deserted her makes him more odious, but does not seem to 
have dimmed his specious self-image as a m a  n of virtue and temper­
ance. 
The image is shattered w h e n he cannot resist his lust for Isabella. 
His two soliloquies, one immediately following hisfirst conversation 
with her, the other preceding the second and decisive interview, show 
the change in his soul. Passion conquers the reason of which he 
prided himself, and he realizes n o  w that the self-knowledge he 
imagined he possessed was merely self-delusion. H  e no longer knows 
himself: " W h a t dost thou, or what art thou, Angelo?" (II.ii.173). 
It is the most fundamental question that any of Shakespeare's charac­
ters asks himself, and none had yet asked it in so direct and explicit 
a manner before Measure for Measure. Antipholus of Syracuse in 
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The Comedy of Errors came close to it; but for him the question was 
merely one of wonderment about the identity the Ephesians thrust 
on him. Richard II had looked into the mirror of self-knowledge, but 
vanity prevented him from looking beyond his grief deeply into him­
self. Brutus had overlooked the impurity of the mirror Cassius had 
held up to him. Hamlet had mystified and complicated the inquiry 
into the self by skeptically asking w h o he was and what m a n is. 
Troilus had altogether evaded the look into himself when his disil­
lusionment through Cressida's betrayal gave him the opportunity. 
N o n  e of Shakespeare's tragic heroes had yet said simply, "what do 
I and what a  m I," as does Angelo. Lear was later to ask the question 
again. 
Not that Angelo's answer is altogether clear and honest. In his 
first soliloquy, in which he poses the question, he tries to wriggle out 
of it by calling his temptation the work of the devil. Arrogantly, he 
thinks of himself as a saint baited by another saint. A n  d there is a 
similar presumption in his second soliloquy when he regrets the loss 
of his gravity—the least of his losses—coyly remarking that he hopes 
nobody will hear him taking pride in his reputation for seriousness. 
Yet he cannot totally suppress the awareness that he, like others in 
high places, has lived with a lie: 
O place, O form, 
H o  w often dost thou with thy case, thy habit, 
Wrench awe from fools, and tie the wiser souls 
T  o thy false seeming! Blood, thou art blood. 
(II.iv.12-15) 
T h e n e w Angelo is a m a n whose thoughts and prayers are at cross 
purposes. W h e  n Isabella appears for the second time before him, he 
speaks to her no longer in the clear, absolute idiom he used earlier, 
but he tortures her and himself with sexual allusions and innuendos. 
His attempt to trap her into accepting the act of lust as one of mercy 
for her brother and Isabella's misunderstanding of his meaning pro­
duce moments of psychological subtlety and high comedy. 
A kind of incipient self-knowledge comes to Angelo through his 
self-loss, through the experience of "blood," that is, passion, in him­
self. Even though he n o w becomes worse, his evil is more accessible 
to cure. H  e is a conscious hypocrite rather than, as formerly, an un­
conscious one. Although he has fallen through passion, he has now 
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become capable of a cathartic h u m a  n emotion: lust is related to love, 
the greatest and most beneficial of man's feelings. There is some­
thing to the seemingly absurd argument with which Mariana in the 
end eagerly pleads for his life: "They say best m e n are moulded out 
of faults; / A n d , for the most, become m u c h more the better / For 
being a little bad" (V.i.437-39). T o use afigure from All's Well, 
the web of Angelo's life is a mingled yarn and his faults whip his 
virtues. His ideal image of himself as a saint, specious as it is, is yet 
of assistance in his change, giving him an ethical and religious aware­
ness of his fall and making his later penitence somewhat more 
plausible. 
Angelo's regeneration, however, is brought about in a most un­
usual manner: it hinges on his sexual fall, caused by his lust, and its 
medium is Mariana, w h o  m he believes to be Isabella. Thus Angelo's 
marriage is completed and Mariana's wrong righted. H  e is pardoned 
and forgiven. Incredible as the story is, Shakespeare makes it, in 
various ways, psychologically most intriguing, not least by sug­
gesting that there is a connection between Angelo's sexual knowl­
edge of Mariana and his acquisition of a greater knowledge of him­
self. Hints of a connection between these two kinds of knowledge 
are given. There is, at a critical m o m e n  t of the dialogue between 
Angelo and Isabella, a pun on the cognitive and sexual meaning of 
"knowing": 
ISAB. I a m come to know your pleasure. 
A N G  . That you might know it would much better please m  e 
Than to demand what 'tis. 
(II.iv.31-33) 
The pun is repeated during the denouement just before Mariana 
unveils herself: 
that is Angelo, 
W h  o thinks he knows that he ne'er knew m  y body, 
But knows he thinks that he knows Isabel's. 
(V.i.200-202) 
Before getting to k n o  w himself, Angelo has unknowingly k n o w  n 
(carnally, as Lucio says) the w o m a n to w h o m he was engaged on a 
pre-contract; his marriage is ratified. 
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In giving a role to carnal knowledge in developing self-knowledge, 
Measure for Measure resembles All's Well, where on two similar 
junctures there are puns on "knowing." Bertram harps on the word 
when he demonstrates his aversion to marrying the poor Helena 
(Il.iii.in ff.) and again when he accepts her if she proves to have 
been his partner: "If she, m y liege, can make m e know this clearly, / 
I'll love her dearly, ever, ever dearly" (V.iii.309-10). But the pas­
sage also m a  y be taken to imply that Bertram's love and, with it, his 
continued improvement depend on Helena's sexual power. If so, it 
raises the question whether a character change achieved by a fortu­
nate fall into a bed can be lasting. 
T h e idea that there was a connection between self-knowledge and 
sexual knowledge was playfully suggested by Ovid in The Art of 
Love (498-502). T h e Delphic Apollo here advises the lover that 
"only he w h o knows himself will love with wisdom and perform 
all his tasks according to his powers." 8 The idea was apt to be 
moralized in the Middle Ages and Christian-humanist Renaissance, 
but it was also understood in its true cynical meaning by the new 
Ovidian poets. Shakespeare used it in his Ovidian Venus and Adonis 
—and here already its significance is uncertain—by making Adonis 
reject the importunities of the amorous Venus: "Before I know m y  ­
self, seek not to k n o w m e " (525). In contrast to Adonis, Shake­
speare's problematic heroes, Bertram and Angelo, experience the 
knowledge of women—shall w  e say good or shall w  e say bad w o m e  n ? 
—before they discover whatever self-knowledge they gain. 
It is not merely our overexposure to psychoanalysis that makes 
us speculate on the psychological significance of the events that occur 
in the dark chambers of Marseilles and Vienna. B  y drawing attention 
to the cognitive aspects of the bed tricks, Shakespeare prevents us 
from accepting them in the w a y some scholars say w e should accept 
them, that is, merely as dramatized devices deriving from the 
romantic novella, in which they were used as a narrative convention. 
It has been pointed out that Elizabethan psychology allowed Shake­
speare's contemporaries to entertain more easily the idea that sexual 
consummation had a regenerative power because of the w a y they 
explained the act physiologically. In intercourse, they thought, men 
and w o m e  n exchanged their seeds and mingled them in a manner 
analogous to the w a  y Platonic lovers fused their souls on an ideal 
plane; the seeds, in turn, were believed to enter the bloodstream. 
Yet this explanation would not have given an Elizabethan audience 
the certainty that Helena's and Mariana's influence wins out because 
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the physiologists were at odds on the question whether a stronger 
w o m a  n could improve a weaker m a  n in this fashion.9 Moreover, 
there is the question whether Helena and Mariana really are morally 
superior; their consent to the bed trick makes this a debatable issue. 
The puzzling Helena does not really concern us here, and Mariana is 
so slightly sketched that she does not emerge clearly as an improving 
influence on Angelo. H e r idyllic life at "the moated grange" m a y 
suggest her romantic possibilities, and her ardent plea for Angelo's 
life m a  y prove her kindness (or is it her sexual interest in h i m ? )  . All 
this is very little. 
W  e therefore had better turn to the other and more carefully 
drawn w o m a n , w h o is an important agent in the accomplishment of 
the bed trick and in the pardon of Angelo. Isabella is more properly 
Helena's counterpart in Measure for Measure. A  t least she does not 
suffer from Helena's handicap of directly practicing the deceitful 
substitution (a handicap that Helena well realizes). But although 
Isabella is saved from having to submit herself sexually and from 
other strenuous business that requires Helena to exert herself, she 
is a problematic heroine. Like Angelo and because of him, she is 
subjected to an intricate test of her character, first by his lust for her 
and later by the problem of h o  w his transgression should be judged. 
Shakespeare complicated her test by making her a novice of the 
convent of Saint Clare. For the heroine of Whetstone's play, there is 
no problem of which is dearer to her, her chastity or her brother. 
She opts for her brother, which presumably Shakespeare's contem­
poraries thought was the right choice for her. Isabella, however, is 
at the threshold of the convent; she is about to dedicate soul and 
body to G o d and thus is in a dilemma for which there is no easy 
answer; hers is a case of extreme moral delicacy. O n  e can have 
different opinions about what she should do. T h e critics w h o lay 
aside this vexed question and concern themselves not with the 
Tightness or wrongness of her decision but with the w a  y it is given 
appear to have a more promising approach to her character. It is 
notable that she never hesitates for a m o m e n  t and that she rises to 
the challenge almost with gaiety: 
Then, Isabel, live chaste, and, brother, die: 
More than our brother is our chastity. 
I'll tell him yet of Angelo's request, 
A n  dfit his mind to death, for his soul's rest. 
(II.iv.184-87) 
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She is, as has been said, of the stuff of which martyrs are m a d e ; but 
it should m a k e a difference to her that the martyrdom she accepts is 
not her o w  n but her brother's. T h  e test of her faith does not involve 
her soul only but also that of the h u m a  n being closest to her. 
H e  r reaction agrees with the impression she creates from the 
beginning. H e  rfirst eager question about the rules of the order of the 
convent of Saint Clare is motivated by her wish to live a life of even 
"more strict restraint" than prescribed by the austere order.10 She 
parallels Angelo's ascetic temperament, and she has something of 
his bent for legal and ethical absolutism, for dividing the world into 
white and black. T h e two absolutists consequently react to each 
other like flint and stone, but the flame they produce is divided into 
a holy and a profane one. 
Isabella's stony purity makes her a strong but rather cold pleader 
for her brother's life. She has really no quarrel with the anti-fornica­
tion law—she and Angelo are the only characters that think it 
entirely just—and she admits from the beginning that in pleading for 
Claudio she is "at war 'twixt will and will not" (II.ii.33). T h e allu­
sion to Paul's account of the struggle offlesh and spirit indicates that 
she believes that the caritas that makes her plead has an element of 
carnality. H e  r inability to see the issue as one between law and 
justice leads her to highly abstract arguments on the magistrate's 
duty to be merciful—a concept as theoretical as is Angelo's of justice. 
But the religious intensity with which she demands that the mercy 
of m a  n be brought in line with the forgiveness of G o  d has been 
thought aesthetically pleasing; she burns, to use Walter Pater's 
famous phrase, with a hard, gemlike flame. 
Pater, whose portrait of her forms a refreshing contrast to such 
Victorian sentimental gush as M r s  . Jameson's, admired her fiery 
eloquence that occasionally lights up in swift, vindictive anger. A 
famous example is w h e n she turns her eyes upward toward heaven, 
pleading with Angelo not to judge more severely than G o d : 
Merciful Heaven, 
Thou rather, with thy sharp and sulphurous bolt, 
Splits the unwedgeable and gnarled oak 
Than the soft myrtle. But m a n , proud m a n , 
Dress'd in a little brief authority, 
Most ignorant of what he's most assur'd, 
His glassy essence, like an angry ape, 
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Plays such fantastic tricks before high heaven 
A s makes the angels weep; who, with our spleens, 
Would all themselves laugh mortal. 
(ILii.114-23) 
Isabella's speech is occasioned by Angelo's immediately preceding 
metaphor of the law as a newly awakened prophet, w h o looks into a 
mirror to see what future evils must have their instantaneous end be­
fore they come to life—an ironic figure in view of Angelo's im­
minent temptation. Isabella holds up a mirror of her o w n to Angelo 
and to judging m a  n in general. Like Angelo's earlier soliloquy, her 
speech is fraught with nosce teipsum implications of the kind Shake­
speare developed in Lear. T h  e diminution Isabella discerns in the 
image of m a  n whe  n seen from a divine perspective resembles Lear's 
vision of the world as a great stage of fools. She contrasts the brief 
robe of authority m a  n proudly wears with his ignorance of himself— 
the "glassy essence" of which he feels assured but which he fails to 
understand as his fragile soul.11 
The image, however, has some implications for Isabella's o w n 
soul. The law is not alone in being angry—in fact, its earthly repre­
sentative is, at present, in the throes of a different passion; Isabella 
also speaks in anger or, as she presumes, in a divine indignation. 
The mirror had a general symbolic value for the angry and a special 
one for simians, particularly female ones, and both are most ap­
propriate for Isabella. In his essay " O f Anger" (II.xxxvi.1-3), 
Seneca took note of the suggestion that it was good for people to 
look at themselves while angry; but he refuted the idea for various 
reasons: the mirror does not reveal the whole m a n  , the m a  n w h  o goes 
to the mirror generally is already a changed m a n  , and sometimes 
angry people even like their fiery image. There can be little doubt 
that the spirited Isabella likes hers; she holds up the veritas mirror 
(with its particular implication for magistrates) to Angelo, but 
ironically she does not realize that she looks into the ira-vanitas 
mirror herself. 
W  e m a y use an early seventeenth-century emblem to illustrate 
the simian symbol used by Isabella as it applies to her. T h e emblem 
is a few years too late to have influenced Shakespeare, but it is based 
on a tradition with which Shakespeare must have been familiar, per­
haps as early as g r a m m a r school. T h e emblem pictures an ugly ape— 
female, as the context implies—looking into a mirror. T h  e picture 
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banner explains that all are pleased with their o w  n shape—an allu­
sion to Ovid's Art of Love (I.614), where it is stated that every 
w o m a n thinks herself lovable no matter h o w ugly her appearance. A s 
the emblem motto explains, even the ugliest thinks of herself as a 
goddess.12 T h  e accompanying explanation refers to such classical 
illustrations as the mirror of self-love in Virgil's Eclogues II.25, 
where the infatuated Corydon asks the offish Alexis, whose love he 
wishes to gain, to be the "judge" in confirming the beauty of his 
self-image in the sea. This passage was one of those which the 
humanists thought demonstrated h o w wisdom was often dissociated 
from love. T h e prime Ovidian passage for this purpose was the 
story of Polyphemus in Metamorphoses XIII; here Polyphemus 
fancies that he "knows himself" (novi me, 840) when he admires 
his hairy image in a clear pool. Polyphemus also boasts on this 
occasion of being bigger than the thunderer Jove (as does Isabella's 
m a  n of authority). It is possible that, in expounding these passages, 
Shakespeare's schoolmaster would have mad  e the point, as does the 
motto of the emblem, that an inward ugliness is more deplorable 
than an outward one and offends God . S o m e words on self-knowl­
edge and on self-love would then have been also natural. But it does 
not matter h o  w Shakespeare acquired the associations of the vanitas 
mirror; this was familiar material and he used it with masterful 
allusiveness to create a superbly ironic image of Isabella. 
T h e angels surely weep about the assurance with which Isabella, 
god-like, holds up the mirror to judging m a n  . If she looked into her­
self, she would see that she too judges, and that she does so with 
angry severity. H e  r sympathy with the brittle, glassy nature of m a  n 
is limited. This point is also suggested, and again by ironic mirror 
imagery, in her second interview with Angelo. She finds w o m e n as 
frail "as the glasses where they view themselves, / Which are as 
easy broke as they m a k e forms" (II.iv.125-26). She exempts herself, 
and, indeed, her frailty does not have the softness of the feminine 
complexion. But it does have a touch of that intellectual pride which 
stains Angelo, a pride that was the main reason for the skeptics to 
characterize m a  n as a stupid and histrionic animal. 
Strangely, she does subsequently bend in some fashion by lending 
herself (and, more directly, Mariana) to the duke's plan of "the 
substitute bride." He  r legalism—after all, the trick does constitute a 
"marriage"—her subjection to religious authority, and a curious 
conception of charity all appear to play a role in her enthusiasm for 
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the questionable device. That the "image" of it pleases her is comical. 
The duke's rejoinder to her that this image "lies m u c h in your hold­
ing up" (III.i.252) m a y indicate that w e are to look upon this 
episode as merely preparatory for her later character development. 
There is certainly no bending here of the kind needed for self-knowl­
edge. 
It is the task of the duke, one of his several tasks, to bring about 
that change. Vincentio is himself a puzzling character, as changeable 
in his actions and psychological explanations as he is in his clothes. 
The play begins as his governmental experiment, an experiment, it 
appears, in which he will take no further hand. Yet from the third act 
on, his direction of events in the guise of a friar is powerful to a 
degree that he becomes something like the author of the play, the 
writer of its script, the director of the actors, and the main dramatis 
persona. T h e play proves to be what it did not appear atfirst, an 
intricate, controlled experiment, planned and supervised by the duke, 
or, more precisely, by Shakespeare through the duke. 
In this respect, Measure for Measure resembles The Tempest. 
Duke Vincentio and Prospero are the two Shakespearean characters 
in w h o  m even critics generally opposed to the biographical heresy 
have seen some measure of identification between the poet and his 
creature.13 But Prospero's purpose is m a d  e m u c  h clearer, and his 
resources are supernatural and incontestible. D u k  e Vincentio's plan 
is, by contrast, never stated, and its execution depends on his 
ethically questionable disguise as a friar, which gives him a peculiarly 
intimate acquaintance with the thoughts and feelings of Claudio, 
Isabella, and Mariana. H  e uses his power as a spiritual adviser to 
keep Claudio in agony about his imminent execution, to arrange with 
Isabella and Mariana the dubious bed trick, and to lead Isabella to 
believe that her brother has been executed when , in fact, he is still 
alive. His secretiveness and indirection m a k e Lucio's slur of him as 
"the old fantastical D u k  e of dark corners" (IV.iii.154) not totally 
inappropriate. O  n the other hand, his benevolent vigilance also gives 
credence to Angelo's later observation that the duke watched over 
him "like pow'r divine" (V.i.367). 
The duke is, it appears to m e  , the key figure in a strategy of in­
direct presentation and ironic revelation; it is a strategy for which 
mannerism is noted. T h e method is not unlike that of sonnet 94. 
Just as here the poet, by intimation and irony, slowly reveals the 
true nature of the unmoved movers, so the duke only gradually al­
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lows us a look into his mind and heart. At first, it appears as if he 
had arranged a simple governmental experiment by putting in his 
place a m a  n supposedly stronger than himself, a m a  n w h  o had in­
herited all of heaven's graces. N o danger for him of becoming lax 
as has been the case with Vincentio! But then, the duke discloses that 
his deputy is a m a n whose self-control is dangerously taut, and the 
question arises what, if power change purpose, will our seemers be. 
Even as an answer comes to this question in Angelo's fall through 
passion, and he is exposed as a m a  n that does not do the thing he 
most shows, the duke discloses that his experiment had another 
aspect or even a different direction: it is n o  w to reveal that Angelo 
is a lily that smells far worse than a weed. 
T h  e political side of the experiment turns on a problem that 
Jean Bodin, theorist of absolutism, discussed in The Six Books of a 
Commonweal, which was translated in 1606, a few years after 
Shakespeare wrote Measure for Measure (1604?). In one of his 
chapters (IV.ii), Bodin dealt with the question "Whether it be 
convenient or expedient for the majesty of a sovereign prince to 
judge his subjects himself or be m u c  h conversant with them," and he 
came to the conclusion that, by and large, it was not convenient or 
expedient. Of course, in Measure {or Measure, the question is be­
devilled and m a d  e morally ambiguous by the fact that the duke's 
deputy is a dangerous character, a fact that m a  y in part account for 
the surreptitious supervision and control Vincentio adopts. But even 
with a morally pure deputy, the experiment would smack of Machia­
vellism. A  s the duke explains, he sees in Angelo a convenient instru­
ment to enforce laws that through his o w n fault have fallen into dis­
use. Angelo m a y "in th' ambush of m  y name, strike home, / A n d yet 
m  y nature never in the fight/To do in slander" (I.iii.41-43). 
Angelo thus becomes the duke's administrative tool—the figure of 
the ambush makes the idea particularly unpleasant—to enforce laws 
and let the duke escape the blame for them. This was exactly the 
method Gentillet's Contre-Machiavel, which was translated in 1602 
—not long before the play was written—accused Machiavelli of ad­
vocating as a m a x i m : " A Prince ought to commit to another those 
affairs which are subject to hatred and envy and reserve to himself 
such as depend upon his grace and favor." 14 Jean Bodin, however, 
thought it entirely proper for the prince to reserve for himself the 
rewards, honors, graces, and favors and to leave to others the 
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"condemnations, fines, confiscations, and other punishments" so 
as to acquire and maintain the love of his subjects.15 
Vincentio is an exemplar of the theory and practice of political 
absolutism. In that surely lies the explanation for the resemblance 
he has to King James and for the parallels, mostly commonplaces, of 
some of his words and actions to passages in this monarch's Basili­
con Doron.16A direct identification was hardly intended; that James 
would have considered it a compliment is doubtful. T h  e similarities 
they have, such as their reluctance to show themselves to the people, 
can be most easily explained by their aura as absolute rulers. T h  e 
wise prince, according to Bodin, "must but seldom times come into 
the sight of his subjects." 17 T h e rhymed tetrameters in which Vin­
centio explains his governmental theory (III.ii.243 ff.) state in quite 
general terms the requirements and functions of the absolute prince, 
w h o must be as holy as he is severe and distribute justice by weigh­
ing "self-offences." H  e is a ruler w h  o has to apply craft against vice 
because he has to deal with m e n like Angelo, angels on the outer 
side w h  o hide the darkness within. 
The theory of absolutism was posited on the skeptics' view of 
m a  n as an unstable, inconstant, and deceptive creature w h  o needed 
to be ruled by a prince w h  o radiated an ideal self but actually adapted 
himself in some fashion to his environment. Vincentio's Vienna is 
not the organic medieval-Renaissance state of the England in Henry 
V, but resembles the kind of late Renaissance state Charron saw as 
the norm, "wholly composed of lies, colored, counterfeit, and danger­
ous." In this state, it is required "of the sovereign, distrust, and 
that he keep himself close, yet so as he be still vertuous and just." 
A ruler of this kind, Charron says, expanding Machiavelli's serpent-
fox metaphor, must in turns be a lion, a fox, a serpent, and a dove.18 
There is a strain on the moral and psychic powers of a ruler w h o , 
like Vincentio, must frustrate a design of lust, save a condemned 
man , arrange a substitution of bedmates, and bring about conver­
sions. There is also a strain on the credibility of a plot that allows 
all these manipulations to be successful. In thefifth act, this strain is 
almost unbearable w h e  n the duke turns from fox to dove and, inter­
mittently, threatens to become a lion. A n  d these protean changes 
seem a great deal of effort for exposing and improving Angelo, the 
main business of the act. 
The climactic issue, the repentance of Angelo, is, however, m u c h 
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better treated than the corresponding situation in All's Well. The 
final turn-about is prepared in the fourth act by Angelo's realization 
that he has fallen from grace (IV.iv.17 ff.). In the final scene, 
Angelo once more shows his hypocrisy and his unfitness as a judge 
w h e n he allows himself to be put in judgment of Mariana and Isa­
bella; also Vincentio proves his potential severity when he reveals 
himself in all his majesty. N o  w Angelo faces his transgression with­
out blanching. In agreement with the judgment he ironically found 
just for a crime such as his, he begs immediate death. H  e does not 
support the pleading of Mariana and Isabella for his pardon. But, 
most important, he feels sorry, humanly sorry, for the grief he has 
inflicted: 
I a  m sorry that such sorrow I procure; 
A n  d so deep sticks it in m  y penitent heart 
That I crave death more willingly than mercy; 
'Tis m  y deserving, and I do entreat it. 
(V.i.472-75) 
Isabella too is being tested and, I think, found improved. She has 
m u c h reason to hate Angelo, and not only because of his lust for her; 
the duke has m a d e her believe that Claudio is dead—the explanation 
he gives in soliloquy, that he will "make her heavenly comforts of 
despair," is characteristic of his strategy of indirection. W h e  n 
Angelo is exposed, w  e might expect Isabella, the ethical crusader, to 
burn once more in ferocious indignation. W  e are in dramatic sus­
pense as Mariana, imploring the duke for her husband's pardon, 
appeals for her help. Will she overcome her ethical absolutism and 
become truly merciful ? Will she plead for the m a  n she assumes to be 
her brother's murderer even though she must believe it to be the 
duke's wish to m a k  e Angelo pay for Claudio, death for death ? Mari­
ana has to ask her twice; but then Isabella complies, kneeling down 
next to her, and pleads with the duke: 
Look, if it please you, on this m a n condemn'd, 
A  s if m  y brother liv'd. I partly think 
A due sincerity govern'd his deeds 
Till he did look on m e  ; since it is so, 
Let him not die. M  y brother had but justice, 
In that he did the thing for which he died; 
For Angelo, 
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His act did not o'ertake his bad intent, 
A n  d must be buried but as an intent 
That perish'd by the way. Thoughts are no subjects; 
Intents but merely thoughts. 
(V.i.442-52) 
For Isabella, the great debater, this is an almost unbelievably bad 
speech, "a string of palpable sophistry," as Quiller-Couch called it.19 
Since it is bad logic, one can argue, of course, that it is an insufficient 
guide for h u m a  n conduct (but, from a skeptic-fideistic point of view, 
all logic was exactly that). T h e very conspicuousness of her bad 
logic suggests that she is highly emotional in a n e w w a y . She has lost 
—permanently, one hopes—her old absolutism of standards; before 
now, she certainly never thought of anything partly. In granting 
Angelo sincerity, she is, of course, partly right. T h  e contrast she 
makes between her brother and Angelo, however, is quite dubious. 
W h e  n she says that her brother had but justice, she sounds like the 
old absolute Isabella, but she does not set Angelo in any logical rela­
tionship to this statement; the metrically defective line "For Angelo" 
points to confused and conflicting ideas and emotions as she looks 
into herself. T h e excuse she makes for Angelo, that he did not actu­
ally execute his crimes (through no fault of his o w n !  ) is legalistic 
enough, but it runs counter to Christian ethics in which intention 
counts as m u c  h as execution. A reason for her forgiveness is needed, 
and she supplies it, a bad reason for a good act. W h a  t one remembers 
better than these half-truths—and what an audience cannot miss— 
is the cry of her heart: "Let him not die." It is a salutary change 
from the callous sentence she had earlier for her brother: " 'Tis 
best thou diest quickly." Thus , her last speech is bad logic with a 
note of true compassion. T  o the duke's marriage proposal she says 
nothing, and that is better than a shout of joy. A n  d Shakespeare 
hardly intended her to express her pleasure pantomimically as I have 
seen an actress do. 
Yet the actresses' and the critics' difficulties with the role suggest 
that one should be somewhat tentative about all interpretations of 
her character. I do not think that this is because the workmanship of 
the scene is defective, but because the reverse is true. T o  o m u c  h 
certainty would be the wrong ending for a play that deals with such 
ambiguous situations and such complex and opaque characters. Isa­
bella's is not the only notable silence in the end; w  e get no explana­
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tions of their feelings from Angelo—except for the "quickening" in 
his eye—and from Mariana. T h  e pardoned Claudio never speaks a 
word. All have been through distressing situations; Claudio, of 
course, has suffered most. These are silences of uncertainty and, one 
hopes, of self-knowledge. 
T h  e duke's marriage proposal to Isabella is the second great sur­
prise of the scene after the almost offhanded pardon of Angelo by the 
duke. ( W  e shall pass by such minor surprises as the survival and 
pardon of Barnardine.) For Isabella, the proposal is a reward— 
unless w  e think she should have stayed in a nunnery. W  e m a  y take 
it tentatively as an outward sign of her moral improvement and 
softened sensibility. 
But the more important implications of the proposal m a y be those 
that concern the duke's character rather than Isabella's and the out­
come of his experiment rather than her improvement. T h e duke's 
decision to marry is certainly unexpected. O n e of thefirst statements 
he makes in the play, in a bantering conversation with a friar, indi­
cates h o  w far from his thoughts is the search for a wife; he rejects 
the idea that "the dribbling dart of love / Can pierce a complete 
bosom" such as his (Liii.1-3), and he explains that he has other 
reasons for desiring seclusion. His preference for the life removed— 
in Shakespeare, generally a danger for a ruler—points not only to a 
realization that emotions are dangerous—that was good Renaissance 
doctrine—but also to a fear of using emotions for beneficial purposes. 
His reluctance to stage himself to the eyes of his people, good abso­
lutist theory as it m a  y be, yet m a  y also be taken to corroborate his 
distrust of all emotional commitments.20 Vincentio, not unlike 
Angelo, has turned this deficiency into a self-acknowledged virtue 
by taking pride in his self-control; both suffer from a Puritanical 
suppression accompanied by the compensatory intellectual com­
plaisance against which the skeptics warned. There is a slight comical 
touch in the duke's wounded pride at hearing himself slandered as a 
lecher by Lucio. H  e promptly seeks reassurance from Escalus that 
his self-image as a m a  n of all temperance is true; and that old and 
benevolent counselor characterizes him as "one that, above all other 
strifes, contended especially to k n o  w himself" (III.ii.218). 
T h  e duke's marriage proposal, then, looks like an admission that 
self-knowledge requires him to become more h u m a n , just as Isabella 
has become more so. T h e embrace of a w o m a n n o w seems more 
important to him than a certificate of temperance, just as an orgasm 
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has proved more important for Angelo than his reputation of probity. 
W h e  n Vincentio marries Isabella, it is in the realization of an unful­
filled need. There is, I think, an indication of this in his words as he 
unmasks Claudio and proposes to Isabella: 
If he be like your brother, for his sake 
Is he pardon'd; and for your lovely sake, 
Give m  e your hand and say you will be mine, 
H  e is m  y brother too. 
(V.i.489-90) 
Ironically, self-recovery, for D u k e Vincentio just as for Angelo 
(and, for that matter, for Isabella), consists in becoming more like 
Claudio, the one character w h  o has succumbed to a h u m a  n impulse 
and, for that reason, has faced death. Thus , by marrying, Vincentio 
adds another stipulation to the conventional and stiff desiderata he 
had established for the ruler: he will not be only "holy and severe" 
and weigh others by "self-offences," but he will also put aside the 
subtle pride in his armor against h u m a n affections. W h a t he calls the 
"pattern in himself to k n o w  " will include a recognition that it is 
through their nobler emotions that m e n become brothers. 
In recognizing the significance of h u m a  n brotherhood, the ending 
of Measure for Measure has a faint resemblance to that of The 
Comedy of Errors. But there is also a marked difference, symbolized 
by the w a y one must visualize the processional exits. N  o longer is 
there a graded order, determined by a design inherent in the world, 
according to which Antipholuses and Dromios march out hand in 
hand. Th  e absolute ruler n o  w determines to w h o  m he extends his 
hand. M u c  h is left to his arbitrary reordering; and, of the future 
disposition of such matters as marriages, m u c h is left to heaven. But 
one need not be cynical with Lord Byron. T h e ending does affirm 
the importance of h u m a  n values and of building units, even though it 
does affirm both significances in a somewhat tentative way . But there 
is no longer the intense questioning and debilitating uncertainty that 
there is in Hamlet and Troilus and Cressida. Theoretical humanism 
is shown to be subject to revision, but practical humanism is affirmed. 
However, w e had better look at what the ending does to the 
disposition of the major issues of the play. T h e apparent outcome of 
Duke Vincentio's experiment is certainly unexpected and ironic. T h e 
quest for self-knowledge has led him to measure his performance in 
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the administration of the law; perhaps his psychological interest or 
perhaps his awareness of the advantages of the choice of Angelo for 
his o w n reputation as a merciful ruler has led him to select a flawed 
m a  n as his deputy and as a med iu  m for his self-comparison. H  e has 
sought answers to the questions on the right w a  y to govern, on the 
h u m a  n qualities needed for the ruler, and on the proportionate rela­
tionship of justice and mercy. All this is an oblique and complicated 
w a  y to search for the self—not quite as obviously wrongheaded as 
the quest of the knights of Navarre in Love's Labor's Lost, but more 
subconsciously weighted in favor of a successflattering to the ego, 
m u c  h like the experiments w  e generally undertake with ourselves in 
real life, subtly biased and with a hoped-for answer predicated. But 
it turns out—again in a subtle w a  y that is only half-acknowledged by 
the duke—that he shares in some measure the deficiency of his 
experimental medium. H  e rectifies the problem by wholesale pardons 
and by a marriage proposal. W h a  t these actions imply for the nature 
and result of the governmental experiment is uncertain, and if one 
wishes to give a tentative answer, he must infer what he can from a 
few hints and from the general quality of the ending. That the play's 
title is ironic would be obvious even if the irony were not driven 
h o m e by the duke w h e n he threatens to punish Angelo: "Like doth 
quit like, and Measure still for Measure." But in what this irony, 
followed as it is by Angelo's repentance and pardon, consists, is not 
so certain. W  e can say that retributive justice, as the duke realizes 
and—it appears by his previous laxity and his selection of the strict 
Angelo—has always realized, is no preventive to sin and crime. But 
it does not appear that he thinks or that w  e ought to think that the 
solution is to give up judging altogether and to just forgive. If this 
were true, there would have been no reason for Vincentio to test 
himself by instituting the experiment. A n d  , by pardoning Angelo, 
the duke does m a k e a judgment based on the predication that 
Angelo's repentance augurs a permanent reformation. O n  e can, of 
course, say that the play proves that m a  n must judge not by giving 
measure for measure but by judging with measure and thus proves 
the need for the via media.21 But if so, it is strange that the ending 
puts more emphasis on mercy than on the moderation of punishment. 
O n  e might even say that the play proves the difficulty offindinga 
via media, desirable as it would be to determine where it is. Nobody 
really seems to represent it. Escalus, wise m a  n and old judge, is 
probably too easygoing. T h  e duke, by his o w  n confession, has 
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veered too far toward lenity in the past and m a  y just possibly have 
made the same mistake again by pardoning Angelo and Barnardine. 
In demonstrating the difficulty of judging according to a just m e a  ­
sure, Shakespeare agreed with Bodin that it is "a most hard thing 
for a sovereign prince fitting himself in judgment to keep a mean 
between too m u c h lenity and severity." 22 But Bodin thought such 
judgment possible, if difficult. Shakespeare appears to say that situa­
tions arise in which it is better to forget about judging and try to 
take up life as if it had a ne  w beginning. It m a  y even have occurred 
to Shakespeare, as it did not to Bodin, that absolutism, as the duke 
must practice it, does not really permit a true via media. 
The play's last dialogue, that between the duke and Lucio, throws 
an ironic sidelight on the ethical and legal judgments debated and 
made in the last scene. Lucio is the only character w h  o is not released 
into at least conditional happiness and the only one that is dissatisfied 
with the w a y measure has been meted out. For a m o m e n t it seems 
even as if the old reprobate, for w h o m w e have acquired some liking 
because he has mad  e us laugh, were to be punished severely by being 
forced to marry and by being whipped and hanged. T h  e duke is 
spoofing, and he promptly remits Lucio's punishments except for the 
marriage. But, for Angelo and Claudio marriage is mercy; for Lucio 
it is not. A s he says, establishing his o w n scale of what measure for 
measure means: "Marrying a punk, m  y lord, is pressing to death, 
whipping, and hanging" (V.i.520-21). Considering what w e k n o w 
of the lady in question—her name, Kate Keepdown, is symptomatic 
—he m a  y be said to have a point if he feels punished rather than 
forgiven. N o  r can his sentence be said to be correspondent to the 
nature of his crime: he is married to Kate not for fathering her 
child but for calumniating the duke. W h e  n the latter claims that 
slandering a prince deserves being punished by marriage to a punk, 
we might well wonder a little at the incongruity between punish­
ment and crime. A n  d as w  e compare Lucio's situation with that of 
the others, w  e experience a feeling for the relativity of all judg­
ments: the same measure that offers the hope of a better life for 
Angelo, Claudio, and the duke threatens a dismal one for Lucio. 
Thus, in a peculiar way, Lucio lives up to the symbolism inherent 
in his n a m e : he brings some light to the play by showing in his o w n 
way how bewildering the h u m a n situation is. But if w e sympathize 
with Lucio in his perplexing predicament, w e do so only for a 
moment; then w e laugh, and it seems all a little less painful. O f the 
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rotten commentators that help to make the worlds of the problem 
comedies more rotten, he is the least noxious and most amiable and 
humorous. Thus Lucio's name is appropriate in still another sense: 
he adds a touch of badly needed lightness to the play and particularly 
to the ending, which otherwise is rather solemn. 
Lucio's treatment is an amusing example of the oblique and in­
direct w a  y in which Shakespeare presented the major theme of 
Measure for Measure: the dilemma of m a n w h o judges and w h o is 
being judged. T h e play shows up the difficulty of gaining and pre­
serving self-knowledge in either role. T h e major characters, like men 
in general, are sometimes in the stand of the accused and sometimes 
on the bench of the judge; they are most severely tested when they 
are in judgment of themselves. Th  e play does tell us that m a  n must 
judge and, most of all, must judge himself, although such verdicts 
are difficult and m a  y bring uncertain and unexpected results. In 
judging himself, as in all other judgments, m a  n m a  y err in quantity 
or quality, fall below what is needed or exceed it. 
Does the play, then, say anything at all about the connection be­
tween self-knowledge and the judgment of others? I think it does in 
some fashion. It indicates that the law is apt to be administered 
poorly by those w h  o have not looked into themselves and that there 
is at least hope of justice—and, even more, of mercy—from the 
hands of those w h  o have looked into themselves and become more 
h u m a n  . A n d  , indeed, were one to be judged by an Angelo, would it 
not be better to be judged by him after, rather than before, he has 
repented ? 
PART FOUR

Achievement and Synthesis


CHAPTER THIRTEEN 
Will and Passion:

Heightening the Self

TH E R E IS G O O D EVIDENCE that Shakespeare wrote Measure for Measure and Othello in the same year, 1604, and the two plays do indeed have some similarities in their 
patterns of self-knowledge. In both, man's lack of self-knowledge is 
one of the central issues. Angelo creates the illusion that he is a m a n 
of rectitude and attempts to live with it; Othello accepts the absolute 
lie that Desdemona is unfaithful that is pressed upon him by Iago. 
Both heroes change from m e  n of signal self-control into slaves of 
passion. Yet these similarities are slight in comparison to the differ­
ences. In Othello, the indirect strategy of psychological development 
we noted in Measure for Measure has given w a y to a direct one; 
the M o o  r is a fascinating but not a puzzling character, and the 
play is one of the most simple, lucid, and direct of Shakespeare's. 
This is not merely due to a difference of genre, a shift from comedy 
or tragicomedy to tragedy, for even if Hamlet, which anticipates 
Othello by only two or three years, becomes the m e d i u m of c o m ­
parison, the contrast remains. T h  e dramatic hesitations and per­
plexities Shakespeare built into the plays of his mannerist period 
have given w a y in Othello to an energetic artistic affirmation, one 
that persists in the great tragedies and romances that were to follow. 
Not that Shakespeare returned to the simpler patterns of his 
earlier, "Renaissance" period. T h e moral field of action of Shake­
speare's later tragic and romantic heroes is wider than that of the 
earlier ones, and they m o v e more dynamically in it. Ethically, 
Othello is, in the beginning, somewhere near the angelic Desdemona, 
but he turns from good to evil under the influence of the diabolic 
persuasion of Iago. In Lear, good and evil characters are even more 
strongly contrasted. T h e old king is somewhere in the middle ground 
between them; in his terrifying outbreak, however, he surrenders 
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himself to evil, and it takes a tremendous expiatory suffering for 
him to realize the falsity of those he believed good and the good­
ness of those he believed evil. Macbeth opts from the beginning for 
the evil world symbolized by the witches (and I shall argue that 
he does not do so by w a y of a basic change in character) ; but his 
soul is so strongly and progressively subjected to evil as to undergo 
also a dynamic movement. 
If the heroes of Shakespeare's later tragedies have a dynamic 
ethical development, w  e cannot be in doubt about its direction, and 
w  e can be sure about their orientation at any point of the action. In 
the plays of Shakespeare's mannerist period, the question of w h  o and 
what is good is often posed but generally not definitely answered; 
n o w it does not even arise because the moral positions are more 
certain from the beginning. W  e debate h o w to place Hamlet, Troilus, 
and Angelo morally, but w  e k n o  w that Iago is evil and that Othello, 
good at the beginning, becomes evil, and w e k n o w just when this 
transformation occurs. A n d w e have no questions about Desdemona's 
moral fiber, whereas w  e are puzzled about Ophelia, Gertrude, and 
Isabella. This ethical placement is a major reason for our feeling 
that Shakespeare's plays from Othello on—experiments and partial 
failures like Timon of Athens, Pericles, and Cymbeline excluded— 
have greater clarity and unity. 
This unity is dynamic, comprising contrast and diversity and de­
riving primarily from the opposition and interplay of gigantic forces 
of good and evil, or will and passion. Othello here provides the best 
demonstration. Coleridge expressed the general feeling that this 
tragedy has a conspicuous dramatic unity w h e  n he said that in it 
everything assumes its due place and proportion and the mature 
powers of Shakespeare's mind are displayed in admirable equilib­
rium.1 This, however, is a different balance from the one achieved 
in some pre-Hamletian plays, as is evident from a comparison of 
Othello with Henry V, the model of a symmetrically balanced play 
in Shakespeare's Renaissance period. T h  e balance of Othello is dy­
namic; it derives not from a static view of an ideal hero but from 
the interaction of polar forces of evil and good, passion and patience, 
hate and love. T h  e play pairs and antithesizes the most cold-blooded 
of Shakespeare's villains with a strong and warm-hearted hero. It 
also contrasts this most evil of villains with the one a m o n  g Shake­
speare's heroines most actively intent on doing good. Once the stage 
is set, the force of evil attacks with purposive speed and awakens 
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in the seemingly self-assured Othello a dormant passion that tears 
him apart in a conflict of love and hate. Othello's passion explodes, 
most manifestly, in an epileptic fit and, most painfully, in the murder 
of the w o m a  n he deeply loves. Simultaneously, the force of evil, 
working through an Othello transformed into a slave of jealousy, 
turns Desdemona from a self-assured Venetian lady into a frightened 
and confused little girl w h o  , without understanding the reason, be­
comes her husband's victim. All the contrasting dynamic forces are 
integrated into a unified dramatic structure unequaled in Shake­
speare until The Tempest, the last of the romances. 
I shall show in greater detail in the next chapter that the fore­
going brief analysis of Othello describes accurately the essence of 
the play. I have given this account here because I believe it exposes 
a formula of dramatic construction that elucidates the patterns of 
self-knowledge in the plays I shall subsequently discuss. Each of 
these achieves or comes close to achieving a dynamic unity on the 
basis of the formula, modified and varied to suit the particular action. 
This is not to deny that each play has its unique h u m a n  , social, or 
political concerns; but if one interprets it from the central dynamic 
placement of its hero, a similarity to the Othello formula emerges. 
The tragic heroes, and at least Leontes and Prospero a m o n g those 
of the romances, are greater than life-size; they are endowed with 
mighty wills and potentially violent passions that erupt as a conse­
quence of the powerful evil that is at work from the outside or inside 
and destroys or threatens to destroy them. All these m e  n are in the 
center of a general conflict of good and evil forces that draws into 
a vortex the innocent and guilty until the heroes die or, in the 
romances, until they are released from suffering and passion. Thus , 
in a sense, the plays ratify the humanists' warnings against evil and 
passion, but they also demonstrate humanity's dignity and greatness 
in its extraordinary capacity for suffering. T h  e heightened selves of 
Shakespeare's later heroes are constructed on the paradox that what 
destroys or nearly destroys them also makes them great. 
It should be said that the Othello formula, as I have called it, is 
not used in two later tragedies, Antony and Cleopatra and Corio­
lanus. Although the heroes of both have mighty wills and passions, 
these are not triggered by conspicuous forces of evil. N o  r is the 
theme of lack of self-knowledge as prominent in them as in Othello, 
Lear, and Macbeth; it is transcended by other concerns, the conflict 
of love and power in Antony and Cleopatra and the rival demands of 
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pride and patriotism in Coriolanus. In a discussion of the dynamics 
of will and passion in Shakespeare, these two plays would be 
prominent, but in the present study, they do not urgently demand 
treatment.2 
Because the principle of the dynamism of will and passion affects 
all patterns of self-knowledge in Shakespeare's later plays, w  e m a  y 
recall h o  w m u c  h it reflects prominent political, spiritual, intellectual, 
and artistic concerns of the dawning baroque age, an age that cele­
brated and practiced power and was at the same time fascinated with 
intense feelings and states of mind.3 Absolute monarchs and their 
statesmen craved and achieved authority and adorned it with cere­
monies and displays of luxury. In their desire to dominate their 
subjects politically, the princes and their councilors were rivaled by 
the eagerness of both Catholics and Protestants to dominate their 
believers spiritually, and neither the efforts of the monarchs nor 
those of the religious leaders were restricted to their respective polit­
ical and religious spheres. Because there was a growing and justified 
conviction a m o n g the intellectuals that these were trying times, 
philosophers and moralists of various persuasions sought no less 
arduously than the theologians to ar  m m e  n for the battle of life, 
particularly by giving rules on h o w to strengthen their wills and to 
direct and, if necessary, to break the wills of others. Bacon com­
bined this theoretical interest with a statesman's practical aim of 
political domination. H  e went beyond these ethical and political 
concerns to outline a system through which m a  n would find it pos­
sible to subject and control nature. 
A n energy similar to that which m a d e Bacon turn outward to 
nature m a d  e itself felt in the turning inward in religious thought 
and expression, in the mysticism and the mystical poetry that 
flowered in the seventeenth century. Baroque painting and sculpture 
translated this interest in the dynamics of feelings into works aflame 
with emotions. These strike us often as excessive, but they give a 
unity of movement to the total design. Bernini's Saint Theresa ap­
pears the victim of a religious transfiguration hardly distinguishable 
from an erotic rapture, and she is aquiver with a synchronized emo­
tion equally apparent in the expression of her face and the tremor 
of her g o w n . A n d what was true for religious art also held good for 
secular painting, sculpture, and architecture. T h  e baroque, as art 
historians have described it, was both more emotional and more 
unified than the preceding styles. It overcame the mannerist uncer­
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tainties by dynamic certainties. It worked with great masses of 
stone or color in motion, masses that were controlled and subor­
dinated to the total design.4 It is true that the English plastic arts 
had no real equivalent for this exuberant baroque, be it because of 
the restraining influence of Puritanism or because of the relative lack 
of patronage at the English court. But English poetry and drama of 
the early seventeenth century show evidence of a tendency analogous 
to that of continental art to intensify will and passion and m a k e them 
central to a baroque unity of composition. 
T  o ascribe the greater force and unity of Shakespeare's later 
tragedies to the baroque style is not to question that their artistic 
success was,first of all, due to his mature mastership of all stylistic 
and dramatic means. But these means and the strong integrative im­
pulse with which he used them owed something, I would say a great 
deal, to artistic and cultural tendencies of the age. I have noted in an 
earlier part of this book that the concept of self-knowledge under­
went considerable modifications and shifts in emphasis because of 
certain counter-humanistic tendencies. It is true that these originated 
before the seventeenth century, but they reached their full strength 
and had their greatest impact at this time. All shared a particular 
interest in the working of the will and, for the most part, of the 
passions, the two structural elements of the Othello formula. Even 
if Shakespeare was not attracted to any one of these political, reli­
gious, and philosophical movements and doctrines, he could not 
have escaped the aggregate of their influence, which promoted an 
interest in what one might call personality dynamics. T h e dialectics 
of ideas in Shakespeare's later plays, I believe, clearly shows that 
he was influenced. 
O n  e such influence, pervasive but difficult to pinpoint, wa  s that of 
aristocratic tastes. Under absolutism, the expansive self of the 
courtier was becoming the inflated self of the royalist cavalier. This 
development tended to create two separate ethical standards, a re­
ligious-moral one for c o m m o  n m e  n and a glorified antihumanistic 
one for aristocrats. For instance, T o m m a s  o Buoni in The Problems 
of Beauty and All Human Affections (translated in 1606) extolled 
the superior constancy of great m e  n in love and even explained as 
natural their greater talent for hatred and condoned it: princes "are 
endowed with a knowledge more than h u m a n " and therefore have 
greater insight into wickedness and conceive greater hatred against 
it; altogether, in noble m e n , w h o have "natures more divine, the 
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affections, making deeper impressions, are of greater force." 5 Aris­
tocratic tastes gained greater influence on drama as the interest of 
the court increased—as is evident in the m u c h larger number of 
dramatic performances at court—and as the middle class began to 
desert the theaters that the Puritanical preachers condemned in to to 
as sinful. Aristocratic tastes were surely influential in promoting 
the popularity of the great-souled hero with superhuman will and 
passion, although a shoemaker's son from Canterbury had started 
the fashion and the learned and abstruse C h a p m a  n brought it to a 
culmination. 
Will power was not cultivated only in aristocratic circles; it be­
came not merely an attribute of status but also a requirement for eco­
nomic aspiration. This is a subject even more impervious to literary 
analysis, and there is no space here to discuss economics. W  e m a y 
merely recall that, in the seventeenth century, England participated 
in a European economic crisis due to universal restructuring of 
society. T h  e crisis indeed had been brewing in the sixteenth century, 
but only n o  w did it lead to a recognizable conflict of economic 
classes. T h  e possessive and increasingly wealthy bourgeoisie began 
to feel its strength and its economic superiority over the financially 
debilitated nobility in the capitalistic-absolutistic order.6 T h  e prac­
tical and acquisitive self of the bourgeois came into conflict with the 
courtly and inflated self of the aristocrat, w h o , in fact, was becoming 
economically dependent on the bourgeoisie. Shakespeare was sensi­
tive to the trend toward acquisitiveness and its effect on morality; as 
William Elton has noted, King Lear and Timon of Athens con­
demningly explore "with mor  e specific monetary allusions than usual 
in Shakespeare, the n e  w acquisitive impulse." 7 Elton sees a connec­
tion between the rejection of ethical absolutes and natural law by a 
character like E d m u n d in Lear and the self-assertion of those w h  o 
felt that they were the class w h o , because of its drive and freedom 
from conventional restrictions, had the right to rule. 
W  e must take into consideration still another class, one that had 
no chance of exerting its will actively but was attracting more atten­
tion: the poor. Except for some preachers and a few satirists, the 
poor had no advocates in the sixteenth century, and even these 
generally did not diagnose poverty as the result of economic condi­
tions but as due to misfortune or man's sinfulness (that of the poor 
as well as the rich). But n o w there were occasional attempts to see 
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the world from the perspective of the poor. O n e of these was a two-
part poem, The Poor Man's Passions and Poverty's Patience, by-
Arthur Warren (1605), written, according to the author, in prison 
(evidently a debtor's prison) as a kind of nosce teipsum poem for 
the poor. It paints a somber, unjust, upside-down, and degenerating 
world in which the poor can live only by adopting an extraordinary 
patience. This solution, to which the whole second part of the book is 
devoted, draws on conventional Christian and Stoic remedies. O n e 
of the consolations—"So low I a m , lower I cannot fall" 8—is shown 
as the fallacy that it is by Edgar in Lear (IV.i.26). W h a  t makes 
Warren's poetic pamphlet almost a manifesto of class pride is his 
acclaim of the superiority of the life of the poor, their primitive, 
simple, wholesome life, as compared with the luxurious, ostentatious, 
wasteful, and diseased life of the rich. Even if the elements of this 
contrast can be found in earlier literature, the author's angle of 
vision, tone, and emphasis gives them a certain novelty and convic­
tion. There is here an urgency in the call for justice based on charity 
that can also be felt in Lear. 
M o r  e open to literary analysis than the role of the economic and 
social conditions in creating an increased interest in the working 
and the use of the h u m a n will is the influence of the major religious 
and intellectual movements. O f course, there was a connection be­
tween these movements and the economic upheavals; if w e believe 
the Marxists, the former caused the latter. But reverse relationships 
have also been pointed out, such as the function of Calvinism in 
promoting capitalism.9 Even if w e restrict ourselves to considering 
the ideological core of these movements, w e shall see a fascination 
with will power, a fascination that transcended individual creeds and 
philosophies. In religion, it was fostered by the religious crisis. A  s 
the warfare of the Christian on earth became largely internecine, 
both parties, the Protestants as well as the R o m a  n Catholics, sought 
to stiffen the determination of their followers. There was, of course, 
nothing ne  w in the interest in the will as such. Medieval and Renais­
sance theologians saw it as the h u m a n faculty that subjected m a n to 
sin and yet was a significant instrument in bringing about his salva­
tion. Th  e Christian humanists restated this balanced account of the 
failure and the achievement of the will, and their position later be­
came Anglican doctrine. A s Richard Hooker pointed out in The 
Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity (Bk. I, Chap, vii), m a  n sinned because 
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he willed to sin; but his will also enabled him to m a k e the right 
choices between good and evil if it followed the guidance of the 
understanding in adjusting itself to the divine order. 
T h e two major theological movements that competed with A n ­
glicanism in England, R o m a  n Catholicism and Calvinism, gave still 
greater emphasis to the role of the will in man's conduct on earth 
and stressed his need for discipline. For the R o m a  n Catholics, con­
vinced as m u c  h as the Anglicans of the freedom of the will, this 
emphasis grew out of the aims and needs of the Counter-Reforma­
tion. Its main instrument, the Jesuit order, had been founded on the 
idea of gaining and retaining control over souls through a brother­
hood trained in soldierly discipline. Naturally, they incurred much 
hostility. "Their holy exercise," said an English clergyman, was 
"but a mere Machiavellian device of policy only to make strong 
themselves in their busy preparations for a spiritual monarchy." 10 
It is surely obvious that the English recusants were in need of bol­
stering their confidence in some more than ordinary way. It is not 
surprising that exhortations to constancy, firmness, application, reso­
lution, and fortitude are recurrent notes in the popular little book of 
doctrine that the Jesuit Robert Parsons published for his fellow 
Catholics in England under the title of The First Book of Christian 
Exercise (1582). But it is astonishing that this book, later called 
The Christian Directory, was republished, in only slightly adapted 
form, by Anglican divines far into the seventeenth century. Par­
sons's call for an energetic religion evidently found response and 
echo in the Protestant camp. 
T h e greater outward belligerence in religion was accompanied by 
a turning inward for renewed strength. T h  e plentiful descriptions of 
the evil, degenerating world—in particular, of that n e  w Jerusalem, 
London, with its fashions, vices, and sins—and the threats of an im­
pending d o o m were intended to keep the faithful on the right path 
as m u c h as to deter the wicked. In the new literature of exhortation 
and consolation, the believers were asked to despise the allurements 
of this world as m u c  h as they had been in the old contemptus tnundi. 
For the writers of such tracts, self-knowledge meant primarily a 
realization of the world's evils, a repentance of sin, and a recognition 
of the need for patience. A  s the Spanish Jesuit Diego de Estella said 
in his De Contemptu Mundi, which was twice translated in Eliza­
bethan times, once for the benefit of R o m a  n Catholics at Douay and 
once by the Protestant clergyman T h o m a s Rogers: "Therefore, if 
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thou seek to k n o  w thyself, it will cause thee neither to be proud nor 
ambitious nor disdainful; it will m a k  e thee bear injuries with a 
quiet mind in as m u c h as thou shalt find thyself to be a miserable 
sinner, and worthy of all m e n to be hated and condemned." n This 
is exactly the kind of self-knowledge so painfully acquired by Car­
dinal Wolsey in Shakespeare's last play, Henry VIII. After his fall, 
Wolsey renounces his pride and ambition and, in his famous fare­
well, says, "I k n o  w myself n o w "  ; and he feels in himself "  A peace 
above all earthly dignities, / A still and quiet conscience" (Ill.ii. 
350 n \ ) . Not even so conspicuous a consumer of contemptus mundi 
as Shakespeare's Richard II espouses more strongly than Wolsey the 
concept of self-knowledge of this old tradition. In Lear and other 
later dramas, similar moral patterns occur that stress the danger of 
pride, the need for patience, and the connection between self-knowl­
edge and the voice of conscience. A  n apocalyptic m o o  d imbues parts 
of Othello, Lear, Timon of Athens, and Macbeth; and the romances 
have such strong religious strains as to have tempted m a n  y critics to 
interpretations in terms of Christian allegory. In some ways, the 
universes of these plays take on the coloring of the morality of the 
characters in them, as is true for the romantic and treacherous world 
of the Mediterranean in Othello and the usuring, decaying Athens 
that "wears as it grows" in Timon (Li.3); but this connection— 
and it is often a problematic one—cannot console the characters 
about the existence of a benevolent purpose in the world. They must 
rely altogether on their o w  n resources. 
This greater inwardness of the later patterns of self-knowledge in 
Shakespeare's plays,fideistic as it is in a general way , does not allow 
us to claim Shakespeare's adherence to any particular creed. If the 
R o m a  n Catholics assessed the h u m a  n situation pessimistically and 
derived from this pessimism the need for a stronger faith, so did the 
Calvinists, whose number and assertiveness were increasing. Self-
knowledge meant for Calvin primarily a recognition of man's fallen 
nature and a submission of the h u m a n will to the will of G o d . For 
Calvin, the role of the will was most crucial in drawing m a  n to sin, 
for it did not have the understanding as its guide, as it did for the 
Christian humanists; the whole mind, understanding and will, of 
unregenerated m a  n was for him corrupt, and in fact, mind was 
merely flesh in the biblical sense. Yet this corruption did not relieve 
m a n of his responsibility for his actions; his will was "voluntary" 
even though G o d was assumed to foresee and preordain its choices. 
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A paradox like Calvin's of basing a voluntaristic ethics on a provi­
dential metaphysics is, of course, c o m m o  n to deterministic theologies 
and philosophies, which are always interested in attracting believers 
to their system of determinism. Calvin's w a  y out of the paradox of 
determinism and free will was to say that the will of m a  n that obeyed 
G o d fulfilled necessity, but that the will of m a n opposing H i m was 
responsible for its disobedience. 
O  f greatest interest in Calvin's theology for our present subject 
was his disparagement of the understanding and his elevation of the 
will to the role of guide for man's actions. Calvin brought the will 
in m u c  h closer conjunction with the passions than did the Christian 
humanists, for w h o m  , according to the medieval faculty psychology 
they continued, it was the active part of the rational soul; man's suc­
cessful life on earth depended on making the will serve the under­
standing in controlling the appetites, which belonged to the sensitive 
soul and thus were clearly segregated from reason. In Calvin's 
psychology, however, the will of unregenerated m a  n was to all in­
tents and purposes identical with the passions. A n  d yet, paradox­
ically, this will was the h u m a n faculty most necessary for salvation. 
In making little distinction between the will and the passions and 
in attributing to them greater significance in h u m a n conduct, Cal­
vinism was paralleled by various current philosophical directions. 
T h e skeptics, whose affinity to fideism has been noted earlier, 
thought of reason as little as did Calvin. They decried the Christian 
humanists' trust in the ability of reason to keep the appetites under 
control, a trust founded on the Socratic equation of truth and virtue. 
B y showing that the understanding was too weak to discern the 
truth and the will was toofickle to stick to what reason posited as a 
goal, the skeptics described m a  n as a being motivated largely by 
nonrational factors. They attributed greater force to the will than 
to the understanding, basing their theory of ethical conduct on the 
former rather than on the latter. Self-knowledge thus became more 
closely associated with what m a  n wants than with what he knows. 
A s Charron said, "  A m a  n is neither good nor wicked, honest nor 
dishonest, because he understandeth and knoweth those things that 
are good, and fair, and honest, or wicked and dishonest; but be­
cause he loveth them and hath desire and will towards them." 12 
Although the only partly skeptical Francis Bacon was generally 
confident in the ability of reason, freed from errors, to find the way 
to truth, he described the influence of passion and will on the under­
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standing in terms very similar to those of the skeptics. In pointing 
out the "errors of the tribe," that is, mistakes of judgment due to the 
general h u m a  n condition, he noted that reason cannot be tightly 
separated from the will and from the emotions; m a  n often thinks 
that to be true which he wishes: "The h u m a n understanding re­
sembleth not a dry light, but admits a tincture of the will and pas­
sions, which generate their o w  n systems accordingly; for m a  n always 
believes more readily that which he prefers . .  . in short, the feel­
ings imbue and corrupt his understanding in innumerable and some­
times imperceptible ways." 13 
Shakespeare's later villains and heroes exemplify the truth of 
Bacon's principle although, of course, they do so through their ac­
tions and the explanations they give for them rather than through 
philosophic inquiry. W h e  n they appeal to reason or believe to found 
their behavior on it, they often express only the dictates of their 
will. W h e  n Iago proclaims that " w  e have reason to cool our raging 
motions," he means that m a  n by his will can control the direction of 
his desires. Iago appears so cool and rational that it is easy to 
forget that he is perverted and impelled by a destructive hatred that 
has corrupted his mind. Sometimes, w h e n self-knowledge becomes 
a possibility for Shakespeare's later heroes, it remains a rational con­
sideration powerless to combat the forces of will and passion that 
have infiltrated the understanding and pull it in the direction of what 
they prefer. Although Macbeth is at the threshold of self-knowledge, 
he refuses to act on its prompting because his will drives him to 
seek a knowledge of evil that promises power and domination. A n  d 
even though Antony at one point realizes the effect of his abandon­
ment to pleasure and publicly admits that "poisoned hours had 
bound m e u p / F r o m mine o w n knowledge" (II.ii.93-94), this ra­
tional consideration does not help him to resist the magnetic attrac­
tion of Cleopatra. In the very next scene after this admission of 
having lacked in self-knowledge, he suddenly announces: "I will to 
Egypt ) / • • . I' th' East m  y pleasure lies" (II.iii.39—41). Quite 
generally, in Shakespeare's later plays, the passions are even more 
powerful than in the Christian humanists' warnings against them 
because they are often indistinguishable from the will and together 
with it imbue and corrupt the understanding in innumerable and 
often imperceptible ways. 
Of the ancient philosophies that came into vogue in the seven­
teenth century, Stoicism gave the greatest emphasis to the function 
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of the h u m a n will; it insisted on man's need to elevate himself by its 
power over fortune and fate. Stoicism, it is true, had been an in­
gredient of the Christian-humanist synthesis. But, although some of 
the humanists admired Seneca's ideas and culled commonplaces 
from his essays, their preference for Cicero's style drew them to the 
latter's eclectic ethics, which was only in part indebted to the Stoics. 
Although Shakespeare surely read some of Cicero's philosophical 
works in g r a m m a r school, it is extremely unlikely that he was ex­
posed to anything more than a few commonplaces from Seneca's 
essays, and there is nothing to show that he read these later. They 
were not available in translations, except for two minor essays, 
until T h o m a s Lodge's complete translation in 1614, and Shake­
speare probably had no taste for reading moral philosophy in Latin 
after leaving school. But some of the treatises of continental neo-
Stoic writers became available in English before the end of the 
sixteenth century. Sir John Stradling translated Justus Lipsius's De 
Constantia in 1595, and T h o m a s James rendered Guilleaume du 
Vair's La Philosophic morale des Stoiques in 1598. T h  e impact of 
neo-Stoicism was increased by the fact that it was accompanied by a 
change in English prose style from the imitation of Cicero's balanced 
rhetoric to that of Seneca's racy and aphoristic sentences.14 English 
essayists like William Cornwallis and Francis Bacon imitated 
Seneca's manner and echoed m a n y of his ideas. So did Marston, 
Webster, and C h a p m a n . 
In assessing the influence of Seneca on Jacobean drama, one 
should not separate Seneca's essays from his tragedies, in which the 
seventeenth century discovered a n e  w interest. Macbeth has closer 
parallels to Seneca's tragedies than any of Shakespeare's plays since 
Titus Andronicus and Richard III, and some of these parallels are 
so close as to give the impression that they come from a knowledge 
of the Latin text.15 Shakespeare, w h  o is not likely to have encoun­
tered Seneca's tragedies in school, m a  y well have preferred to read 
them in the original language rather than in the antiquated early-
Elizabethan translations. 
This interest of the age in both the essays and the tragedies testi­
fies to a realization that they have a c o m m o  n substance. O n  e could 
say, indeed, that this substance has a striking similarity to the 
Othello formula of violent contrasts that yet form a dramatic unity, 
and one could even liken neo-Stoicism to Calvinism in this respect. 
Like Calvin's theology, Stoicism is based on a paradoxical combina­
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tion of a voluntaristic ethics with a deterministic metaphysics; it 
reconciles inexorable fate—in the Christian Stoics' terminology, the 
providence of God—with man's responsibility for his choices. A s the 
neo-Stoics liked to say in an old Christian formulation, G o d knows 
man's choices, but it is the will of m a  n that makes them. Seneca 
and the Stoics pointed up the opposites that constitute m a n  , life, and 
the universe, that is, body and soul, passion and reason, vice and 
virtue, good and evil. They countered the variability of the world 
with the constancy of the mind and the violence and passions of 
ordinary mankind with the patience and the imperturbability of the 
saint-like Stoic sage. These contrasts were to encourage m a  n to 
choose the latter alternatives and to m a k e him aware that the choice 
was in the power of his will. Even more stridently than the essays, 
Seneca's dramas oppose evil and good, passion and patience. In the 
tragedies, hysterical and pathological outbreaks, like those of Medea , 
Oedipus, and Hercules, are set off by choruses of moderation, such 
as the second ode in Medea, the fourth in Oedipus, and thefirst in 
Hercules Furens. Hercules, Seneca's superman, unites in himself the 
antithesis of passion and patience through his blinding fury in which 
he kills his family {Hercules Furens) and through his endurance 
on Mount Oeta {Hercules Oetaeus). 
In the dynamic relationship of violent contrasts, this dramatic 
Stoicism of Seneca had an affinity to a tendency in baroque art to 
set light and dark areas and contrasting bodily shapes in tension and 
energetic movement, a tendency w e have noted in the dynamic con­
trasts of the Othello formula. Seneca's polarization of passion and 
patience could have served as a prototype for the dynamic tension 
of Iago and Othello. T h  e evil in Iago, w h  o is absolute in his patience 
because he is devoid of ordinary h u m a  n emotions, is the force that 
sets in passionate motion the soul of the too-trusting Othello. Iago's 
patience is, of course, that of a villain, not that of a Senecan philos­
opher or Christian Stoic; but, in that it is based on the suppression 
of all emotions, it has a resemblance to the ironlike "apathy" the 
theologians accused the austere Stoics, n e  w and old, of advocating. 
Further, Stoicism m a y well have had something to do with the 
growing emphasis on the theme of salvation from passion and evil 
through patience, a patience purified through love, in Shakespeare's 
later tragedies and romances. It is n o w patience even more than 
temperance that becomes associated with self-knowledge. T h  e 
achievement of self-knowledge through patience is the major theme 
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of the subplot of Lear, the Gloucester story. In Lear and the ro­
mances, the heroes w h  o fall prey to passion are accompanied by, or 
contrasted with, characters w h o come close to being embodiments of 
patience and w h o aid them on the w a y to regeneration. Such are 
Cordelia, Kent, and Edgar in Lear, Marina and Thaisa in Pericles, 
Imogene in Cymbeline, Hermione and Paulina in The Winter's 
Tale, and Gonzalo in The Tempest. Interestingly, in Shakespeare's 
last play, Henry VIII, the dying Queen Katherine, a figure of 
patience herself, is consoled by a maid named Patience—one of the 
few overt allegorical touches Shakespeare ever allowed himself. It 
is in most of these cases fruitless to debate the question whether the 
patience of a character is Christian or Stoic because in practice there 
was little difference. T h e Christian theologians tended to make less 
of the power of reason to overcome passion than did Cicero and the 
ancient Stoics, and they often denounced the Stoics' insistence that 
all passions were evil; but Christian patience was in effect very 
similar to the Stoic brand in being an active virtue that demanded 
unusual strength and fortitude. 
In any case, the Jacobean emphasis on man's need for patience 
must in large part be attributed to the darkening moral climate, to 
the growing belief that the world was more evil than good and be­
coming worse rather than better. W h e  n m a  n is a feather to each 
wind that blows, as it appeared to adherents of various creeds and 
philosophies, he can be saved only by an extraordinary patience. The 
neo-Stoics, the neo-Platonists, the austere Calvinists, the militant 
Catholics, and conservative sympathizers with the poor, like Arthur 
Warren , all thought so. 
But there was also a more active method than the use of patience 
to steel one's will for the conflict with an evil world, a method that 
came to be fathered upon Machiavelli. A  s pessimism became more 
widespread during the last decade of the sixteenth century, there 
were occasional remarks that Machiavelli had been right, after all, 
w h e n he based his politics on the premise that m e n are by nature 
inconstant, dissembling, and lacking in gratitude. Such statements 
appeared atfirst in attacks on Machiavelli, as for instance, in Richard 
Barckley's A Discourse of the felicity of Man (1598) : 
The time is so changed and men's manners with them so corrupted 
that the precepts heretofore given by wise m e n for the commodity 
of life, grounded upon virtue and honesty, will not serve the turn. 
Friendship is grown cold; faith is foolishness; honesty is in exile 
and dissimulation hath gotten the upper hand. That is effectually 
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done which is commonly spoken: he that cannot dissemble cannot 
live. Machiavel's rules are better followed in these days than those 
of Plato, Aristotle or Cicero; whose scholars have so well profited 
under him that many are able to teach their master.16 
The querulous tone and the rhythm of Barckley's diatribe re­
semble quite notably Gloucester's complaint in Lear (I.ii.112) that 
he has seen "the best of our time": "Love cools, friendship falls off, 
brothers divide. In cities, mutinies; in countries, discord; in palaces, 
treason; and the bond crack'd 'twixt son and father." Ironically, 
Gloucester makes these comments to his Machiavellian son E d m u n d  , 
w h  o in his immediately following soliloquy adopts his father's anal­
ysis that this is the worst of times but w h  o is happy to live in it, 
totally rejecting his father's contention that the stars determine 
man's fate and limit the freedom of the will. 
A  s w  e have noted earlier, the claim of the anti-Machiavellians 
that The Prince served as a conduct book for his "scholars" appears 
justified. Although Machiavelli drew the portrait of a prince w h  o by 
manipulation achieved political supremacy and retained it, the pic­
ture could inspire lesser mortals to think of themselves as m e  n of 
potential prestige, influence, success, and power. Machiavelli seemed 
to describe so m u c h better the actual world of power struggle and 
intrigue than the humanistic moralists with their sentimental picture 
of order, harmony, and degree. This, at any rate, w a s the conclusion 
drawn by Gabriel Harvey, w h o thought Machiavelli really k n e w the 
"fashion and cunning of the world" and could teach him to be wise 
for himself, to acquire the wisdom of the serpent, to be bold, to 
concentrate all his strength on the immediate purpose, to have a 
winning manner for achieving success, and to become a veritable 
combination of serpent, dove, and wolf. T h e method could not fail 
to bring results: "  A grain of credit with other; and a dram of confi­
dence in yourself is powerable to remove mountains and states and 
to work miracles, being politically applied with reasonful discre­
tion." 17 Although the method did not actually produce miracles for 
Harvey, his words prove that Machiavelli taught his disciples 
(whose aspirations would have utterly surprised h im) to associate 
self-knowledge with a tough-minded, utilitarian, and materialistic 
concept of m a n . H e taught them to evaluate themselves in relation­
ship to a world where only strength succeeded and to impose their 
wills subtly on those whose weakness could be exploited. 
Bacon's discipleship of Machiavelli rested on the feeling that The 
Prince described more accurately than the humanistic conduct books 
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what m e n actually do rather than what they say. A n d he had a point. 
O n  e looks in vain into the nosce teipsum tracts, which continued to 
be written by the preachers and schoolmasters, of whose improving 
influence Bacon thought little, for a recognition that the humanistic 
recipes work only when people in general adopt them. T h e one tract 
I k n o  w of which proceeds beyond these recipes is T h o m a  s Wright's 
The Passions of the Mind (1601), whose sympathy with skeptic 
ideas has been noted previously. In his Preface, Wright suggested 
that knowing oneself had the practical usefulness of equipping the 
honest against the dishonest. H  e advertised his book as helpful for 
good m e n to protect themselves against "inventions, fetches, sleights, 
and judgments." H  e found his countrymen in particular need of 
this protection because they lacked the "certain politic craftiness" of 
the Italians and Spaniards. Naivete about villainy, he said in an­
other passage, can be costly since "simple m e  n . . . mustfirst try 
and then trust, for their rule lieth in experience and practice more 
than in reading and speculation because their o w n harms or their 
neighbors must school them, for few are capable of practical rules in 
universal, or at least they cannot apply them to particular, sub­
jects." 18 
Wright believed in the need for serpentine wisdom beneath 
columbine innocence. His chapters on "Prudence in Passion" and 
"Policy in Passion" presuppose that even for an honest m a  n the end 
justifies the means in dealing with villainy. H  e advised "to conceal, 
as m u c  h as thou canst, thy inclinations or that passion thou knowest 
thyself most prone to follow." T h  e prudent m a  n must k n o  w that the 
w a  y of evil m e  n is to destroy others "by ministering matter to 
passions, to cast a bait with a hook to draw them into their own 
ruin." In this world of envy and deception "it importeth much to 
k n o w h o w to second or cross other men's affections, h o w w e may 
please them, m a k e them out friends or foes." Because m e n are de­
lighted with those w h o  m they see affected by the passions they have 
themselves, it follows that "if thou wilt please thy master or friend, 
thou must apparel thyself with his affections and love where he 
loveth and hate where he hateth." 19 Wright expanded the discussion 
of these matters in his second edition of 1604, showing h o  w the 
passions can be moved by various means, such as producing visual 
"appurtenances" for stimulation.20 
I have, on purpose, quoted instructions showing that the tech­
niques useful for honest m e  n and those practiced by villains were 
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often identical for Wright in order to point out h o w different Shake­
speare is in this respect. Although Wright's arguments sometimes 
evoke parallels from Shakespeare, they do so mainly when it comes 
to his villains' attitude and strategy. These indeed draw Wright's 
moral that simplicity is foolishness in this evil world—and they 
accept this world gladly. Thus Iago sneers at the "free and open 
nature" of Othello (I.iii.393), at his "unbookish jealousy," which 
will make him construe falsely Cassio's conversation with Bianca 
(IV.i.101), and at "honest fools" like Cassio and Desdemona. Iago 
is a master in moving the passion of Othello, producing as the final 
irritant that visual appurtenance, the handkerchief. E d m u n  d con­
gratulates himself on having "  A credulous father! and a noble brother, 
/ . .  . on whose foolish h o n e s t y / M y practices ride easy!" (I.ii. 
170 ff.). Wright's remarks on the shortcomings of honesty also 
recall Iago's hypocritical protests that "to be direct and honest is 
not safe" (III.iii.382) and that "I should be wise; for honesty's a 
fool, /And loses that it works for" (386-87). In reading Wright's 
remark that simple people must be schooled by their harms, one 
recalls Regan's saying that her father had ever but slenderly k n o w  n 
himself (Li.293) and her "moral" on his exposure to the storm: "to 
wilful m e n / T h e injuries that they themselves procure / Must be 
their schoolmasters" (II.iv.301-3). Wright's instructions on pru­
dence and policy in passion bring to mind h o w Shakespeare's villains 
ensnare their victims, as, for instance, h o  w Iago kneels next to his 
master and swears to devote "wit, hand, and heart" to Othello's 
service and h o w E d m u n d draws his sword against his brother "in 
defence" of his father. Both E d m u n  d and Iago boast their self-
knowledge, and, in the sense the word takes in The Passions of the 
Mind, they have a point. 
Wright's book was more useful as practical psychology than the 
conventional nosce teipsum tracts because it had something of a n e  w 
practical orientation. Shakespeare might indeed have found it helpful 
when he read it, as I think he did,21 but he also must have thought 
distasteful the attitude taken in it that h u m a n beings can be managed 
and controlled. Although Othello and Lear m a y be said to demon­
strate the danger of a lack of self-knowledge of the kind described by 
Wright, they do not point the moral that good characters must study 
rules and tricks of rhetoric for combatting evil. W h e  n a good charac­
ter, such as Edgar in Lear, uses techniques of counter-strategy 
against evil, he is aware of the ambiguity of the situation, and thus 
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w e become conscious that virtue and deviousness are uneasy bed­
fellows. 
Just as Shakespeare had not succumbed to the stifling moralizing 
of traditional nosce teipsum doctrines, so he did not espouse the 
simplifications of the practical approach to self-knowledge. His 
knowledge of " m e n as they really are" was deeper than that of the 
"Machiavellian" psychologists of his time, and it was more sympa­
thetic. O n e can well imagine him to have smiled at some of Wright's 
generalizations, such as the one according to which resemblance in 
nature causes love, and contrast, hatred.22 Although Iago persuades 
Othello of the truth of this principle, it is negated by Desdemona's 
abiding affection for Othello. N o  r did Shakespeare accept the 
premise that m e  n as a whole are ungrateful, inconstant, and dis­
sembling. Although his later tragic world is dark, the gloom is 
relieved by the brightness of the Desdemonas, Cordelias, Kents, and 
Edgars. Timon's misanthropic tirades are disproved as an absolute 
truth about h u m a n nature by the loyalty shown to him in misery by 
a selfless steward. Shakespeare had less to learn from the moralists, 
even from one as practically oriented as Wright, than they could 
have learned from him had they desired to do so. H  e was conscious, 
as they were not, that it is impossible to classify h u m a n nature. H e 
had a sense for the unexpected as well as expected actions of men, 
for weaknesses that lie below surface strength, as in Coriolanus's 
sudden reversals, and for subterranean psychic forces that break 
through miraculously, as in Lear's self-discovery in suffering and 
madness. 
Shakespeare's essential humanity also saved him from the danger 
of distortion inherent in the heightening of his heroes' selves. Out of 
context, one might sometimes read a passage in his plays as an 
adjustment to inflated aristocratic self-conceptions. In The Winters 
Tale, Polixenes, like Buoni and others, claims that the passions of 
great m e  n are part of their greatness: 
This jealousy 
Is for a precious creature; as she's rare, 
Must it be great; and as his person's mighty, 
Must it be violent . . . 
(I.ii.451-54) 
But in Shakespeare, w  e must understand the remark in its dramatic 
context; Polixenes' words are the benevolent excuse of the weak­
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ness of a friend. Even if they echo an aristocratic prejudice, it was 
not Shakespeare's. A n  d when Shakespeare created in Coriolanus an 
aristocratic Herculean hero in the pattern of C h a p m a n  , he m a d  e his 
inner weakness clear, and it is impossible to think of him as an apo­
theosis of superhuman will and violent passions. 
Shakespeare's humanity, gentleness, and sanity did not leave him 
as he fashioned the dynamic patterns of self-knowledge in his later 
plays. His questioning of the rigid formulas during the Hamlet 
period had evidently helped him to gain a more penetrating vision 
of the varied and complex patterns of life; but he did not reject what 
he found valuable in the humanists' concept of self-knowledge: their 
call for self-control and for a reasonable assessment of the h u m a  n 
situation is audible in his later plays even more clearly than in his 
earlier ones, although n o  w his heroes have to face this call without 
the assurance that it will give them a rational orientation to the 
universe. A n  d Shakespeare assimilated to these patterns the ideas of 
the changed intellectual climate that were congenial to him, such as 
the demand for social justice, a demand raised with particular 
urgency in Lear and Timon. But since Julius Caesar at least, Shake­
speare had a strong sense for the limitations of all theory. T h  e heroes 
from Brutus on are not insured against self-loss by possessing hu­
manistically orthodox theories of self-knowledge. Othello has them; 
he is very m u c  h aware of the hierarchy of psychic functions that 
subordinates passion to reason, and yet he cannot control his passion. 
H  e is even, a la Wright, conscious that the means of persuasion used 
by Iago might be tricks of custom in a dishonest m a n  , and yet he 
succumbs to them. Macbeth knows that in order to live with his 
deed, he will have to deny his former self, and yet he continues on 
his path to crime. But the choice of the opposite direction, the acquisi­
tion of self-knowledge or of at least part of a knowledge of himself 
in the humanistic sense is for Coriolanus a choice of death. W h e  n he 
gives in to his mother's pleading to show mercy to R o m  e rather 
than to continue his revenge—a choice w  e think is right although, 
ironically, he feels it offends the gods—he speaks his death sentence. 
Elsewhere, the humanistic injunction to self-knowledge is shown to 
be a valid guideline for the reasonable conduct of a moral life, but 
the injunction is transcended as a criterion for judging a hero's 
character. O n e can condemn Antony by Christian-humanist stan­
dards, but such judgment is drawn into doubt by his romantic 
charisma and the power of his love that, at times, makes R o m e ' s 
imperium seem paltry. 
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Although Shakespeare took from the creeds, doctrines, and fash­
ions of his day what he found useful, he remained himself. H  e re­
jected what he could not reconcile with the immensely sane view of 
m a  n that had become his, and he continued to draw on ideas that 
he found true and important, no matter whether they were conven­
tional or fashionable. His deep and abiding humanity prevented him 
from adopting the simplifications in any of the particular concepts 
of m a  n that vied for his allegiance. His good sense kept him from 
accepting and echoing what was exaggerated in the baroque; he was 
not tempted by it to create caricatures rather than characters. Instead 
w  e find that his later heroes' heightened selves intensify experiences 
and feelings that are true and genuine. Although Shakespeare's great 
characters are often more passionate or more patient, more virtuous 
or more infamous, more glorious or more unfortunate than w e shall 
ever be and speak in a language more mighty and splendid than ours, 
w  e feel that they are essentially like us. 
CHAPTER FOURTEEN 
Othello: 
Subjecting the Self 
TH E M O S T C O N C E N T R A T E D , most tightly constructed, and fastest-moving of Shakespeare's tragedies, Othello has a kinetic unity that derives in large part from the impetus 
given to the action by Iago, w h o  , although not the hero of the 
tragedy, is its prime mover. H e is the controller and transformer of 
the characters and personalities of the others, particularly of Roder­
igo, Cassio, Desdemona, and Othello. It must be said, of course, that 
to move some of these he requires little effort because of an overt 
weakness in them and that circumstances and unconscious coopera­
tion by his victims aid him. Roderigo is a born gull. Cassio has a 
low resistance to alcohol that makes it easy for Iago to compromise 
him and have him ousted from his office. T h e change of Desdemona 
from a self-assured Venetian lady and loving wife into a frightened 
little girl is only indirectly Iago's work, for it is effected by Othello's 
apparently inexplicable passion and cruelty, which are in turn fed 
by her kind solicitations to the M o o  r for the reinstatement of Cassio. 
It is the transformation of Othello from a calm and composed m a n  , 
" w h o  m passion could not shake," into a gull, a slave of jealousy, 
and the murderer of his wife that is Iago's hardest task, the one he 
accomplishes, with some help from others and from accidents it is 
true, essentially by himself. H  e convinces a m a  n w h  o has just m a r  ­
ried a w o m a n w h o deeply loves him that she is a strumpet. This m a n 
is Iago's superior, a M o o  r with a romantic background and military 
distinction, a famous general of royal lineage, appointed by the 
Venetian state, which relies on him, to be governor of Cyprus, a m a  n 
whose self Shakespeare heightened externally and internally. 
There is a modern school of interpretation that would de-psycholo­
gize the influence Iago exerts on Othello and would attribute it to 
the stage convention of the "calumniator believed." Iago would thus 
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become primarily a theatrical mechanism, a traditional evil, tacitly-
accepted by the audience. According to Bernard Spivack, he belongs 
to the family of the medieval Vice and carries on the function of 
seduction c o m m o  n to this type.1 But whatever few touches Iago m a y 
o w  e to the Vice, he is surely not merely a type on w h o  m a conven­
tional h u m a  n nature is grafted; he is a complex character, almost 
incredibly evil and yet totally believable, and his subjection of 
Othello is a subtle and accomplished performance. It is the play and 
not merely our interest in psychology that makes us ask the question 
what it is that gives him the strength to change andfinally to destroy 
the initially calm and self-composed Othello. 
T h  e answer to this question is surely not that Iago has a super­
h u m a  n intelligence because, as a reasoner, Iago does have limita­
tions.2 H  e lives in a lower world of the intellect, completely devoid of 
all feeling for the higher qualities of mankind: love, generosity, kind­
ness are u n k n o w n to him. H e has no full comprehension of a world 
in which husband and wife are faithful to each other and handsome 
young m e n do not habitually go to bed with other men's wives; his 
is a world in which animal instincts predominate. H  e believes, or 
appears to believe for a while, that it would be possible for him to 
seduce Desdemona and that she might fall in love with Cassio—even 
Roderigo finds that hard to accept! N o  r is Iago a great strategist. 
A t the outset, he has no very clear idea of what to do except to harm 
Othello, and he plays with two alternatives—either to seduce 
Desdemona or to m a k e Othello insanely jealous. His success in the 
latter plan can be ascribed more to superior tactics than to strategy, 
to improvisation and clever exploitation of accidents rather than to 
a master plan. His best stroke, the use of the handkerchief, is due to 
Desdemona's accidentally dropping it at the time Othello demands 
an "ocular proof," and nothing could demonstrate Iago's weakness 
in strategy better, considering that the handkerchief becomes the 
incriminating evidence that brings him d o w n . That he involves his 
wife in procuring it proves him to be less than a totally competent 
judge of people, for he underestimates her loyalty to Desdemona. 
But yet the skill with which Iago makes his world, his thoughts, 
and his imagination dominate Othello is masterful. Th  e process is 
not primarily an intellectual one, for neither agent nor victim are 
strong thinkers. Professor Jorgensen has pointed out that the two 
characters' deficiency in quality of thought is highlighted by the 
ironic use of keywords denoting knowing and thinking and that this 
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motif illuminates the mind-control Iago exerts.3 Iago, w h  o uses 
words with cognitive meaning more than anyone else, understands 
h o w to m a k e what he knows of others, incomplete as it is, the start­
ing point of his design, and to create for them a pseudo-knowledge 
that they are not able to contradict. T h e first words of the play indi­
cate h o w he uses what he knows in order to exploit Roderigo, and 
they hint that he m a  y have used this method earlier. Says the latter: 
Tush, never tell m e  ; I take it much unkindly 
That thou, Iago, w h  o has had m  y purse 
A s if the strings were thine, shouldst know of this. 
In duping Othello, Iago uses a similar technique of making the 
most of bits of true knowledge he has about the M o o  r and others and 
of having these true items serve to support the putative knowledge 
he seeks him to accept. Thus , in the persuasion scene, he intimates, 
by references to Cassio's role in the wooing of Desdemona and to 
Brabantio's earlier prediction of Desdemona's unfaithfulness, that 
there has been a long, amorous relationship between her and the 
lieutenant and that she has a bent toward disloyalty. 
Yet this clever technique is hardly sufficient to explain by itself 
the power Iago can achieve over the minds of others. A n  d it does 
not account for his genius of destruction. W  e must look for other 
facets in his make-up. W  e m a y , I think, rule out supernatural 
sources.4 Iago, it is true, shares with all Shakespeare's villains some­
thing of the eternal spirit that denies goodness and truth; he is a 
mocker, a cynic, w h  o sneers at honesty as the weakness of fools. But 
he lacks the incandescence of mind that makes Goethe's Mephistoph­
eles a believable antagonist of the deity, and he is surely not an allegor­
icalfigue representative of the Jacobeans' idea of the devil. Occasion­
ally he glories in being of the devil's party, swears by the divinity of 
hell, and feels at h o m  e in the infernal darkness that will bring the 
monstrous child of his brain to light. But this self-elevation to the ulti­
mate evil is belied by the pettiness of his personal grievances. His 
glorying in the imagery of damnation and hell demonstrates not his 
greatness in evil but his littleness as a person, his need to bolster his 
ego. Neither is the "diabolical" imagery associated with him alone; 
Othello uses it even more after he adopts Iago's habits of thought.5 
It is true that, in his final moments , Othello temporarily entertains 
the notion that Iago is a devil and that he looks for Iago's cloven 
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foot. H  e charges at him and cries, "If that thou be'st a devil, I cannot 
kill thee," and he cannot. But the reason for this failure surely lies in 
the Moor's physical exhaustion. W h e n  , just after his futile attempt 
at Iago's life, he speaks metaphorically of Iago as having ensnared 
his body and his soul, he calls his seducer merely a "demi-devil" 
(V.ii.280,-305). 
Iago is too small a m a  n to be the devil incarnate, as m u c  h as he 
would like to be. H  e is a m a  n of multiple and petty resentments, a 
malcontent w h  o sets himself apart from the social order and delights 
in the disorder he creates.6 H  e is an envious m a  n with an ingrained 
contempt and hatred for all that is worthy and good, one w h  o resents 
the success of others. It is characteristic of him that he gives as one 
of the reasons w h  y Cassio must die that " H  e hath a daily beauty in 
his life / That makes m  e ugly" (V.i. 19-20) . T h e reader or spectator 
is not likely to find such extraordinary beauty in Cassio's life and 
must conclude that its evocation by Iago is a symptom of his envious 
disposition. 
Iago's motives are those of an envious m a n w h o must have sub­
jects and objects for envy. A  s T h o m a  s Rogers put it, "It is part of 
this envy like as fire to covet the highest places and to bark at those 
worthiest preferred." 7 H  e hates Cassio, w h o  m he thinks "a mere 
arithmetician," but w h  o is highly regarded in Venice, as his ap­
pointment as Othello's successor demonstrates. Most of all he hates 
the M o o r  , as w  e learn in thefirst lines of the play and hear again 
afterward. W h e  n he sneers at Roderigo's stupidity, he quickly re­
proaches himself for spending too m u c  h thought on this gull and 
reasserts his hatred of Othello (I.iii.376ff.). This primacy of hatred, 
as Lily Campbell has pointed out, is quite characteristic for an 
envious m a  n because envy was, in the thinking of the Renaissance, a 
species of hatred. W h e  n Iago explains his hatred of the M o o  r in the 
instance just noted, he gives as his reason his fear of having been 
cuckolded by Othello, a rumor, he says, he has heard. But he does 
not even care whether it is true; he says that he, "for mere suspicion 
in that kind, / Will do as if for surety" (I.iii.383-84). Iago's sexual 
jealousy is part of his all-inclusive envy of others; in Renaissance 
psychology, jealousy was generally considered a subspecies of envy 
and in Shakespeare's English, "jealous" could be used as synony­
m o u s with "envious."8 
Iago's jealousy, which has been taken too seriously at times, is sig­
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nificant not really as a motive for his malignity, whose ultimate origin 
is probably as undiscoverable as the ultimate reasons for the existence 
of evil in the universe, but on other grounds. His search for motives, 
no matter h o  w petty and specious, demonstrates his small, calculating 
mind. Moreover, his acquaintance with jealousy, slight as it is, gives 
him some familiarity with the passion he decides to produce in the 
Moor . O n e might even say that Iago's "jealousy" (in both the 
general and the specific sense of the w o r d ) furnishes him with the 
design for Othello's destruction. H  e ponders whether he should get 
even with the M o o r  , "wife for wife," but then he decides that he will 
put him into a jealousy so strong that judgment cannot cure it 
(II.i.293 and II.i.295). Iago's o w  n jealousy can be cured by judg­
ment. H  e does not writhe in passion as the moralists said an 
envious or jealous m a  n does. Once, it is true, he says that he is 
tortured, that is, w h e  n he professes suspicion that Othello has cuck­
olded him, "the thought whereof / Doth like a poisonous mineral 
gnaw m  y inwards" (II.i.290-91). But this statement comes i m m e ­
diately after he disclaims interest in Desdemona, w h o  m he "loves" 
merely because she will "diet" his revenge. T h  e context gives his 
statement a peculiar flavor; it appears that in attributing a gnawing 
jealousy to himself, he is, as it were, trying out and heating up the 
emotion so he can transfer it to his victim. 
Iago has a constitutional, but controllable, inclination to jealousy 
because of his endemic envy. T h e devouring effect of jealousy, which 
Iago claims he feels in himself, is very m u c  h the one that moralists 
like T h o m a s Rogers attributed to envy: 
This envy is compared unto the canker; for as the canker eateth 
and destroyeth iron, so doth envy eat and consume the hearts of the 
envious. . . . For another's prosperity is their poison, and an­
other's adversity their comfort.9 
A n d when Iago later inoculates Othello with jealousy, he gives him 
an imaginary picture of the tortures of this passion, a picture quite 
in the tradition of the moralists' warnings against envy: 
O  , beware, m  y lord, of jealousy; 
It is the green-ey'd monster which doth mock 
The meat it feeds on. 
(III.iii.169-71) 
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In the central part omitted from the passage previously quoted from 
Rogers's tract, envy is described similarly: "The poets feign Envy 
to be one of the Furies of hell and to be fed with nothing but adders 
and snakes to show that envious persons do swallow d o w n poison 
and likewise vomit up the same again." T h e topos of envy-jealousy 
as a monster that makes the food it mocks was c o m m o n . Iago knows 
the trait and produces it in Othello, in whose poisoned imagination 
Desdemona becomes "a cistern for foul toads / T  o knot and gender 
in!" (IV.ii.62-63). Thus Iago is the preceptor of Othello; he teaches 
him a jealousy that has the worst features of envy and makes him eat 
out his heart. Othello is Iago's obedient disciple, w h  o in turn applies 
ideas suggested to him most inappropriately—or, from Iago's point 
of view, appropriately—to Desdemona. 
If Iago's "jealousy" is the primary one and Othello's the secon­
dary, as Professor Heilman has said, Othello's is also the manifest, 
explosive passion, Iago's the submerged and controlled one. In fact, 
one forgets during the play that Iago is capable of hate, envy, and 
jealousy because he appears practically passionless. O  n his concious­
ness of self-control Iago builds m u c  h of his assurance of self-knowl­
edge, an arrogant assurance, but one that is, in a sense, justified. In 
the second speech he has in the play, he asserts that he knows his 
"price." This knowledge makes him feel superior to others; he says 
sneeringly of Roderigo that "I mine o w n gain'd knowledge should 
profane / If I would time expend with such a snipe / But for m  y 
sport and profit" (Liii.378-80). Until his exposure in the end, he 
never loses the assurance that he can master all situations. H  e is the 
only one of Shakespeare's major villains w h o has not a single m o ­
ment of remorse. A n  d in the end, when he is exposed and his knowl­
edge of others is shown to be faulty, he still takes pride in his 
self-control: he announces that henceforth he will never speak another 
word. It is not important whether w e believe him or Gratiano, who 
says that torture will open his lips; Iago's assurance matters, and 
what he says with it: " W h a t you know, you k n o w " (V.ii.306). His 
knowledge of himself, a knowledge synonymous with trust in the 
strength of his will, remains with him to the end. 
In the sense in which the Christian humanists or the fideistic 
skeptics spoke of self-knowledge, Iago cannot be said to possess it, 
for he totally lacks any moral commitment or faith. Moreover, such 
presumption of self-knowledge was outrageous to them even when 
ethically or religiously oriented. Erasmus said in the sixth chapter 
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of Enchiridion that nobody should hold the fantastic opinion that he 
knows himself well enough; even Paul did not dare judge himself. 
Iago's self-estimation is not only arrogant but also egotistic and im­
moral; he compounds the sin of pride with the sin of self-love. H e 
never yet found a m a n w h o kne w " h o w to love himself" (I.iii.315) 
—except, of course, himself. B  y following Othello, he follows but 
himself, and, in glaring perversion of the concept "soul," the first 
and primary object of self-knowledge, he declares those w h  o act like 
him to be fellows that "have some soul." 
In equally conspicuous contempt for the doctrine of moral deco­
rum, which the humanists had thought central to self-knowledge, 
Iago espouses a philosophy of seeming: 
For when m  y outward action doth demonstrate 
The native act and figure of m  y heart 
In compliment extern, 'tis not long after 
But I will wear m  y heart upon m  y sleeve 
For daws to peck at: I a m not what I a m . 
(I.i.62-66) 
This is a self-declaration underneath the surface meaning intended 
for Roderigo that Iago must disguise his true feelings for Othello. 
Iago's concluding boast, "I a  m not what I a m ,  " denies both the self-
reflexive identification, "I a  m what I a m ,  " and the identification with 
the h u m a n race, "I a m a m a n in the sense of a moral being." 10 H e 
feels that he is a m a  n apart, outside h u m a  n and divine laws. 
B  y standing outside, or believing to stand outside, the h u m a  n race, 
Iago finds it possible to manipulate the others without really involv­
ing anything but his will in his contact with them. T h e student and 
teacher of jealousy is also a student and practitioner of the science 
of the will, and it is here that he is most competent. H  e observes the 
use of will-power by himself and by others, seeing himself as possess­
ing a strong and effective will that gives him self-direction, aggres­
siveness, energy, and determination, and hefinds the will of the others 
to be submissive, determined by wishful thinking, and dominated by 
appetite and lust. This attribution of weakness to others, however, is 
often merely another side of his inability to understand the higher 
provinces of thought and emotion. H  e has a consistently low opinion 
of Othello's will because Othello loves, an emotion that he equates 
with softness: 
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His soul is so enfetter'd to her love 
That she m a y make, unmake, do what she list, 
Even as her appetite shall play the god 
With his weak function. 
(II.iii.334-37) 
Iago has no such fetters. T h e "love" that he confesses for Desdemona 
is the attraction of the villain to the victim, the satisfaction of finding 
a h u m a n being whose destruction serves to destroy another. Al­
though Iago's failure to understand man's nobler nature and his lack 
of capacity for love makes him an incomplete h u m a n being, it also 
gives him a liberty and scope denied to those w h o are ethically 
superior to him. 
Thu  s w  e m a  y say in answer to the question posed earlier, what 
quality enables Iago to be the powerful and destructive agent of 
Othello's tragedy, that this quality is his will. H  e succeeds because of 
his effective use of a strong, morally uninhibited will for the subjuga­
tion of the morally oriented and restricted wills of the others. For 
Iago, the exercise of his will is, as Bradley saw, the main motivation 
—if one can speak here of motivation. Joy in the triumph of his will 
is what he primarily gets out of doing what he does: he chuckles 
about making Roderigo his purse, and he anticipates turning Desde­
mona's virtue into pitch and leading Othello by the nose like an ass. 
T h e prospect of "pluming up" his will, not the desire for the lieuten­
ancy, is the subject of his first soliloquy. M e r  e ambition, the main 
driving force of Shakespeare's earlier Machiavellian villains, is only 
a minor motive for him. H e evinces no joy w h e n he becomes Othel­
lo's lieutenant, and he goes forward without stop on his destructive 
path. 
Iago understands h o  w to estimate the quantity and quality of the 
wills of others, and he foresees what happens when different wills 
come together to reinforce or to oppose each other. H  e recognizes 
that by creating in the doting Roderigo's mind the hope of obtaining 
Desdemona he also has fashioned a completely subservient tool who 
does not shy away even from murder. H  e realizes that Cassio's low 
resistance to alcohol can be used to bring about disorder and thus to 
provoke Othello's will to preserve order. F r o  m the beginning, Iago 
is convinced that he can mastermind Othello. "These Moors," he 
says, "are changeable in their wills" (I.iii.348). This remark is to 
give Roderigo hope that Othello m a y stop loving Desdemona, but it 
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is also symptomatic of Iago's confidence in his ability to control the 
M o o r . 
Even more than on the control of Roderigo, Cassio, and Othello, 
Iago counts on making Desdemona his tool. "Out of her o w n good­
ness," he says, he will make "the net / That shall enmesh them all" 
(II.iii.350-51). It is a matter of his counting not on the weakness of 
Desdemona's will but rather on its strength, strength for the achieve­
ment of good purposes. Desdemona's strength of will is, in fact, 
stressed repeatedly; by it, she, rather than Othello, appears to be at 
times Iago's opponent. This strength, which proved itself in her 
unconventional choice of a husband, permits Iago with a semblance 
of truth to argue that she is fundamentally perverted: 
Foh  ! one m a  y smell in such a will most rank, 
Foul disproportion, thoughts unnatural. 
But pardon me—I do not in position 
Distinctly speak of her; though I may fear 
Her will, recoiling to her better judgment, 
M a  y fail to match you with her country forms, 
A n  d happily repent. 
(III.iii.236-42) 
The argument can m a k e the by-now weakened Othello feel that 
Desdemona must be unfaithful according to a kind of natural law. 
But Iago is right about the strength of her will although not about 
its perversion. W h e n she takes up Cassio's cause, it is with an 
unfortunate tenacity: "I will have m y lord and you again / A s 
friendly as you were" (III.ii.6-7). She pledges to do more for 
Cassio than for herself: " W h a t I can do I will; and more I will/ 
Than for myself I dare" (III.iv.131-32). H e r extraordinary energy 
shows itself most excruciatingly in her physiologically improbable 
revival from strangulation and in her pathetic last words that 
nobody killed her but herself, the white lie with which she at­
tempts to help her husband. H e r determination to do good has a 
symbiotic effect on Emilia, w h o  , at the crucial m o m e n  t of the action, 
acquires an obstinacy that even overcomes Iago's whe  n she refuses 
to be silenced by him. It is ironic that Iago, w h o masterminds every­
body else, finds it impossible to restrain his o w n wife, intent on 
salvaging her mistress's reputation. This is the only miscalculation 
Iago makes in judging the will of others; he succumbs here to his 
inability to understand higher emotions and loyalties. 
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A n interest in the manipulation of the will, as w e have noted, was 
in Shakespeare's air at the time he wrote Othello. Will and its 
triumphs were widely admired from the Machiavellians to the devout 
Catholics. Iago's view of m a n  , as m u c  h as it differs from these 
movements in other respects, resembles them in seeing man's charac­
ter as primarily a product of his will. Iago is, of course, m u c h more 
extreme in this belief. This feature gives him his look of total eman­
cipation from Christian humanism and makes him a "new m a n . " 
Mos  t revealing for this seventeenth-century "modernity" is his 
speech to Roderigo that precedes the soliloquy in which he expresses 
pleasure in "pluming up his will." This carefully worked-out speech 
constitutes a n e  w pattern of self-knowledge in Shakespeare, one that 
travesties the old in some important aspects. Iago reacts to the 
simpering Roderigo's lament that it is not in his "virtue," that is, 
power, to a m e n d his "fondness." Answers Iago: 
Virtue ? afig! 'Tis in ourselves that w e are thus or thus. Our bodies 
are our gardens to the which our wills are gardeners; so that if w  e 
will plant nettles or sow lettuce, set hyssop and weed up thyme, 
supply it with one gender of herbs or distract it with many, either 
to have it sterile with idleness or manur'd with industry—why, 
the power and corrigible authority of this lies in our wills. If the 
balance of our lives had not one scale of reason to poise another of 
sensuality, the blood and baseness of our natures would conduct us 
to most preposterous conclusions. But w  e have reason to cool our 
raging motions, our carnal stings, our unbitted lusts; whereof I 
take this that you call love to be a sect or scion. 
(I.iii.320-31) 
Iago proclaims here the need for psychic balance and does so by 
means of the field-garden imagery with which humanistic philosophy 
underlined the importance of education. A passage in L a Primau­
daye's French Academy is similar enough to be suspected as Shake­
speare's source: 
Th  e nature of m a  n is like a pair of balance. For, if it be not guided 
with knowledge and reason unto the better part, of itself it is 
carried to the worse. A n  d although a m a  n be well born, yet if he 
have not his judgment fined and the discoursing part of his mind 
purged with the reasons of philosophy, it will fall often into gross 
faults and such as beseem not a prudent m a n . For in those men 
that are not induced with virtue ruled by certain knowledge, nature 
bringeth forth such fruits as naturally come from the ground with­
out the manuring and helping hand of m a n .  1  1 
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Iago's speech appears to carry the idea of balance even further 
than L a Primaudaye by including theflora of the garden that is m a n : 
the two sets of plants, hyssop and nettle versus thyme and lettuce, 
balance each other, for according to the herbalists' botany the former 
were hot and dry, the latter cold and moist.12 However , Iago's 
choices for the will are not the moral qualities of the humanistic use 
of the figure, good and evil, but the psychological ones, control and 
lack of control of desire. It m a  y even be more significant that Iago 
equates will and reason; in effect, will is Iago's balancer or gardener 
rather than reason and knowledge as in L a Primaudaye. In the 
latter's system, will is the agent, even the servant of reason, not its 
master; reason or (elsewhere) G o  d is the gardener. Nowher  e in 
Renaissance moral literature have I found will designated as balancer 
or gardener; if either role is assigned to m a n  , it is always because 
he is divinely endowed with reason. Thus Iago's speech does not 
have the true Renaissance balance; rather, it advocates the supremacy 
of the "rude will" that in Romeo and Juliet Friar Lawrence calls 
the enemy of "grace." Iago's particular use of the garden imagery 
and the microcosmic analogy proclaims not the virtue of temperance 
but the gospel of the iron will, a gospel that the humanistically 
educated in Shakespeare's audience must have recognized as false, but 
that to some advanced thinkers of the time sounded sweet. 
Iago's "Virtue! a fig!" disparages goodness and puts in its stead 
a concept of "virtue" as innate ability and powerful exertion of the 
will. Iago's speech has thus a general allusiveness to the intellectual 
trends in Shakespeare's time that in various ways emphasized the 
significance of will power. It m a y have m a d e some in Shakespeare's 
audience uncomfortably aware of the evils of the acquisitive spirit 
that was around them and in themselves. T o others it m a y have 
suggested the Machiavellian virtu in its vulgarized interpretation as 
the power to manipulate people and get ahead. For still others of 
Shakespeare's contemporaries, the argument m a  y have cast Iago in 
the role of a "Jesuitical Machiavel" given to the machinations asso­
ciated with a sinister brotherhood.13 Perhaps some m a  y have seen 
him as applying to psychology the n e  w scientific rationale with its 
empirical methods and step-by-step procedure. Others m a  y have 
identified him with one of the "new Stoics" about w h o  m they had 
heard from the pulpit, m e n w h o were also sometimes, with that 
loosely applied term, called atheists. 
The speech, in fact, does m a k e this latter identification evident. 
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W h e n  , in conclusion, Iago denounces love as "merely a lust of the 
blood and a permission of the will," he associates himself with the 
rigorous Stoics, censured by Saint Paul as m e  n "without affection" 
(2 T i m  . iii:3). A  s Bullinger said, " W  e Christians have nothing 
to do with the ironlike philosophy, since our Lord and Master hath 
not in words only but with his o w n example also utterly condemned 
it." 14 Iago's classification of love as lust would have struck Renais­
sance theologians as the worst kind of such Stoicism. Even the 
admired Cicero was thought to have erred in this matter when in 
Tusculan Disputations he declared amor to be an irrational emotion 
that fell under libido and was subject to voluntary control (III. 12­
X3J IV.57 , 65, 72) . Cicero's method of devaluating love was so 
similar to Iago's that it m a y well have been in Shakespeare's mind: 
libido was, just like "lust," originally a neutral word, meaning 
desire in a general sense; but both words, by their authors' times, 
had depreciated in meaning. For Iago, new m a n and new Stoic, 
"love" is merely a raging and stinging lust of the blood and a per­
mission of the will, just as libido was for Cicero. 
Iago's affinity with the n e w Stoics also shows in his fondness for 
the word "patience," which is used more often in Othello (thirteen 
times) than in any other play of Shakespeare. Iago mocks those who, 
like Roderigo, are poor because "they have not patience" (II.iii.358). 
W h e  n Iago victimizes Othello, the sneer shows in his hypocritical 
advice: "Patience, I say; your mind perhaps m a y change" (Ill.iii. 
456) . "Patience" here counterpoints "passion," for immediately 
after this advice Othello's jealousy rises like "the Pontic Sea." 
Desdemona's method, innocently adopted to help Cassio, to "watch 
him [Othello] tame, and talk him out of patience" (III.iii.23), nas 
the same effect. Iago's repeated admonitions to Othello to preserve 
patience are intended to kindle the latter's passion while giving him 
the delusion of control. 
This is certainly Iago's technique as he makes Othello observe the 
confidences of Cassio and Bianca and induces him to believe that they 
concern an assignation between Cassio and Desdemona. Othello has 
just risen from a lethargy and acquired a n e  w fury in demanding 
"ocular proof" of Desdemona's unfaithfulness. A s Othello's passion 
rises, Iago admonishes his victim to confine himself "but in a patient 
list" (IV.i.75) and appeals to his sense of m a n h o o d  : "Marry, 
patience; / O  r I shall say you are all in all in spleen, / A n  d nothing 
of a m a n " (87-89). Whereupon Othello chimes in with a bitterly 
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ironic play on "patience": "I will be found most cunning in m  y 
patience;/But—dost thou hear?—most bloody" (90-91). T h u s 
Iago, like a hypnotist, imprints on Othello a concept of manhood 
founded on a perverse and inhuman idea of patience while stirring 
his mounting passion. 
W  e m a  y note here h o  w the idea of the victory of patience over 
passion becomes an ironic movement in the symphonic structure of 
Othello as the M o o r  , imagining himself to be an interrogating judge, 
"examines" Desdemona, w h  o understands only the fury in his words 
but not their sense. T h  e deluded Othello fancies that his habitual and 
exemplary patience has been lost because of the magnitude of Desde­
mona's "crime": 
H a  d it pleas'd heaven 
T  o try m  e with affliction, had they rain'd 
All kinds of sores and shames on m  y bare head, 
Steep'd m  e in poverty to the very lips, 
Given to captivity m  e and m  y utmost hopes, 
I should have found in some place of m  y soul 
A drop of patience. 
(IV.ii.48-54) 
Othello's model for self-comparison is the biblical Job, w h  o lost his 
possessions and contracted boils and sores, and yet remained patient: 
his story in the words of the preamble in the Genevan Bible was "the 
example of a singular patience." But Othello goes even further by 
claiming that not even an angel's patience could endure his suffering: 
Turn thy complexion there, 
Patience, thou young and rose-lipp'd cherubin— 
A y  , here, look grim as hell! 
(63-65) 
This personification of patience evokes, in a highly ironic manner, 
the allegorical Christian portraits and descriptions of this virtue. 
Bullinger, for instance, w h e n redrawing Tertullian's "lively image of 
Patience," sketched her with 
her countenance . . . calm and quiet, her forehead smooth without 
furrowed wrinkles, which are signs of sorrow or anger. Her brows 
are never knit, but slack in cheerful wise, with her eyes cast comely 
down to the ground, not for the sorrow of any calamities, but only 
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for humility's sake. . . . Her color is like to theirs that are nigh 
no danger and are guiltless of evil. . . . For she sitteth in the 
throne of that most meek and quiet spirit, which is not troubled 
with any tempest nor overcast with any cloud but is plain, open, 
and of a goodly clearness.15 
T h e hellish grimness with which Othello endows his Patience is 
incongruous with such serene portraits; itfits this virtue as little as 
the accusation of adultery does Desdemona, w h o listens uncompre­
hendingly. Indeed, the maligned Desdemona is an image of the 
patience extolled by Tertullian-Bullinger, but refurbished for grim 
times. T h  e sources of her fortitude are old, but her strength of will 
makes this fortitude commensurate to times of exceptional tribula­
tion. If Iago is a n e w m a n , she is something of a n e w w o m a n . She is 
certainly a n e  w kind of heroine in Shakespeare, heightened as she is 
by her signal patience; and she foreshadows the heroines of the ro­
mances : Marina, "Like Patience gazing on kings' graves, and smiling 
/Extremity out of act" {Pericles, V.i. 137-38) , or Hermione, w h o 
teaches the guilty Leontes a lesson in expiation by remaining in 
hiding for sixteen years before revealing herself to him as a seeming 
statue—a living m o n u m e n  t to patience. Othello's grotesque image of 
Patience with her clear brow darkened to look as grim as hell, points 
up the exemplary patience of D e s d e m o n a — w h o takes her place 
a m o n g the suffering and patient w o m e n in Shakespeare's later plays 
—and it is also an ironic caricature of the changed self of Othello. 
Iago's relatively easy success in achieving this distortion of 
Othello's vision points to some weakness in the M o o r that facilitates 
the villain's task. Perhaps w  e should say that, in spite of appearances 
to the contrary, Othello's character has an affinity with Iago's or, at 
least, that there is something in Othello that desires such affinity. 
Othello's subjugation by Iago is, in a sense, a seduction, and a 
seduction requires not only a seducer but also a person w h  o can be 
seduced.16 Surely it is not true that under Othello's circumstances 
any m a  n would become jealous, and Shakespeare provides occasions 
where Othello very simply could test Iago's insinuations. Not that 
Othello is naturally jealous or even, atfirst, notably passionate; his 
calmness and composure at the beginning are extraordinary, and so 
is the eloquence with which he demonstrates them. Such phrases as 
"I fetch m  y life and b e i n g / F r o m m e n of royal siege" and " m y 
parts, m  y title, and m  y perfect soul" ring in one's ear. Yet there is 
something in these assertions that makes one distrust their confi­
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dence. In a more melodious and elevated key, they echo Iago's pro­
testations of self-knowledge, and they are, like his, underlined by 
repeated uses of the word " k n o w . " A n d it is ironic that Othello's 
claim of having a "perfect soul" follows Iago's declaration that those 
fellows w h o , like him, do not follow their masters "have some soul." 
Of course, Othello's perfect soul is one free from wrongdoing, Iago's 
soul is one that gives him power to deceive the world; but in either 
case there is a lack of humility. T h e humanists and, even more 
strongly, the skeptics had enjoined this virtue as a prerequisite for 
whatever self-knowledge a m a  n can achieve, and Othello is almost as 
conspicuously shown deficient in humility of mind as is Iago. 
There is a hint at self-delusion in Othello's assertion that amorous 
emotions are "defunct" in him as he supports Desdemona's request 
to accompany him to Cyprus. T h e idea that her presence might dis­
tract him from his military duties is, to him, absurd: 
N o , when light-wing'd toys 
Of feather'd Cupid seel with wanton dullness 
M  y speculative and offic'd instruments, 
That m  y disports corrupt and taint m  y business, 
Let huswives make a skillet of m  y helm, 
A n  d all indign and base adversities 
M a k  e head against m  y estimation! 
(I.iii.268—74) 
Apart from the low estimate of the power of passion that these lines 
betray, they are sound as theoretical psychology of the humanistic 
kind: Othello's distinction between the speculative and the active 
mind shows his awareness of the mental processes that the humanists 
thought involved in moral action. But the lines also indicate Othello's 
trust in his will, the one faculty in which Iago thinks him deficient. 
Othello has, like Iago, a penchant for self-dramatizations. Othello's, 
it is true, ring sonorously in one's ear; Iago's grate on it. I do not 
think that self-dramatization is per se a tragic weakness; it is rather 
a demonstration of the tragic hero's heightened self that makes us 
feel his glory and suffering as extraordinary.17 Yet Othello's manner 
of self-dramatization is different from Hamlet's or Lear's. T h e 
sensual lilt, the "Othello music," as Professor Knight has called it, 
points to a sentimental- temperament, and the subject matter is 
generally Othello's romantic past. Not that he exaggerates its 
glamor. A  s one listens to his account of his travels, one thinks of 
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Elizabethan adventurers' voyages to faraway lands. But it is notable 
that he dramatizes himself almost always in terms of his past. Iago, 
w h  o practically never talks of the past, is his very opposite here; he 
has no romantic vein. H  e is colder, more efficient. 
It m a  y be natural for an older m a  n to try to establish his identity 
by reference to the past, to define what he is in the present by what 
he has been before; but there is often something in Othello's re­
capitulations that inspires apprehension about his ability to cope with 
the present. T h e most notable example is his eloquent retrospective 
self-assessment in which he says farewell to the soldierly profession 
(III.iii.351 ff.). It is a hasty farewell, as precipitous as the despair 
of Richard II; Iago has not yet played his trump of the hand­
kerchief. T h  e premature defeatism is as unwise as his earlier boast 
of rational control; the speech bears some resemblance to those of 
earlier dramas in which erstwhile confident conquerors confess the 
subjugation of their souls by love, but Othello's ruination is more 
painful because it is due not to light-feathered Cupid but to the 
green-eyed monster of jealousy. 
It will be said that the important difference between Iago and 
Othello is not that the one represents the present and the other 
the past, but that the one is a Negro and the other a Venetian. This, 
of course, is true; but the difference matters only because of what 
Iago makes of it. At the decisive m o m e n t of the seduction, he hints 
that he knows such supersubtle Venetians as Desdemona, and Othello 
does not. It is after having m a d  e Othello insecure that Iago suggests 
the significant difference between himself and Desdemona on the 
one hand and Othello on the other: the dissimilarities of "clime, 
complexion, and degree" (the first two imply race) m a k e Desde­
mona's choice of Othello "unnatural" (III.iii.205-37). lago's argu­
ment for the seduction of Othello hinges on an old commonplace of 
the mutual attraction of like natures and the repulsion of unlike 
ones. 
A s previously noted, lago's method of arguing was paralleled in 
the procedures recommended for the "passion mover," that is, the 
person engaged in controlling other people's reactions, by Thomas 
Wright in The Passions of the Mind, which had its second, en­
larged edition in the year Shakespeare presumably composed Othello 
(1604). W  e m a  y recall that Wright takes a similarly protective atti­
tude toward his well-meaning but naive countrymen as Iago hypo­
critically does toward Othello: they must be shielded from the 
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sleights and deceits of sophisticated foreigners (specified as Italians 
and Spaniards by Wright) . O f course, Wright wanted his book to 
serve the defense of virtue; Iago's arguments are used in its defeat. 
But in the employment of psychological means, Wright and Iago 
have something in c o m m o n  ; they have been to a n e  w school, whereas 
Othello is "unbookish." 
If Othello is overly trustful, he is certainly not a born dupe like 
Roderigo; even Iago does not call him an ass but predicts that he 
will, egregiously, m a k e him one. Othello's trust is the abundance of 
a good quality and, as such, a fault, large enough for an Iago to 
exploit, small enough to warrant our sympathy. There is a subtle 
dramatic irony in Othello's speaking of Iago as a m a  n "of honesty 
and trust" (I.iii.284) just after declaring his imperviousness to 
passion. Othello's confidence in himself thus becomes associated with 
a mistake of judgment of others. In his conversation with Roderigo, 
Iago has just blatantly demonstrated his unworthiness of the trust 
Othello puts in him, and one must conclude therefore that Othello's 
knowledge of himself and of other people is faulty. W h e  n it later 
becomes evident that his judgment of Iago is shared by others, one 
is not likely to judge that Othello really knows more of people than 
it appeared, but that Iago is an even more clever villain than it 
seemed. 
Th e skillful transfer of envy and jealousy from Iago to Othello 
requires a peculiar closeness, almost a melting of the one into the 
other. T h e two become friends w h o swear eternal brotherhood; 
they are n o w , in an old humanistic commonplace, "one soul in 
bodies twain." In Wright's terms, the two form a "union of haters," 
which reinforces their strength.18 But in this combined organism, 
they are still differentiated; Iago supplies the will and Othello the 
passion. Iago is thus, in Wright's term, the "passion mover." In one 
of his analogues Wright calls this agent the "doctor" w h  o admin­
isters doses of passion or moderation according to the condition of 
his "patient"—the old metaphor of the passion as a disease thus 
assumes a new meaning: "The passion mover must look narrowly 
to this point and imitate herein the c o m m o  n practice of prudent 
physicians w h  o apply their medicine to the same maladies with par­
ticular respect and consideration of the patient's temper." 19 
This is exactly the treatment Iago administers to Othello; he 
provides at all stages just the right dose of poison to stimulate 
Othello's passion and the right amount of a lenitive to keep it from 
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exploding prematurely. H  e produces in Othello a progressive series 
of cumulative reactions, each of which is calculatingly determined 
and controlled by Iago, until Othello loses all self-direction and 
collapses. T h  efirst incident in this series is Iago's instigation of 
Cassio's drunkenness, which strains Othello's sense of discipline to 
the breaking point; the confusion of Cassio and Montano about the 
reasons for the disorder and the seeming reluctance of Iago to re­
veal them prevent Othello from making a rational inquiry, and 
passion threatens to overcome reason (II.iii.196 fL). This is a pre­
lude to the future turbulence. W h e  n Iago slowly injects jealousy 
into Othello's mind, the effect becomes audible and visible, and 
Iago himself registers the progress on the Moor's face, bearing, and 
speech. Othello n o  w gyrates between love and hate, and between 
violence and exhaustion. In one sentence, he pities Desdemona and 
recalls her sweetness, in the next, he wants to tear her all to pieces; 
in one scene, he shouts at the perplexed Desdemona in highest 
passion, and in the next, he enters so fatigued and exhausted as to 
m a k e it possible for Iago to anesthetize him with a few obscene 
insinuations. 
T h e continued vexations engineered by Iago do not allow Othello 
to return to his former, composed self. Just before his epileptic 
breakdown, he does, however, m a k e something of an attempt to 
shed the character imposed upon him by Iago. T h e latter's question, 
"Will you think so ?" with which the fourth act opens, suggests that 
Othello has objected to Iago's report of a kiss between Cassio and 
Desdemona or tried to give it an innocent interpretation; but when 
Iago evokes the picture of Cassio and Desdemona naked in bed, 
Othello's passion rises again. Iago reminds him n o w of the hand­
kerchief, and the m e m o r y of it comes over Othello's mind "as doth 
the raven o'er the infected house." W h e  n Iago n o  w insinuates that 
Cassio has confessed to lying with Desdemona, the word "lie" hits 
Othello like a dagger, and his puns turn it around in his heart. His 
mind disintegrates, he stammers disjointed and incoherent phrases, 
trembles and shakes, sees in the darkening of his vision a fore­
shadowing of nature, loses consciousness, and falls to the ground. 
This is the m o m e n  t of Othello's greatest physical passion. Iago 
calls it "epilepsy" w h e n Cassio appears on the scene. T h e fit is, I 
believe, modeled on Hercules's breakdown and madness in Seneca's 
Hercules Fur ens, which in the Renaissance was interpreted as epi­
lepsy.20 But the question whether it is this particular disease is of 
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secondary importance; Othello's sprawling on the ground is certainly 
pathological, and represents the ultimate in the physical expression 
of passion. Only the presence of Iago, w h o stands triumphantly over 
his fallen master, makes this tremendous outbreak credible; the 
incident of Othello's highest passion is also the m o m e n  t of the com ­
plete subjection of his self to Iago's will. Passion and will attain 
here a powerful baroque intensity. Iago can suggest n o  w to Othello 
that self-knowledge requires the murder of Desdemona. Othello's 
case, he says, is better than that of those cuckolds w h o do not k n o w 
they have been deceived: 
N o , let m e k n o w ; 
A n d knowing what I a m , I know what she shall be. 
(IV.i.72-73) 
Othello accepts this monstrous idea as wisdom: "  O thou art wise; 
'tis certain." 
This, the climax of the action, falls into the fourth act, as is usual 
in Shakespeare's dramatic structure. In Othello, the impact is inten­
sified by the three episodes in which the M o o  r is visibly blinded by 
passion; besides his collapse, there are his maddening commentary, 
accompanied by violent gestures, on Cassio's conversation with 
Bianca and his striking of Desdemona in Lodovico's presence. In 
each case, the provocation is great, but in each case it is also based 
on delusion—on the fantasy image of Desdemona and Cassio in 
bed, on a misinterpretation of the subject of Cassio's discourse, and 
on a misunderstanding of Desdemona's innocent remark that she is 
glad to see Cassio m a d e governor of Cyprus for "the love" she bears 
him. B  y showing Othello so totally deluded, Shakespeare lessens the 
painfulness of his decision to kill Desdemona for the sake of "jus­
tice." T h e Othello w h o goes to kill Desdemona has been brain­
washed by an expert and is no longer in control of himself. Lodo­
vico's amazement about the change of the m a  n w h o  m passion could 
not shake draws attention to the accomplished change. 
The answer to the question whether Othello ever emerges from 
his subjection to Iago is a difficult one.21 It seems sentimental to 
claim that there is always something in Othello that resists the ulti­
mate subjugation. But I think it is also not true that he remains in 
the end completely submerged. T h e crux is Othello's last, most im­
portant, and most problematic self-assessment in his charge to 
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Lodovico to report to the Venetian Senate the story of his life: 
"Speak of m e as I a m " (V.ii.345). T h e present tense should not 
blind us to the fact that this is another retrospective self-dramatiza­
tion. H o w e v e r  , it is not, I think, merely an exercise in Bovarysm, 
as T  . S. Eliot claimed.22 Bovarysm implies an ironic incongruity 
between the ideal and the actual arising from a congenital inability 
to face the truth about oneself; and as m u c h as Othello m a y drama­
tize himself, he is not anywhere shown to be merely a romantic liar. 
H  e appears to be intent on telling his story aright to Lodovico so 
that it can be told to the unsatisfied in Venice—"nothing extenuate, 
/ N o r set d o w n aught in malice": 
Then must you speak 
O f one that lov'd not wisely but too well; 
O  f one not easily jealous, but, being wrought, 
Perplexed in the extreme. 
(V.ii.345-49) 
But this is too simple a formula. That Othello loved not wisely, 
one agrees; but that he loved too well is hardly true: surely the 
greatest kind of love is not one that leads to precipitous jealousy. 
W h e  n Othello calls himself "not easily jealous," he denies what in 
the course of little mor  e than a day has taken place. But yet, the 
speech is not merely rationalization or self-pity. It is possible to 
read Othello's words in the explanatory w a y some critics d o : "loving 
too well" m a  y m e a  n to be doting; it m a  y be the kind of all-absorbing 
passion that, as does Othello's, becomes an obsession. "Not easily 
jealous" m a  y m e a  n "not naturally jealous," and Othello certainly 
is not a naturally jealous m a  n in the sense in which Iago is one. 
Still, this interpretation is not immediately suggested by what 
Othello says, and, without it, Othello's self-explanation falls short 
of total illumination. 
After all, it would be surprising if Shakespeare, after writing 
plays that demonstrate m a n '  s difficulty in attaining a true picture 
of himself, would have given one of his least intellectual heroes a 
clear and rational view of his situation. Moreover, the dim and par­
tial recognition of the truth he gave to Othello is psychologically 
and dramatically appropriate. T h e m a n w h o once more looks back at 
his life has just murdered his wife and has experienced the chaos 
in himself that he ironically predicted would be the end of love. H e 
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has realized that both the nonjealous and the jealous Othello have 
ceased to exist. 'That's he that was Othello—here I a m ,  " he says 
as his pursuers take him captive. In this simple phrase is contained 
perhaps a better anagnorisis—and note the juxtaposition of past and 
present tense—than in his last retrospective self-assessment, which 
cannot be totally successful if it is to be plausible. T h e words are 
those of a m a  n w h  o drops tears as fast as the "Arabian trees their 
med'cinable g u m ,  " w h  o is still in the grip of passion although of a 
nobler one than that which motivated him to kill. A n  d the words 
are the prelude to another passionate act: suicide. It is probably im­
possible ever to recapture the past completely; for Othello to formu­
late a rational self-explanation at this m o m e n t would be quite uncon­
vincing. 
If the intellectual truth of Othello's words is incomplete, there is 
something in the imagery of the speech that adds a glow of e m o ­
tional, "fideistic" truth, to which the allusion to Othello's Christian­
ity contributes. H  e n o  w senses the value of the pearl that he, like 
the base Indian (or, should w  e read "Judean" with the Folio?), 
threw away. A n  d his concluding description of the incident in Aleppo 
when he slew the Turk that "beat a Venetian and traduc'd the state" 
recalls that Othello hit another Venetian, Desdemona  ; and if he did 
not traduce the state, he certainly scanted its "serious and great busi­
ness." Past and present merge in the magnificent metaphor in which 
Othello takes his o w n life: the hand that leads the knife is n o w , just 
as in Aleppo, Othello's; the same hand that killed Desdemona kills 
n o  w himself. Othello is not only the executor of justice but also a 
criminal; he is the "dog" w h o  m he once slew. 
Although Othello's conscious judgment of himself is defective, it 
is nevertheless true that he is a victim w h  o deserves pity. A  s he 
says, he was, "being wrought, / Perplexed in the extreme." Even 
granted the imperfections in Othello's character—his overconfidence, 
his rootedness in the past, his excessive trust, his premature de­
featism, his obsessive love—without Iago's extraordinary skill of 
engendering jealousy in him, the M o o r could not be thought to turn 
from an honorable general into what he grotesquely calls an "honor­
able murderer." O n  e gets the impression that Othello's self-knowl­
edge, defective as it is, would have been sufficient for all situations 
except the one in which Iago involves him. T h e subjection of 
Othello's self requires the skillful and relentless ministrations of a 
master deceiver. Iago's machinations interlock with Othello's reac­
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tions so that the latter always appear a plausible result of the former. 
In contrast to other Jacobean dramatists w h  o also strove for strong 
effects, Shakespeare understood h o w to m a k e great passion humanly 
credible: Othello's jealousy and violence strike us as plausible and 
awe-inspiring because of the strength of the begetter Iago. T h  e 
effect is commensurate to the cause. T h e dynamic subjection of 
Othello's self is so masterfully treated that the intensity of Othello's 
passion produces not merely amazement but also compassion. 
Othello inflicts suffering; but he himself also suffers excruciatingly. 
It is primarily his capacity for suffering that, in spite of his lack of 
intellectual strength, makes him the powerful tragic hero he is. 
CHAPTER FIFTEEN 
King Lear: 
Valuing the Self 
TH E L A C K O F S E L F - K N O W L E D G E is treated trag­ically in King Lear, as it is in Othello. T h e theme is, of course, the spring for most of Shakespeare's plays. Even the 
comic plots generally evolve around men's failures to k n o w them­
selves and their conditions; but they deal with this subject more 
lightly, and the flaw is corrected in time. In the plays of Shake­
speare's mannerist phase, the problem of man's understanding of 
himself is associated with that of man's insecurity, and it is treated 
in the larger frame of the difficulty of understanding the truth in 
general. This context is also present in the baroque tragedies, but 
the lack of self-knowledge is here intensified and shown to have 
gigantic consequences because of the tremendous will and passion 
of the heroes. Hamlet is puzzled, thwarted, and disillusioned as 
he seeks for truth in an environment that hides and obscures it; 
Othello, in a situation more open to rational solution, accepts an 
absolute falsehood as truth, a falsehood that becomes the guiding 
force of his whole being. Macbeth equally resolutely excludes the 
possibility of facing the imperative of moral action and goes on to 
violate it in one senseless murder after another. But Lear's lack of 
self-knowledge even by comparison with Othello's and Macbeth's is 
monumental and its consequences are devastating. Wi th no outside 
persuader or extraordinary temptation to blind and seduce him, the 
king foolishly accepts his false daughters as true and his true 
daughter as false, and, as a result, he is subjected to a gigantic 
suffering of body and soul; he disintegrates while the world that 
he once ruled trembles and shakes. 
Th  e first scene of King Lear makes the strongest statement about 
lack of self-knowledge anywhere in Shakespeare, so strong a state­
ment that it comes close to being psychologically improbable. A 
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m a  n w h  o arranges a contest of love protestations a m o n  g his daugh­
ters and, as a result, disinherits his favorite at the spur of the m o  ­
ment m a  y be thought, from the point of view of strict realism, to be 
too foolish to be a tragic hero; and, indeed, the great realist Tolstoy 
preferred the somewhat less irrational Leir of Shakespeare's source 
play to him. Shakespeare disdained to give his king even the kind of 
feeble motivation he has in the old play, where the rejection of the 
favorite daughter is somewhat prepared for in the six scenes that 
precede it. Here the idea of dividing the kingdom was not the old 
king's but that of a trusted counselor, reluctantly agreed to by Leir 
because it gave him an opportunity to provide dowries for his 
daughters to m a k e them marriageable. T h e contest had the special 
purpose of tricking his favorite Cordelia into marriage; she had so 
far refused to marry, wanting to do so only if she could love. Confi­
dently expecting Cordelia to outdo her sisters in affirming her devo­
tion, Leir plans to take the opportunity to elicit from her the promise 
to marry the D u k e of Brittany as a pledge of her love. His dis­
appointment, a mild passion compared to Lear's terrifying wrath, is 
rooted in a father's frustration over his failure to provide for his 
daughter. 
B y contrast, Shakespeare has his king commit a well-nigh inex­
plicable blunder, enhanced by a public display of gigantic wrath. The 
love declarations, a private matter in the old play, become a cere­
monious rite of kingship arranged for no better purpose than the 
satisfaction of Lear's ego after the fait accompli of the division of his 
kingdom. His outbreak of anger is punctuated by the violent oath 
with which he disclaims propinquity and paternal care of Cordelia: 
. .  . by the sacred radiance of the sun,

The mysteries of Hecat and the night;

B  y all the operation of the orbs

F r o m w h o m w e do exist and cease to be.

(I.i.108-11) 
Lear's folly is underlined by his parallel reaction to Kent's cou­
rageous warning to "see better." W h e  n Lear swears "by Apollo," the 
asseveration must have struck m a n y in Shakespeare's audience as 
ironic because the ancients had thought that nosce teipsum emanated 
from this very Apollo. A s Kent says, Lear swears his gods in vain. 
T h e truth, which Lear says shall be Cordelia's dowry, is irreconcil­
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able with the demands of his ego. His lack of self-knowledge is 
monumental. 
Th  e setting of thefirst scene is a ritual, ceremonious and splendid; 
but the public show is punctured by elemental passions. T h e moral 
and emotional coloring is heightened above realism. Goneril and 
Regan protest their loves in hyperbolically hypocritical ways; Cor­
delia, confessing her love for her father in asides, is uncompromis­
ingly forthright in her insistence that she can say nothing to c o m  ­
pete with her sisters; Kent minces no words w h e n he calls Lear 
" m a d " and "old m a n . " Will impacts on will, and the clashing forces 
—evil and good, treachery and loyalty, self-seeking and altruism, 
hate and love—are irreconcilable. Between these stands Lear, as 
extreme in his passion as is Cordelia in her low-voiced patience. H  e 
is an elementary h u m a  n force, a creature of a distant and pagan past; 
when he casts Cordelia from his heart as if she were a "barbarous 
Scythian," he characterizes himself as barbaric, primitively irra­
tional in his hatred. But this hatred betrays an equally elemental 
love from which it springs, an unreasonable, egotistic love that de­
mands what it has no right to ask. W  e cannot but accept Regan's 
judgment: he has ever but slenderly k n o w  n himself. 
Not enough is one such demonstration of folly; the second scene 
presents a similarly gigantic blunder (although put into a somewhat 
lower key because the scene is in prose, except for E d m u n d '  s solil­
oquy) . O  n the basis of the forged letter given to him by his bastard 
son, the Earl of Gloucester concludes that his legitimate son is a 
villain w h o seeks to conspire against him to bring about his death. 
E d m u n  d pushes the unbelievability of the situation to the degree 
that he alleges this letter was thrown into his window in what, from 
a realistic point of view, must appear to be an unnecessary and inex­
plicable conspiratorial furtiveness. But Gloucester accepts this m o n  ­
strous lie as truth; he trusts where he should suspect and suspects 
where he should trust. Even on Edgar, w h o enters almost i m m e ­
diately after Gloucester leaves, the villainous practices of E d m u n  d 
ride easily. T h  e tragedy of Gloucester, which will vie in intensity 
with Lear's, has begun. 
A s Lear sharply contrasts good and evil, knowledge and igno­
rance, patience and passion, so it groups the major characters ac­
cording to their capacity or incapacity to reevaluate, to suffer, and 
to learn. Obviously, the irremediably evil ones, Regan, Goneril, 
E d m u n d , and Cornwall, do not learn. They "understand them­
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selves" in the sense in which Iago does; they cannot comprehend 
that feelings and thoughts beyond egotistic desires have beauty and 
value. Yet, Shakespeare was never simple and schematic, and he 
gave at least E d m u n  d a last-minute change of mind and perhaps of 
heart when, against his "nature," he tries to save Cordelia, whose 
death he has ordered. Yet even this seeming inconsistency helps 
to point up the destructive consequences of learning nothing or learn­
ing too little and too late: Cordelia is already dead. Contrasted 
with the wicked w h  o refuse to learn are those characters w h  o are 
sent to school: Lear, Edgar, Gloucester, and Albany. Each of them 
can be said to fail a test: Lear and Gloucester that of recognizing 
truth and falsehood, loyalty and treachery; Edgar that of courage 
and cowardice; Albany that of decision and indecision. Yet each of 
them also progresses beyond the lowest point, most spectacularly 
Edgar, w h  o becomes a teacher of patience to his father and, in the 
end, the prosecutor and judge of the wicked. T w  o characters need 
not learn since they already possess truth and goodness, the old Kent 
and the young Cordelia. They represent virtue by what they are. 
T h  e learning processes, which include partial discoveries, hesita­
tions, reversals, and (in the case of Edgar) full achievement, take 
on a cosmic dimension through the characters' pagan theologies. This 
is a subject which has been fully explored in William Elton's pains­
taking study,1 but w  e need to examine its bearing on the theme of 
self-knowledge. Incontrovertibly, Lear is a paganized version of 
the same story to which the old Leir had given a pious Christian 
coloring. Jupiter, Apollo, Hecate, and Nature are invoked, but not 
the Christian God. A s the characters, in agony and despair, in horror 
and awe, in anger and grief, and (rarely) in hope and joy, view 
themselves and others, they express their reactions by addressing the 
gods, invoking, questioning, rejecting, and accepting them. Thus the 
theologies give the characters a metaphysical extension and help to 
place them into psychological and philosophical categories. 
But I do not think that the views the characters express about the 
gods detract attention from the h u m a  n predicament the play depicts ; 
they do not do so for us, and neither, I think, would they have done so 
for the Christians (and these, from lukewarm to orthodox, surely con­
stituted the overwhelming majority) of Shakespeare's audience. I 
shall argue that—paradoxical as it m a  y sound—the pagan climate was 
likely to have increased their interest in the theme of self-knowledge. 
In order to understand the implications of a strongly pagan treat­
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ment of a story for the theme of self-knowledge in Shakespeare's 
time, one should realize that the theologians, regardless of their atti­
tude toward possible salvation for pagans, found meritorious what­
ever moral excellence these possessed; in fact, they found it more 
meritorious than the virtue of Christians, w h  o had the guidance of 
the true faith. A n d though pagans could not k n o w the ultimate good­
ness, that is, God , they could understand the springs of virtue in 
the h u m a  n soul. Deprived of the spiritual light as they were, they 
were examples of h o w far m e n m a y go by the light of reason alone 
in practicing virtue. If they demonstrated self-knowledge, they could 
serve as exemplars for Christians, whose faith provided them with 
much greater incentive. Thus, the theologian T h o m a s Rogers ex­
plained that he had illustrated his Anatomy of the Mind "with m a n y 
examples of heathen m e n  , to the bettering, I hope, of dissembling 
Christians, which—if not by wholesome sermons of godly m e n , yet 
by the notable example of others destitute of those gifts and graces 
which w e are adorned with—may k n o w themselves, be ashamed of 
their ungratefulness, embrace virtue, and increase in godliness." 2 
Thus the pagan frame of a story could serve to give nosce teipsum 
precedence over nosce Deum, as I think does Lear. It is the merit of 
Professor Elton's study to have shown that Lear is not a play about 
purification leading toward salvation in a benevolent world order, as 
it has often been interpreted, and to have demonstrated the charac­
ters' complex relationships to the gods as well as the analogies these 
relationships suggest to Christian conceptions of G o d  . But the play 
is not an examination of pagan religion, or an examination of reli­
gious skepticism, or an evocation of the horror of existential noth­
ingness, although it does contain such elements or keeps them at the 
edges of the characters' experiences. Neither, of course, is Lear a 
sermon, although it does contain m u c  h homiletic material. A n  d I 
shall not claim that it is a program for the achievement of self-knowl­
edge ; but I shall argue that it draws on such programs and that they 
are a major constituent element in the tragic vision imprinted on 
the action and the thought. 
I should like to go a step further and say that the program of 
self-knowledge inherent in this tragic vision is humanistic in the 
two major, and not always compatible, senses in which the word is 
used for Shakespeare's period. T h e program is humanistic in the 
sense of this study inasmuch as it contains values championed by 
the Christian humanists; but it is also humanistic in the sense that 
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the w a  y to self-knowledge is not illuminated by a theologically con­
ceived universe that cooperates in man's plan. T h e Deus absconditus 
w h o  , according to M r  . Elton, is enthroned over Lear's England, does 
not reveal his design. S o m  e time before Lear, as w  e have noted, 
Shakespeare had dissociated the search for self-knowledge from the 
purposes of the universe and the dispositions of heaven. But Lear, 
like other plays of Shakespeare, does measure m e n  , not with a 
divine measurement but with one obtained by a sympathetic and yet 
firm view of humanity. M u c  h of this measuring is done by the way 
the characters are compared and contrasted with one another. M a n  , 
in Lear, is as he values himself and others and is valued by them. 
In Lear, more than elsewhere, the measuring and valuing proceeds 
by w a  y of paradoxes. T h  e most sympathetic characters often take po­
sitions that contrast with c o m m o n opinion, and they make us take their 
perspective. T h  e action itself is constructed on the pattern of a huge 
paradox that tests the characters by turning them into the opposites 
of what they were or appeared to be atfirst. A powerful king, whose 
every word is a c o m m a n d , becomes a despised old m a n subjected to 
the inclemencies of the weather. F r o  m the center of his kingdom, he 
is thrust to its periphery; from a demigod, he plunges to being hardly 
more than a naked animal. Analogous paradoxical transformations, 
arising from Lear's and Gloucester's follies, are undergone by others. 
T h e two daughters w h o  m Lear has enriched turn against him in 
boundless cruelty, and the one he has deprived and rejected be­
comes his last joy. Cordelia, atfirst Lear's most-loved daughter, then 
his most hated, is, in his deprivation, his consoler and temporary 
healer. Kent, the king's favorite nobleman, is made into an outlaw; 
then, in disguise, he becomes the faithful companion of the king wh  o 
outlawed him. Gloucester, w h o like Lear is part-agent of his down­
fall, descends from a mighty duke to a blind old m a n  , pursued by the 
bastard son w h o  m he has made his heir, but saved and guided by the 
legitimate son w h o  m he has disinherited. E d m u n d  , the treacherous 
bastard, becomes "the legitimate," and, at least briefly, Earl of 
Gloucester. Edgar, the true and loyal son, finds himself a m a n with­
out a name, a fugitive w h o masquerades as a crazed beggar. Yet 
when all seems lost, he turns into an executor of justice who , al­
though he cannot prevent the death of innocents, exposes the evil­
doers and brings about their punishment. This outcast of society, 
Edgar, becomes in the end the ruler of England. 
These outward paradoxes are associated with, and accompanied 
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by, inner ones. T  o these even critics w h  o deny that the physical suf­
ferings of Lear and Gloucester are accompanied by, or bring about, 
ethical or religious purification react in some fashion. Although 
Swinburne wanted to have nothing to do with finding atonement, 
reconciliation, requital, redemption, amends, equity, explanation, 
pity, and mercy in Lear, he saw its pessimism as carrying a para­
doxical message: "Nature herself, w  e might say, is revealed—and 
revealed as unnatural." 3 L  . L  . Schucking, w h  o wished to see Lear 
as a play of the stage only and thought the king attains few insights 
in madness, yet found him a paradox: his weaknesses are comple­
ments of his strength; what makes him so majestic and powerful, 
that is, his consciousness of authority and greatness, are the main 
elements in the rigidity that brings about his downfall through 
wrath.4 
Swinburne responded to the paradoxical uses of "nature" in the 
play, and other critics, notably Robert Heilman, have uncovered 
similar language and image clusters that force statements in terms 
of thematic paradoxes. A s Heilman has shown massively, the method 
of underlining meaning by symbols and images embraces the play; 
each of these is a restatement of the central theme on a reduced scale 
—a restatement that never merely repeats, but amplifies, enriches, 
supports, and gives a new perspective to the central theme.5 Thus the 
paradoxes of Lear go beyond the Renaissance concern with rhetorical 
devices; they are not merely verbal and formal like the sophistical 
wit of a Berowne in Love's Labor's Lost or the sentential warnings 
of a Lucrece to Tarquin. T h  e paradoxes of Lear enter into the plot 
structure, the character delineation, the thematic strands, thefiber of 
thought. They are paradoxes of significance, intrinsic to a dramatic 
and moral strategy that negates in order to affirm, plunges Lear into 
madness to give him a sense of the h u m a n condition, deprives 
Gloucester of sight to m a k e him see feelingly, causes fools to speak 
more wisely than the sane and intellectually keen, and strips those 
that wear gorgeous clothes more revealingly naked than those that 
have nothing but blankets to hide their skins. These thematic para­
doxes turn opinion upside-down, not merely in order to prove it 
wrong, but also to make us evaluate the characters' actions against a 
higher truth and wisdom. In this respect, the paradoxes of Lear 
resemble the technique of baroque artists w h  o created a spatial 
perspective by taking the viewers' eyes backward and forward from 
foreground to background and from background to foreground and 
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w h  o thus achieved "first negation, then strong affirmation, which 
gives a special illusion of release into 'distance' and 'infinity.' " 6 
In creating this perspective, which combines a most painful tragic 
experience with a profound ethical and metaphysical suggestiveness, 
Shakespeare drew on a tradition of Renaissance moral paradoxes, 
which in their Christian-pagan syncretism suited the particular intel­
lectual and spiritual atmosphere of the play. T h  e general indebtedness 
of Lear to this convention has been well recognized, and Professor 
Colie has sketched engagingly the paradoxical thought of the play in 
the context of her work on the Renaissance paradoxical tradition;7 
but in this study w e shall do well to reexamine briefly the general 
sources of Shakespeare's patterns in order to extract the raw mate­
rials they rendered to him for the design of his tragedy. 
Both the classical and the Christian traditions of self-knowledge 
were ingrained with paradoxes. Renaissance prescriptions of nosce 
teipsum generally pointed to Socrates's modest interpretation of the 
Delphic oracle's pronouncement that he was the wisest of m e n  : he 
was aware of his o w n ignorance. A n d m a n in general was depicted 
in Renaissance psychology as a paradox of body and soul, of animal 
and spirit, as simultaneously the weakest and most conceited being, 
the most glorious and most abject of earthly creatures. His physical 
and psychic organisms were composed of antithetical qualities: hot 
against cold, moist against dry in his humorial constitution; animal 
passion against angelic reason in his soul; speculative understanding 
against angelic reason in his mind. H  e needed to realize that the 
stars influenced in some w a y his condition and action, but that his 
free will m a d e him responsible for his actions. T h e humanistic school 
exercises acquainted all educated m e  n with the Stoic paradoxes of 
the slavery of the supposedly free m a  n and the freedom of the ap­
parently enchained. A n  d educated and uneducated alike were nour­
ished with the biblical, particularly Pauline, paradoxes of the value 
of the goods of the faith as compared with the riches of the world, of 
the blindness of those that think they see and the foolishness of those 
that believe they k n o w  . 
Eager collectors of the pearls of wisdom hidden in the shell of 
rhetorical figures as the humanists were, they gathered paradoxes 
from various sources, adding to them by their o w n ingenuity and 
making them subservient to their non-doctrinaire but ethically 
charged Christianity. They drew into this context even the para­
doxes that began as rhetorical sleights of hand, the paradoxical 
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encomiums, that is, ironical eulogies of minute, or apparently un­
worthy, or trifling subjects. O n e large collection of paradoxes, some 
merely clever, some seriously probing man's condition, was the 
Italian humanist's Ortensio Landi's Paradossi (1543). It was trans­
lated, paraphrased, and augmented by Charles Estienne as Paradoxes 
(1553). Twelve of Estienne's twenty-six paradoxes were in turn 
translated into English by Antony M u n d a y under the title of The 
Defence of Contraries: Paradoxes Against Common Opinion (1593). 
S o m  e of these paradoxes are of the kind Shakespeare w o v  e into 
Lear: besides the ubiquitous ones that extol foolishness over wisdom 
and blindness over seeing, there are those that claim the preference 
of banishment to liberty, of illness to health, of scarcity to abundance, 
of sterility to fertility (because of the ingratitude of children), and 
(this latter paradox is merely listed, not developed into an essay) of 
bastardy to legitimacy.8 
Although the primary purpose of The Defence was to provide 
young minds with rhetorical exercises, a secondary one, as the 
Epistle to the Reader explained, was to teach that truth is a matter 
of perspective: 
Even as contrary things, compared one with another, do give en­
deavor of their value and virtue, so the truth of any matter whatso­
ever appeareth most clearly when the different reasons against the 
same is equaled or neighbored therewith. . . . For this intent, I 
have undertaken in this book to debate on certain matters which 
our elders were wont to call paradoxes, that is to say, things con­
trary to most men's present opinions, to the end that by such dis­
course as is held in them opposed truth might appear more clear 
and apparent.9 
I a  m tempted to think that Shakespeare read The Defence and was 
impressed by its strategy of moral perspective before writing Lear; 
but whether he ever saw the book or not, he was surely familiar 
with the tradition it reflected. 
A s Professor Jorgensen has shown, there is yet another kind of 
paradox that plays a very special role in Lear, an offshoot of the 
genre of paradoxical encomiums, the praise of that subject of least ap­
parent value, of "nothing." 10 A sixteenth-century French poet, John 
Passeratti, m a  y have started the fashion in a Latin poem, "Nihil." 
A  n Italian, Francesco Beccuti (II Copetta), wrote a series of prose 
reflections in the same vein, Capitolo ne quale si lodano le Nonce­
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velle. This exercise also produced an English offshoot when an E  . D .  , 
variously identified as E d w a r d Dyer or Edward Daunce, adapted the 
idea in a small prose pamphlet, The Praise of Nothing (1585). 
E  . D. ' s attempt at a comico-serious tone is not totally successful, but 
he does manage to collect an impressive list of the significant "noth­
ings" on which depend all things. Central to his design is the rejec­
tion of the claim that "nothing comes from nothing." T  o refute this 
axiom is a "mean to attain to the true knowledge of God and of our­
selves; of G o d , w h o , making all things for m a n of nothing, is 
preached to us by the architecture of this mighty engine of the 
world; of ourselves, w h o  , being m a d  e of reasonable souls and bodies, 
partake of both the nature of angels and brute beasts." u Similar 
statements can be found elsewhere outside of the paradoxical genre. 
In the light of this commonly held belief, it is clear that Lear's 
"nothing will come of nothing" would have struck Shakespeare's 
audience as a falsehood. It is, I think, no less than a symbolic state­
ment of Lear's hamartia, which consists of a gigantic lack of self-
knowledge. 
Because the phrase has become overlaid with commentary, it will 
be salutary to recall its primary meaning: Lear says that where 
nothing is given, that is, no declaration of love, there will be no 
dowry, no land. Lear's axiom is based on a hardheaded, materialistic 
attitude toward a world in which everything has its price. The 
phrase symbolizes Lear's procedure in thefirst scene: he metes out 
lands and possessions according to protestations of love he ex­
pects as a return on his o w  n investment in his daughters. H  e speaks 
according to what he thinks is a realistic assessment of the world, of 
the kind of world described by the Stoic Guillaume du Vair, w h o 
says bitterly that those w h  o wish to have honors, favors, and riches 
mustflatter and cheat, suffer injuries, and lose their liberty: "For as 
the world goeth n o w  , there is nothing to be gotten for bare noth­
ing." 12 
However , the nothing-from-nothing phrase had a metaphysical 
and ethical suggestiveness. M a n  y in Shakespeare's audience would 
have remembered from grammar school Persius's third satire, 
in which the ignorant are ridiculed w h  o refuse to be enlightened 
about "what w e are" and w h o laugh at the axiom gigni de nihilo 
nihil, in nihilum posse reverti. But the Renaissance commentators, 
and thus the pedagogues, proved Persius himself ignorant in this 
matter, and with him such materialistic philosophers as Democritus, 
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Epicurus, and Lucretius. Th  e commentators opposed to them the ec­
clesiastical d o g m a that G o d had created the universe as well as man's 
soul from nothing.13 W h e  n Shakespeare studied Persius in gramma r 
school, he was very likely told that all important things came from 
nothing. Besides, the antinomies of "all" and "nothing" were in­
grained in the language into which he grew; they were the antipodes 
to underline the eternal significances of life and death, immortality 
and mortality. 
Lear's "nothing will come of nothing" highlights in its context his 
ignorance of spiritual and ethical values, in particular his ignorance 
of the nature of the "all" that arises from man's soul. A s Shake­
speare's audience knew, G o d created that sublime essence, man's soul, 
of nothing. T  o quote only one of the m a n  y statements, from The 
Anatomy of Sin (1603), " W h e n G o d inspired a soul into A d a m , he 
made a blast not of his o w n nature, nor the air round about him, 
but even of nothing."14 A n  d E  . D  . was "persuaded that this 
latter age cannot but acknowledge sundry benefits which rise of 
nothing, as that which nurseth the godly in the love of virtue and 
punisheth the transgressors of good laws." 15 Lear takes a squarely 
materialistic attitude in a matter that concerns the most immaterial 
of substances and its qualities. B  y contrast, Cordelia, Kent, and 
France take an ethical-spiritual stance in their low opinion of material 
comforts and possessions valued by the world. Cordelia is ready to 
live as the nothing that paternal rejection makes her; Kent takes on 
himself the nothing he must be in exile; and the King of France ac­
cepts the Cordelia w h o  , according to Lear, is nothing without her 
dowry. All three understand that some nothings must be accepted 
for the sake of keeping and obtaining greater values. 
France most strongly denies the truth of nothing from nothing 
when he refuses to believe in Cordelia's wickedness, a belief, as he 
paradoxically puts it, which would be "a faith that reason without 
miracle / Should never plant in m e " (222-23). T h e point, of course, 
is that he has faith in miracles like Cordelia, a point enlarged upon 
in the paradoxes in which he acclaims the ideal nothingness of 
Cordelia, "most rich, being poor; / Most choice, forsaken; and most 
lov'd, despis'd" (250-51). This speech suggests clearly the Pauline 
attitude toward the things of this world which are "nothing" (1 
Cor. 1) and toward the materially poor but spiritually rich, w h o  , 
"having nothing," yet possess all things (2 Cor. 6:10) . T h e Genevan 
sidenote to the former passage explained that the "vile things" 
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chosen by G o d are "in man's judgment almost nothing, but taken 
for abjects and castaways." W h e  n France accepts Cordelia in mar­
riage and takes up, as he says, "what's cast away" (253), he shows 
that he understands, pagan though he is, the quality of nothing. In 
his contrasting ignorance, Burgundy rejects her on Lear's principle 
that nothing can come from nothing. This thematic use of the para­
dox thus points up symbolically Lear's and Burgundy's failures of self-
knowledge as rooted in their inability to understand the values of the 
h u m a n soul, and it contrasts this ignorance with the wisdom of 
Cordelia, Kent, and France. 
T h  e resulting suffering of Lear and his painful and thwarted 
groping toward an understanding of himself and of others will be 
the subject of the following chapter; at present I shall turn to the 
subplot, the Gloucester story, a subplot unique in Shakespeare by 
being of an importance almost equal to that of the main plot. It is 
indeed possible that the idea of treating the Cordelia-Lear story 
tragically in contrast to the sources, where it ended happily, came 
to Shakespeare through the source of the Gloucester plot, the story 
of the Paphlagonian king in Sir Philip Sidney's Arcadia. For Sidney, 
the story was a lesson in self-knowledge, demonstrating the danger 
of breaking the marriage bond and with it the laws that keep m a n 
within the bounds of humanity.16 But the story also was an example 
of the alleviating influence of true sympathy on suffering. Sidney's 
king falls prey to the deceit of his wicked bastard son, Plexirtus, w h  o 
slanders the legitimate son, Leonatus, and makes his father reject 
him. In "wretched ungratefulness," Plexirtus has his father blinded, 
usurps his place, and causes him to stray helplessly through the 
country. In this misery, Leonatus, endowed with "true natural good­
ness," becomes his father's helper and guide, the king's acknowledged 
"glass even to m  y blind eyes." 17 Here was the nucleus for the moral 
significance of the subplot and for the seeing-in-blindness paradox, 
which, together with that of wisdom-in-folly, is the major structural 
paradox of the play. 
T h e two paradoxes of blindness and folly were generally thought 
to be related. In The Defence of Contraries, the claim that ignorance 
is better than knowledge (Declamation 3) is followed by the asser­
tion that blindness is better than sight, and both m a k  e the point that 
the states of deprivation entail greater wisdom and insight. Thus 
blindness "gives m e n leasure and commodity of power, at their o w n 
ease, to contemplate celestial beauties and excellencies divine." But 
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The Defence quickly lapses into absurdity: one of the "advantages" 
the blind have over the seeing is that the former "have no need of 
spectacles wherewith to see small things nor of eyeglasses, otherwise 
called barnacles, w h e n they travel in windy weather." 18 
It is possible that this painful jest gave Shakespeare the idea of 
connecting, by means of the "nothing" leitmotiv, Gloucester's 
hamartia with that of Lear. A  s E d m u n  d pretends to be surprised by 
Gloucester and alleges to have been reading "nothing," the D u k  e 
queries: " N  o ? W h a  t needed then that terrible dispatch of it into your 
pocket ? T h e quality of nothing hath no such need to hide itself. Let's 
see. C o m e  , if it be nothing, I shall not need spectacles" (I.ii.32-35). 
Gloucester's comment plays a variation on Lear's "nothing from 
nothing" phrase and symbolizes, by its expression of optic myopia, 
his spiritual blindness. There is also an echo of Lear's materialistic 
interpretation of "nothing" in Gloucester's order to pursue Edgar: 
"Find out this villain, E d m u n d ; it shall lose thee nothing" (I.ii.i 15). 
This charge follows immediately upon Gloucester's wholesale ac­
ceptance of judicial astrology ("These late eclipses in the sun and 
m o o n portend no good to us"), which corroborates both Gloucester's 
bent to credulousness, evidenced in his trust of Edgar, and his delu­
sion of knowing all about the ways of the world. 
That Gloucester thinks of himself as worldly-wise is evident from 
the nonchalance with which, at the opening of the play, he speaks to 
Kent about the pleasant faux pas that produced E d m u n d  . Such 
inclination to pleasure and lust was , as L o d o w y c k Brysket explained, 
a kind of blindness : 
A n d this ignorance concerning the knowledge of a man's self is 
the cause that he [the voluptuous m a n ] cannot tell h o w to use him­
self. For these unreasonable affections do so darken the light of 
reason that he is a blind m a  n and giveth himself over to be guided, 
as one that hath lost the right way, to as blind a guide as himself 
and so wandereth astray which way soever his bad guide doth lead 
him.19 
Gloucester's credulousness, which is intellectual blindness, and his 
sensuality, which is moral blindness, m a k  e his later loss of sight an 
external manifestation of his h u m a  n flaws. Gloucester's blinding 
parallels and emphasizes Lear's madness, which in turn arises from 
anger (a passion that, according to the much-quoted Horatian 
dictum, was a "short madness"). O n e revolts against considering 
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Gloucester's blindness and Lear's madness as "punishments" be­
cause this idea seems so m u c h like taking the part of E d m u n d , G o n ­
eril, and R e g a n  ; yet these afflictions have a relationship—if not in 
degree, at least in kind—to the nature of the follies to which they 
succeed. T h u  s Shakespeare conveyed the impression that there are 
sometimes cause-and-effect relationships between conduct and fate; 
but, by making the effects excessive, he avoided the false moral that 
in this world one receives exactly what one deserves. 
T h e act of blinding, even more importantly, demonstrates the 
sadistic urges of those w h  o in this world set themselves up as the 
judges of morality but whose hands are stained with greater vices 
than those w h o  m they condemn. In its questioning of worldly justice, 
Lear recalls Measure for Measure, but it proceeds from a probing 
into an accusing m o o d . Gloucester's torture is the more painful and 
raises the greater horror because it is occasioned by his acts of sym­
pathy for his old sovereign, w h e n he shelters him and communicates 
with Cordelia's party. In this most wantonly cruel act of the play, 
Shakespeare demonstrated climactically the boundless cruelty of the 
wicked w h  o seek to achieve the satisfaction of their egos by natural­
istic self-seeking. W  e identify with the servant's and with Albany's 
horror of this unnatural act and feel that humanity so directed must 
at least eat up itself. W  e also identify, momentarily at least, with 
Albany's feeling that there are justicers above w h e  n the servant kills 
that most contemptible of villains, Cornwall. 
T h  e blindness of Gloucester,first spiritual and then actual, serves 
to underline the folly of Lear in wrath and in madness. T h e play 
encourages continual cross-references between Gloucester and Lear; 
what one of them does or experiences is in an analogous m o d e done 
or suffered by the other. Lear's rejection of Cordelia can be looked 
upon as a kind of ethical and spiritual blindness; the imagery of 
darkness and light, which accompanies the rejection, encourages the 
analogy. Similarly, Gloucester's failure to discern truth and false­
hood is not only blindness but also foolishness bordering on madness. 
A n  d as Lear's insensitivity to "nothing" extends his ignorance of 
himself, so Gloucester's superstition gives his spiritual myopia a 
cosmic dimension. It is not Gloucester but Lear w h  o actually brings 
up blinding and ironically foreshadows what will happen to the duke 
(I.iv.301). A n  d while Gloucester never mentions sexuality and its 
effects again after his initial allusion to the "sport" that went into 
E d m u n d ' s making, Lear is obsessed with the subject from his denun­
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ciation of Goneril—"Into her w o m  b convey sterility . . ." (I.iv. 
278 ff.)—to the terrifying Centaur speech ( I V . v i . m - 3 1 )  , the latter 
being delivered in the presence of Gloucester, homo sensualis. 
Since Lear's earlier imprecations immediately precede the threat 
of blinding and are a reaction to Goneril's demand that he dis-
quantity his train, an association between ingratitude, sterility, and 
blindness is created. This is one of the most pervasive thematic links, 
and it is therefore worth noting that the same linking occurs in the 
paradox "that a barren w o m a  n is more happy than a bearing" of 
The Defence of Contraries (Declamation 8 ) . Wi th heavy irony, The 
Defence recommends sterility as "a sovereign medicine against the 
private malice of children" and suggests that those w h  o wish to bear 
children should procure "the divine plant, called Hermetiae, which 
whosoever useth—if Democritus be not a liar—not only shall en­
gender honest children and well disposed, but likewise fair and 
gracious." But, says The Defence, this herb m a y be lost, or D e m o c ­
ritus imagined it, or dreamed of it, "after he had put out his o w n 
eyes to become thereby the better philosopher." 20 But, regardless of 
whether there is any influence of The Defence on Lear in this point, 
the Democritus exemplum serves to remind one that there were 
precedents for the symbolic meaning of the Gloucester story that 
physical blindness can mea  n better spiritual vision. Tiresias, Oedipus, 
Samson, and Saint Paul come to mind; their blindness was apt to 
be moralized in the Renaissance as showing that this affliction can 
bring about understanding and insight. 
But perhaps the most relevant example was that of Tobit in the 
Apocrypha because it pointed a moral m u c h like that Edgar wishes 
to instill in his father w h e n he asks him to "bear free and patient 
thoughts" (IV.vi.80). In the words of the Genevan side-note, Tobit 
was "made blind as an example of patience to his posterity." A s 
Estella put it, " B  y afflictions . . . assure thyself that thou shalt 
recover the inward sight as Tobit did by the gall of the fish." 21 
The dung that deprived Tobit of his eyesight was generally inter­
preted to represent the filth of the world and to symbolize punish­
ment for worldly pleasures—a parallel to Edgar's moral that "the 
dark and vicious place" where Gloucester begot E d m u n  d "cost him 
his eyes" (V.iii. 172-73) . Also, Tobit's physical recovery, like the 
moral regeneration of Gloucester, was aided by a good son, Tobias, 
who, like Edgar, was believed to have been lost. Tobias's faith, sym­
bolized by the gall of thefish, makes this miracle possible. T h e story 
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was well-known; one place a m o n g m a n y in which Shakespeare m a y 
have been reminded of it was that old Stratford building which is 
n o w the S w a n Hotel. T h e message of the mural it harbors was not 
lost to him as it is to the modern tourist. 
But before Gloucester can approach a pattern of patience like that 
of Tobit, he falls prey to the temptation of his suicide attempt at 
Dover Cliff, which leads to the pseudo-miracle engineered by Edgar. 
Shakespeare fashioned the incident from a one-sentence statement in 
Sidney's Arcadia in which the Paphlagonian king asks Leonatus to 
lead him to the top of a rock so he can take his life by throwing him­
self d o w n , a demand that Leonatus understandably denies. Shake­
speare m a d e Gloucester take a leap; but since it is on level ground 
and, as a fall from height exists only in Gloucester's imagination 
(which is aided by Edgar's description), the incident is complex, 
inaccessible to realistic interpretations, and somewhat baffling in its 
bearing on the ethical issues. 
T h e lesson Edgar teaches his father at Dover Cliff does not only 
include the jump but also what immediately precedes and what fol­
lows. It is a lesson in visual and spiritual perspective; Edgar be­
comes the glass to Gloucester's eyes. T h e elaborateness of Edgar's 
description of the dizzy height (IV.vi.n ff.) goes certainly beyond 
what is required by the dramatic need to create for Gloucester the 
illusion of standing at the edge of a precipice. In a very similar 
description in Cymbeline (III.iii.11ff.), the speaker draws the con­
clusion that "it is place [that is, status and rank] which lessens and 
sets off." In Lear, the moral is more subtle. At first sight, it m a y 
appear fanciful to connect Gloucester's downwar  d look with the 
arguments of skeptic philosophers that the h u m a  n eye fails to see 
things truly, that the same objects seen from different sides, or from 
different angles, or at different places, appear different objects— 
proof of the unreliability of the senses. Yet a passage in Montaigne's 
"Apology of R a y m o n d Sebond" developing this topic has been 
plausibly claimed to have been Shakespeare's source for Edgar's 
description.22 Montaigne argued that the senses can dominate a 
man's imagination and inspire him with such fear as he cannot 
counteract with his reason: even a philosopher put in a cage on top 
of Notre D a m  e could not keep his composure, "but the sight of that 
exceeding height must needs dazzle his sight and amaze or turn his 
senses." Montaigne then reported his o w n experiences in the Alps in 
words that have some resemblance to Edgar's. 
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But Montaigne's conclusion is perhaps of even greater interest 
since it makes the point of the superiority of insight over sight: 
A n  d that w  e cannot, without some dread and giddiness in the head, 
so much as abide to look upon one of those even and downright 
precipices: "Ut despici sine vertigine simul oculorum animique 
non possit: So as they cannot look down without giddiness both of 
eyes and minds." . . . Therefore was it that a worthy philosopher 
pulled out his eyes that so he might discharge his soul of the seduc­
ing and diverting he received by them and better and more freely 
apply himself unto philosophy.23 
Edgar, like Montaigne, will "look no m o r e ; /Les t m y brain turn, 
and the deficient sight/Topple d o w n headlong" (IV. vi.22-24). 
The deficient sight becomes associated with Gloucester's lack of 
moral perception. H e stumbled w h e n he saw, and he walks unsteadily 
even n o w . After the Dover Cliff episode, he will walk a little more 
steadily. 
Gloucester's suicide attempt is an outgrowth of the pessimism and 
fatalism of the we-have-seen-the-best-of-our-time speech of the be­
ginning (I.ii.iooff.)—a speech associated with his optic and ethical 
blindness. U  p to the m o m e n  t of his leap, Gloucester believes that his 
fate is due to the "great opposeless wills" of the gods; in their sight, 
he seeks to "Shake patiently m  y great affliction off" (IV.vi.34 ff.). 
F r o m a Christian point of view (one valid also w h e n it came to 
judging meritorious pagans), Gloucester's self-knowledge fails him 
when he assumes his act to be a deliverance. In Brysket's words, he 
is like a m a n w h o is so overcome by happy or unhappy incidents that 
he does not realize that his passion proceeds from the nature of his 
mind: 
For their cowardice, w h  o suffer themselves to be overcome by such 
passions, persuades them that such things happen of necessity and 
through the immutable order of things, and so they make them­
selves wittingly slaves where they were free, wanting either will or 
power to use that liberty of their mind, either in the one fortune or 
the other.24 
T h e thoughts Edgar wishes his father to bear are significantly not 
merely "patient" but also "free" (80). T h e most obvious lesson of 
the incident is thus a rejection of the idea that suicide is permissible 
under certain circumstances and then constitutes a patient acceptance 
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of the inexorable laws of the universe—an idea attributed to some 
extreme Stoics. Edgar teaches his father that suicide is really despair 
and submission to fate rather than to the will of the gods.25 H  e 
makes Gloucester believe that his life is due to a miracle, a super­
natural event that breaks the apparently unbreakable enchainment of 
causes. A n  d Gloucester indeed does assume afideistic attitude n o w  ; 
he thinks that the gods, w h o , as Edgar prompts him, "make them 
honours / Of men's impossibilities," have preserved him. 
However , the incident is also fraught with the implications h u m a n 
engineering generally has in Shakespeare: it is a deceit, even though 
a benevolent one in the manner T h o m a s Wright recommended it to 
the "passion mover." Edgar has a faint similarity to an Iago imprint­
ing his will on Othello by administering to him a dose of "medicine"; 
it is a calculated dose because it is restricted to an attempt at curing 
his father from his suicidal urge. Edgar does not reveal his identity 
to him and thus does not free him from the ignorance this lack of in­
formation entails. W h  y he does not do so is one of the several puzzles 
of the play. Perhaps he thinks his father's heart too weak to sustain 
this truth as, indeed, it proves to be when he reveals it to him. H o w ­
ever, by then, this heart has been subjected to further suffering. 
But whatever moral ambiguity is attached to Edgar's conduct in 
the episode of Dover Cliff is relieved by the irony that this incident 
and his subsequent guiding of Gloucester is as m u c h or more a test­
ing of the psychic and ethical resources of Edgar than it serves to 
restructure Gloucester's philosophy. Edgar cannot prevent his father 
from subsequently relapsing into despair and from dying in a 
highly uncertain state of soul—between joy and grief. A n  d the eye-
piercing sight of the meeting between the m a  d king and the blind earl 
proves almost too m u c h for Edgar himself. H  e is not "stoical" like 
Iago, and neither is he superhuman; as he intimates later, he, too, has 
been tempted to take his o w n life (V.iii. 184-86) . But Edgar's 
general capacity for feeling and his strength to translate it into 
sympathetic action m a k e him the most conspicuous learner and 
teacher; and, in the end, he can be said to have passed all tests. H  e 
tries to teach his father h o  w to see "feelingly" and he keeps to the 
very end his awareness of the alleviating power of h u m a n emotion, 
asking us in the last lines of the play to say what w e feel, not what 
w  e ought to say. 
T h e transformation of Edgar from an apparently minorfigure at 
the beginning to a dominant one at the end is one of the most 
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surprising dramatic developments in Shakespeare. T h  e introduction 
of Edgar by his maliciously histrionic brother—"Pat! he comes like 
the catastrophe of the old comedy" (I.ii.128)—carries a strong 
irony. Edgar does indeed become the m e d i u m for whatever allevia­
tion there is in the end; he provides a "comic catastrophe" at least 
to the degree of bringing about the punishment of the villains and 
taking the reins in his hand. 
Edgar's vitality and protean role-changes give him a tremendous 
vitality on the stage, but he assumes even greater significance in 
thematic analysis. His various roles unite all the important paradoxes 
that form the schematic pattern of the evaluation of m e  n in Lear. In 
playing a half-crazed beggar, he shows that foolishness is better than 
arrogant knowledge, poverty better than unfeeling wealth, scarcity 
better than careless abundance, and humility better than proud great­
ness. In hisfirst soliloquy, he declares that he must be a near-nothing 
in this world; he has become a m a n without a n a m e , "the basest and 
most poorest shape / That ever penury in contempt of m a  n / Brought 
near to beast" (II.iii.7-9). T h  e pricks he puts in his bleeding flesh 
manifest his physical suffering, which, like Lear's, is stifled by the 
overwhelming mental pain. 
Edgar tries to adjust to the "something" he has n o w become; 
he adopts a Stoic resignation somewhat in the tenor of the paradox 
"that a m a  n ought not to be grieved though he be despoiled of his 
goods and honors" (The Defence, Declamation 6 )  . A  s he reasons 
in his second soliloquy, the lowest and most dejected thing in nature 
has the advantage of expecting a change for the better (IV.i.1-9). 
There is a touch of Pollyannaism in this Stoic self-consolation, and 
Edgar's concluding defiance of the unsubstantial air to whose blast 
he owes "nothing" reads like a hybris in the light of the simultaneous 
entrance of his blind father led by an old m a n . Edgar is forced to 
revise his Stoicism: "The worst is not / So long as w e can say 'This 
is the worst' " (IV.i.27-28). M e r e theory, no matter h o w well in­
tended, breaks d o w n in the inferno of life. M a  n must feel, suffer, and 
act rather than theorize. Edgar's empathetic initiation into the 
human tragedy is marked by his awe at the "mutations" of this world 
(IV.i.n). 
Only after being theoretically negated does Edgar's acceptance of 
"nothing" prove itself in the heat of fire. H e can n o w assume a new 
and exemplary identity as a thingfirst to be wondered at, then to be 
imitated. W h e  n his voice sounds from the tempest-shaken hovel, he 
300 ACHIEVEMENT AND SYNTHESIS 
provokes Kent's amazed question: " W h o ' s there? . . . W h a t art 
thou that dost grumble there i' th' straw?" (III.iv.41ff.). Lear, him­
self at the threshold of madness, interrogates him on the reason for 
his deprivation: " W h a t , has his daughters brought him to this pass? 
/ Could'st thou save nothing? Would'st thou give 'em all?". Im­
mediately following, Lear strips himself naked in emulation to be­
come, like Edgar, a quintessential m a n ("Consider him well"). A n d 
this uncovering takes place during an identity crisis that focuses on 
Edgar; Lear asks " W h a t hast thou been? . . . What's he?", and 
Kent and Gloucester join in: " W h o ' s there? W h a t is't you seek? 
. . . W h a t are you there? Your names?" W h e  n Lear subsequently 
calls Edgar a philosopher, he is m a d , but there is a touch of sanity 
in this madness: if Edgar does not exactly philosophize on some of 
the big questions, he poses them by what he is. H  e represents the 
self-sufficient m a n  , unencumbered by an adulterating civilization; 
he is the incarnation of the value of "nothing." 
At the crucial point of the inception of Lear's madness, Edgar thus 
becomes for the old king a teacher of the essentials of nature, a kind 
of Cynic philosopher. Shakespeare's contemporaries were fascinated 
by this austere sect, whose insistence on frugality and the simple life 
suggested contemptus mundi attitudes with which they were familiar; 
Christian asceticism and ancient Cynicism had m u c  h in c o m m o n  . 
Yet since the Middle Ages some theologians thought that the Cynics' 
asceticism went too far and that they missed the purpose of the 
effort, which was to demonstrate faith in the true G o d ; they were 
peculiar combinations of saints and m a d m e n  . 
O n e of Lear's titles for Edgar, "good Athenian," would, for 
Shakespeare's audience, have suggested the Cynic Diogenes, w h  o 
had a signal place in Renaissance moral thought. H  e had been put 
on the stage in Lyly's Campaspe, where his w a y of life was much 
like that assumed by Edgar: "  A crumb for thy supper, an hand for 
thy cup, and thy clothes for thy sheets. For Natura paucis contenta" 
(I.ii.4-5).26 Lear's other title for Edgar, "learned Theban," also has 
significant associations. A  s has been suggested, the address most 
likely would have evoked the Theban philosopher Crates, a disciple 
of Diogenes, w h  o loomed almost as large in the anecdotage of the 
Renaissance as did his teacher.27 The anecdote of Crates' throwing 
his patrimony into the sea in order not to be hampered in the study 
of philosophy was for T h o m a s Nashe an example of the contrast 
between the frugal and sensible life of a true m a  n and the luxurious­
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ness and wantonness of courtiers w h  o were intent on nothing but 
"the feeding of their mistress' fancy and the fostering of their law­
less lusts, showing under their purple robes and embroidered apparel 
a heart spotted with all abuses." 28 O n  e is reminded of the w a  y 
Edgar describes his alleged career as a serving m a n , "proud in 
heart and mind; that curl'd m  y hair; wore gloves in m  y cap; serv'd 
the lust of m  y mistress' heart and did the act of darkness with her" 
(III.iv.84ff.). This is the state of average sophisticated depravity 
Edgar asserts to have overcome in order to be the Crates of Lear. 
Crates's attacks on women'  s luxuriousness and inordinate desires 
would make him also the pattern for Lear in his ragings against the 
female sex, but the king in his madness exceeds the model in 
savagery. 
Lear's identification of Edgar with a Cynic like Crates also gives 
Edgar the structural role of exemplifying the paradox that it is 
better to be a fool than to be wise. T h  e titles "philosopher" and 
"fool" were sometimes treated as interchangeable in the paradoxical 
tradition. In The Mirror of Madness (1576), D a m e Madness d e m ­
onstrated that she was the "notablest philosopher" by the argument 
that "by reason of madness—that is to say, the matter—philosophers' 
books are esteemed and accounted most excellent" and that "what­
ever maketh a thing such, the thing whereby it is mad  e is of 
necessity more such." 29 W h e  n Lear comes to mistaking Edgar for 
a famous philosopher, he does so according to the principle that a 
philosopher m a  y look like a m a d m a n  ; and there is a justification in his 
nominating Edgar, w h o , feigning madness, has actually become the 
most notable philosopher of the play. Crates, the learned Theban, 
was a salient example of the wise madness of philosophers; in 
philosopher's madness he vied with Diogenes, w h o  m Lyly called "a 
Socrates furious." A  s Robert Greene said in The Debate Between 
Folly and Love, " W h a  t kind of people that hath been in greater 
credit than philosophers, and w h o more fools ? . . . Did not Crates 
in casting his treasure into the sea commit a wise deed?" 30 
The "Cynicism" assumed by Edgar and sensed by Lear becomes 
an important issue in the paradox that scarcity is better than abun­
dance—an issue touched on in Gloucester's temptation and central 
to Lear's change of values. Lyly's Diogenes already knew that one 
should not give nature more than nature needs. A n  d Nashe upheld 
Crates as exemplifying the axiom that "no vestis sed virtus hominem 
evehit," and he hoped that the courtiers "would reject all superfluity" 
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as sinful and "betake themselves to a more temperate moderation in 
each degree of excess." 31 Edgar's affiance to poverty makes him a 
catalyst for both Gloucester's and Lear's questioning of themselves 
on essential h u m a  n needs in their struggle to gain a perspective on 
h u m a n life. W h e n Gloucester gives money to his disguised son so 
he will lead him to Dover, he comments on the relativity of a fate 
that creates happiness for the poor from the wretchedness of the 
rich, and he commend  s the heavens for creating greater economic 
quality in this fashion (IV.i.66-72). A similar note is sounded by 
Lear, just before he finds Edgar, in his prayer to "naked poverty": 
Take physic, p o m p ; 
Expose thyself to feel what wretches feel, 
That thou mayst shake the superflux to them, 
A n d show the heavens more just. 
(III.iv.33-36) 
O  n one level, this prayer is a call for greater social justice, a call 
of the kind increasingly being raised in England during the time of 
the first performances of Lear. Thus in The Poor Mans Passions 
and Poverty's Patience (1605), Arthur Warren asked Virtue to 
protect him with her "sacred providence" by not giving him too 
m u c  h or too little: 
Give not abundance lest I should forget 
The Giver where such surplusage I see; 
The golden mediocrity I crave 
T  o quit the world and m  e conduct to grave.32 
But Lear's is not merely a call for social justice; it is also an 
anguished outcry against an unjust cosmic order. Out of Lear's suf­
fering, questioning of necessities, and his quarrel with his gods 
comes a proclamation of h u m a n fellowship for the achievement of a 
distribution more nearly equal of the means for happiness. A n d yet, 
as I shall argue in the next chapter, our understanding of the mean­
ing of this prayer would be incomplete without some sense of what 
it does for Lear's o w  n soul. 
But w e must return to the major agent of this development. Edgar, 
w h  o aids the others in their search for self-knowledge, also has to 
pursue his o w  n quest, and strenuously so. It does not, I think, lead 
to a certainty of achieving self-knowledge. It does lead, of course, to 
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success in an outward sense by his finding of himself in a significant 
role, a greater one, indeed, than could have been envisaged before. 
H  e resembles the traditional hero of a legend, w h  o has lost his 
inheritance and suffered m u c h  , but w h  o has w o  n a greater gain. 
Thus he embodies the paradox of The Defence that "it is better for 
a m a  n to lose his worldly estates and dignity than himself to be lost 
and destroyed forever." 33 But w h e n it comes to describing what 
Edgar has w o n  , internally, the skeptic reader of the play can hardly 
be certain. It m a  y be said, perhaps, that he has w o  n "ripeness," the 
goal that he holds out to his father w h e n the latter falls once more 
into his fatalistic despair after the lost battle: " M e  n must endure / 
Their going hence, even as their coming hither: / Ripeness is all" 
(V.ii.9-11). But the content of this ideal ripeness is hard to define; 
it varies according to the perspective from which w  e approach it. W  e 
must think of it presumably as a concept that merges the best of 
paganism and Christianity, as do other of the values suggested by 
the play. W  e m a  y say that ripeness includes a patient but not fatal­
istic endurance of life, an altruistic conception of man's role in the 
world, and a sympathy with all suffering humanity. Admittedly, this 
is vague; but to go m u c h beyond it is to risk substituting one's o w n 
goals for the vaguer, but also more provocatively suggested, ideals 
of the play. In Edgar, Shakespeare did not portray a pattern that 
embodies all the wisdom self-knowledge could be m a d e to include, 
but he created a dramatic character w h  o struggles, in a particular 
context and under particular circumstances, for the achievement of 
such wisdom. It would be presuming too m u c h to say that he 
achieves it; but his career implies that the struggle does avail. A m a  n 
m a  y find himself, as m u c  h as he ever can be said to, even in the 
naturalistic world of Lear w h e  n character and fortune cooperate. T h  e 
success of Edgar brightens the otherwise somber and tragic ending 
and increases the feeling created by the play that learning h o  w to 
evaluate oneself and others justly is important. 
B  y drawing a lesson of this kind, w  e respond to tragedy with a 
moral reaction; w e experience a feeling of tragic pleasure (some 
would call it a catharsis). A n  d this is a paradoxical feeling. A  s Edith 
Hamilton has noted, our reaction to great tragedy expresses itself 
in the w a  y w  e speak about it: w  e call pain, sorrow, and disaster de­
pressing, but never tragedy; w  e say "lift us to tragic heights." W  e 
speak of the depth of pathos, but always of the height of tragedy.84 
It has been the argument of this chapter that the paradoxes e m  ­
304 ACHIEVEMENT AND SYNTHESIS 
bedded in Lear have m u c h to do with the feeling of tragic pleasure 
created by this greatest of Shakespeare's tragedies. These para­
doxes stimulate us to seek for a meaning in life even at its most 
cruel A n  d they suggest that a w a  y to self-knowledge m a  y be found 
by applying a paradoxical perspective: w  e should consider the pos­
sibility that what appears to be pride is really humility, what seems 
weakness is really strength, what looks like foolishness is yet wisdom, 
and what w  e believe to be misfortune is beneficial to our souls; 
and w e should ponder m a n y similar apparent paradoxes. At the same 
time, Lear also warns us against simplifying all statements about 
ourselves and our situations, including paradoxical statements; it 
invites us to view characters, situations, and incidents from unex­
pected angles and to revise our opinions in the light of later insights; 
and it creates the hope that the whole picture eventually will become 
intelligible. T h u  s the paradoxes ingrained in Lear help to promote 
the illusion that this play is like life itself, which forces us to evalu­
ate ourselves and our situations with whatever wisdom w  e are able 
to acquire. 
CHAPTER SIXTEEN 
King Lear: 
Stripping the Self 
IE A  R IS A K I N  G born to c o m m a n d , not to ask questions. His first words give the order that the King of France and the -«•» D u k e of Burgundy are to attend the ceremonious division of 
the kingdom. Th  e questions Lear asks in the beginning of the play 
could just as well be put as imperatives. T h e fateful "Which of you 
shall w  e say doth love us most ?" is not really an inquiry but an order 
to his daughters to protest their quantity of love. But love is a subject 
in which quality means everything, and therefore Cordelia, as she 
announces in an aside, will not answer a question so wrongly posed: 
" W h a t shall Cordelia speak? Love, and be silent." W h e n asked by 
Lear what she can say "to draw / A third more opulent than your 
sisters," she replies, "Nothing." This is thefirst unexpected answer 
Lear receives; unbelievingly, he asks Cordelia to repeat it. It is an 
answer that strikes at his value system, and similarly upsetting 
answers are to follow. Thus, contrary to Lear's expectation, the King 
of France replies affirmatively to the question whether he will accept 
Cordelia in marriage without dowry; he disregards the absence of 
a quantitative endowment because of her possession of a qualitative 
one, her lack of riches for her owned sincerity. 
After Lear has divested himself of power, he receives a different 
kind of unexpected answers. Lear's questions tend to become rhetorical 
now, based as they are on the conception of himself as a powerful 
monarch and beloved father. Only the faithful Kent, banished by 
Lear but still ready to serve him in disguise, accepts the king on 
these terms. W h e  n Lear asks him, "Dost thou k n o w m e , fellow?" 
he answers, " N o  , sir; but you have that in your countenance which 
 would fain call master" (I.iv.27). Those that go the w a y the 
world goes do not assess Lear any longer by the authority imprinted 
on his face. The disrespectful Oswald answers Lear's question " W h  o 
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a  m I?" with the insolent " M  y lady's father" (I.iv.78). Lear's evil 
daughters give him an identity entirely different from the one he 
gives himself; they call him a weak old m a n w h o should adjust to his 
age and become wise, and they do not accept his self-image of a 
powerful king surrounded by a large troop of retainers. With a hint 
at Lear's lack of self-knowledge, Goneril suggests that he should have 
only such m e n around him "which k n o w themselves and you" (I.iv. 
251) . Goneril and Regan apply the kind of quantitative reasoning to 
their father that he had demonstrated in arranging the love protest; 
they wish him to "disquantity" his train and to k n o w himself for 
what he is, that is, in measurable terms, "nothing." With a semblance 
of truth on her side, Goneril asks her father to "put away / These 
dispositions which of late transport you / F r o  m what you rightly 
are" (I.iv.220-22). But the Fool, with his remark about the ass's 
not knowing when the cart draws the horse, puts the situation in a 
different perspective and induces Lear's first identity crisis: "Does 
any here k n o w m e ? This is not Lear. / . . . W h o is it that can tell 
m  e w h  o I a m ?  " (I.iv.225-29). Th  e rhetorical questions have led to 
an existential one. 
Th  e answers the others give to Lear's questions place them in a 
moral scheme. Kent answers as a loyal courtier, Oswald as a time­
server and opportunist, and Goneril and Regan as ungrateful and 
disloyal daughters. Th  e valuing of the selves has begun. A n  d with it, 
Lear begins to re-evaluate. T h e process is speeded up but also made 
more bitter for Lear by the Fool, w h o rubs his wounds with the 
salve of truth, a simple commonsense truth in rhymes, songs, and 
sayings. Lear first threatens to whip him; but he nevertheless listens 
to him. W h e n the disrespectfully treated king asks w h o can tell him 
w h o he is, the Fool's ready answer, "Lear's shadow," does not 
produce another threat of whipping from Lear but the relatively 
gentle remark that he would fain learn w h  y he should be a shadow 
since he has daughters. T h e Fool becomes a teacher for Lear: "Lad; 
teach m e  " (I.iv. 138), Lear says. A n  d so the Fool does, setting his 
master to the school of m e n  , fools, and ants. 
Lear's progress in education that began with imperative questions, 
to which he thought the answers self-evident but found them totally 
unexpected, and continued with rhetorical questions, to which the 
answers were impertinent, has led to a profoundly disturbing exis­
tential question. His educational progress will leadfinally to ques­
tions on the nature of m a n  , questions that he had never posed in his 
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life and of which the answers involve moral and metaphysical values. 
A  s Lear becomes unsure of his identity, he loses his certainty of the 
identity of m e  n and gods. H  e becomes an alien in the world he once 
dominated, and m a  n appears to him an alien in the world he claims to 
rule. In the storm on the heath, feeling no better than a naked animal 
and worse equipped to defy the elements, he poses his culminating 
question: "Is m a n no more than this?" (III.iv.ioi ff.). A s he strips 
himself naked, he exposes the naked self of m a n  . 
F r o  m hisfirst question on his personal identity to this question on 
the identity of m a n , Lear follows unconsciously a program of self-
examination as it was implied for the humanists in the injunction 
nosce teipsum. Th  e general process has been well described by Profes­
sor Jorgensen.1 Lear's is not a consistent, clearly progressive pro­
cedure, and the insights he attains are momentary and partial; they 
come to him at the threshold of madness, in lucid intervals, and as 
lightning-strokes in the night of madness. But there is yet behind 
them a method and a philosophy that bring to fruition the concepts 
in Shakespeare's earlier plays. In order to illuminate this method 
and this philosophy, I shall examine Lear's self-questioning by 
reference to a book that makes schematic and explicit what Lear does 
tentatively and unsystematically. This work, which has been pre­
viously mentioned, is Sir James Perrott's The First Part of the 
Consideration of Human Condition (1600). It is a slender book of 
sixty pages; but, in the words of its subtitle, it promises no less than 
"the moral consideration of man's self as what, w h o , and what 
manner of m a n he is." 2 
"Consideration" is for Sir James a program of the total assessment 
of m a  n as a species and as an individual in relationship to everything 
that is under him, next to him, and above him. T h e program thus 
aims at gaining wisdom by perspective, one that comes from seeing 
m a  n in the place he takes in the total picture of the universe. T  o con­
sider m a n in this fashion means to meditate on his h u m a n , political, 
and divine nature and his relationship to the material and spiritual 
domains; it means to ask the right questions. Sir James not only 
poses these but also answers them unequivocally. In his scheme, all 
questions m a  n must ask are subsumed under three major ones: what 
is m a n , w h o is m a n , and what manner of m a n is he. The answers to 
these questions require subsidiary questions. T o k n o w what m a n is, 
one must ask what his main components are, where he takes his 
origin and h o w he ends, and what the purpose of a life is that leads 
ACHIEVEMENT AND SYNTHESIS 
from one of these stations to the other. Perrott answers in orthodox 
humanistic fashion with a strong touch of contemptus mundi: m a n is 
primarily a soul chained to a body for a short period; his beginning 
and end are painful; and the in-between is short and uncertain. Only 
death is certain, but it also offers the hope of immortality. Sir 
James's second main question, w h o m a n is, requires an examination 
of his material condition; the state of his body, its health or sickness; 
the nature of his possessions, his wealth or poverty; and his worldly 
status, his calling, profession, and authority. T h  e answer to this 
question must be given with the understanding that all these material 
qualities depend on the impermanent parts of m a n , which are inferior 
to those deriving from his immortal soul. T  o understand w h  o m a  n 
is, one must take into consideration what he is so as not to over­
estimate the importance of temporal achievements. The answer to 
Perrott's final question, what manner of m a  n somebody is, probes 
the differences in intellect, character, and temperament by which 
m e n become individuals. T h e doctrine of the humors and the system 
of the virtues are here evoked, but with a hortatory note: no inclina­
tions, complexions, and traits must negate the demand that m a n ful­
fill his essence and be what he ought to be. That means he must 
search for wisdom and control the perturbations of his mind. 
If the questions of The Consideration are used as a standard test 
for humanistic self-examination, as, I believe, they can be, they show 
h o  w woefully deficient the early Lear is in self-knowledge. In the first 
scene of the play, the king fails all three questions. His "nothing can 
come of nothing" shows that he does not k n o w what m a  n is, that is, 
he does not k n o  w his origin. Truth and Scripture, as Perrott 
explained, said "that the world was m a d e of nothing . . . and of 
this nothing, m a d e something, was m a n at thefirst created, as Holy 
Writ doth testify; for he was m a d e of no other mould than of the 
dust of the earth, a weak and slender beginning for a high and 
haughty mind, but most fit to set forth the great might of the al­
mighty creator" (p. 11). 
But Lear also shows immediately that he does not k n o w who he 
is because he is unmindful of the warning given to the great of the 
earth: 
If thou be noble-born, then commonly pride and presumption catch 
hold and lay such violent hands on thy will, thy affection, and thy 
understanding that they can hardly be removed from thee till they 
have removed thee from the knowledge of thyself, w h  o thou art. 
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For thy presumptuous pride and self-liking affection will make thee 
believe that thou art much better than indeed thou art. (p. 29) 
Obviously, Lear is also ignorant of what manner of man he is. 
His anger against Cordelia and Kent, instances of the wilfullness 
that, according to Regan, has always been characteristic of him, 
violates the postulates of self-control and wisdom; Kent's calling him 
m a  d and foolish punctuates his temperamental and intellectual 
weakness. Lear is of the choleric temperament that Perrott, in the 
wake of the physicians, describes at length; his anger is of the kind 
The Consideration warns of as against reason w h e n a m a n is angry 
with himself "because he cannot do that which he would or cannot 
have that which he desireth, being things either impossible or un­
profitable to be performed, or else unlawful or unmeet to be desired" 
(P. 58). 
Goneril, w h  o is blind to the larger aspects of Lear's lack of self-
knowledge because they have an affinity to her o w n  , yet recognizes 
the physical component of Lear's self-ignorance, his excess of choler; 
in conformance with the humors theory, she predicts that he will 
grow more wrathful with increasing age. A n  d it appears that her 
prediction will be fulfilled as the king's wrath waxes in volume and 
intensity until in the storm he vies with the raging elements. This 
anger expresses itself against all kinds of persons and objects; it 
assumes the spectrum analyzed in The Consideration according to 
which there are five shades: the anger of m a  n against himself, of 
m a n against m a n , of m a n against G o d , of m a n against inferior 
beings, and of m a  n against things without life (pp. 57 -58) . A n  d 
Lear's anger explodes into madness, as Perrott warned unprofitable 
and unmeet anger would. But, and here Shakespeare's portrayal 
differed from that of Perrott, Lear's wrath is also an impetus to 
self-discovery. It has, perhaps, an element of what the theologians 
called "just anger"; at any rate, Lear's questions ride on a tide of 
wrath, and as it rises, advances his progress not only toward madness 
but also toward self-awareness. Lear does not gain whatever self-
knowledge he acquires primarily through an intellectual process, but 
through a predominantly volitional and emotional one. In his 
baroque plays, as w  e have had occasion to observe, Shakespeare pre­
sented m e n not as beings whose pysche can be divided into neat 
categories but as dynamic organisms in w h o  m intellectual and 
emotional powers are inextricably mixed. 
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After Lear meets with neglect and disrespect, his questions are as 
m u c h outcries as inquiries. His reactions are generally m u c h more 
vehement than the situation warrants; until Goneril and Regan 
exclude Lear from shelter in the storm, they show themselves as 
egotistic and callous, but not as the cruel monsters Lear calls them 
and they later turn out to be. Yet from his excessive anger about 
lack of respect come Lear'sfirst questions about his identity: " W h  o 
a m I, sir ?" " W h o can tell m e w h o I a m ?" This is not as yet a serious 
inquiry, and the answer he receives serves as m u c  h to increase his 
irritation as his curiosity. F r o  m anger with himself and others, Lear 
turns to attacking the gods and their injustice and what Perrott 
calls "things without life"; in the storm, he curses the raging 
elements, to w h o  m he feels enslaved, as "servile ministers" of his 
ungrateful daughters. Yet with his increasing irrationality comes 
also an advance in the kind of questions he asks about m a n  ; from 
questions that fall under Perrott's " w h  o is m a n  " category, he 
proceeds to those of the "what is m a n  " type: "Is m a  n no more than 
this?" "Is there any cause in nature that make these hard hearts?" 
" W h a t , art m a d ? A m a n m a y see h o w this world goes with no eyes." 
Lear never explicitly asks Perrott's third question, what manner of 
m a  n he is; but he begins to answer it, together with the "what is 
m a n  " question, in the storm. His ignorance about this latter subject 
was directly responsible for his outbreak of anger against Cordelia 
and Kent, and it appears n o w to him that the question he did not 
ask himself is being demanded of him by the raging elements that 
arrogate to themselves the roles of judges by joining with his two 
pernicious daughters: "Here I stand, your slave, / A poor, infirm, 
weak, and despis'd old m a n  " (Ill.ii. 19-20) . 
But, as m u c  h as he approaches an answer to the question of what 
manner of m a n he is, he lacks the humility a m a n must have w h o 
knows w h o and what he is. Defiantly, he wrestles with his gods, and 
they keep silent. A n d when he calls himself "a m a n / M o r e sinn'd 
against than sinning" (59-60), self-pity is in his voice. Just as it is 
not Edgar's theorizing about misfortune but his empathy with his 
father that takes him a step further, so it is Lear's genuine concern 
for the welfare of the Fool, a concern that grows out of his own 
deprivation, which advances his reeducation. A  s the Fool feels cold, 
so does Lear; it is hisfirst altruistic emotion. T h e last step in Lear's 
progress to the answer of what manner of m a n he is comes much 
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later, in the lucid interval when he kneels before Cordelia and 
acknowledges humbly: 
I a m a very foolish fond old man , 
Fourscore and upward, not an hour more nor less; 
And, to deal plainly, 
I fear I a  m not in m  y perfect mind. 
(IV.vii.60-63) 
For an audience that was acquainted with the general method of 
self-examination implied in the Renaissance injunction of nosce 
teipsum, there were implications in what Lear says that w e are apt 
to miss. The Renaissance attitude toward self-knowledge was, for 
one thing, determined by the basic postulate to understand the nature 
of body and soul, of matter and spirit, and of their relationship. In 
the first scene of the play, Lear showed his ignorance of these 
fundamentals. His "nothing from nothing" axiom denies the exis­
tence of a spiritual realm in which the greatest somethings come 
from nothing. Lear is ignorant of the love that arises from the soul. 
But it turns out that he does not even realize what the axiom means 
in the limited, materialfield to which it applies. In a world in which 
physical nature reigns, such as the world of Goneril and Regan, 
nothing comes from nothing: where there is no power there is no 
respect and authority. The Fool, with his needling, childish songs 
and commonplace wisdom, drives h o m e this lesson: 
Can you make no use of nothing, nuncle ? 
Lear. W h y  , no, boy; nothing can be made out of nothing. 
Fool. [To Kent.] Prithee tell him, so much the rent of his land 
comes to. 
(I.iv.130-32) 
A n  d again: 
N o  w thou art an O without afigure.I a  m better than thou art n o w  : 
I a  m a fool, thou art nothing. [To Gon.] Yes, forsooth, I will hold 
m  y tongue; so your face bids m e  , though you say nothing. 
(192-94) 
Lear gradually learns what it is to be materially nothing; he is 
taught a lesson about the physical needs of the body. This initiation 
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into wisdom is quite in agreement with his nature; from the be­
ginning he has a strong sense for, one might say even an obsession 
with, the physical nature of m a n  . H  e severs, for instance, his ties 
with Cordelia by disclaiming his "propinquity and property of 
blood" in her (I.i.113). In his horror about Goneril's ingratitude, he 
calls her a disease in his flesh and prays to nature to make her 
w o m  b sterile (Liv.278). But Lear has to realize that he shares this 
property of blood with all humanity, that, to speak with Sir Thoma s 
Elyot, a gentleman and a carter are m a d e of the same clay.3 A n d he 
learns. A  s in the storm he is subjected to deprivation, he experiences 
on his o w n body what The Praise of Nothing calls "the affinity . . . 
between nothing and the poverty of m e n .  " Poverty, says the author 
of this tract, is "necessary for the knowledge of ourselves that are 
by the contrary most insolent and intolerable."4 T h  e suffering Lear 
acquires an empathy with his fellow sufferers, with the naked Edgar 
and with the houseless poverty of other poor wretches. H  e feels n o  w 
the same needs that others have, the basic needs of h u m a n beings 
badly equipped for the struggle with nature. 
Lear's concern with the needs of nature points from the physical 
to the psychic realm and is foreshadowed earlier in the play. W h e  n 
Goneril and Regan dispute Lear's idea about his need of retainers 
and Regan bests her sister in asking him w h y he wants even one 
attendant, Lear reacts with the outcry, "  O reason not the need!" If 
one allows nature no more than nature needs, he lectures her, man's 
life is as cheap as that of a beast and her gorgeous clothes are there­
fore superfluous. Rage makes him choke in the middle of this disquisi­
tion, and he realizes that he too has needs: "patience, I need" (Il.iv. 
270) . Although Lear appears to be thinking here only of the necessity 
of controlling himself, he touches on one of the most basic permanent 
psychic needs the moralists of Shakespeare's age proclaimed. T  o 
quote two of the Disticha Catonis by which Shakespeare was intro­
duced to this postulate early in g r a m m a  r school: 
The commodity of nature thee never faileth

If thou be content with that that need requires.

If thou be in poverty, see patiently that thou take it,

A n d think how, into the world, you came all naked.5

Lear is in the process of learning a lesson on the physical and 
moral needs of m a n  , of which patience is one of the greatest, and that 
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presumably makes him feel darkly in his madness that he is no longer 
a mere learner, but can be n o w a teacher of patience to Gloucester: 
"Thou must be patient" (IV.vi.179). Gloucester has been deficient 
in patience, but it is Lear w h  o has the greatest need. 
It is through the inquiry into physical needs that Lear advances 
most toward self-knowledge. In agreement with the moralists' 
program of self-consideration, Lear probes both theoretically and 
practically the essential nakedness of m a n  . W h e  n the boundless 
cruelty of m a n makes him the equal of the lowest of mankind, he 
defiantly rejects his coverings as symbolic of all the trappings of the 
civilization he has come to loathe. This m o m e n t is emphasized by his 
most dramatic gesture in the play, his stripping himself naked. H  e 
thus imitates Edgar, his quintessential m a n . T h e speech that ac­
companies Lear's gesture is his last clearly sane one before he mis­
identifies Edgar as a philosopher; in it, he gives the needs-of-nature 
theme its most pessimistic accent: man's life is as cheap as a beast's 
but it is more miserable, and m a n , natural m a n , is worse equipped to 
cope with his condition than an animal: 
Is m a n no more than this ? Consider him well. Thou ow'st the w o r m 
no silk, the beast no hide, the sheep no wool, the cat no perfume. 
H a  ! here's three on's are sophisticated! Thou art the thing itself: 
unaccommodated m a n is no more but such a poor, bare, forked 
animal as thou art. Off, off, you lendings! C o m e  , unbutton here. 
(Ill.iv. 104-8) 
Pessimistic as Lear's assessment of the physical condition of m a  n 
is, it is quite in the tradition of humanistic self-consideration, which 
had pagan as well as Christian precedents. These are amply rehearsed 
by Perrott, according to w h o m a m a n wanting to k n o w what he is 
mustfirst answer the question of "what thou art in thy conception 
and natural constitution." A n  d here one must start with the body 
and consider it in comparisbn with the animals—the passage is worth 
quoting at some length: 
But if thou wilt enter farther into the consideration of thy natural 
constitution of body after thou art born, thou shaltfind that, as thou 
art born naked, so thou dost still of thyself remain naked, having 
by nature no other covering or any defense save only thy bare body, 
but that thou dost borrow helps of other creatures, which thou ac­
countest but as base and vile. For thou clothest and keepest thyself 
warm with the garments made of wool, being but the covering of 
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silly sheep; with skins, the natural garments of brute beasts; thou 
deckest thyself with silk, being but the excrements of poor worms. 
. .  . all which the needy, naked m a  n doth borrow of beasts and of 
other creatures to cover, to maintain, and to adorn his weak and 
all-wanting body. But thou, not being content to use the help of 
those natural creatures, for the supply of thy natural defects, dost 
yet therewith take occasion to be proud, like the beggar, who, hav­
ing borrowed a new coat, should therewith presently fall into liking 
of himself and scorn all the rest of his fellow beggars. So doth the 
naked unconsiderate m a  n borrow, of birds, feathers; of beasts, 
skins, wool, with other coverings. . . . A n d  , having all these helps 
not of himself but of other creatures, he useth them as instruments 
to increase his pride rather than to sustain his necessities. 
(pp.12-13) 
Perrott's contrasting comparison of m a  n and animals derives from 
Pliny.6 Shakespeare, it has been suggested, read it in a passage of 
Montaigne, beginning, "Truly w h e n I consider m a n all naked." 7 It 
might be noted, however, that Perrott's version of the commonplace 
has equivalents for the " w o r m ,  " "sheep," and "hide" of Shakespeare's 
version, but Montaigne does not; Perrott, it is true, lacks an 
equivalent for "perfume," which Montaigne has. In this as in other 
significant statements of m a n  , Shakespeare, just like Perrott and 
Montaigne, seems to have m a d e his o w n commonplace from various 
sources of the particular topos. These, besides Pliny, included a 
biblical-theological tradition of consideration in which to "consider" 
is the key word, deriving from Hebrews 2 :6 : " W h a t is m a n that 
thou shouldst be mindful of him? or the son of m a  n that thou 
wouldst consider him!" (Genevan only; Bishops has "thou visitest 
him.") T h e likening of man's condition to beasts comes from a re­
lated passage, Ecclesiastes 3 :18-19: "I considered in mine heart 
the state of the children of m e n that G o d had purged them; yet to 
see too they are in themselves as beasts. For the condition of the 
children of m e  n and the condition of beasts are even as one condition 
unto them. A  s the one dieth, so dieth the other; for they have all one 
breath, and there is no excellence of m a  n above the beast; for all is 
vanity." W h e  n Lear says to Edgar—it is this sentence that sets him 
off on his consideration of man—that he were better in his grave, he 
refers to this temporal condition of m a n  . 
This condition was deeply probed in the contemptus mundi tradi­
tion and in the n e  w naturalism of the later sixteenth and earlier 
seventeenth centuries, which borrowed some of its colors from tradi­
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tional Christian pessimism. "Let m a  n then, with tears, consider 
whereof he is made , what he doth and what he meaneth to do" is 
George Gascoigne's rendering of one of thefirst sentences of Pope 
Innocent's De Humanae Miseriae Conditioned Pierre Boaistuau's 
Theatrum Mundi, a, later product of this tradition, "considered" m a  n 
very similarly, repeatedly using this key word. In one passage it 
serves to introduce the same Plinian commonplaces used by Shake­
speare : 
N o  w therefore—having well considered the universal state of m a  n 
—it is requisite to make a most ample discourse of this matter and 
to contemplate m a n more near, to the end that he learn to humble 
himself under the hand of his God. . . . among all the heathen, 
Pliny, as m  e seemeth, hath most worthily philosophied of our na­
ture. . . . Let us consider a little, saith he, h o  w it behooveth a m a  n 
to cover his body at the dispensation of beasts, w h o  , being favorable 
of their natural liberality, bring even from the belly of their dams 
some, feathers; others, hair, skin, scales; and others, wool.9 
Thus, to s u m up this discussion of the general sources of Lear's 
consideration-of-man speech, it uses a pagan's, that is, Pliny's images 
on the physical insufficiency of m a n , images that were thought ap­
propriate for illustrating Christian ideas. W h e  n Lear asks the 
question whether m a  n is no more than this, he introduces a familiar 
topos, which he labels by exhorting himself to "consider" m a  n well. 
This prefix was expected in a pessimistic account of the material 
condition of m a n , just as Hamlet's "what a piece of work is a m a n " 
was expected to introduce a balanced assessment of m a n , body and 
soul. A  s a statement on the teipsum that is the body, Lear's consider­
ation exposes, according to approved recipes, the naked self of m a n  . 
A n d the presence of Edgar, as w e have noted, makes the considera­
tion of what m a n is into an object lesson. 
In terms of self-search, Lear's stripping on the heath can be said 
to lead only to a partial discovery. It might even be said that in seeing 
himself as animal-like, he approaches the naturalistic basis from which 
E d m u n d proceeds. But that would be stressing the mere outward 
likeness; there are indications, as in his struggle for patience even 
when it ironically highlights his impatience ("I will be the pattern 
of all patience; I will say nothing"), that Lear reaches toward a 
higher wisdom. 
According to humanistic prescriptions of self-knowledge, Lear 
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could not be said to have attained a sufficient perspective unless he 
gained some understanding of the nature of the soul. Virtuous 
pagans were expected to realize the immortality of the soul and its 
role in the achievement of h u m a  n happiness. If Lear's questioning is 
to bear fruit in the sense in which the moralists thought it should, 
his concern with theflesh must lead to an understanding of the nature 
of the soul and its relationship to the body. T h e full spiritual signifi­
cance of these matters could hardly be revealed to a pagan like Lear, 
but even pagans could attain good parts of this knowledge. 
Aristotle had developed theories about the natural soul that were 
approved of, and Plato, Cicero, and others had anticipated Christians 
in understanding the immortality of this divine essence. 
I think it can be shown that Lear does concern himself in a dim, 
tentative w a y with his soul, and that this concern is the most subtle 
and allusive part of Lear's quest for self-knowledge. In the same 
sense in which Lear's initiation to poverty can be said to be the 
beginning of his understanding of the nature of the flesh and the 
body, his realization of what it is to be ill is the key to his under­
standing of the soul. That affliction and sickness could promote such 
knowledge was often noted by moralists. A s T h o m a s Rogers said, 
"Sickness is necessary to bring a m a  n to the mindfulness of himself 
w h e  n health hath brought forgetfulness. . . . Plato is reported 
never to have favored philosophy before sickness m a d e him to know 
himself." 10 A n  d The Defence illustrated by this notable example the 
paradox "That it is better to be sick than always healthful" (Decla­
mation 10) : 
Plato, the philosopher, because he felt himself strong and over-
mighty in nature to follow his study as he ought, chose for his place 
of abiding a watery, marshy ground, a discontented air, where 
heaven showed none other but dark and pitchy clouds, that thereby 
he might become sick and so have means to refrain the tedious and 
perilous assaults of theflesh wherewith he felt himself sometimes 
pricked and moved. For his advice was that a good mind could not 
flourish iffirst of all theflesh was not overmastered.11 
Lear demonstrates early in the play an interest in illness, con­
ceiving it as a dominance of the flesh; but later in the storm, 
suffering grievously in his o w  n body, he contradicts this explanation 
with one that more nearly approaches that of The Defence. W h e n — 
this is thefirst instance—Cornwall refuses to receive him, the old 
m a  n protests furiously that as a king and father he deserves better 
King Lear: Stripping the Self 317 
treatment, but then he seeks to excuse the earl by what he thinks he 
knows of physical matters: 
M a  y be he is not well. 
Infirmity doth still neglect all office 
Whereto our health is bound; w e are not ourselves 
W h e  n nature, being oppress'd, commands the mind 
T  o suffer with the body. 
(II.iv.103-7) 
Although this m a  y seem a simple statement, it touches on the 
much-discussed problem of the interaction of body and soul, and it 
does so in highly technical language. There were, one might say, 
two divergent attitudes: that of Aristotle and the Aristotelians, 
according to which the body influences the mind; and that of Plato 
and the Stoics, supported by The Defence, according to which the 
mind must reject such influence. T h e wording of Lear's excuse re­
flects these two attitudes though siding with Aristotle. F r o m Plato 
comes the idea that "nature c o m m a n d s the mind" (although the 
Platonic "nature" c o m m a n d s the mind to control the body rather 
than to suffer with it). A  s George Gascoigne translated (without ac­
knowledgment) the well-known passage from Phaedo (86 A ) , "The 
body and the mind being in one, nature doth yet c o m m a n d the 
body to be governed, to serve, and to be subject. But it commandeth 
the mind or the soul to rule and bear dominion." 12 Lear uses the first 
part of this statement, that nature c o m m a n d s the mind, but he dis­
regards the Platonic injunction that the mind should rule the body. 
Instead, he finishes his explanation by borrowing from the Aris­
totelian (or, as it is n o  w assumed, pseudo-Aristotelian) De Physio­
gnomica. This work begins with a sentence that John Woolton 
translated as follows: 
For there is such a sympathy between the body and soul that the 
inclination of the soul followeth the constitution of the body and is 
affected with the motions thereof, as it m a  y be evidently seen in 
gluttony, drunkenness, and diseases of the body, when the mind 
is oppressed with dullness and sorrow.13 
O  n the following page, Woolton paraphrased "sympathy" as 
"compassions and suffering of the soul and body together," a phrase 
that resembles Lear's "the mind to suffer with the body." Clearly, 
Lear's words show Shakespeare's knowledge, in whatever w a y 
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acquired, of the psychological terminology that goes back to Plato 
and Aristotle. 
But the point is not that Lear is accurate in his terminology, nor 
even that the application of the Aristotelian doctrine of the sympathy 
of body and soul to Cornwall is quite meaningless, since Cornwall is 
not physically ill—like Rega  n and Goneril, of course, he does suffer 
from a worse illness, that of the soul. T h e point is rather that Lear 
before the storm signally stresses the physical above the psychic 
and spiritual elements, and that Aristotle's conception of the soul as 
a physically oriented phenomenon was, to the moralists, one-sided. 
Brysket explained that 
Aristotle in his books De Anima spoke of the soul as she was nat­
ural and the form of the body, performing her operations together 
with the body, and as she was the mover of the body and the body 
moved by her, but not as she was distinct or separate from the 
body. A n  d right true it is that, while she is tied to the body, she 
cannot understand but by the means of the senses; but, that being 
free and loosed from the body, she has not her proper operations, 
that is most false.14 
Lear could hardly be expected to realize the freedom of the soul 
in its immortality, the sense in which Brysket uses the word "free"; 
but it is significant that in the storm he discovers the distinctness and 
separateness of the soul in a w a y that directly contradicts what he said 
at Cornwall's door—an indication that he has, in the words of The 
Defence, "overmastered the flesh." Exposed to the elements, but yet 
suffering even more cruelly mentally, Lear learns h o w m u c h worse 
psychic pain is than physical torture. His mental strain reaches such 
intensity that it all but obliterates his physical discomfort. In raging 
with the elements, he denies what he said about Cornwall and pro­
claims the dominance of the m i n d : 
Tho  u think'st 'tis muc  h that this contentious storm

Invades us to the skin; so 'tis to thee,

But where the greater malady is fix'd

Th e lesser is scarce felt. . . .

W h e  n the mind's free 
Th e body's delicate; the tempest in m  y mind 
Doth from m  y senses take all feeling else, 
Save what beats there. 
(III.iv.6-14) 
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Sir John Davies said similarly, "when the body's strongest sinews 
slake, / Then is the soul most active, quick, and gay." 15 A n d Lear's 
advocacy of the hegemony of the soul is the same Platonic one as in 
Tommaso Buoni's Problems of Beauty and All Human Affections 
(trans. 1606), where the body-soul interactions are discussed in a 
series of "problems" (numbers 101-7) . Buoni asked and tentatively 
answered such questions as w h y the grief of the body is communi­
cated to the mind, and the grief of the mind to the body, and why-
grief in general is "more sensible and violent in soft and delicate 
bodies." A n d , again apropos of Lear, Buoni asked in problem 103: 
" W h  y are the griefs of the mind far greater than those of the body?" 
W h a  t Buoni took for granted, Lear discovers through suffering. 
A recognition of the immortality of the soul might have come next 
in Lear's discovery, but Shakespeare did not provide it, or, he did not 
quite provide it. However, I believe that Lear's prayer on the heath 
does have some intimations of immortality, that is, some indications 
in the wording and the imagery that he dimly feels the soul's im­
mortality. H  e approaches the notion through a widening of his 
sympathies, through a realization that there is something in others, 
even in the lowest of mankind, that deserves protection and help. 
The boundless cruelty of those from w h o  m he had most right to 
expect gratitude frees him from the h u m a n and social limitations of 
his position, from the arrogance into which he grew and which was 
fed by the flattery around him. W h e  n the winds in their fury 
catch his white hair and make "nothing" of it, he experiences the 
paradox of nothing, of being nothing in the eyes of the world, but 
yet being much better than he was before. H e becomes the equal of 
the lower, suffering part of mankind; he feels the needs of others. H e 
urges Kent and the Fool to enter the protection hovelfirst, quite 
contrary to the order of rank of which Shakespeare's audience was 
more conscious than w e are. Gloucester, interestingly, makes a 
similar altruistic gesture and directly associates it with the care of 
the soul when he asks that clothes be given to the almost naked 
Edgar: " A n d bring some covering for this naked soul" (IV.i.45). 
And Gloucester, like Lear, follows his act with a prayer for a better 
distribution of commodities. 
Lear's prayer, atfirst sight, seems to be lacking any indication that 
he seeks for a spiritual meaning, addressed as it is to physical needs 
and to the establishment of social justice. But thefirst part of the 
prayer contains some subtle spiritual notes: 
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Poor naked wretches, wheresoe'er you are, 
That bide the pelting of this pitiless storm, 
H o  w shall your houseless heads and unfed sides, 
Your loop'd and window'd raggedness, defend you 
From seasons such as these ? 
(III.iv.28-32) 
For an audience brought up on the Bible, as the Jacobeans were, this 
house-garment imagery would surely have provided an intimation 
that Lear is groping his w a  y toward an understanding not merely of 
the body but also of the soul. In 2 Corinthians 5: 2-5, Paul described 
naked m a  n as sighing for being "clothed with our house, which is 
from heaven." Elizabethan moral literature accustomed Shake­
speare's contemporaries to associate house-garment metaphors with 
the body, the earthly house and covering of the soul, and with 
heaven, its ultimate h o m  e and garment. These were metaphors that, 
with warnings against luxury, must have sounded from m a n y an 
Elizabethan pulpit.16 Although Lear's prayer has no explicit Chris­
tian reference, it uses evocatively a traditional religious imagery 
associated with the soul and thus makes Lear's prayer significant 
not only in his struggle for social justice but also for a greater 
awareness of the needs of his soul. 
Lear must, after all, seek to establish his o w n measure of the 
soul, as he must seek to gauge the depth of hell and the distance 
of heaven; he is not in the possession of Perrott's reassuring hand­
book. His probing of these outer limits is beyond the confines of 
this study. But w e m a y touch, at least for a moment , on the awesome 
Centaur speech, which has implications not only for Lear's hell but 
also for that of m a  n in general. It is a m a  d speech, with its virulent 
attack on the lasciviousness of w o m e  n and their simpering hypocrisy, 
and, most of all, with the reference to that hell beneath their girdle— 
that "sulphurous pit— / Burning, scalding, stench, consumption" 
(IV.vi.128-29). T h e vivid image suggests that this hell has always 
been a disturbing reality in Lear's imagination; the ounce of civet he 
asks n o w to sweeten it is an ironically inadequate means. Lear, it 
appears, has never been able to love wisely either paternally or 
sexually (but to be wise and love exceeds man's might). W h a t the 
speech m a  y imply about Lear's earlier sexuality or his conception of 
heaven and hell w  e can only guess; as Lear is raving, w  e can be sure 
only that it is a continuation, in a more strident key, of the crusade 
against theflesh that he began when he was still sane. 
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W  e are on safer, more conventional no see teipsum grounds when 
Lear probes the condition of m a  n between birth and death—what 
m a  n is. In the voice of the preacher, he harangues Gloucester: 
Thou must be patient; we came crying hither. 
Thou know'st the first time that w e smell the air 
W  e wawl and cry. I will preach to thee. Mark. 
Glou. Alack, alack the day! 
Lear. W h e n w e are born, w e cry that w e are come 
T  o this great stage of fools. 
(IV.vi.179-84) 
Shakespeare here has Lear turn a simple moral commonplace into a 
reason-in-madness lesson on the wisdom that comes from seeing 
mankind in perspective. Lear's "text" is biblical, one often quoted by 
the moralists to illustrate what m a n is by his natural condition: " A n d 
when I was born, I received the c o m m o n air and fell upon the earth, 
which is of like nature, crying and weeping at the first as all the 
others do. . . . For there is no king that has any other beginning of 
birth. All m e  n have one entrance unto life and a like going out" 
(Wisdom 7:3-6) . Lear's metaphor of the world as a stage, a 
Renaissance topos, evolves naturally from the biblical figure of the 
entrance and exit of life. If the actors on Lear's stage are fools, so 
were they for Erasmus's Stultitia: "Good Lord, what a theater is 
this world? H o  w m a n  y and diverse are the pageants that fools play 
therein." 17 Lear's, like Stultitia's, is a peculiar perspective on life, but 
one that has analogues in the moral literature concerned with self-
knowledge. Pierre Boaistuau, for instance, explained at length in his 
Preface that m e n  , born naked and crying, develop m a n  y different 
roles for themselves in the theater of life until death comes and 
"maketh an end of this bloody tragedy. . . . A n  d then the Lord that 
is in Heaven laugheth at their foolish enterprises and vanities—as 
the Prophet David witnesseth—but with such a dreadful laughter 
that he maketh us quake for fear and the earth to shake." 18 W h a  t 
looks like a tragedy from below is a comedy, albeit a bitter one, 
when seen from above as by Boaistuau's God. A n d the m a d Lear 
forcefully tries out the divine perspective. 
Only for one short m o m e n t does Lear's vision of truth become 
sane and strong, in the fourth act, as he awakens from the curative 
sleep imposed upon him by the doctor. Lear is on the rack of this 
tough world; he feels as if he came out of a grave and were bound 
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upon a wheel offire. A s he dimly sees Cordelia before him, he thinks 
of her as "a soul in bliss." A n d w h e n she asks him the identity 
question, "Sir, do you k n o w m e ? " Lear answers, " Y o u are a spirit, 
I k n o w . / W h e r e did you die?" (IV.vii.48-49). H e is in the 
twilight zone between sanity and insanity; he is still "far wide," 
as Cordelia says, but he is also never closer to the truth. M a  n is but a 
soul or a spirit and that divine creature is most poignantly one. 
Lear's visionary insight is accompanied by a ne  w and true humility, 
in which he kneels and confesses to be a foolish, fond old m a n . For a 
m o m e n t , a precious m o m e n t , Lear knows—or, better, feels—who, 
what, and what manner of m a  n he is. This is his anagnorisis and the 
summa epitasis of the play. 
In its inward turn, Lear's anagnorisis is a m u c  h less intellectual 
process than the self-recognition of Perrott's Consideration. Of all 
those in Shakespeare's plays, it is the most dream-like and pre­
carious. It demonstrates Shakespeare's turn toward fideism, a turn 
that also agreed with the baroque tendency to see the strongest kind 
of experience as an emotional condition. O  f the descriptions of states 
of the soul by Renaissance moralists and physicians, Lear's self-
discovery approaches most that of the supersanity of a trance. In such 
a state, the soul was said to rely on its "inward sense" with little 
help from the outer ones. A s Sir John Davies put it, the soul sees 
with "a power above the senses." 19 Timothy Bright argued that this 
state wa  s an anticipation of the separation of soul and body. Th  e soul 
could also experience this anticipation in some dreams that are "a 
kind of ecstasy or trance and separation of the soul from this bodily 
society, in which it hath been in old time instructed of God by 
revelation and mysteries of secrets revealed unto it, as then more fit 
to apprehend such divine oracles than altogether enjoying awake the 
corporal society of these earthly members ." 20 
If the diagnosis be accepted that Lear's self-recognition is an 
initiation into a "mystery of secrets" in the sense that Lear's soul 
intuitively grasps its needs and experiences the value of goodness, 
something can also be said in explanation of the state of his soul when 
he sinks into madness again, without attributing to him either a 
blabbering idiocy or a vision of an impending salvation for himself 
and Cordelia. A s Lear and Cordelia are led captive onto the stage, 
the latter asks whether they shall n o  w see "these sisters and these 
daughters," and Lear shrinks from the evil reality. T h  e fourfold 
"no," which anticipates thefivefold "never" just before his death, be­
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trays his desire to cling to his happy vision. H  e would rather with­
draw to the prison as to a birdcage and warble, birdlike, an escapist 
dream: 
N o , no, no, no! C o m e , let's away to prison. 
W  e two alone will sing like birds i' th' cage. 
W h e  n thou dost ask m  e blessing, I'll kneel down 
A n  d ask of thee forgiveness; so we'll live, 
A n  d pray, and sing, and tell old tales, and laugh 
At gilded butterflies, and hear poor rogues 
Talk of court news; and we'll talk with them too— 
W h  o loses and w h o wins; who's in, who's out— 
A n  d take upon's the mystery of things 
A  s if w  e were gods' spies; and we'll wear out, 
In a wall'd prison, packs and sects of great ones 
That ebb and flow by th' moon. 
(V.iii.8-19) 21 
Lear's speech has an almost surrealistic quality. T h  e curious idea of 
singing with Cordelia like birds in a cage hints that for Lear the 
prison will be the house of madness from which even laughing at 
gilded butterflies can bring no deliverance; Lear craves in vain for 
the happiness of a bird. But there is still a soft echo of his former 
search for more important goals. T h e prison or cage was after all 
the conventional symbol of the body that fettered the soul—it is so 
in Richard's speech at Pomfret Castle—and birds were symbolic of 
the imprisoned soul. There is, for instance, a plethora of such images 
in T h o m a  s Walkington's The Optic Glass of Humors (1606), in 
which the body is described as a "darksome cage" and the soul as 
"not so blind as a bat; yet is it like an owl," and, freed from its 
prison, like "a high-soaring eagle." 22 For Palingenius, the soul, 
"Like as the goldfinch while in cage, her doleful destiny / With 
sundry sorts of pleasant tune doth seek to pacify." 23 
W h e n Lear would like to beguile his time in this bird-like existence 
by taking upon himself and Cordelia "the mystery of things," the 
irony between his expectation and the hope of its fulfillment appears 
overwhelming. I doubt that the words have blasphemous overtones, 
as Professor Elton suggests;24 Lear is not concerned with an over-
curious inquiry, thought unlawful by some, into the mystery of 
nature. It is more natural to associate this wish with his happy, 
dream-like state at his reunion with Cordelia. In dreams, said John 
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Davies of Hereford, the soul often "doth wakeful thoughts con­
ceive, / Making the mind beyond itself to spy" 25—an analogue that 
serves Davies to support the legitimacy of visionary experiences of 
the soul. Whatever the mystery is Lear seeks to spy into, it is clear 
that in its permanence it contrasts with the pseudo-achievements of 
"packs and sects of great ones / That ebb and flow by th' m o o n . " 
There is a hint here of Lear's desire to leave the world of mutability 
for the higher regions above the m o o n  . Palingenius, speaking about 
the soul in the prison of the body, asked his readers to "mind these 
mysteries I tell: / All things are good and never fade above the m o o n 
that dwell." 26 But Lear cannotfly to this region; he must live below 
the m o o n where all is "naught and ill." Just w h e n Lear appears to be 
at the point of establishing a saving intercourse with his true self, 
madness irrevocably engulfs him. His desire to learn of "the mystery 
of things" is merely a pathetic echo of his former search for self-
knowledge. 
His last entrance with the dead Cordelia in his arms is heart­
breaking, and one wishes with Kent that one might let him pass and 
vex not his ghost. Surely no futher revelation of either self-knowl­
edge or divine knowledge can be read into his speeches. H  e has 
passed beyond them. Neither Gloucester nor he dies into love, joy, or 
knowledge. Gloucester's heart breaks in a conflict it is too weak to 
sustain. If one took the usual position of Renaissance moralists, one 
might call his death a warning against excessive joy as well as grief. 
But that would be mere pedantry. T h e ending is stark, tragic—an 
apocalyptic vision that conjures up an image of the end of a decaying 
world. Lear tortures himself as m u c  h with the vain hope that 
Cordelia m a  y be alive as with the conviction that she is "dead as 
earth" (V.iii.261). W h  y a dog, a horse, a rat should have life and 
Cordelia no life at all isfinally unanswerable. Lear's despair is cosmic, 
and his five-times repeated "never" denies any consolation. Whatever 
he m a y see on Cordelia's face w h e n he utters his final "look there," 
even if it were a sign of life or an escaping breath, does not matter; it 
is at best an illusion; at worst, the reality. In either case, our normal 
reaction is to feel heartbroken that n o w  , w h e  n he has fathomed the 
value of Cordelia, he cannot live with her. Hisfinal pathetic request, 
"Pray you undo this button," recalls in ironic contrast his earlier 
defiant divesture of his clothes in the storm. Once he could strip the 
self of m a n ; n o w he has to seek help to breathe more easily. 
W h a  t this starkly tragic ending does to the meaning of the play 
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is a much-debated question. Perhaps no universally valid answer can 
be given; w  e are addressed here too personally and individually. W  e 
m a y say with Kent—and it appears to be thefirst and most natural 
reaction—that all is cheerless, dark, and deadly. O r w e m a y say some­
thing similar by quoting Gloucester's earlier words that m e n are like 
flies to the gods, w h o kill them for their sports. Certainly, if one 
is affected by this play at all, he cannot come away from it "feeling 
good" about m a  n and his place in the scheme of things. But some­
how, an unlimited pessimism is an incomplete reaction to the ending 
and to the play; taking this attitude means accepting the point of 
view of a character w h o has grown prematurely old in his sym­
pathetic suffering with the greatest of the play's sufferers and w h  o is 
destined soon to depart on another "journey," and it means echoing 
the passionate outcry of an old m a  n driven into temporary despair by 
the pain inflicted on him by man's cruelty. These are partial reactions, 
and they are only partially valid. For these characters, pessimism is 
a personal response; for us, it is a m u c  h too external one like 
counting the dead, commenting on the absurdity of fate, and going 
about our business. S o m e h o w , w e are asked to say (I a m almost 
tempted to say "do") more : w e are asked to say what w e feel, and 
thus to assimilate our attitude in some manner to the speaker's, 
Edgar's, sympathetic humanity. A n d what w e have come to feel about 
Lear is very m u c  h influenced not only by his suffering but also by the 
ethical transformation, however incomplete andfinally negated, w  e 
have seen him undergo. T h e material values on which he put his 
trust, his power and authority, have proved insubstantial; the 
spiritual values, which he rejected as nothings, have given him 
whatever small and dim consolation he achieves. A n d w e have seen 
him suffer and, in his suffering, have gauged the potential greatness 
of his soul. W  e have experienced a similar regenerative movement in 
the weaker Gloucester's struggle for patience. Lear's plunge into m a d  ­
ness and death and the cracking of Gloucester's heart m a k  e their 
moments of sanity and strength stand out even more saliently. 
Shakespeare does not permit his characters to spy into the mystery 
of things, if by that is meant the w a y of the gods or of G o d with m e n , 
nor does he explain this mystery to us. Neither does he altogether 
explain some h u m a n mysteries. Palingenius said that m a n cannot 
know God's mysteries, he can only k n o w himself.27 But by the time 
of Lear, Shakespeare had grown away from the definiteness of the 
"know" in this statement. Not only the design of the universe but 
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also the springs of man's actions had become more mysterious to him. 
I have contended that Lear does spy a little into the inner mystery, 
that of the h u m a n soul; but it is certainly m u c h more significant that 
both he and Gloucester and other characters in the play have ex­
perienced a mystery in themselves and in others: the mystery of 
evil and good. If w e are to say what w e feel at the end of the play, 
w e must speak of the mystery of evil; but w e must also pay tribute 
to the mystery of goodness: to the miraculous goodness of Cordelia, 
the loyal goodness of Kent, the just goodness of Albany, the active 
goodness of Edgar, and, not the least, the growing toward goodness 
of Lear. That there is so m u c  h goodness in the darkest and greatest 
tragedy of Shakespeare is one of the most remarkable paradoxes. 
CHAPTER SEVENTEEN 
Macbeth: 
Losing the Self 
TO M O V E F R O M Lear to Macbeth is to m o v e into a dif­ferent but related tragic world. Like Lear, Macbeth is the tragedy of a m a  n w h  o loses himself in the crisis of his life. 
The danger of such self-loss, as w e have noted, is present in all of 
Shakespeare's dramatic designs and is, even in the comedies, often at 
or near their center; but in the tragedies, it is more ominous and 
becomes in the end a destructive reality. T h  e heroes are isolated, lost 
in a world they had taken for granted, but which suddenly takes on a 
menacing look and becomes an illusional landscape or enemy terri­
tory; as they lose themselves, they find death, whether at their o w  n 
hand or that of others. All Shakespeare's tragedies are in some sense 
tragedies of self-loss; * but those generally considered his greatest, 
Hamlet, Othello, Macbeth, and Lear, have the best claim for this 
designation. They are tragedies of self-loss not merely in the sense 
that they depict it in the fate of their heroes but also in that they 
present patterns for the self-losses of m e  n in general, address them­
selves to deep-seated fears and anxieties, and give us, so to speak, 
metaphysical shudders. Shakespeare's earlier tragedies and their 
heroes do not have quite this effect. T h e wholesale murders and at 
times grotesque horrors of Titus Andronicus alternately n u m  b and 
bewilder our sensitivities and m a k  e it difficult to accept the individual 
sufferings of its hero as psychologically convincing and truly tragic; 
moreover, it is not even clear which, if any, of his actions are to be 
attributed to moral failure. T h  e serious self-losses in Romeo and 
Juliet are not those of the lovers, whatever their responsibility for 
falling precipitously in love and marrying without their parents' con­
sent ; these losses are those of the quarreling Montagues and Capulets 
who create a world in which the lovers cannot live together and 
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must, crossed by fate, die together. Richard III is the tragedy of a 
villain's self-loss, but the moral issue is somewhat perfunctorily 
treated. Richard II appears so m u c h more tragic in the Shakespear­
ean w a y because the play dwells on the hero's state of mind and 
soul w h e  n he experiences grief and anxiety about his place in his 
kingdom and in the world. If one hesitates to mention the play in 
one breath with the great tragedies, it is because Richard is and 
remains too immature and self-pitying to attract full tragic sympathy 
and because the play is too lyrical and not sufficiently intense dramat­
ically. N o  r does Julius Caesar appear to be in the first rank of 
Shakespeare's tragedies; although the political issues of the play are 
handled brilliantly, the hero, Brutus, does not permit a look into 
himself that shows us that his fortune has engendered a h u m a n re­
action deep enough to experience vicariously. Hamlet, however, does 
attract tragic sympathy; he lives in an agony of uncertainty and ex­
presses it hauntingly—a condition that is understandable to audiences 
and readers of all kinds and times because it goes beyond Hamlet's 
particular problem of revenge to include a general anxiety about the 
h u m a n condition. In the major tragedies that I have called baroque, 
the application of the heroes' particular situation to mankind's 
general predicament comes about, I believe, in a somewhat different 
fashion. Their follies, passions, and crimes are so monumental and at 
the same time so convincingly depicted that Shakespeare's art per­
suades us to accept them as symbolically heightening the self-losses 
all mankind is subject to. T h e huge and commanding Othello is 
turned into a tortured slave of jealousy and a wife-murderer in a 
w a y so convincing on the stage that it excites awe and fear about 
the destructive nature of h u m a  n passions. Lear, w h  o loses himself in 
incredibly foolish anger, gives a gigantic demonstration of the effects 
of blinding emotion, and his pain and madness are so agonizing as 
to create an empathy for not only his o w n suffering but that of m a n ­
kind in general, which he and w  e come to feel him as symbolizing. In 
their destructive effects on others, the consequences of Lear's self-
loss go even beyond those shown in Othello. 
Nowhere , however, did Shakespeare dramatize the phenomenon 
of self-loss more emphatically, explore it with greater seriousness, 
than in Macbeth, where he showed the effect of self-loss on the 
hero's soul, that of his wife, and the fortune of a whole nation. 
Macbeth's first crime, the murder of Duncan, is invested with a 
supernatural horror because of Macbeth's temptation by the witches, 
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and it drains his moral being, losing him all relationships, including 
the association with his wife w h o urged him to commit the deed. 
Although the murder brings him the crown, it robs him of all peace of 
mind. T  o regain it and secure himself, he commits crime after crime 
and divests himself of the remnants of his h u m a  n feelings. H  e 
attempts to replace his moral self by an amoral one and seeks to draw 
assurance and strength from the powers of evil. But he gains no 
satisfaction as either a m a  n or a king, and, with the loss of his 
humanity, comes spiritual nihilism. Macbeth's self-loss is the greater 
because Shakespeare, after the murder of Duncan, never allows him 
to repent and acknowledge his responsibility as do Othello and Lear 
after their falls. A n  d Macbeth's self-loss gains a spectacular national 
significance as it threatens the loss of Scotland's self w h e  n he throws 
the cloak of his bloody tyranny over her. Only his death rescues the 
country from total chaos.2 
The tragedy of self-loss thus has two aspects, a personal and a 
public one. T h  e weight of interest of the personal tragedy lies in the 
earlier parts of the play, in Macbeth's state of mind before and after 
the murders of Duncan and B a n q u o ; the public drama comes to the 
fore in the later parts w h e n Macbeth recedes into the background 
and the spotlight is on the suffering of the Scots, most excruciatingly 
dramatized in the murder of Lady Macduff and her children. In the 
earlier parts, Macbeth suffers in struggling with his fear and guilt; 
in the later parts, Scotland groans under oppression and tyranny. 
The one suffering follows logically and consistently from the other. 
Near the beginning of his career, in Lucrece, Shakespeare had 
dealt with the consequences that a crime committed by a public 
figure has on the psyche of the criminal and on the order and well­
being of a state. If one makes allowance for the differences between 
narrative poetry and tragedy, Lucrece adumbrates m u c  h of the outer 
structure of Macbeth? T h  efirst half of the poe  m is devoted to the 
conception, preparation, and execution of Tarquin's crime, the 
second to the suffering of the violated heroine; but neither crime 
nor suffering is described as a merely personal act. T h  e criminal is 
the son of the king of R o m e  , and his deed brings about a lack of 
political stability and threatens chaos. T h  e core of Lucrece as well 
as that of Macbeth lies in the personal tragedy, in the harm the crime 
does to the souls of criminal and victim; the public consequences flow 
from that. But in Macbeth they flow more quickly and more 
naturally. In order to underline the public aspects of Tarquin's crime, 
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Shakespeare resorted to the far-fetched device of making the heroine 
recall a painting of the fall of Troy and reflect on the connection be­
tween personal guilt and general suffering. T h  e political allegory is 
tenuous, and rather than explaining the connection, it tends to make 
it less plausible. With obvious application to Tarquin, Lucrece asks 
at one point, "For one's offence w h y should so m a n y fall, / T o plague 
a private sin in general?" (1483-84), and indeed one wonders w h y 
they should. In Macbeth, there can be no such question, and that is 
not merely because Macbeth becomes king while Tarquin is a prince. 
Macbeth's crime is speedily reflected in the public chaos that, with 
tragic irony, he predicts immediately after the deed. T h  e death of 
Duncan, so he intones elegiacally, has led to the loss of everything 
worthwhile: renown and grace are dead and the wine of life is 
drawn. T h e hypocritical dirge is proved to be prophetic not only 
by Macbeth's later weariness with life but also by Scotland's loss of 
all happiness. It is dramatically significant that this note of loss is 
struck in the presence of Duncan's sons, w h o are most directly 
affected. Donalbain's question " W h a  t is amiss?" and Macbeth's 
answer " Y o u are, and do not know't" (II.iii.95) transfer the theme 
of self-loss from him to them. Donalbain's subsequent remark, "the 
near in blood, / T h e nearer bloody" (139-40), makes of this transfer 
almost a physical law. T h  e conversation between Ross, Macduff, and 
the old m a n , which follows in the next scene, shows h o w doubts and 
fears spread further afield. Before Macbeth's death, all Scotland 
will be plunged into uncertainty and horror. 
Scotland thus becomes an extension of the self of Macbeth, a 
motif that is underlined by thematic echoes. In a momen  t of near-
repentance after Duncan's murder, Macbeth admits, " T o know m y 
deed, 'twere best not k n o w myself" (II.ii.73). Later, when Ross 
comes to inform Lady Macduff of her husband'sflight, he expresses 
his fear for Scotland and himself in words that seem to echo M a c ­
beth's : "But cruel are the times, when w e are traitors / A n d do not 
k n o w ourselves" (IV.ii. 18-19) . T h e continuation of the speech also 
recalls an earlier sentiment of Macbeth's. W  e lose the knowledge of 
ourselves, according to Ross, 
when w e hold rumor 
From what w e fear, yet know not what we fear, 
Butfloat upon a wild and violent sea 
Each way and none. 
(19-22) 
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This recalls Macbeth's agitated state of mind at the witches' proph­
ecy: 
Present fears 
Are less than horrible imaginings. 
M  y thought, whose murder is yet but fantastical, 
Shakes so m  y single state of m a  n 
That function is smother'd in surmise, 
A n  d nothing is but what is not. 
(I.iii.137-42) 
Macbeth's fear of facing his deed and knowing himself is once 
more echoed by Ross w h e n he joins Malcolm and Macduff in E n ­
gland and reports on the condition of Scotland: "Alas, poor coun­
try, / Almost afraid to k n o w itself!" (IV.iii. 164-65) . Ross's descrip­
tion of the suffering of the Scottish people, whose "violent sorrow 
s e e m s / A modern ecstasy" (169-70) , recalls the tortures of the 
mind, of which Macbeth speaks earlier, in which he lies in "restless 
ecstasy" (III.ii.22). Macbeth overcomes the affliction of his terrible 
dreams only by inflicting similar anxieties on Scotland. H  e makes 
the macrocosm a reflection of his chaotic microcosm; he tyrannizes 
Scotland in a kind of attempt to purge himself from fear by creating 
fear, just as Iago purges his jealousy by creating it in Othello. 
Such forceful projection of the self as that of Macbeth is a feature 
inherent in the heightening of the heroes and villains in Shake­
speare's later plays. Analogies between m a  n and the universe on 
this basis differ in their one-sidedness from the structural depen­
dence Renaissance moralists saw between microcosm and macro­
cosm. W h e  n Lear in his anger "Strives in his little world of m a  n 
to outscorn / T h e to-and-fro conflicting wind and rain" (IILi. 10-11) , 
he makes the storm of nature into a symbolic projection of the power 
of his o w  n tempestuous soul. A n  d Prospero, as w  e shall note, suc­
ceeds by his will to m a k  e his island realm a reflection of his o w  n 
painfully achieved self-control. In Macbeth, it is the negative aspect 
of the hero that imprints itself in such fashion on the country that he 
rules. 
Personal and public self-loss are more strongly interlinked in 
Macbeth than in Lucrece for still another reason besides the dynamic 
way in which the latter loss is shown to be the result of the former. 
In Macbeth, both individual and general affliction arise more believ­
ably from a substance of evil that suffuses the universe. In Lucrece, 
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Shakespeare seems to have been hard put to it to explain h o  w sud­
denly evil springs up in Tarquin's soul: " W h  y should the w o r  m in­
trude the maiden bud?" (848). A n  d indeed one might wonder why. 
In Macbeth, ones does not wonder; one feels horror and awe. Yet the 
reason for the existence of evil is hardly different: it is a metaphysi­
cal fact and a mystery. T h  e "explanation" given in Lucrece is that 
"no perfection is so absolute / That some impurity does not pollute" 
(853-54)—the perfection being the h u m a  n soul, created divine and 
immortal. But in Macbeth, there is no bald statement of this kind, 
which can only be intellectually unsatisfactory; rather, the hero is 
dramatically confronted with the horrifying shapes of the weird sis­
ters, creatures of destiny and symbols of evil. They predict the out­
come of Scotland's battle and the future glory of Macbeth; they 
tempt him to shape his fate to his o w n and his country's undoing. 
In addition, Macbeth is urged on by a wicked wife w h o invokes 
spirits of evil to unsex her andfill her with direst cruelty. Later he 
draws reassurance from a visit to the weird sisters. T h e supernatural 
forces that tempt and support Macbeth do not cause his murderous 
thoughts or his oppressive reign, but their presence adds an element 
of cosmic mystery to Macbeth's submission to, and persistence in, 
evil. W  e m a  y speak of the greatness of his temptation, of the bad in­
fluence of his wife, of his anxiety to secure his position; but we 
cannot help feeling that there is something mysterious, an element 
that defiesfinal analysis, in the urge that drives him to kill and kill 
again and that his nature has a subhuman or superhuman stratum 
that responds powerfully to the suggestion of evil. 
Because Macbeth's infection with evil is quasi-demonic, it is much 
more serious than that of Tarquin, and the evil with which he infects 
Scotland is too pervasive to be healed by h u m a n power alone. It is 
not accidental that the forces destined to heal the sickness of the 
body politic of Scotland gather at the English court, where the 
saintly E d w a r d cures the scrofula by touch. At the end of the play 
w h e n "the time is free," Malcolm acknowledges the "grace of Grace" 
that has helped him to restore order and, he prays, will help him to 
perform his royal duties. 
T h  e story of personal self-loss, which will be examined in the re­
mainder of this chapter, can have no such happy ending. The soul 
of Scotland can be cleansed; that of Macbeth, which has incurred 
mortal sin, cannot. Here again, the basic pattern is that adumbrated 
in Lucrece. Although Tarquin feels sorry for what he has done 
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whereas Macbeth does not, what is at stake in both cases is quite 
similar. O n  e might say that the formula on which Shakespeare con­
structed the two personal tragedies is the winning-losing antithesis 
of M a r k viii.36: 'Tor what shall it profit a m a n if he win all the 
world and lose his o w n soul ?" The Genevan side-note explained this 
question in words that are echoed by both Tarquin and Macbeth: 
"They are the most foolish of all m e n  , which purchase the enjoying 
of this life with the loss of everlasting bliss." Tarquin senses even 
before his crime the foolishness of what he seeks to w i n — " A dream, 
a breath, a froth offleeting joy"—and yet goes on to sell "eternity 
to get a toy" (211-14). Macbeth realizes his bad bargain after his 
first murder: 
For Banquo's issue have IfiTd m  y mind; 
For them the gracious Duncan have I murder'd; 
Put rancours in the vessel of m  y peace 
Only for them, and mine eternal jewel 
Given to the common enemy of m a n 
T o make them kings—the seeds of Banquo kings! 
(IILi.64-69) 
Tarquin conquers the body of Lucrece, but loses his soul. Macbeth 
wins the crown, and also loses his soul. 
Yet, quite apart from the fact that for most of us murder is a 
more serious crime than rape, the case of Macbeth is not quite the 
same as that of Tarquin. Macbeth does not face up to what he loses 
as does Tarquin; he never attains Tarquin's recognition of the great­
ness of his crime or the immensity of his responsibility before 
heaven. Macbeth regrets the loss of his "eternal jewel" only because 
it has not brought him the full gain he expected, afirmly held crown. 
Moreover, he hesitates to admit the seriousness of his loss and cov­
ers it through a semantic ambiguity. W h a  t exactly is the "eternal 
jewel" whose loss he laments? O n e might take it to mean "soul," 
but the preceding "vessel of m  y peace," which the image varies, sug­
gests that Macbeth means merely his peace of mind.4 A n d even 
"common enemy of m a n  " is an evasive phrase for whatever power 
of evil Macbeth has in mind. 
B y having Macbeth express a sense of indefinite anxiety but 
punctuate it with traditional ethical and religious images, Shake­
speare emphasized the moral consequences of Macbeth's fall without 
having him confess them. Macbeth is thus a m u c h more believable 
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criminal than Tarquin, w h o is a "heavy convertite" and knows his 
soul indelibly spotted w h e n he steals away from Lucrece. For that 
matter, Macbeth is a m u c h more believable h u m a n being. W  e know 
only too well that it is h u m a  n nature to embellish faults and only 
half-admit guilt and responsibility if admit them at all. There is just 
a little of Macbeth in all of us so as to make us understand his eva­
sions if not to sympathize with them. 
If the winning-losing formula is used with greater psychological 
subtlety in Macbeth than in Lucrece, it nevertheless enters more 
prominently into the texture of the language. T h  e antithesis is im­
mediately struck in the first scene, so atmospheric and foreboding, 
when the witches appear only to agree to meet again "when the bat­
tle's lost and w o n . " W h a t winning and losing means to these evil 
creatures is inhuman; for them "fair is foul and foul is fair"—as the 
immediately following paradox suggests. This suggestion of a re­
versal of values tinges with irony the words of Duncan that im­
mediately precede the reappearance of the witches: " W h a t he [Caw­
dor] hath lost, noble Macbeth hath w o n " (I.ii.68). Macbeth is to 
win from the Thane of Cawdor not only his title of thane but also 
his evil nature and the title of traitor, and for whatever he wins, he 
loses his soul. Macbeth's first appearance w h e  n he approaches the 
witches, but does not yet see them, associates him with their topsy­
turvey values: "So foul and fair a day I have not seen" (I.iii.38). 
It is a day of victory in battle and a dark day not only in weather 
but also in the hero's life.5 
T h e relevance of the winning-losing formula to Macbeth is em­
phasized by the contrast between his and Banquo's reactions to the 
witches' prophecies. Although Banquo too is given expectations of 
future glory, at least for his family, he realizes at once the seductive 
danger of the promise: 
A n d oftentimes to win us to our harm,

The instruments of darkness tell us truths,

W i  n us with honest trifles, to betray's

In deepest consequence.

(I.iii. 123-26) 
Banquo appears to fear from the beginning that the witches' 
prophecy might enkindle Macbeth to gain the crown by foul play. 
This is surely the reason for his brief conversation with Macbeth 
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just before the murder of Duncan when he broaches the subject of 
the witches by saying that he dreamed of them. W h e  n he notes on 
this occasion that to Macbeth they have brought some truth, he does 
so evidently in order to elicit from Macbeth an indication as to 
whether he is affected by temptation. Macbethfirst evades the im­
plied question; but then the idea of testing Banquo in return occurs 
to him. H  e says that he will later discuss the matter with Banquo 
when it will "make honor" for him if he "cleaves" to Macbeth's con­
sent. But Banquo rules himself out as a possible ally; he rejects the 
idea of winning dishonestly and sets himself unequivocally in con­
trast to Macbeth: 
So I lose none [honor] 
In seeking to augment it, but still keep 
M  y bosom franchis'd and allegiance clear. 
(II.i.26-28) 
Duncan's death makes into near-certainty Banquo's suspicion that 
Macbeth has succumbed to the witches' lure, has played "most 
foully" for what they promised (Ill.i.i—3). If Banquo does not 
openly oppose Macbeth n o w but rather professes loyalty, the reason 
is surely not (as Bradley thought) Banquo's hope to m a k e the 
witches' prediction for his children come true. Only lack of oppor­
tunity and time prevents him from opposing the tyrant. That even 
Banquo must give "mouth-honor," must lie and prevaricate, is symp­
tomatic of the falseness that Macbeth has injected into the life of 
Scotland. For m e n whose intentions are fair this country has be­
come an alien place, where, as Lady Macduff later says, "to do 
harm / Is often laudable, to do good sometime / Accounted dan­
gerous folly" (IV.ii.74-76). But in Banquo's conscience, fair is still 
fair and foul is foul. H  e is the foil of Macbeth, and he represents the 
positive case of the winning-losing formula. Although he does not 
actively seek to make the witches' prediction come true, he reaps 
the profit and becomes the ancestor of a royal dynasty. 
Macbeth recognizes the fundamental contrast between Banquo 
and himself when he details the reasons w h y Banquo must die. H  e 
fears Banquo not merely because his designation as the ancestor of 
future kings limits his o w n power and glory but also because in 
Banquo's "royalty of nature / Reigns that which would be fear'd." 
Macbeth feels that by him " M  y genius is rebuk'd, as it is said/ 
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M a r k Antony's was by Caesar" (III.i.49 ff.). T h e remark not only 
anticipates Antony and Cleopatra but also looks back to the strug­
gle of Brutus's "genius" with his "mortal elements" in Julius Caesar 
(II.i.66) ; yet neither Antony nor Brutus feels threatened because 
he thinks himself morally inferior to his adversary. T  o adapt a 
phrase Iago applies to Cassio, Banquo has a daily beauty in his 
life that makes Macbeth feel ugly. A n  d thus Banquo must die. 
This hatred of Banquo's moral superiority marks Macbeth as an 
envious and an evil m a n  . H  e does not appear to m  e ever really to 
show the essential or original nobility so m a n y critics and actors 
have read into his character, misled, I think, by the attribution of 
nobility to him early in the play and perhaps also by some general 
ideas about what a tragic hero is or should be, notions on which 
Aristotle's definition has had considerable influence. W  e all know, 
theoretically at least, that Aristotle's model of a noble and above-
average character is not properly applicable to Macbeth—for Aris­
totle a villain did not m a k e afitting tragic hero anyway—but w e find 
it in practice difficult to get away from the generalizations of The 
Poetics. If Macbeth is greater than the average, it is not because of 
his nobility but because of the magnitude of his crime and through 
what is at stake in his grasp for power—not only his kingdom but 
also his immortal soul. A n d , I think, Macbeth is tragic not because 
of the ruination of his alleged nobility but because of the intensity 
of his emotional states that, in heightened form, depict the self-loss 
sin and crime bring with it. 
M o r  e than one critic has found the idea of nobility hard to recon­
cile with Macbeth's criminal nature. S o m e , like Robert Bridges, 
have seen here an inconsistency that cannot be psychologically re­
solved and is explainable only by Shakespeare's sacrificing character 
consistency to theatrical effect.6 T h  e reputation of nobility, it should 
be said, rests on Macbeth's martial courage, which is notably con­
trasted with his private insecurity. L  . L  . Schucking has noted that 
"Macbeth is certainly a lion in the field of battle; open and visible 
dangers leave him unmoved. But this is not compatible with the 
fact that, at heart, he is greatly dependent on other people, is always 
prey to fear and feels himself helpless in every moral conflict into 
which his actions lead him." 7 Schucking came to see in this con­
tradiction an antithetical character construction, peculiar to the 
baroque.8 H o w e v e r this m a y be, I do not think that the character 
of Macbeth lacks in psychological consistency, provided one realizes 
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the limited nature of the nobility attributed to him. Richard Moulton 
appears to m e to have seen his nature clearly when he described it 
as a "union of superficial nobility with real moral worthlessness . . . 
connected with the purely practical bent of his mind." 9 
Macbeth's nobility is shown to be superficial quite early in the 
play in one of the kind of indirect and ironic revelations of character 
that Shakespeare practiced since Measure for Measure. Indeed, it 
comes in that famous phrase of the "milk of h u m a  n kindness" of 
which the Lady says her husband is too full (I.v.14)—a phrase w e 
have often heard applied benevolently to Macbeth. But of that 
milk, nothing is evident in h im; it is a measure of the Lady's per­
version of standards that she should consider whatever reluctance 
to murder exists in Macbeth as due to kindness and holiness. W h a  t 
she actually says about her husband's morals is quite damaging if 
one makes allowance for her peculiar definition of terms: 
Thou wouldst be great; 
Art not without ambition, but without 
The illness should attend it. W h a t thou wouldst highly, 
That wouldst thou holily; wouldst not play false, 
A n  d yet wouldst wrongly win. 
Thou'dst have, great Glamis, that which cries 
"Thus thou must do," if thou have it; 
A n  d that which rather thou dost fear to do 
Than wishest should be undone. 
(I.v.i 5-22) 
The Lady does not really credit her husband with a moral nature, 
but sees in him a lack of determination to execute evil by "catching 
the nearest w a y . " There is irony in her calling him "great Glamis," 
and, significantly, she says that he would "wrongly win." Banquo 
makes it clear that he would not. W h a t the Lady appears to have 
in mind is not that Macbeth is too kind but that he has a residual 
consciousness of being of humankind and subject to its laws. This is 
a far cry from the nobility some commentators have seen in him and 
rather bears out Moulton's characterization, old-fashioned as it m a  y 
appear in its moral tone, that Macbeth has no "real love of goodness 
for its o w n sake, founded on intelligent choice or deep affection." 10 
Macbeth's residual consciousness of belonging to humanity does 
indeed contribute to his suffering and makes him at times appear 
less evil than Richard III or Iago. But it should be said that neither 
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of these villains ever quite designs and personally executes a murder 
as Macbeth does Duncan's; neither of them, therefore, is quite 
tested in his commitment to evil as he. Nor , for that matter, is the 
Lady, w h o prides herself on her superior strength. Although she 
entertains the notion of killing Duncan herself and grandiloquently 
announces that he m a  y leave everything to her, she cannot actually 
do the deed. 
O n  e should resist the temptation of constructing a character for 
Macbeth before he appears and confronts the evil sisters; but given 
the m a  n presented in the play, it is difficult to think of him as ever 
having been positively good and noble. H  e is certainly not merely 
duped by superior demonic forces and an evil, scheming wife. Even 
though the witches are at least partially prescient, knowing as they 
do that Macbeth will become Thane of Cawdor and king, they are 
not executors of fate; they do not decree h o w he is to become king, 
whether by fair means or foul. Macbeth himself considers the pos­
sibility that he might be crowned without any effort of his own. 
Presumably the witches k n o w that he will become king because he 
is ready to get the crown by foul means. Although their prophecy 
stirs the thought of murder in Macbeth's brain, the thought is still 
his o w n  . A n  d he appears to have had it even earlier; the Lady's 
question, what m a d e him "break this enterprise" to her when he 
n o w seems reluctant to execute it, indicates that Macbeth considered 
murdering Duncan when there were no evil spirits yet to tempt 
him. 
Macbeth's intense fascination with evil (accompanied as it often 
is by weak recoils) is unparalleled a m o n g Shakespeare's villains. O n 
hisfirst appearance, he reacts with a kind of a psychic shock to the 
witches' greetings, but Banquo remains calm and unperturbed. The 
latter notes h o w Macbeth "starts" and seems "rapt withal" (I.iii.57). 
H  e recovers temporarily, only to be again "rapt" (142) when he is 
promptly awarded the title of Thane of Cawdor. Banquo is as much 
surprised by his partner's extraordinary reaction as he is by the 
appearance of the witches. Macbeth is given to states of feverish 
excitement in which he is attracted to evil as m u c h or more than 
he shrinks from it. These psychic states are not absorptions in 
thought, but "raptures," that is, turmoils of the spirit in which 
thought, imagination, and passion circle wildly around the events; 
they are neurotic anxieties, transportations of fear, hallucinations, 
and strange obsessions. They are not reactions to stimuli commen­
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surate with them. Macbeth is as profoundly affected by the illusion 
of the dagger he knows to be merely in his mind as he is by the 
ghost of Banquo that is for him—and was for Shakespeare's au­
dience—real enough. If he did not almost crave the fright that the 
specter produces, he would hardly repeat the n a m e of Banquo that 
brought about its first appearance. Lady Macbeth's explanation at 
the banquet that he has been subject to seizures since his youth 
(III.iv.54) has a ring of truth. Associated from the beginning with 
a "bloody execution" as Macbeth is and reacting emphatically to 
the suggestion of evil as he does, he is destined by character and 
temperament to do a gigantically monstrous deed. 
But Macbeth's "raptures" represent not only a psychological 
phenomenon but are also a dramatic device comparable to similar 
dramatic devices in Shakespeare's baroque plays. T h e moments of 
Macbeth's greatest attraction to evil have an outward resemblance 
to Lear's penetration to goodness in his intuitive realization of his 
and Cordelia's true values in that both Macbeth and Lear are in 
trance-like states. Different as the inner conditions of these two 
heroes are, both of them achieve the strongest emotional expression 
of their characters by at least partial removal from their surround­
ings. A n d w e m a y also recall Othello's passionate breakdown, which 
is called a "trance" by the Folio stage direction, and by Iago (to 
Cassio) an "epilepsy" and (to Othello) an "ecstasy" (IV.i.43,50, 
78). W  e shall observe a similar tendency of heightening passion 
into ecstasy in The Tempest w h e  n Prospero takes leave of his 
island spirits. T h e strong movements toward self-loss or self-finding 
by the heroes of Shakespeare's later plays are given an extraordi­
nary emotional emphasis. 
I think that the psychological and dramatic movement of the 
earlier parts of Macbeth derives not, as is frequently explained, 
from a conflict between ambition and conscience in Macbeth but 
from his intense reaction to evil and from the impact of the strong 
will of the Lady on his weaker but also criminal will. O f the dynamic 
interplay of these two characters' wills something must be said 
later. A  s to the matter of Macbeth's conscience, it is surprising that, 
in view of the role it has played in the analysis of his character, 
Macbeth himself never speaks of "conscience." It is notable that 
there is something inexplicable for him (and, as I have argued, also 
for us) in w h  y he acts as he does; and that puzzlement includes for 
him also w h  y he feels as he does. H  e cannot explain w h  y the appear­
34° ACHIEVEMENT AND SYNTHESIS 
ance of the weird sisters shakes him so violently and sets his whole 
being adrift. H  e is dimly aware that he violates h u m a n and divine 
laws, and yet he is compelled to commit his crimes. T h e imaginary 
dagger terrifies him and yet draws him to Duncan's chamber. H  e 
appears to k n o w that he cannot rely on the evil sisters—"damn'd all 
those that trust them," he says to Lennox (IV.i.139)—and yet 
he is reaffirmed by them in his evildoing. But though he never 
speaks of conscience, he often speaks of, and evinces, fear. Of course, 
one m a  y see in this fear and its accompanying phantasmagoria a 
subconscious reassertion of his conscience; but then one must also 
acknowledge Macbeth's conscience to be a fear-inspired psychic 
state, a conscience of the most conventional and unexamined kind 
and one difficult to distinguish from neurosis. Marlowe's reputed 
utterances concerning religion indicate that some free Renaissance 
spirits wanted to relegate all manifestations of conscience to a con­
ditioning in fear. But the orthodox, then as n o w , attempted to dis­
tinguish between conscience and fear. They contrasted the "honest 
fear" of conscience, which included some intellectual considerations, 
focusing on a moral view of m a n and a reverence of G o d and his 
laws, with a "dishonest," that is, practical and cowardly, fear. The 
latter could become pathological, and, as such, it interested not only 
the moralists but also doctors like Timothy Bright, for w h o  m it was 
a form of the all-inclusive psychological illness of melancholy (by 
which, in this case, he meant neurotic disorders). Admitting the 
difficulty of distinguishing between conscience and fear-melancholy, 
Bright saw the latter characterized by vivid conceits, fearful appari­
tions, imagined voices, and frightful dreams.11 Macbeth is affected 
by evil in this fashion. 
In regard to the kind of conscience with which Macbeth is en­
dowed, a comparison with Tarquin in Lucrece is illuminating. 
Shakespeare almost appears to invite a comparison when Macbeth 
"With Tarquin's ravishing strides, towards his design / Moves like 
a ghost" (II.i.55-56). But the Tarquin of Shakespeare's poem 
goes through a long debate between reason and passion before he 
strikes, and the former is given a hearing even if its arguments are 
rejected. Macbeth's internal conflict never leads to a real weighing 
of alternatives, not even in thefirst aside after the witches' prophecy 
when, as Coleridge surmised, the decision to kill or not to kill is still 
in his power. But I believe it is clear that Macbeth is already yield­
ing to the evil in his heart: 
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This supernatural soliciting 
Cannot be ill; cannot be good. If ill, 
W h  y hath it given m  e earnest of success, 
Commencing in a truth ? I a m Thane of Cawdor. 
If good, why do I yield to that suggestion 
W h o s  e horrid image doth unfix m  y hair 
A n d make m y seated heart knock at m y ribs 
Against the use of nature ? Present fears 
Are less than horrible imaginings. 
(I.iii.130-38) 
These lines do reflect Macbeth's struggle with good and evil; but 
they depict a morally confused struggle that betrays the tremendous 
impact the suggestion of evil has on him. Macbeth is confused about 
what is "good" and "ill." T h  e fulfillment of the first part of the 
witches' prophecy is "good" because it is a happy prologue to the 
imperial theme of which he dreams. Good is what brings power. 
W h a  t is "ill" is less clear. Is it the "horrid image," the personified 
imaginary murder of his thought, or is it the fear that makes him 
shrink from the image? Certainly, if "present fears / Are less than 
horrible imaginings," a good w a y to go about restoring the "smoth­
ered function" is to commit the murder. T h e reason Macbeth kills 
Duncan is surely not merely that he wants to become king. That 
wish is the one Lady Macbeth has for her husband; she appears to 
have no other motive. T h  e traditional roles of m a  n and w o m a  n 
are here reversed: it is she w h  o has the acquisitive urge and he 
w h o has the scruples, weak and confused as they are. Macbeth, w h o 
mentions ambition only once, compares it to a horse that overleaps 
itself under the spur of the h u m a  n will and declares it to be an in­
sufficient motivation (I.vii.25-27). 
W h a t then, if not ambition, drives Macbeth to kill ? T o the degree 
that an answer can be given, it must be sought in the nature of the 
fear that both drives him on and makes him recoil. O n e need not 
subscribe to Lily Campbell's thesis that the whole of Macbeth is a 
study in fear in order to accept her arguments on the significance of 
this emotion in the hero's psychological constitution.12 T h  e m a  n w h  o 
is introduced as "brave Macbeth" and "valor's minion" and w h o is 
called "valiant cousin" by Duncan and "Bellona's bridegroom" by 
Ross before w e even meet him is, during m u c h of the action of the 
play, under the spell of fear. Shakespeare surely intended the irony 
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and wished to m a k e some statement concerning the nature of courage 
and fear. 
Miss Campbell explains, I think correctly, Macbeth's courage in 
battle as what the moralists called "false courage" or "rashness," a 
passion devoid of reason and opposite to fear. True courage was the 
Aristotelian m e a  n between the excesses of rashness and fear. M a c  ­
beth veers from one of these excesses to the other. There is something 
excessive in that first action reported of this minion of valor when 
he slew Macdonwald, not desisting "Till he unseam'd him from the 
nave to th' chaps, / A n  d fix'd his head upon our battlements" (I.ii. 
2 2 - 2 3 ) . Although this deed is applauded, it gives the impression 
of being committed by a m a n w h o is easily carried away. A n d when 
Macbeth says he killed the sleeping grooms because the expedition 
of his violent passion (his alleged love for D u n c a n  ) outran "the 
pauser, reason" (II.iii.109), the explanation sounds most appro­
priate for a m a  n with a reputation of rashness. Later, Macbeth con­
trasts himself enviously with B a n q u o  : " A n  d to that dauntless tem­
per of his mind / H  e hath a wisdom that doth guide his valour / T o 
act in safety" (IILi.51-53). Banquo's is the true courage.13 
T h  e combination of military courage and moral cowardice in 
Macbeth, antithetically baroque as it has been thought, is yet plau­
sible in our psychology as well as that of the Renaissance. According 
to humanistic moralists, excessive courage or rashness could be the 
expression of an underlying fear. Charron noted that some military 
courage was of this kind: 
This military valor is pure and natural in beasts, with w h o  m it is 
as well in females as in males. In m e  n it is often artificial, gotten by 
fear and the apprehension of captivity, of death, of grief, of poverty; 
of which things, beasts have no fear. H u m a  n valor is a wise coward­
liness, a fear accompanied with foresight to avoid one evil by an­
other ; choler is the temper and file thereof. Beasts have it simply. 
T h e driving force of Macbeth is well characterized by Charron 
w h e  n he describes the "dishonest fear" that impels m a  n to evil as 
that vicious fear that troubleth and afflicteth, which is the seed of 
sin, the twin of shame, both of one w o m b  , sprung from that close 
and cursed marriage of the spirit of m a  n with a diabolical persua­
sion. . . . It is a deceitful and malicious passion and hath no other 
power over us, but to mock and seduce us. It serves its turn with 
that which is to come; where though w e seem to foresee much, we 
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see nothing at all . .  . for fear seemeth not to other end than to 
make us find that w efly from. Doubtless, fear is of all other evils 
the greatest and most tedious, for other evils are no longer evils 
than they continue and the pain endureth no longer than the cause; 
but fear is of that which is and that which is not and that perhaps 
which never shall be, yea, sometimes of that which cannot possibly 
be.14 
Charron's is the perfect explanation of the feverish state of the 
imagination in which Macbeth's function is smothered in surmise, 
and "no thing is but what is not." Charron elsewhere shows h o  w 
false fear can drive a m a  n to violent deeds. This fear, he says, 
ariseth from dangers and m a n  y times casteth us into dangers; for 
it engendereth in us such an inconsiderate desire to get out that it 
astonisheth, troubleth, and hindreth us from taking that order that 
isfit to get out. It bringeth a violent kind of trouble whereby the 
soul, being affrighted, withdraweth itself into itself and debateth 
with itself h o  w to avoid the danger that it presented. Besides that 
great discouragement that it bringeth, it seizeth on us with such an 
astonishment that w  e lose our judgement, and there is no longer 
reason or discourse in us.15 
The fear described by Charron is the kind of emotion that besets 
Macbeth w h e n his soul withdraws into itself during his raptures. 
It vitiates his attempts to assess his situation rationally and makes 
him prefer the quick solution to the moral and prudent one. 
This urge to extricate himself from trouble by a quick action 
prevents Macbeth from ever fully probing his condition. His ner­
vous, disjointed, and equivocal soliloquy before he murders D u n  ­
can—"If it were done w h e n 'tis done, then 'twere well / It were 
done quickly"—is an example h o  w Macbeth approaches the great 
moral issue at stake, but then quickly evades it. T h  e residual c o m  ­
punction and w e a k recoil from the deed are overcome by his leap 
forward, not in courage but in cowardice, so he can catch what the 
Lady calls "the nearest w a y " : 
If th' assassination 
Could trammel up the consequence, and catch, 
With his surcease, success; that but this blow 
Might be the be-all and the end-all here— 
But here upon this bank and shoal of time— 
W e '  d jump the life to come. 
(I.vii.2-7) 
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Macbeth in this speech does not m a k e clear to himself and to us 
what he really fears, whether it is the possibility of failing and with 
it the punishment of worldly justice, or, in spite of success, the 
punishment of G o d  . T h  e logic of the argument, such as it is, favors 
the former interpretation; some of the terms and images, it is true, 
the latter. "The life to come" echoes the prayer-book phrase for the 
after-life, "the life of the world to come." Yet Macbeth continues 
with " w e still have judgment here. . . ." A n  d even if one assumes 
him to be vaguely afraid of spiritual consequences, the question is 
still whether he thinks of these as a risk to be taken or a threat to 
be evaded—"jump" could have either meaning. In both cases, the 
energetic action suggested by the image contrasts sharply with the 
vague if imaginatively beautiful evocation of the retardative forces. 
T h e "even-handed justice" Macbeth fears seems to be temporal 
punishment; but w h e  n he says that it " C o m m e n d  s th' ingredience of 
our poison'd chalice / T  o our o w  n lips," he appears to think of a spiri­
tual affliction. W h e  n he imagines that the old king will attract pity 
to himself because of his meekness in office, Macbeth thinks in a 
very practical w a y about the murder and its consequences; but 
w h e n he likens pity to a "naked, new-born babe" and to "heaven's 
cherubin hors'd" and sees Duncan's virtues plead like angels "against 
/ T h  e deep damnation of his taking-off," the religiously tinged lan­
guage evokes a hazy, child-like picture of divine vengeance. H o w  ­
ever, Macbeth uses these images merely as analogies, and the specific 
reasons he marshals against killing Duncan are not in themselves 
particularly spiritual: Duncan is his kinsman and his lord as well as 
his guest, and the laws of family loyalty and hospitality demand that 
he should be protected rather than murdered. Never does Macbeth 
face directly the c o m m a n d m e n t " T h o u shalt not kill." If his argu­
ment against the killing were that murder, heinous by itself, is still 
more heinous in this case, it would be strong; but because Macbeth 
evades the main moral issue, the wrongness of murder, the reasons 
he gives do not serve to underline his recoil as m u c h as they bring 
his monstrous ingratitude to our minds. 
W h e n  , after this soliloquy, the Lady enters, the reasons Macbeth 
gives her for wanting to desist are even weaker than those he gives 
to himself. They are strictly prudential rather than ethical, and they 
demonstrate, as Moulton has it, his practical mind rather than his 
moral nature: Duncan has honored him of late and he has gathered 
golden opinions from others. T h e Lady could easily refute these ob­
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jections by reminding him that the murder of Duncan will bring him 
even greater honor: the crown. But she does not choose to reason 
with her husband in this fashion; rather, she accuses him of cow­
ardice and admonishes him to be a m a n . She makes him afraid of 
being thought afraid. A n  d surely she does so because she thinks 
that he is at heart a coward w h  o is willing to silence his humanistic 
conscience if he is assured of success. That she is proved right pro­
ceeds from Macbeth's last and weakest objection to the murder, "If 
w e should fail" (59). T o demonstrate her o w n superiority to such 
weakness as his, she proclaims her readiness to dash out her child's 
brain had she sworn to execute this deed as he has the murder—a 
remark that elicits from Macbeth the half-admiring, half-horrified 
exclamation "Bring forth men-children only." H e  r "undaunted met­
tle" dissuades him from the fear that they might fail, and her "ex­
ample" energizes him: "I a  m settl'd, and bend up / Each corporal 
agent to this terrible feat" (79-80). Earlier, the Lady had asked 
him to "look like th' innocent flower, / But be the serpent under't" 
(I.v.62-63). Macbeth n o  w accepts this Machiavellian principle and 
reciprocates with the advice: " A w a y  , and moc  k the time with fairest 
show;/False face must hide what the false heart doth k n o w " (I. 
vii.81-82). 
For the ideological and dramatic pattern of the drama, it is signif­
icant that in the clash between Macbeth and the Lady two concepts 
of manhood are evoked, the one humanistic, the other antihumanistic 
and tinged with Machiavellism as it was understood in Shakespeare's 
time.16 Manhood and its relationship to courage and fear is a major 
issue of the play; all through the action, Macbeth feels challenged 
in his status as a m a n . There is something in him that requires him 
to prove himself as such. At the Lady's charge of cowardice in that 
moment of hesitation before the murder of Duncan, he seeks to take 
refuge in the notion that being a m a  n means to accept moral limita­
tions : "I dare do all that m a y become a m a n ; / W h o dares do more 
is none" (I.vii.46-47). Sarcastically, the Lady retorts: " W h a t beast 
was't then/That made you break this enterprise to m e ? " H e r 
specious contrast of m a  n and beast flouts the humanistic doctrine 
of moral decorum based on the distinction of m a  n and beast. For 
her, Macbeth can prove himself "more the m a n  " if he can throw off 
his moral fetters. She sees m a  n as an exclusive product of his will, a 
will strong enough to impose its laws on the world. 
Here, as before, the Lady assumes the traditionally masculine 
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role; she resembles the kind of "new m a n  " embodied by Iago. Her 
acceptance of the philosophy of seeming and her glorification of the 
will as the victorious agent in a battle that has to be fought by as­
suming the "condition of the beast" m a k e her a "Machiavellian." 
She prides herself in possessing the psychic strength that some of 
Machiavelli's disciples identified with their master's concept of virtu 
and that they thought free of all ethical limitations. Gabriel Har  ­
vey, as w  e observed, was one of the stealthy Machiavellians; and his 
secret acclaim of man's psychic resources is worth quoting in full: 
Quicquid est in deo, est deus; 
Quicquid est in viro, sit virtus et vis; 
Quicquid cogitat, vigor; 
Quicquid loquitur, emphasis; 
Quicquid agit, dynamis; 
Quicquid patitur, alacritas. 
Totus vita entelechia, juror, selus, ignis.11 
Force in thought, emphasis in speech, dynamism in action, courage 
in suffering—qualities characteristic of the baroque age of energy-
were traits that fascinated Shakespeare w h e n he created the heroes 
and villains of his later tragedies. But unlike Harvey, he did not 
identify a collection of such traits with manhood, as is evident by 
his representing them, strongly and in an unalloyed manner, in his 
villains. A n Iago and an E d m u n d are deficient as h u m a n beings be­
cause they possess m u c h force, emphasis, dynamism, and courage, 
and very little else. 
In Macbeth, the psychological dynamics bears a certain resem­
blance to that in Othello: one of the two major characters supplies 
the ethically unrestricted will that triggers the passionate action 
of the other—or so, at least, it is for Macbeth's first crime. But 
there are major differences. In Macbeth, the process is not a seduc­
tion away from good and toward evil, for Macbeth is already under 
the spell of evil; it is merely an infusion of energy to keep him on 
his path. Macbeth's "humanism" is halfhearted; it gives the impres­
sion of having been learned by rote rather than ever deeply felt. H  e 
has an old-fashioned sense—one that, by n o w  , is quite unusual in 
Shakespeare—that the world should have a firm, "framed" order 
that comprises matter and spirit, microcosm and macrocosm: 
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But let the frame of things disjoint, both the worlds suffer, 
Ere w  e will eat our meal in fear and sleep 
In the affliction of these terrible dreams 
That shake us nightly. 
(III.ii.16-19) 
Yet this humanistic assertion of a universal cohesiveness (earlier, 
he speaks of the "single state of m a n " ) only springs to his mind 
when he ponders murder. It is an acquired, mechanical reaction ac­
companying the ambiguous fear that both makes him shudder and 
drives him on; it is not a deeply felt conviction. 
Different from Othello also is the profoundly ironic effect of the 
infusion of energy that takes place in Macbeth. T h e m a n of passion 
does indeed succeed in suppressing his disturbing emotionalism, 
and he acquires the qualities of vis that Harvey admired (although 
he does not, I shall argue, retain his most aspired-to acquisition, 
courage, to the very end) ; but this gain comes at a terrible price: he 
loses all humanity and becomes alienated from himself, his wife, 
and the world. A n  d the Lad  y breaks under the strain of her absorp­
tion of these qualities. She, no less than he, is a most conspicuous 
example of the folly and tragedy of trying to force h u m a  n nature 
into a mould of superhuman hardness. 
The irony of the Lady's self-proclaimed dehumanization becomes 
apparent first: she fancies herself to have derived her strength from 
evil spirits and to have divested herself of all womanly and motherly 
feelings; yet her influence on her husband, diabolical as one might 
call it, is not exerted in any supernatural way. N  o superhuman 
force is needed to dispel the compunctions of this mechanical hu­
manist. Moreover, although the Lady rises in words to demonic 
power, her deeds do not carry the same conviction.18 She does not 
actually m a k e the w o u n d in Duncan's body with her keen knife as 
she envisaged that she would (I.v.49). H e r spirit buoyed up by 
alcohol, she is bold enough to smear the grooms with the blood from 
the daggers Macbeth thoughtlessly brought back with him. But there 
is some lack of logic in her reproach of him for refusing to return 
to the place of his crime: "the sleeping and the dead / Are but as 
pictures; 'tis the eye of childhood/ That fears a painted devil" (II. 
ii.53-55). It was with the eye of childhood that she looked at the 
sleeping Duncan and found herself incapable of murdering him. A 
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substratum of h u m a  n nature that she mistakenly thought did not 
exist in her comes to the surface when she faints during her hus­
band's account of his murder of the grooms. Ironically, her compo­
sure leaves her just whe  n he excuses his act as inspired by courage 
to make k n o w n his love (II.iii.117)—she appears to have overrated 
her o w  n courage and demonic strength; the alternate explanation 
that she is merely feigning here has no support in the text or in the 
stage directions.19 She does recover temporarily from this failure of 
her nerves, and even acts once more as her husband's support when 
he is unnerved by fear at the appearance of Banquo's ghost and 
quite "unmanned in folly" (III.iv.74) ; and once more she urges 
her concept of manhood on him. But she has the advantage of not 
seeing the ghost. Notably, she n o w conjures up no more evil spirits 
to help herself or him. 
This is the last time she appears as her husband's monitor. A  s he 
becomes increasingly self-directed, the embodiment of vis in Har  ­
vey's Machiavellian sense, he needs her less and less. H  e keeps the 
details of his plan to murder Banquo from her; in the killing of 
Lady Macduff and her children she has no role at all. She drops 
from sight after the banquet, and when she reappears in the sleep­
walking scene, nature has taken its revenge. W h e  n Macbeth was 
obsessed with the notion that an ocean could not wash Duncan's 
blood from his hand, she scoffed at his distraction; a little water, 
she thought, would clear them both of the deed. N o  w all the per­
fumes of Arabia cannot wipe the spot from her hand. But her 
insanity and death, presumedly by suicide, are merely side issues of 
the story. 
T h e main issue, to which the Lady is a mere contributor, is the 
loss of Macbeth's self, a loss that consists in a progressive self-reduc­
tion to nothingness. This movement is the main psychological one 
of Macbeth in the later parts of the play; but it begins with his 
neurotic self-alienation immediately after the murder of Duncan 
when Macbeth is frightfully shaken and, in his fearful anxiety, looks 
at himself, as it were, from the outside: the m a  n w h  o committed 
the deed is a m a n w h o m he does not know. T h e voice he hears cry 
"sleep no more" addresses him as a triple stranger: "Glamis hath 
murder'd sleep; and therefore Cawdor / Shall sleep no m o r e — M a c ­
beth shall sleep no more" (II.ii.42-43). H  e views in horror his own 
bloody hands as if they did not belong to him: " W h a t hands are 
here? H a  ! they pluck out mine eyes" (59). W h e  n the Lady now 
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admonishes him "be not lost / So poorly in your thoughts," M a c  ­
beth answers in a sentence pregnant with meaning: " T o k n o w m y 
deed, 'twere best not k n o  w myself" (II.ii.73). 
This sentence is deceptively simple, and hard to paraphrase. O  n 
the primary level, it can be read (as does Kenneth Muir ) to show 
Macbeth's shrinking from reality: "It were better for m  e to remain 
permanently 'lost' in thought, i.e., self-alienated, than to be fully 
conscious of the nature of the deed." 20 But the disjunctive syntax 
of Macbeth's sentence supports an interpretation that makes it an­
other instance of his evasion of moral responsibility and of his un­
willingness to admit the existence of a conscience. O n  e might expect 
Macbeth, that is, a stronger, moral Macbeth, to have said, " T o 
know, i.e., fully acknowledge, m  y deed would m e a n to feel repen­
tance." Instead, Shakespeare's Macbeth gives the sentence the cogni­
tive meaning recognized by Professor Muir. But the disjunctive 
syntax also makes the second part of the sentence a kind of answer 
to thefirst, an answer that draws a balance, such as in U n  a Ellis-
Fermor's paraphrase: "If I a  m to live on terms with this deed, I 
must break with m  y real—my former—self." 21 T h  e sentence is thus 
a diagnosis of Macbeth's state of mind, an evasion of his guilt, and 
a program for the future. 
With regard to Macbeth's evasion of the n a m e and idea of con­
science, it is interesting to note that, according to an old theological 
definition, the conscience could be described as the soul's knowledge 
of itself. William Worship noted the definition in The Christian's 
Jewel (1617) : 
Conscientia, saith Saint Bernard, soundeth as much as cordis 
scientia because it [i.e., the soul] knows itself and many other 
things. Conscientia, saith Aquinas, is scientia cum alio, a knowl­
edge with another; which combination hath either reference to the 
soul, reflecting upon itself, or else to God, w h o is privy to her in­
most contents. . . . W h a t m a n knows the things of m a n , saith 
Saint Paul, save the spirit of m a  n which is in him ? 22 
There is no indication, however, that Macbeth uses the phrase " k n o w 
myself" in Worship's sense; and in the seventeenth century, as w e 
have noted, an ethical-religious definition of self-knowledge was no 
longer taken for granted. But by shrinking from such a definition 
and from acknowledging his guilt, Macbeth stops far short of self-
discovery. T h  e vague and ill-defined w a  y in which he uses the term 
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indicates that he tries to transfer the awareness of his guilt from 
the ethical sphere to the intellectual one. Macbeth's "to k n o  w m  y 
deed, 'twere best not k n o w myself" thus marks a missed anagnorisis, 
paradoxically by invoking the idea of self-knowledge. 
For a self-knowledge with an ethical basis, Macbeth tries to find 
a substitute in an arcane knowledge of evil he need not share with 
others, not even with his wife. T h  e term of endearment he has for 
her w h e n he refuses to satisfy her inquiry into his plans for Banquo 
ironically emphasizes the distance that begins to separate him from 
her: " B  e innocent of the knowledge, dearest chuck, / Till thou 
applaud the deed" (III.ii.45—46). However , the "knowledge" he 
keeps from her is actually quite indebted to her teaching; when he 
goads the murderers to kill Banquo, he does so by questioning 
whether they are m e n , ready to avenge wrongs: the strategy of 
questioning the manhood of the two daredevils is the same the Lady 
applied to him. A c o m m o n "manhood" associates him n o w with 
the two villains, for w h o m he feels such contempt. 
H  e is, however, not immediately successful in his attempt to 
break with his former self. Banquo's ghost shocks him once more 
into fear. But since he alone sees the specter, this event contributes 
to his isolation and self-alienation: 
Y o u make m e strange 
Even to the disposition that I owe, 
W h e  n now I think you can behold such sights 
A n  d keep the natural ruby of your cheeks, 
W h e  n mine is blanch'd with fear. 
(Ill.iv.i 12-16) 
But he determines to readjust his values to his n e w self and calls 
the brief resurgence of fear his "strange and self-abuse," which is 
only "the initiate fear that wants hard use" (142-43). H  e decides 
to visit the weird sisters in order to obtain the knowledge he needs 
to still his fear and harden his heart: "For n o w I .am bent to know / 
B y the worst means the worst" (134-35). Again, Macbeth follows 
the method he had seen the Lady use; she, too, called upon the 
spirits of evil tofill her with direst cruelty. 
Macbeth's visit to the weird sisters is the dramatic climax of the 
play, the summa epitasis. Structurally, it introduces the counter­
movement, the revenge action of Malcolm and Macduff, through 
Macbeth: Losing the Self 351 
the apparitions of the armed head, the bloody child, and the crowned 
child, bearing a tree. MacdufFs flight to Malcolm, which is reported 
immediately afterwards, confirms the success of the countermove­
ment and highlights Macbeth's increasing isolation. But, deluded 
by false knowledge, he takes the witches' warnings about the m a  n 
of no w o m a n born and about the moving of the w o o d to Dunsinane 
Castle as assurance of his invulnerability. His desire to k n o w finds 
thus its specious gratification in equivocations that he takes to be 
certificates of security. T h  e visit to the witches does indeed produce 
the "new Macbeth," formed in the image of manhood proclaimed by 
the Lady, the m a  n free from fear and from the remnants of his 
moral self. But the visit also emphasizes the barrenness of this 
achievement by the show of the eight kings symbolizing the succes­
sion of Banquo's line. Macbeth is isolated not only in his time, but 
also in history. H  e wears a useless crown. H  e reacts in passion; 
once more he is in the throes of one of the raptures through which 
threatening events register on his nervous system: he stands "amaz­
edly" (IV.i.126). But he has no moral recoil n o w even while he 
recognizes the horror of the event: "Let this pernicious hour / Stand 
aye accursed in the calendar" (133-34). A s in Job iii.5, to which 
Macbeth's words form a kind of ironic parallel, this is the hour of 
darkness stained by the shadow of death. There is no substitute for 
self-knowledge; the knowledge of evil Macbeth seeks is a denial 
of the principle of life. 
Because Macbeth never acknowledges what was at stake, he never 
admits what he has lost. H  e does subsequently deplore the side-
effects of his self-loss whe  n he speaks of having lost the comforts 
of life: 
M  y way of life 
Is fall'n into the sear, the yellow leaf; 
A n  d that which should accompany old age, 
A  s honour, love, obedience, troops of friends, 
I must not look to have; but in their stead, 
Curses, not loud but deep, mouth-honour, breath, 
Which the poor heart would fain deny, and dare not. 
(V.iii.22-28) 
These lines are not an appeal to sympathy; they are a demonstration 
of the moralists' warnings against the suppression of all fear. A  s 
Coeffeteau says, 
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There is a kind of people which fear nothing, that is to say, such 
as have renounced all feeling of things whereof w  e have just cause 
to apprehend the loss, as they which have lost all honor, abandoned 
all shame, wasted their fortunes and their goods, and those whose 
lives are tedious unto them. For what can they fear wh  o have 
nothing remaining to trouble them.23 
Macbeth is n o w a symbol of the emptiness of life and of the inanity 
of trying to impose an amoral self on the world. H  e had envisaged 
the even-handed justice of temporal punishment, and he had even 
glanced at the risks in the life to c o m e  ; but he had not thought of 
what actually becomes his fate: his reduction to a meaningless 
existence. In this progressive loss of his self in this life, not in his 
death or in any consequences to his soul in the hereafter, lies his 
tragic predicament. 
A  s the others lose all trust in him, so he loses all trust in them, 
clinging only to the hope of survival given him by the weird sisters. 
While he goes through the motions of activity, fortifying Dunsi­
nane, he does so without any sense of the significance of his actions 
either for himself or for Scotland: 
S o m  e say he's mad  , others, that lesser hate him, 
D  o call it valiant fury; but for certain, 
H  e cannot buckle his distemper'd cause 
Within the belt of rule. 
(V.ii.13-16) 
W i t h the loss of his fear, he loses also all power to feel compas­
sionate. T h  e w o m e n '  s shriek that heralds his wife's death elicits 
from him the boast that he has almost forgotten what fear tastes 
like. W h e  n the cry is interpreted as due to his wife's death, he has 
no word of sympathy and pity; he expresses no sense of loss at the 
news of her death, only annoyance at the untimely event and disgust 
with the monotony and uselessness of life. W i t h the loss of his 
moral self, Macbeth has gained only a meaningless life: it is a tale 
told by an idiot, signifying nothing. T h e utter impersonality of this 
most pessimistic passage in all Shakespeare marks it not as the 
poet's ipse dixit, but as a dramatic expression of the price of self-
loss. T h  e generalization is grand and false. 
After the exhaustion of his life substance, to have provided M a c  ­
beth with even a shred of repentance would have weakened the im­
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pression of the tragic consequences of self-loss and sentimentalized 
his character. Shakespeare did not mak  e this mistake. Macbeth never 
admits his responsibility for his fall; as he begins to realize the 
danger threatening him, he blames the witches, not himself. T h e 
final change in Macbeth's psyche—and another ironic turn in the 
play—is provided not by a repentance but by a reemergence of that 
fear Macbeth thought he had extinguished. 
The first blow falls when Birnam W o o d actually comes to D u n ­
sinane. "I pull in resolution," says Macbeth, "and begin / T  o doubt 
th' equivocation of the fiend/That lies like truth" (V.v .42-44) . 
Interestingly, when he n o w remembers the witches' prophecy, it is 
not quite in the form it was given. "Fear not, till Birnam w o o d / D o 
come to Dunsinane" (44-45) is his version, but the witches said: 
"Macbeth shall never vanquish'd be until / Great Birnam wood to 
high Dunsinane hill / Shall come against him" (IV.i.92-94). Yet 
he does not admit fear but evinces disgust with the world: "I gin 
to be aweary of the sun, / A n  d wish th' estate o' th' world were n o  w 
undone." A n  d he actually recovers temporarily his heroic stance: 
"At least we'll die with harness on our back" (V.v .49-52) . 
But stark, naked fear breaks out in Macbeth when he confronts 
Macduff. His puzzling refusal to fight Macduff even before the 
latter reveals that he was untimely ripped from his mother's w o m  b 
m a  y be a combination of weariness and of that instinctive fear of the 
Thane of Fife he had expressed earlier (IV.i.74). H  e had surely 
not avoided Macduff "of all m e n else" because of what he gives as 
the reason for his refusal tofight: " M  y soul is too m u c  h charg'd / 
With blood of thine already" (V.viii.5-6). T  o read into this sen­
tence a repentance is to disregard the meaninglessness of the concept 
of soul for the Macbeth w h o has lost his self. A n d undisguised fear 
is his reaction to Macduff's revelation of himself as the m a  n of no 
w o m a n born: "Accursed be the tongue that tells m e so, / For it 
hath cow'd m  y better part of m a n !  " (17-18). His belief of having 
won a new self, free from fear, is shown to be an illusion. Thus 
again, just before the catastrophe, Macbeth avoids a true self-dis­
covery; he fails to "know himself" in the ethical-religious sense of 
the humanists, although he knows himself as a coward well enough. 
W  e are the more aware of his moral failure because of the great 
number of explicit nosce teipsum references—Macbeth can be said 
to have more of these than any other play of Shakespeare. The 
tragedy that presents self-loss on the largest scale also reasserts 
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most strongly the value and significance of the humanistic concept 
of self-knowledge. 
In its last scenes, the play points up the self-destructiveness of a 
manhood such as Macbeth's that lacks all ethical considerations. 
Macbeth's cry of fear whe  n he faces Macduff demonstrates that the 
acquired vis, emphasis, and dynamis are not enough to preserve 
Macbeth's alacritas, that painfully acquired courage. The phrase 
"better part of m a n ,  " generally used to refer to the soul, has an 
ironic ring in the mouth of the m a  n w h o  m Macduff calls hell-hound 
and traitor; the phrase might well be transcribed as "hope for sur­
vival." Macbeth's last fear is the fear of death. Macduff has to shock 
him into fighting by threatening to display him as a monster for 
public show, as a beast rather than a m a n . That Macduff on this oc­
casion calls him "coward" m a y also awaken that old fear in M a c ­
beth of being thought fearful—so potent in him, as the Lady knew— 
and help to lash him into a last desperate action. 
Macduff's fight with Macbeth takes place behind the stage, so 
w  e never really learn whether Macbeth's last stand (or is it a run?) 
is as determined as he would have it; but the last words w e hear, 
" A n d d a m n ' d be him thatfirst cries, 'Hold, enough!' " sound like a 
self-pronounced epitaph. Also, the episode intervening between his 
cry and Macduff's return with the head of Macbeth would lose its 
significance if it were not intended as a contrast to the death of 
a coward. In this episode, Ross reports the death of young Siward 
to his father: 
Your son, m  y lord, has paid a soldier's debt. 
H e only liv'd but till he was a m a n ; 
The which no sooner had his prowess confirm'd 
In the unshrinking station where he fought 
But like a m a n he died. 
(V.viii.39-43) 
There is an irony in young Siward's dying like a m a  n whereas 
Macbeth, w h o had so strenuously sought to be what the Lady sug­
gested to him, "more than m a n , " has become no better than a 
beast. T h e "unshrinking station" where the young m a n ends his 
life evokes by contrast the shrinkage of Macbeth's world; and old 
Siward's acclaim of his son's prowess points up the cowardice of 
the tyrant. T h  e father takes consolation in his son's bearing his 
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wound in front: " H a d I as m a n y sons as I have hairs, /  1 would 
not wish them to a fairer death" (48-49). W  e are not told whether 
Macbeth receives his fatal wound in front or in back; nobody asks 
Macduff, and Macduff merely presents "the usurper's head" without 
comment. At any rate, Macbeth's end, however exactly it comes 
about, is not "fair." Nothing is falser to the spirit of the play than 
the final bravado performance often given by actors of the role. 
Macbeth's death is not even worthy of the epitaph usually bestowed 
on the hero at the close. In his concluding speech, Malcolm merely 
refers in passing to "the dead butcher and his fiend-like queen." W  e 
realize in the flash of the reference that even the m e m o r  y of the m a  n 
w h  o lost his self will soon be lost in Scotland. 
CHAPTER EIGHTEEN 
The Tempest: 
Th  e Mastered Self 
NE A  R T H  E E N  D of Shakespeare's career stands a simple play not of self-loss but of self-gain. Shakespeare m a  y well have intended it to have been his final one; it is difficult 
to think of Henry VIII as anything but an afterthought. A comedy 
or a tragicomedy, of course, was expected to present an action that 
moved toward self-gain; and the romances Shakespeare wrote dur­
ing his last phase, Pericles, Cymbeline, The Winter's Tale, and 
The Tempest, all conclude happily with their heroes' self-recoveries. 
But The Tempest differs from the other romances in notable ways: 
the hero's self-loss has taken place before the beginning of the play, 
as w e are told by him in the second scene; during the action, he is 
in c o m m a n  d of himself and in control of the events. Further self-loss 
is a continuing threat to Prospero—a somewhat more serious threat, 
I think, than is usually realized—but because it is avoided and be­
cause the play never really approaches tragedy, it is not quite in the 
same category as are its immediate predecessors. It probably deserves 
to be called a comedy rather than a tragicomedy. 
Indeed The Tempest continues and perfects the comic treatment 
of the themes of self-loss, self-search, and self-recovery on which 
Shakespeare structured his early comedies; it gives this structure 
a n e w and more festive polish. But a reading of The Tempest against 
the background of Shakespeare's developing patterns of self-knowl­
edge suggests resemblances also to most other preceding plays, even 
to that signal tragedy of self-loss Macbeth. Reading The Tempest 
in such fashion, as I propose to do in this concluding chapter, will 
allow us to glance back at Shakespeare's earlier patterns as well as to 
see in perspective Shakespeare's final achievement in giving dra­
matic form to the ideas that have been the concern of this study. 
T  o call The Tempest a simple play, as I have done, is to invite con­
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tradiction in view of the diversity of interpretations it has produced; 
yet simplicity seems to m  e one of its most notable qualities. T h  e 
story is, admittedly, a trifle fantastic; some of its credibility depends 
on the acceptance of magic, which for us, contrary to the Jacobeans, 
requires a suspension of disbelief. But the fine web of fantasy 
Shakespeare spun in the play lessens the problem; w  e give our 
hearts to The Tempest m u c h as w e do to fairy tales. A n d perhaps 
for this reason critics become fanciful and imaginative w h e n they 
analyze it; its outlines become vast, wavering, and infinite, and w e 
are told that "any interpretation, even the wildest, is more or less 
plausible." 1 
Actually, no play of Shakespeare's has a clearer dramatic struc­
ture, one more closely tied up with the nature of its hero and the 
major strands of its thought than this, and few have as simple a 
thematic content. That The Tempest observes the unities of time, 
place, and action—the only play of Shakespeare after the early 
Comedy of Errors to do so—is well k n o w n . T h e action is fitly di­
gested intofive acts—they are accurately marked in the Folio text— 
according to the formula derived from the comedies of Terence, 
modified in the epitasis by a movement that comes from revenge 
tragedy. In its act structure, composite but yet composite on a 
simple plan, The Tempest could be compared with Love's Labor's 
Lost (for the simple formula) and with Hamlet (for the revenge 
plot). 
There is, of course, room for disagreement on the place of details 
in this pattern and even more on the meaning of the action. But no 
legitimate interpretation can avoid speaking of the losses and their 
recoveries and of the material, moral, and spiritual transformations 
that give movement to the action. O  n a very simple level, this idea 
is articulated in an almost liturgical tone by the good old counselor 
Gonzalo in the comic catastrophe of the last act. Recalling that he 
and the other Neapolitans set out to attend the wedding of the King 
of Naples' daughter at Tunis, Gonzalo hails the journey's unex­
pected outcome: 
O  , rejoice 
Beyond a c o m m o n joy, and set it down 
With gold on lasting pillars: in one voyage 
Did Claribel her husbandfind at Tunis; 
A n  d Ferdinand, her brother, found a wife 
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W h e r e he himself was lost; Prospero his dukedom 
In a poor isle; and all of us ourselves 
W h e n no m a n was his own. 
(V.i.206-13) 
T h  e losing-finding antithesis that forms the text of Gonzalo's h y m  n 
to joy recalls the rhythm of the paradox of salvation Shakespeare 
had used in previous plays to emphasize the importance of self-
knowledge and to give structural patterns to his plays. Because the 
adaptation of the losing-finding formula in The Tempest grows out 
of these earlier instances, a glance back will serve to demonstrate 
Shakespeare's reliance on this pattern of self-knowledge for recurring 
as well as changing thematic ideas and to point up its particular con­
figuration in the present play. 
T h e formula, as w e noted, was basic to the thematic structure of 
Shakespeare's two earliest comedies, The Comedy of Errors and 
Love's Labor's Lost. Although The Comedy of Errors primarily 
exploits the outward possibilities and impossibilities of mistaken 
identities, it at least implies the danger of self-loss and depicts the 
joy of self-recovery. W h e  n Antipholus of Syracuse arrives in 
Ephesus to search for his brother, he feels like a drop of water 
searching for another drop in the vast ocean. "So I," he says, "to 
find a mother and a brother, / In quest of them, unhappy, lose m y  ­
self" (I.ii.39-40). Antipholus's search starts a chain reaction of 
errors, making the twin-masters and twin-servants doubt at times 
that they k n o w w h o they are. The Comedy of Errors attains what­
ever thematic depth it has by the comic horror Shakespeare injected 
into the threatening loss of identities, and its happy finale comes 
about through a universal finding. T h e movement from self-loss to 
self-recovery is very similar to that of The Tempest; but in the later 
play, both the seriousness of the one and the joy of the other are 
heightened: Prospero's enemies are restrained only by his magic 
power from doing harm to each other and to themselves, and his 
forgiveness has a sacerdotal quality that brings about a more spec­
tacular recovery. But in the endings of both plays, the resumption of 
true identities and relationships creates the hope that a better order 
will evolve w h e  n the respective sets of hostile cities, Ephesus and 
Syracuse, Milan and Naples, are leagued in marriage; The Tempest, 
however, makes this point more strongly through a marriage of 
the heirs of the rulers. O  n the other hand, the ending of The Tern­
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pest does not depict merely a finding of brother by brother but the 
reconciliation of two sets of formerly hostile brothers; and the 
question—one w e must postpone for the moment—of the complete­
ness and permanence of this reconciliation has been raised by critics. 
Closer to the thematic structure of The Tempest than The Com­
edy of Errors is Love's Labor's Lost. It is essentially a comedy of 
self-loss and self-recovery that turns on the problem of self-search. 
King Ferdinand and his three courtiers are shown to be mistaken 
in their belief that they can find their true selves by withdrawing 
into an academy that bars influences disturbing to study, particularly 
w o m e  n and love. W h e  n the princess and her ladies-in-waiting arrive 
on the scene, nature promtply takes its course and Cupid his revenge. 
The love-stricken courtiers are in a dilemma that even the astute 
Berowne cannot solve with his quibble on the losing-finding antith­
esis : "Let us once lose our oaths to find ourselves, / O  r else w  e 
lose ourselves to keep our oaths" (IV.iii.358-59). This ingenious 
turn of the formula Shakespeare m a  y have borrowed from the 
Genevan-Tomson side-note to Matthew 1 6 : 2 5 : "they that deny 
Christ to save themselves do not only not gain that which they look 
for but also lose the thing they would have kept, that is, themselves, 
which loss is the greatest of all." If "losing oneself" is the greatest 
loss of all—as the side-note says and Berowne implies—"finding 
oneself," in the sense of becoming a h u m a  n being w h  o attains his 
greatest moral potential and assumes his proper role in society, 
is the greatest gain. T h  e endings of both Love's Labor's Lost and 
The Tempest pay tribute to the precious goal of "finding" as well 
as to the difficulty of achieving it. T h  e courtiers of Navarre, w h  o 
have thoughtlessly sworn vows contrary to nature and w h o have 
shown no compunction about breaking these vows, ill-advised as 
they were, must, on the princess's orders, expiate their transgres­
sions in a year of penitence and service; the gayest of the courtiers, 
Berowne, w h o had sworn against his better knowledge, must prove 
his regeneration by serving his term of penitence in a hospital. 
There is good reason to believe that he and his fellow sinners will 
eventually find their true selves as both honorable gentlemen and 
men of flesh and blood since the princess and her ladies-in-waiting 
have promised to marry them if they pass their tests. In The Tem­
pest, Prospero arranges the finding of the others and of himself. H  e 
resembles in this respect, as in some others, D u k e Vincentio in 
Measure for Measure. Prospero, in the end, forgives transgressions 
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as great as does Vincentio—and certainly m u c  h greater ones than 
does the princess—and he forgives, as do the arrangers of these 
two comedies, in order to m a k e humane values triumph. However, 
as I shall argue, The Tempest, particularly through the character of 
its hero and the nature of its ending, makes the point even more 
strongly that self-finding must be accomplished through a discipline 
based on a realistic understanding of the nature of m a n . 
W h e  n w  e turn to the tragedies, w  e find self-loss to be the main 
theme and self-gain to be implied as a desirable goal. T h e self-losses 
of the tragic heroes and villains arise from serious moral failures, 
from passion, sin, and crime, and they lead to the destruction of the 
heroes and of other characters, innocent and guilty. The nuanced 
value system Shakespeare infused into the tragedies from Hamlet 
on gave the losing-finding formula a subtler, more existential mean­
ing. T h e Danish prince exercises his probing mind on all questions 
about his o w  n role and the function of m a  n in the world, and yet 
he loses himself more and more in the web of his destiny. Once 
during his probing for certainty in the world of shifting realities, 
Hamlet touches on the biblical losing-finding formula. Just before 
his fatal duel with Laertes, a test that to Hamlet appears one of 
self-knowledge as well as of physical skill, he asks the perplexing 
question: "Since no m a  n of ought he leaves knows, what is't to 
leave betimes?" (V.ii.216). If this version of the passage, that of 
Quarto 2, is correct, as I think it is, Hamlet here gives a skeptical 
turn to the paradox of salvation; for him, life has no recognizable 
pattern, and m a  n profits little by retaining it. But Hamlet's preced­
ing reference to the special providence in the fall of a sparrow sug­
gests that, at least to G o d  , the pattern is meaningful. A similar 
skepticism-fideism, emphasized by a view of the world as illusion­
ary and temporary, is beautifully expressed in Prosperous end-of­
revels speech; but the detachment with which Prospero views the 
transcience of all earthly things has some drops of soothing serenity 
that are completely absent from Hamlet's tentative acceptance of 
the divinity that shapes all ends. 
Although self-losses occur in all the tragedies and the importance 
of self-recovery is suggested someho  w in all of them, the losing-
finding formula rings particularly strongly in Lear and Macbeth. In 
Lear, the paradox of what the world seeks and what it loses becomes 
a tragic agony. T h e King of France weaves from this paradox the 
beautiful speech in which he accepts the disinherited Cordelia, w h  o 
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is "most rich, being poor; / Most choice, forsaken; and most Iov'd, 
despis'd" (I.i.250-51). In the course of the play, Lear, w h  o has let 
evil develop in himself and in others, hasfleeting glimpses of his 
and man's true nature as he loses himself in anger, grief, and m a d ­
ness. B y contrast, Edgar, from being a m a n whose n a m e is lost, 
comes tofind himself in the end; and he assumes a more significant 
role than he has in the beginning. But even if Edgar's self-recovery 
anticipates, in some fashion, Prospero's, it is more painfully achieved 
and at greater loss. Neither—since Edgar is not the hero—did 
Shakespeare focus on the state of his soul as he did on Prospero's. 
Macbeth is as relentless a tragedy of self-loss as The Tempest is 
a consistent comedy of self-gain. Macbeth's self-loss is pointed up 
by the evasiveness with which he speaks about losing the "eternal 
jewel" of his soul. But by his negative example and by his oppres­
sion of Scotland, this tragedy makes a strong point that a m a  n must 
seek to find himself and that a country canfind itself only whe  n it is 
ruled morally. "The time is free" when Scotland shakes off the op­
pressor's yoke in the end. Thoug  h the benevolent Prospero and 
the murderous Macbeth are worlds apart, The Tempest not only 
dramatizes self-finding but also demonstrates the danger of self-loss. 
A  n evil similar to that of Macbeth (although it is not examined in 
its origin or spotlighted in its manifestation) dwells in the soul of 
Prospero's brother Antonio, w h o plots the murder of King Alonso 
with the help of Alonso's o w  n brother, Sebastian. Prospero's firm 
direction keeps these wicked plotters and would-be regicides from 
succumbing to the total self-loss that engulfs Macbeth. T  o Prospero 
himself, nothing worse seems to happen in the play than a temporary 
threat to his peace of mind; but I shall argue that this threat does 
present a danger, particularly because w e k n o w that he has harmed 
himself years ago by becoming lost in his studies and by thus facili­
tating Antonio's usurpation of his throne. Prospero's self-recovery 
from this evil of omission is the main plot of The Tempest. 
However, evil is a less serious threat in The Tempest than in the 
other romances, which veer toward tragedy. In The Winter's Tale, 
for instance, Leontes's unfounded accusation and condemnation of 
Hermione brings about the death of his son Mamilius. If these 
heroes do not suffer permanent self-losses, the reasons lie in the 
extraordinary efforts of recovery through penitence and faith they 
make or in the powerful help, h u m a n and divine, they receive. The 
romances, with their stories of shipwreck, of broken and reunited 
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families, of deep self-losses and strong, sometimes miraculous, recov­
eries, m a k e the losing-finding formula even more prominent than do 
the early comedies, but the formula is n o  w pregnant with moral 
and spiritual associations. 
However , none of the romances or any other play of Shakespeare 
gives greater prominence to the losing-finding formula and extols 
self-finding more melodiously than does The Tempest. N  o other play 
makes the presence of the formula as strongly felt; "lose," "lost," 
"loss," "search," "find," and "found" are key words that occur 
at significant junctures of the action and provide clues to the place­
ment of the characters in the total design. These words are also 
constant reminders that the action presented brings a long story to 
a climax: losses are to be remedied, ills to be healed, and blessings 
to be gained. 
T h  e spectacular tempest that opens the play and furnishes its title 
is an example of this fusion of past and present. Apparently it brings 
about the loss of a ship, its passengers, and its crew. But the second 
scene makes it clear that this storm is also a reenactment of that 
earlier storm, twelve years past, in which Prospero and his infant 
daughter, Miranda, expelled from Milan by the evil Antonio, were 
cruelly exposed to the roaring of the waves; by firmly controlling the 
effect of the present storm and preventing harm to h u m a n lives, 
Prospero recoups his loss and makes it possible for all to be them­
selves. Renaissance rhetoric had taught the Jacobeans to think of 
storms as metaphorical for the gusts of passion and the blows of for­
tune. T h  e initial storm m a  y thus be taken to symbolize the passions 
of the ship's guilty passengers, the passions that brought about 
Prospero's expulsion and continue to threaten violence on the 
island. But this storm m a  y also be understood to symbolize the 
passions of Prospero, slumbering as they are during most of the play. 
W  e learn of his potentially passionate nature by his account of that 
earlier, intellectual ecstasy, when , "transported / A n  d rapt in secret 
studies," he let his brother usurp his place (I.ii.76-77). Most of all, 
w  e experience Prospero's one, if muted, outbreak of anger when, at 
the decisive m o m e n  t of the play, disgust with Caliban's revolt wells 
up in him and threatens to m a k e him prefer revenge to mercy. 
Shakespeare's audience would have especially relished the story of 
the shipwreck and the miraculous preservation of its passengers and 
crew because of the similar fate of his majesty's ship Sea Adventure, 
wrecked on the reefs of B e r m u d a in 1609. Shakespeare exploited the 
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interest created by the incident; he had Ariel remember h o w Prospero 
once awakened him, while sleeping at the same nook where n o w the 
Neapolitan ship is safely hidden, in order to have him "fetch dew / 
F r o m the still-vex'd Bermoothes" (Lii.228-29). But if Shakespeare 
could count on his audience's familiarity with this topical incident, 
he could and did rely even more on their knowledge of a moral tradi­
tion that made shipwreck a prime test of h u m a n reaction to fate and 
fortune. Narratives of the Bermuda wreck, particularly that in the 
Council of Virginia's apologetic True Declaration of the State of the 
Colony of Virginia (1610), were tinged with this moral tradition.2 
It was one that, derived from Homer ' s Odyssey, was continued in 
Virgil's Aeneid and became familiar in the Renaissance to m a n  y a 
grammar-school boy, including William Shakespeare, through 
Erasmus's colloquy Naufragium. A  s Professor Baldwin has noted, 
Erasmus presents a tempest that recalls Shakespeare's in m a n y 
respects, although Erasmus was more obviously interested in the 
moral make-up of his characters.3 But even so, one could well expect 
Shakespeare's audience to have concluded from the extremely vivid 
first scene of The Tempest that the shipwreck represents a moral-
psychological test for the passengers and crew and that nearly all fail 
it as they are thrown into utter confusion, get into each other's way, 
curse, and despair: "All lost! . . . All lost!" (I.i.48). 
There is one notable exception: the old counselor Gonzalo, w h  o 
keeps his humor and, though in vain, admonishes the others to be 
patient; by contrast, Sebastian laments that he is "out of patience" 
(51). F r o  m the beginning, Gonzalo's role in the play is crucial. 
Throughout, he is the voice of charity and patience. This is a voice 
frequent in Shakespeare; but, as w e have noted, it became more 
insistent from Lear onward. It is embodied sometimes in a young 
m a n like Edgar, more often in an old m a n , like Gonzalo and his 
fellow counselor Helicanus in Pericles, but most often in suffering 
w o m e n , in Cordelia, Marina, Imogene, Hermione, Perdita, and 
Paulina. In view of the customary identification of Prospero with 
Shakespeare, it is intriguing to ponder that, judging by the fact that 
his name appears in fourth andfifth position of the actors of his 
company, Shakespeare is more likely to have thought of himself 
when writing the part of Gonzalo than when writing that of Pros­
pero. But Shakespeare probably did not act in The Tempest, and one 
should realize that the voice of Gonzalo, that of patience—important 
as it is for articulating the virtue that was becoming the most 
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important one for the achievement of self-knowledge in Shakespeare's 
later plays—is still only one of his m a n y voices. The aging Shake­
speare m a y have felt greater need for patience; but he knew also of 
m a n  y other needs. 
Th  e patient Gonzalo is an instrument of the power of good and 
demonstrates h o  w m a  n m a  y endure and even master his fate. W h e  n 
the storm of fortune raged hardest for Prospero, it was Gonzalo 
w h o gave him the means to regain control over his fate by furnishing 
the bark in which he and Miranda were set adrift with the books 
from which Prospero gained his knowledge of magic. O  n the island, 
Gonzalo constantly tries to cheer and comfort his companions. H  e 
finds that they have cause for joy, as he says in hisfirst words after 
the miraculous rescue: "for our escape / Is m u c  h beyond our loss" 
(II.i.2-3). It is Gonzalo w h o  , awakened by Ariel, cries out and thus 
unknowingly saves the king and himself from being murdered by 
Antonio and Sebastian. His cry, "good angels / Preserve the King" 
(II.i.298-99), is symptomatic of his reliance on heavenly help; he is 
the only one a m o n  g the Neapolitans to invoke it. Gonzalo becomes at 
times a choric commentator, registering the transformations that take 
place, noting the outward signs of the effect of guilt on the others, and 
rejoicing about the completed changes in the end. His tears, shed 
for the suffering of the others, engender "fellowly" drops in Prospero 
—"holy Gonzalo" Prospero calls him then (V.i.62). His example 
makes Prospero in the end reaffirm patience as an abiding virtue. 
W h e  n Alonso laments what he thinks is the irreparable loss of his 
son and claims that "Patience / Says it is past her cure," Prospero 
(thinking of losing Miranda through marriage) answers: "For the 
like loss I have her sovereign aid / A n  d rest myself content" (V.i. 
140-44) . 
Thus Gonzalo becomes a pattern of patience and charity for all, 
even for Prospero. It is a patience anchored in faith—Christian in a 
general sense (although the pagan Cordelia has it too); it is 
tempered by sympathy and pity rather than hardened into suppres­
sion of the emotions as the Stoics recommended. Gonzalo's orienta­
tion toward one dominant trait is a feature he shares with other 
characters in Shakespeare's baroque plays and makes critics speak of 
allegory. But Gonzalo has other, if less important, traits; w e simply 
are made more aware of the one that is primary for the function he 
has in the thematic movement. 
O f the traits that prevent him from becoming a mere symbol of 
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patience, his garrulity and whimsicality help to take the edge off 
some of his moral commentary. Shakespeare allows him a holiday of 
the spirit on the "poor isle" whose enchanting airs encourage all 
kinds of extravaganzas. Crudely derided by the others, Gonzalo 
paraphrases the famous passage in Montaigne's essay "Of the 
Cannibals" that describes in glowing colors an anarchistic Utopia 
of universal happiness. Gonzalo would like to m a k  e the island into 
such a state and govern, somewhat illogically, as a king "with such 
perfection . . ./ T excel the golden age" (ILL 161-62) . But the 
island turns out to be a quite different country from the idealized 
Brazil of Montaigne's essay—Shakespeare was aware that travelers' 
tales like those glorified by Montaigne do lie. Although the spirits 
commanded by Prospero appear to Gonzalo to be islanders of m o n  ­
strous shapes but of manners kinder than civilized men's, the 
banquet they serve to the starved Neapolitans proves a cruel mirage; 
it is snatched away by Ariel in the guise of a harpy. F r o m n o w on, 
the Neapolitans' life is a nightmare. Thus, in his Utopian dream, 
Gonzalo, after a fashion, loses himself; but his self-loss is of the 
mildest kind, a fantasy of what cannot be and must not be. T h e 
island of dreams, the forest of Arden, the golden age are never more 
than temporary retreats in Shakespeare's plays. M a  n w h o knows 
himself must accept the actual world and assume his proper role in it. 
Gonzalo cannot live in a benevolent anarchy, but must again be a 
counselor of princes. Prospero cannot remain on the island that he 
rules so well, but has to return to Milan to govern as duke. A n  d all 
others must resume their destined functions and offices. 
If a positive and sympathetic reaction to the storm and shipwreck 
characterizes Gonzalo, so it does Miranda. A s she watches the events 
from the shore, she sympathizes with the suffering of the people 
w h o  m she fears to be lost: " O  , I have suffer'd / Wi th those that I 
saw suffer" (I.ii.5-6). Miranda is blessed with that active patience, a 
species of fortitude as well as a religious virtue in the humanistic 
system of values. Like the patience of Marina in Pericles, hers smiles 
"extremity out of act." A  s a child, she instilled her groaning father 
with "fortitude from heaven" w h e n she helped him to bear up in the 
storm-tossed boat that carried the two to the island (I.ii.154). But 
Miranda also plays a part in the thematic movement from self-loss to 
self-recovery. Like the Neapolitans and like Prospero, she is the 
victim of "sea-sorrow." T h  e earlier storm that drove her to the island 
has wiped out her identity; she has lost her privileged place in the 
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world. She still remembers vaguely that she was once favored by 
her birth; her only childhood recollection is that she was tended by 
four or five w o m e n (I.ii.46). She is n o w ignorant of what she is, 
as her father says (I.ii.18), both in the sense of knowing neither her 
exact position nor the real world that surrounds her. But directed by 
her instincts and guided by Prospero, she will find herself in the 
end as the future wife of Ferdinand and as the prospective queen of 
Naples. 
Before she can find herself, she must suffer another "sea change" 
through the impact of the outside world on her sheltered existence. 
Because she has never seen a m a  n besides her old father and the semi-
devil Caliban, she idealizes the creatures of the brave new world, 
particularly the handsome Ferdinand. Miranda's innocence is, ba­
roque fashion, heightened by being spectacularly contrasted with the 
evil of the world. Unacquainted with this evil—her bad experience 
with the only half-human Caliban evidently does not count—she 
equates appearance with reality. She objects to Prospero's calling 
Ferdinand a spy: "There's nothing ill can dwell in such a temple" 
(I.ii.457). She happens to be right in this case, but she is quite 
wrong w h e n she hails the checkered company of the Neapolitans: 
" H o  w beauteous mankind is! O brave new world / That has such 
people in't." Prospero's comment is sobering: " 'Tis new to thee" 
(V.i. 183-84) . She mistakes the old world for the new, and she is too 
innocent and idealistic to realize that both contain m u c  h evil. She 
will have to acquire some prudence and practical wisdom if she is 
not to be lost in the world in which she must play a stellar part. But 
she is virtuous and she can inspire—and does in Ferdinand—virtu­
ous behavior. 
In her innocence, bordering on naivete, Miranda bears some 
resemblance to the pastoral maidens of Fletcher's tragicomedies. The 
whole idea of such pristine innocence as hers is precarious to a degree 
that one step further will lead to absurdity. Dryden and Sir William 
Davenant took this step in their adaptation of The Tempest when 
they m a d e out of Miranda two white virgins shrouded in ignorance 
but not devoid of h u m a  n instincts and confronted them with a young 
m a n m u c h more naive than the pellucid Ferdinand because he had 
never seen a w o m a n  . Dryden thought this triplication of ignorance 
an "excellent contrivance," and the situations arising from it are in­
deed pleasantly risque; but Shakespeare would never have suc­
cumbed to the temptation inherent in the baroque to paint with 
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strong colors by applying false ones as did his adapters. Miranda's 
naivete is bearable because her case is singular; and, besides, she 
has an appealing vitality that makes her take a refreshingly active 
role in courtship. H e  r father's vigilance—or so at least he thinks— 
is required to prevent her from further self-loss by throwing herself 
on Ferdinand. But w e m a y trust her power of recovery when in the 
final scene she is revealed as playing with her fiance that game of 
intellectual patience par excellence, chess. W  e feel that she is bound to 
become Ferdinand's support and comfort as she was Prospero's. 
It appears that Ferdinand will need her. T h e young m a n of the 
beginning of the play w h o is thefirst to jump from the burning ship 
with the cry "Hell is empty, / A n  d all the devils are here" (I.ii.214­
15), is evidently in need of some improvement. But Ferdinand is 
not burdened with guilt as is his father, and he has positive virtues. 
H  e demonstrates hisfilial affection whe  n he grieves for the loss of 
his father w h o  m he believes to be drowned (I.ii.487, III.i.58). H  e 
is the first of Alonso's party to feel the power of regeneration as 
Ariel's music creeps by him on the waters, "Allaying both their fury 
and m  y passion/With its sweet air" (I.ii.392-93). Cheered on 
by Miranda, he demonstrates a newfound patience in the emblematic 
log-carrying task and proves his equilibrium at chess. 
Of the older Neapolitans, King Alonso is relatively sympa­
thetically portrayed. Although he abetted the usurpation of Prospero's 
dukedom by Antonio, Alonso is clearly not a soul totally lost. H  e 
has a capacity for h u m a  n sentiments; he suffers deeply from the 
loss of his son, following hard upon that of his daughter (e.g., Il.i. 
103, 116, 129, 313; III.iii.75, 100; V.i .137). In violent despair, he 
seeks to drown himself in the sea "deeper than e'er plummet sounded 
/ A n  d with him there lie mudded" (III.iii.101-2). His sorrow, the 
self-destructive grief of which the humanists and theologians 
warned, is in part punishment for his complicity in Antonio's crime. 
But grief as such is still a noble passion, and Alonso's basic goodness 
shows itself in his repentance in the end. Although the marriage of 
Ferdinand and Miranda makes him "twice lose" his son (V.i.177), 
he says "amen" when Gonzalo wishes them a blessed crown, and he 
adds his voice to the old counselor's h y m  n to joy (V.i.204 ff.). 
The two arch-plotters, Sebastian and Antonio, are so perverse as 
to be moved by Alonso's grief not to sympathy but to a murder plot. 
With Alonso and Ferdinand removed, Antonio wickedly suggests, 
Sebastian m a y seize power without interference. Antonio's influence 
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on Sebastian and their Machiavellian plotting has a distinct resem­
blance to Lady Macbeth's incitement of Macbeth before the murder 
of Duncan. Poetic justice requires that these two criminals be 
harshly treated. Consequently, they are sorely struck by Prospero's 
magic: in madness they wander through the island in search of an 
invisible enemy and are in danger of killing each other. " A n d even 
with such-like valour m e n hang and drown / Their proper selves," 
comments Ariel (III.iii.59-60). T h e tempest in their hearts, threat­
ening self-loss, is at its climax. O n e must assume them to rave in 
frenzy through the fourth act while the masque is performed and 
Prospero makes his nostalgic farewell speeches. Not until the fifth 
act are Sebastian and Antonio released, together with the despairing 
Alonso, by Prospero's heavenly music. 
S o m  e critics have been disturbed because neither Sebastian nor 
Antonio manifests repentance, and they have seen in this omission 
Shakespeare's lack of confidence in the w a  y he brought The Tempest 
to a conclusion.4 But conscience is, after all, at work in their self-
threatening fury just as it is in Alonso's despair. "Their great guilt," 
comments Gonzalo, "Like poison given to work a great time after, 
/ N o  w gins to bite the spirits" (III.iii.105—6)• There is some indica­
tion that a moral transformation has taken place in Sebastian when 
he hails the reappearance of Ferdinand and his union with Miranda 
as "a most high miracle" (V.i.i77). Sebastian n o w acknowledges 
the divine power that he derided w h e n Gonzalo attributed to it the 
preservation of the travelers after the shipwreck. True, there is not 
even such a sign of a change of heart in Antonio, and this silence is 
alarming. But would not a declaration of repentance, which Shake­
speare could easily have provided, be even more disturbing? Such 
profession, which could hardly be very long and very eloquent in the 
pressure of the ending, would scarcely have been convincing. 
Antonio is the most wicked character of the play; the influence 
he wields over Sebastian is almost comparable to that of Iago over 
Othello. W  e m a y on this basis surmise that he will plot again; but 
it is vain to predict what any of Shakespeare's characters will do 
after they leave the stage, whose illusion is their only reason for 
existence. (That w  e are constantly tempted into guessing is a tribute 
to Shakespeare's power to m a k e us believe in the reality of his 
creations.) W  e cannot really k n o  w whether Antonio will or will not 
plot again. W h a  t w  e can say is that in Shakespeare's conception 
"every m a  n with his affects is born, / Not by might mast'red, but 
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by special grace" {Love's Labor's Lost, Li. 149-50). Antonio, born 
with more passions than most m e n , surely needs both u n c o m m o n 
strength, vigilant supervision, and a strong dose of heavenly grace 
if he is to master them. But when even a Caliban, brought up in 
Setebos-worship, promises in the end of the play to "be wise here­
after/And seek for grace" (V.i.294-95), one m a y discern some 
hope also for Antonio. T h  e emphasis of Shakespeare's ending, at any 
rate, is not on the miraculous efficacy of conversions but on Pros­
pero's power of forgiveness. If w e are left with the impression that 
Antonio will require Prospero's supervision in Milan, w  e m a  y take 
that as a tribute to Prospero's strength—a purely h u m a  n strength 
after his renunciation of magic. 
Of Ariel and Caliban one can hardly speak in the same analytical 
terms as one speaks of h u m a n characters. The two are creatures of a 
brilliant fantasy that tempts a scholar to become a poet. Shake­
speare's empathetic imagination triumphs whe  n it rides on the 
curled clouds, swims through the water, and dives into the fire with 
Ariel, and when it creeps on the ground, listens to the noises of the 
island, and breathes its sweet airs with Caliban. The Tempest, like 
the other romances, has levels of movement that leave the dull 
brain behind. But the scholar can say at least that Ariel belongs to a 
Platonic realm of the spirit that lies beyond the sensual and rational 
one. Crawling on the ground with Caliban is no more comfortable 
an intellectual experience; one must assimilate himself to a quite 
different realm and a no less strange one, that of half-human 
monsters. Caliban, too, is a fantastic and unique creature, sketchily 
but evocatively drawn so as to leave m u c h to the imagination in 
which such as he must live if they are to live at all. 
But it is to m  y purpose in elucidating the thematic structure of 
The Tempest to recall that Caliban and Ariel, different as they are, 
have something in c o m m o n that is important for the movement of 
the play: they suffer from a similar sense of dislocation and depend 
on Prospero for their release from servitude. They thirst for the 
freedom they have lost, and w  e cannot help sympathizing a little 
even with Caliban's pathetic desire; but w  e should not forget that he 
seeks freedom to avenge himself, freedom to hurt and to kill. H  e 
lacks both gratitude and sense w h e  n he exchanges his benevolent 
master, Prospero, for the braggadocio, Stephano, and the raga­
muffin, Trinculo. W h e  n the noblemen lose themselves in dreams, 
conspiracy, and grief, Caliban and the two clowns w h o  m he deifies 
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lose themselves in the bottle. T h  e apocalypse that strikes the noble­
m e n dumps the servants in the pool, where they drop their bottle—an 
infinite loss for Stephano (IV.i.207). Prospero has his spirits 
administer a thorough drubbing to the three, and Caliban, at least, 
comes to realize his stupidity. Whether he will be able to remain wise 
as he promises depends on the "grace" he seeks and on strong 
guidance. Appropriately, he and his two companions are released not 
into immediate freedom but into temporary servitude so that they 
m a  y find their proper subordinate place in society: they are ordered 
by Prospero to trim his island cave, whereas Ariel receives im­
mediately his deserved freedom. T h e humorous Caliban subplot thus 
adds a scherzo movement to the symphonic theme of self-loss and 
self-recovery that reaches its purest notes in the soprano voice of 
Ariel. 
T h e subhuman Caliban and the superhuman Ariel are the poles 
between which Prospero is placed. H  e shares a reason aided by grace 
with the former and the world of the senses and passions with the 
latter; the two creatures indicate the directions, evil and good, into 
which Prospero can move . In a way, all of Shakespeare's characters 
are placed between two such poles, but none is so visibly and, at the 
same time, symbolically assigned to afield of action in which he must 
m o v e  , afield that reaches from almost beneath the earth to just be­
low the heavens. A n d , from the beginning, Prospero moves with 
energy and determination. T h  e concentration and speed of the action 
result from his vigorous and firm control. H  e makes use of the 
advantage offered to him by providence and brings the m o m e n t to its 
crisis: 
by m  y prescience 
Ifind m  y zenith doth depend upon 
A most auspicious star, whose influence 
If now I court not, but omit, m  y fortunes 
Will ever after droop. 
O n  e could say even that the classical unities the play possesses 
are due to Prospero's direction. Divine providence brought Alonso's 
ship to the island, but it is Prospero w h o makes the work of punish­
ment, redemption, and reconciliation happen in the last four hours 
of his island residence. Almost as if he had a stopwatch in his hand, 
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he says to Ariel: "The time 'twixt six and n o w / Must by us both 
be spent most preciously" (I.ii.240-41). All through the play, there 
is a sense of speed, starting with thefirst cries of the mariners, 
"bestir, bestir," a feeling maintained by frequent expletives like 
"here" and " n o w  " and by the several references to Ariel's impending 
release and the completion of Prospero's work.5 T h e movement of 
the action, including its temporary relaxation in the more idyllic 
fourth act, is rigorously controlled by him. His energy infuses itself 
into everything and everybody, produces the storm and the rescue 
of the Neapolitans, sends Ariel about his work, separates Ferdinand 
from the others, engineers his meeting with Miranda, keeps the two 
from too precipitous a union, confounds and punishes his enemies, 
puts on a mask in celebration of the coming wedding, and finally 
effects the universal recovery and reconciliation. 
Prospero's control is the more impressive as it requires only a 
m i n i m u m of his magic skill. That he possesses great occult powers is 
suggested, but very little of what he actually does on the stage 
violates the laws of nature.6 H  e is not a very professional magician, 
as critics have noted. H  e has no magic cauldrons, no witches' brew, 
no squeaking ghosts. T h  e passage in which he evokes most nearly the 
traditional image of the sorcerer is his speech beginning with " Y  e 
elves of hills, brooks, standing lakes, and groves" (V.i.33 ff.). 
These lines are adapted from Medea's incantation in Ovid's Meta­
morphoses; but some of Ovid's lurid details are left out, and the 
speech serves only to abjure "this rough magic." 7 
Prospero exerts his power largely through Ariel, w h o  m he has 
learned to understand and to control evidently by the study of the 
books he prized above his dukedom; at times, Ariel appears to be 
an extension of his mind and imagination.8 Prospero practices white 
magic or theurgy, that is, magic in the service of good and performed 
by benevolent spirits. H  e appears to have derived it from a study of 
natural philosophy and its excrescences astrology and alchemy, and 
also from a knowledge of the properties of music—one of the liberal 
arts in which, as he says, he immersed himself in Milan. Prospero 
uses music by drawing on its generally acknowledged hypnotic and 
medicinal effects. Through his music, he stirs up emotions and allays 
them: a melody in the winds and in the thunder threateningly sings 
like an organ pipe the n a m  e of Prospero to the conscience-stricken 
Alonso, and gentler strains sound in the tune that assuages the 
Neapolitans' grief and fury. Music here has a transforming power on 
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the self; it has the kind of influence that interested T h o m a  s Wright, 
the nosce teipsum author most concerned with the moving of the pas­
sions. (The section on the moving through music was added in the 
second edition of 1604, which had some new material on the control 
of the emotions.) Prospero's particular use of magic testifies to the 
fascination with h u m a  n engineering Shakespeare evinced in his 
baroque plays. Like an Iago, Prospero knows h o w to make m e n lose 
themselves; but like an Edgar, although more successfully, he makes 
m e  n find themselves. 
Generally, Prospero dispenses even with his gentle magic and 
prefers the schoolmaster's apple and rod. H  e is the teacher of 
Miranda and Caliban, and, occasionally, of Ariel. After he has 
created the initial storm, he doffs his magic mantle and lectures 
Miranda on her past, observing in the process the degree of her 
attention and giving her, as it were, good and bad marks. If this 
be weakness, it is one with which Shakespeare m a y have had some 
personal experience and sympathy if, as Aubrey says, he was in his 
younger years a schoolmaster in the country. But if Prospero is at 
times the impatient pedagogue, he also has trained himself to be 
a patient researcher; he does not despise to learn even from Caliban, 
w h  o curses himself for having shown Prospero the fresh springs, 
brine pits, and barren and fertile places. 
O n e can look upon Prospero's activity as a kind of experiment for 
which the island provides the laboratory. If he is to be successful, he 
must show in this smaller setting that he will prevail in the greater 
world of Milan. His exile, except for being forced rather than 
voluntary, resembles the temporary experimental withdrawal of 
D u k  e Vincentio from the government of Vienna. Both dukes have a 
preference for the "life removed," a preference they find it hard to 
reconcile with the demands of their office. Both become engaged in 
experiments the nature of which is not evident in the beginning, ex­
periments that involve their o w  n self-knowledge, the government of 
their countries, and the relationship between their knowledge of them­
selves and the proper conduct of their political affairs. But Measure 
for Measure treats these problems with mannerist opaqueness and 
indirection. T h  e questions, it turns out, are obliquely posed because 
of Vincentio's choice of the corrupt Angelo to give a demonstration 
of the difficulty m a  n has in meting out judgments; and, as w  e noted, 
the outcome of it all is something of a question mark. It is true that 
the full nature of Prospero's experiment is not revealed until its 
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results are established at the beginning of the fifth act when Prospero 
forgives his enemies and renounces his magic; but his experiment 
never has the psychological complications of Vincentio's, and the out­
come, toward which the action develops logically and consistently, is 
much more neat and conclusive than that of the earlier play. 
Because Prospero is the ruler over forces of nature, his experiment 
concerns not only psychology (or in the term of Shakespeare's time, 
moral philosophy) and politics but also natural science and raises the 
question of their relation. It is interesting in this respect that, on the 
connection and analogy between natural science and politics, Sir 
Francis Bacon based an appeal he addressed to King James in the 
first year of his reign. In A Brief Discourse Touching the Happy 
Union of the Kingdoms of England and Scotland (1603), Bacon 
argued that James should study nature in order to reign well and 
bring about the harmonious fusion of his two kingdoms. Bacon's 
Preface opens with the statement that the king should not find it 
strange that a certain book by Heraclitus, n o w lost, was regarded 
by some readers as a discourse on nature and by others as a treatise 
on politics, "because there is a great affinity and consent between the 
rules of nature and the true rules of policy, the one being nothing 
else but an order in the government of the world; and the other, in 
the government of an estate." Therefore, Bacon claimed, the educa­
tion of the kings of Persia was called an education in "magic": 
"For the Persians, magic, which was the secret literature of their 
kings, was an observation in the contemplation of nature and an 
application there to a sense politic, taking the fundamental laws of 
nature, with the branches and passages of them, as an original and 
first model, whence to take and describe a copy and imitation for 
government." 9 
This curious reference to magic certainly does not prove that 
Shakespeare read the Brief Discourse and was influenced by it in 
writing The Tempest. B  y evincing an interest in the control of 
nature through h u m a n energy, Shakespeare showed that, like Bacon, 
he belonged to a period that was fascinated with the search for 
power, which, as a modern historian has said, was the c o m m o n 
ground of the baroque age.10 But, as w  e have noted at the beginning 
of this study, in their ideas about self-knowledge and its place in 
h u m a n endeavor, Bacon and Shakespeare differed fundamentally. In 
the Brief Discourse and elsewhere, Bacon looked upon natural 
science as the field under which to subsume all other h u m a n 
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knowledge and activity, whereas Shakespeare even in his late 
Tempest paid tribute to the humanistic view of m a  n according to 
which a knowledge of moral nature is the initiation to all other 
h u m a n knowledge and endeavor. For Shakespeare-Prospero, the har­
m o n y of nature becomes secondary to the harmony of the self, which 
must be established if the body politic is to be ordered and governed. 
A n d the power over nature is m u c h less important than the power 
over the self for Prospero: he abandons his control over the forces 
of nature voluntarily and returns to Milan as a ruler over himself and 
his dukedom. 
It is only from the point of view of the centrality of the moral self 
and in the context of the play's movement from losing tofinding that 
the events of the fourth and the beginning of thefifth acts, together 
with the most important speech of the play, the end-of-revels speech, 
m a k  e sense. Already Prospero's admission of his failure as a duke, 
which he makes to Miranda in the second scene, indicates h o w 
personally he is involved in the losing-finding movement that under­
lies the action. His account of his rapture and transport during his 
secret studies shows that he is a m a  n of passionate dedication and has 
an explosive temperament. H  e has mastered this earlier weakness; 
but in the fourth act, he is beset by an inner turmoil that makes it at 
least possible that he m a  y lose again the stability of mind and the 
control over himself and others he has gained in his twelve years of 
island residence. 
Shakespeare gave Prospero's disturbance strong dramatic emphasis 
by having it occur in the midst of the most idyllic episode, the per­
formance of the masque. For no apparent reason, Prospero suddenly 
starts to speak. Instantaneously, his spirit-actors disperse, "to a 
strange, hollow, and confused noise," as the Folio stage direction 
says. In an aside, Prospero explains his vexation as due to his 
remembering Caliban's rebellion. Both Ferdinand and Miranda 
punctuate Prospero's distemper by astonished exclamations. Pros­
pero then begins to speak haltingly, addressing Ferdinand, until his 
emotion channels itself into the powerful visionary images of the 
end-of-revels speech. But he stops abruptly, apologizes for his 
weakness and infirmity, and announces that he will walk a turn or 
two to "still" his beating mind. T h e force of his passion makes it­
self strongly felt, although Shakespeare softened its visual impres­
sion by taking him off the stage soon after its inception. Before 
he goes, he expresses in a soliloquy his despair about the educability 
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of Caliban, a despair underlined by the repetition of the key-word 
"lost": 
A devil, a born devil, on whose nature 
Nurture can never stick; on w h o  m m  y pains, 
Humanely taken, all, all lost, quite lost; 
A n  d as with age his body uglier grows, 
So his mind cankers. I will plague them all, 
Even to a roaring. 
(IV.i.188-93) 
W h e  n Prospero reappears, there is no apparent sign that his 
passion has lessened. H  e and Ariel unleash the spirits in the shape 
of dogs against the rebels, and Prospero's last words in the fourth 
act have an ominous ring: "At this hour / Lies at m  y mercy all mine 
enemies" (261-62). Prospero's enemies were at his mercy from the 
beginning of the play; his present awareness of his power over them 
raises the suspicion that he is tempted to avenge himself. Prospero is 
at the point where he mustfinally show that he is not m a d e of the 
stuff of littleness that produces the villain w h  o avenges himself but 
of the stuff of greatness that characterizes the hero w h  o can forgive. 
Th  e significance of Prospero's anger and its connection with the 
end-of-revels speech has frequently been misunderstood. Theodore 
Spencer thought that "in Prospero there is no conflict; in his control 
of the world, internal conflict has no place." u But this opinion 
disregards both Prospero's obvious anger and the peculiar nature 
of this tension-fraught speech, of which something will have to be 
said later. Prospero's agony, it is true, takes a very different form 
from similar phenomena in heroes of earlier plays. It is largely in­
tellectual; but it differs also from the melancholy cerebration of a 
Hamlet, which would be out of spirit with a festival play like The 
Tempest and would not be in agreement with the tendency in 
Shakespeare's later plays to punctuate strong movements toward 
man's losing or finding himself with ecstatic states of his soul. Such 
climaxes in Shakespeare's baroque tragedies and romances manifest 
themselves in rapture, epilepsy, dream-like experiences, and, in 
Prospero's case, in an apocalyptic vision, not in a discourse of reason 
or in a rhetorical expression of passion. 
Frank Kermode , w h o is a m o n g the critics that are at least sur­
prised by Prospero's strong perturbation, yet thinks it "apparently 
unnecessary" and surmises that it " m a  y be the point in which an 
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oddly pedantic concern for classical structure causes it [the distur­
bance] to force its w a  y through the surface of the play." 12 Far from 
it, Prospero's anger is very important for the play, and it is not en­
tirely unmotivated. T h  e rebellion of Caliban threatens the loss of twelve 
years of Prospero's educational labors with him and thus the failure 
of one half of the strictly educational side of his experiment (the 
success of the other half depends on Miranda's chastity). Further, 
the boorish ingratitude of Caliban recalls the graver ingratitude of 
Antonio, and Caliban's threat to Prospero's order mirrors the more 
portentous threat to all order in Antonio's and Sebastian's plot 
against Alonso. In a sense, Caliban's revolt can be taken as symbolic 
of the recalcitrance and rebelliousness inherent in all h u m a  n nature 
owing to its being weighed d o w n by its earthly ingredients. Thus 
Caliban's rebellion can be thought to externalize an internal threat— 
a threat as all m e n face it—to Prospero's stability, whose preserva­
tion is necessary for the happy outcome. In this respect, Caliban 
becomes representative of the lower forces of Prospero's soul, of 
his worse self. This interpretation is supported by Prospero's later 
recognizing a kind of kinship with Caliban, "this thing of darkness," 
which he acknowledges as his o w n (V.i.275). Ariel, w h o in the 
denouement sympathizes with Prospero's enemies, becomes symbolic 
of Prospero's better self; but he is also superhuman—he has no 
senses, as Shakespeare reminds us—and Prospero's problem is a 
h u m a n one. Significantly, w e hear of Ariel's sympathy after Prospero 
has m a d  e his decision strictly as a h u m a  n being (V.i.i ff.). 
Prospero's anger occurs at the structural climax of the play, the 
summa epitasis, but it is a mistake to assume that the play's structure 
produces the anger; it would be more appropriate to say that 
Prospero's vexation creates the crisis. His present understandable 
urge to avenge himself and his even more understandable temptation 
to cling to his magic powers could be as costly to him as his earlier 
intellectual fervor that deprived him of a dukedom. If Prospero is to 
demonstrate that he knows himself and that he can bring the action 
to a happy conclusion, he must once and climactically show that he 
can exorcise the ghost of potential self-loss and resist the attraction 
of superhuman power. This is the acid test of the long and painful 
struggle Prospero has waged on his island; everything depends on 
winning it. Only after he has shown convincingly that he has found 
himself can he help his enemies to find themselves. W h e  n he does, the 
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revenge movement of the plot turns into a movement of reconcilia­
tion. Threatening loss becomes confirmed recovery. 
Prospero's end-of-revels speech has to be understood in the 
dramatic and thematic context that I have just sketched. It is not 
Shakespeare's leave-taking from life and art or a soothing c o m m o n  ­
place—although it has a glow of sunset and a touch of serenity—but 
it breathes Prospero's struggle with his intemperance and im­
patience. Blended of nostalgia and vexation as the speech is, it rises 
to a consideration of life that envelops and yet transcends Prospero's 
particular problem and general unhappiness. 
Dramatically, the speech arises from Prospero's stormy m o o  d that 
interrupts the masque. It is not in sober reflection but in a near-
breakdown of his self-control that Prospero, his spirits scattered in 
fear, turns to the astonished Ferdinand and begins to speak 
haltingly: " Y o u do look, m y son, in a m o v ' d sort, / A s if you were 
dismay'd; be cheerful, sir, / O u r revels n o w are ended" (IV.i.146­
48) . If this assurance is not apt to console Ferdinand, neither is the 
panoramic prediction of the disappearance of all earthly things which 
follows. T h  e spirit-actors, Prospero says, 
Are melted into air, into thin air; 
A n d  , like the baseless fabric of this vision, 
The cloud-capp'd towers, the gorgeous palaces, 
The solemn temples, the great globe itself, 
Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve, 
A n d  , like this insubstantial pageant faded, 
Leave not a rack behind. W  e are such stuff 
A s dreams are made on; and our little life 
Is rounded with a sleep. 
(IV.i.150-58) 
W  e are so familiar with the speech that w  e forget h o  w full of tension, 
h o w puzzling and ambiguous it is. 
Prospero seemingly disparages the masque, the "baseless fabric 
of this vision," with which he compares the fragile and unreal show 
of life. His imagination wings itself above the modest masque when 
he considers the analogous evanescence of the earth and the un­
reality of life; temporary as he knows the dream of existence to be, it 
is yet beautiful with its cloud-capped towers, gorgeous palaces, and 
solemn temples. There is here an aesthetic transfiguration of what, 
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alas, is so fugitive, a transfiguration that envelops both life and the 
masque. T h e real and the artificial realms become indistinguishable: 
life is a vision and a pageant, and the masque becomes the great, 
dissolving globe. T h  e beauty of the double evocation of transcience 
suggests Prospero's difficulty in distancing himself from both worlds, 
the natural and the supernatural one, as he must as an old m a n w h o 
approaches the end of his life and as a mere m a n w h o must divest 
himself of powers that are not man's to wield. 
T h e two final images of Prospero's speech are evidence of his 
struggle for detachment by taking refuge in conventional ideas on 
life and death; they are an attempt to console himself and find 
equilibrium. T h e idea of Prospero's concluding sentence was and is 
commonplace, and Shakespeare's pregnant expression has made it 
more so to us. Yet, in their context, these lines are charged with an 
ambiguity that goes beyond the traditional nature of the sentiment 
they express. T h e comparison of life to a dream was typical of con­
temptus mundi attitudes; it was intended to prevent m a n from taking 
life on earth as the purpose of m a n . A s Calderon's drama La vida es 
sueno shows, the concept appealed also to the baroque imagination. 
In Prospero's reflection, just as in Calderon's play, fragile m a  n is 
still the maker of his dreams, and Prospero's has a seductive glory 
that makes one almost forget the evanescence that is its subject. 
Prospero'sfinal image of sleep rounding off life evokes the proverbial 
figure of sleep as the image of death, which Shakespeare would have 
met in Sententiae Pueriles of early grammar school—somnum imago 
mortis, a proverb that was thought to accustom m a  n to the idea of 
death. But the notion of the dream of life and perhaps also that 
of the sleep of death becomes tinged with the aesthetic and kinetic 
associations of the preceding stage-and-world images so as to suggest 
that the quality of the dream and possibly that of the sleep have 
something to do with man's performance in life. This, at most, is a 
suggestion conveyed through the images; but, perhaps, I have merely 
read it into the speech. 
This is not a speech of certainty—if it were, it would not fit 
Prospero's humility as he expresses it in his epilogue. A n  d the un­
certainty is highlighted by the ambiguous meaning of "sleep": w e 
cannot be sure whether it "rounds off" life merely by bringing it 
to a conclusion or by coming before and after. Perhaps, as has been 
suggested, Shakespeare wished his audience (did he also have in 
mind such skeptical readers as us?) to supply their o w n answers.13 
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W h e n it comes to what Shakespeare believed, w e cannot even be sure 
that he really envisaged afinal dissolution of the earth, although the 
recurrence of the idea in his plays makes it likely that he did. But 
Shakespeare expressed here the nostalgia and vexation of Prospero. 
A n  d from the point of view of Prospero's approach to self-knowledge, 
it is most important that he concern himself with the fact of 
mortality, universal mortality, and not with the hope of immortality. 
Prospero anchors his renunciation of magic on a self-knowledge 
humanly achieved and not on the reward of heaven. In The Tempest, 
as in Shakespeare's later plays generally, it is apparent that m a  n can­
not seek to find himself by guessing at the designs of heaven but only 
by using his o w  n resources; he can, of course, pray that these be in­
creased by divine aid, as Prospero does in the end. 
The recognition of h u m a n limitations makes Prospero not a weak 
but a strong m a n  . "In der Beschrankung zeigt sich erst der Meister," 
Goethe says somewhere. Prospero's role in The Tempest is compa­
rable to the one Henry V  , Shakespeare's Renaissance pattern of per­
fection, has in his play; but it exceeds it, given the somewhat 
different attitude toward self-knowledge operative in the two plays. 
The extension of his influence through his magic gives Prospero, of 
course, a power of action that other Shakespearean heroes do not 
have (even though, as w e have noted, he uses this power gently, 
humanly). Nothing happens in the play of which he does not have 
knowledge, and he instigates everything except Antonio's plot and 
Caliban's rebellion; and even these provide no real difficulty for him. 
Not even D u k e Vincentio, w h o m Angelo likens to "providence 
divine," manages events soflawlessly. There is no such imperfection 
in Prospero's direction as is created by the reluctance of the rogue 
Barnardine in Measure for Measure to have himself executed whe  n 
Vincentio expects it of him. 
But Prospero is also a strong m a  n because he has to win what 
Shakespeare always considered the hardest battle, that against the 
passion and presumption in oneself; and in his case, the battle is the 
harder because Prospero's self is heightened m u c  h above the normal 
scale by his supernatural powers. His passions by themselves are 
potent, as is generally true for the heroes of Shakespeare's baroque 
plays; but their potential destructiveness is increased. S o m  e neo-
Platonic practitioners of theurgy claimed that magic could elevate 
m a n to the level of the gods;1 4 but Prospero rejects this presumption 
and accepts his limitations as a h u m a  n being. This is not because he 
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is a serene sage, as he is sometimes portrayed on the stage. A  s 
E d w a r d D o w d e n has said, "Shakespeare has shown us his quick 
sense of injury, his intellectual impatience, his occasional moment of 
keen irritability, in order that w e m a y be more deeply aware of his 
abiding strength and self-possession, and that w  e m a  y perceive h o  w 
these have been grafted upon a temperament not impassive or un­
excitable." 15 Given this temperament, Prospero demonstrates his 
victory over his passions as m u c h as does Henry V  , w h o says that 
they are as subject to him as are "our wretches fetter'd in our 
prisons." Henry's passions serve life sentences, but they were from 
the beginning lesser criminals. Prospero has the passionate nature 
of a baroque hero like Othello; but he also has the will-power com­
mensurate with it, a will-power cleansed from egotistical motives. 
His passion and his control have the force and strain of baroque art. 
Prospero owes his present strength to his consciousness of having 
overcome his intemperance and impatience. H  e could, in this respect 
too, be compared with Henry V  , w h o , as a prince, had indulged him­
self—not in study, like Prospero, but in reveling. But, in doing so, 
he was conscious of his future glory and set his indulgence in 
contrast to it, so that to some critics his licentiousness has appeared 
to be a proper preparation for his later success. This is not quite so; 
Henry, as the ending of The Second Part of Henry IV and the be­
ginning of Henry V m a k  e clear, goes through a "consideration" in 
which he sheds his offending A d a m  . But Henry always has control 
over himself, and his indulgence is a controlled indulgence; 
Prospero's victory over himself comes from an imperfection over­
come and conquered by will power. His is a mastered self. 
But Shakespeare took care not to make him priggish. H  e does 
not assume the voice and tone of perfection. Considering the echoes 
of the Aeneid in The Tempest—a drama that takes place in the 
general location of Virgil's epic—it is remarkable that Prospero 
is so unlike the stately R o m a  n vir perfectus. Although Aeneas, Dido, 
and Carthage are referred to in the play, Prospero has a quite un-
Virgilian humanity and humility. Even in comparison to Henry V  , 
w h o has a touch of Aeneas, Prospero appears extremely modest. The 
portrait of Prospero, pattern of perfection that it represents in its 
particular way, breathes a m u c h stronger awareness of h u m a n im­
perfection than does the figure of Henry V  . But then, The Tempest 
also contains a strong echo of Montaigne, w h o  , as w  e have noted, 
criticized the Renaissance pattern of perfection as unrealistic and un­
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attainable. Prospero has some obvious h u m a n weaknesses: he is im­
petuous; he coaxes, lectures, blusters, and threatens. H  e is irritated 
not only with Caliban and the Neapolitans but also occasionally with 
Ariel, Ferdinand, and Miranda. Prospero's is a changeable, adapt­
able self of the sort Montaigne saw and observed in himself and 
others. Prospero's attitudes and moods range widely: he is fervent 
at one m o m e n  t and wise at the next; he detaches himself from the 
world at one time and, at another, immerses himself in it with excite­
ment. His Protean personality is, for instance, exemplified in the 
long second scene with Miranda, when he is, in turns, a loving 
father, a narrator of past events, a coaxing schoolmaster, a preacher 
of faith, and a mighty magician. Such quick changes of roles put 
actors to a severe, perhaps an impossible, test. 
In the end, he affirms his temperance, patience, and humility. 
H  e does not here or elsewhere become a "close replica to Christ," as 
Professor Wilson Knight says in pardonable enthusiasm for his 
character.16 Neither does he show himself as weak and prone to 
further disasters, as some critics would have it. Prospero, says 
Northrop Frye, "appears not to be promising m u c  h improvement 
after he returns." 17 O n e suspects that the major reasons for this 
doubt about Prospero's continuing strength lie in his prediction that 
in Milan "every third thought shall be m  y grave" (V.i.311) and in 
the acknowledgment of hisfinal prayer that from n o  w on he will have 
only h u m a n strength. But in concerning himself with death and its 
requirements, he follows a long-standing stipulation of self-knowl­
edge. " T o philosophize is to learn to die" was the title of one of 
Montaigne's essays, which echoed a long tradition that, in its 
Christian form, went back to the ars moriendi. For Prospero, the 
preparation for death is, because of his age, a governmental and a 
human sine qua non; but it does not exclude other important consid­
erations. If one wanted to be mathematical, he could say that, in 
turning every third thought toward the grave, Prospero will be using 
merely that part of his time m a d e free by giving up Miranda, w h o  m 
he earlier called "a third of mine o w n life" (IV.1.3). But it will be 
sufficient to say that Prospero's success as an island ruler bodes well 
for his strength as a duke in Milan. 
The ending of The Tempest does suggest that self-control and 
political control are an unfinished and continuing business, for which 
h u m a n might and divine grace are needed; but it does not show that 
Prospero is tired of his work or defeated by it. Neither, I think, is 
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there anything in The Tempest that shows it to be the work of a tired 
Shakespeare w h  o had too m a n  y third thoughts, be it thought illness 
or religious preoccupation or both, as has been suggested. The tight 
structure and the sweep of ideas do not support Lytton Strachey's 
claim that Shakespeare, when writing his romances, was bored with 
nearly everything, with life, and even with drama, with all but poetic 
dreams.18 A n d I cannot, with Clifford Leech, detect in this play a 
Shakespeare weakened by the Puritan impulse. Though for Leech 
The Tempest is still "the fullest and most ordered expression" of this 
impulse, it shows signs that Shakespeare had grown "tired of dis­
ciplining h u m a  n nature and recognized it as impossible to execute." 19 
A certain fideism, as I have suggested, is notable in Shakespeare's 
plays long before The Tempest; but it is not, in any specific sense, 
Calvinistic or Puritan. In Calvin's Institutes life m a y have the 
evanescence of Prospero's vision, but it altogether lacks its glory. 
Shakespeare, of course, did acknowledge in The Tempest that the 
disciplining of h u m a  n nature has its limits. For these, Caliban, on 
whose nature "nurture" has not so far taken, is the most obvious 
example. But even he becomes in the end somewhat of an educational 
success w h e  n he promises to "be wise hereafter, / A n  d seek for 
grace" (V.i.294-95). Undoubtedly, Caliban will need m u c h grace 
if he is to reach a normal level of intelligence and morality, but the 
fact that n o  w he recognizes the fundamental difference between the 
scoundrels w h o  m he adored as gods and his kind master w h o  m he 
caused anguish provides grounds for hope. Caliban's pledge to 
change his ways is a delayed reaction to Prospero's pains taken 
with him and provides an ever so slight support for the expectation of 
general improvement. 
Prospero, hisfinal humility and the tentativeness of the conversion 
of his enemies notwithstanding, is a very strong hero, perhaps 
Shakespeare's strongest. H  e has achieved self-knowledge in terms of 
the definition of the Christian humanists. "Nothing," said Eras­
m u s in Enchiridion, "is more hard than that a m a  n should over­
come himself; but, then, there is no greater reward than is felicity." 20 
This reward is promised to Prospero when he controls his passions 
and renounces the magic of unlimited power. But Prospero has also 
come as close as possible to achieving self-knowledge in terms of 
those w h o  , like Montaigne, thought that the Christian humanists' 
program was simplified and in need of revision. H  e does not seek 
self-knowledge by lessons on body and soul and on the nature of the 
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passions, but he realizes that it is an on-going process that ends only 
with death. H  e will base his life in Milan on this realization, which 
includes an acknowledgement of his weakness, the weakness of being 
h u m a n . His future power to transform the world and to master 
others will lie not in the magician's wand, not in a power over nature, 
not in Machiavellian schemes, but in a strength that radiates from 
a mastered self. There are good reasons to believe that Prospero 
will retain his mastery and become the fortunate m a n that his n a m e 
implies—good human reasons, at least. A n  d for the rest, Prospero 
prays for divine grace (a supplication that Shakespeare combined 
with a compliment to that deity of the dramatists, the audience). 
Whether Prospero's reliance on a political control that centers on 
self-control is fantastic or prophetic must be decided by the future of 
mankind, not by the reader or writer of this book. Perhaps it is 
unrealistic to expect m a  n to act like a Prospero. Perhaps it is 
merely a humanistic dream that the strength of m a  n develops by 
self-conquest and that felicity ensues w h e n m a n limits his power and 
abandons the idea of dominating others through social and scientific 
means. But it is not an implausible dream, and its fulfillment, which 
will require a most propitious star, is still one of mankind's 
happier expectations. 



APPENDIX A 
Hamlet: 
"What Is a Man?" 
This passage (IV.iv.33 ff.) is one of the several in Hamlet that show 
Shakespeare's literacy in the lore of body and soul and its application 
to self-knowledge. A s Hamlet reflects on Fortinbras's march against 
Poland, he sees m a  n and himself as part animal, part rational being. 
In agreement with the demands of moral decorum, as the Renaissance 
derived them from Cicero's De Officiis, Hamlet argues that m a  n 
must set his course of action by overcoming his animal nature and by 
listening to the dictates of reason: 
H o  w all occasions do inform against m e  , 
A n d spur m y dull revenge! W h a t is a m a n , 
If the chief good and market of his time 
Be but to sleep and feed ? A beast, no more! 
Sure he that made us with such large discourse, 
Looking1 before and after, gave us not 
That capability and godlike reason 
T  o fust in us unus'd. 
(IV.iv.32-39) 
Hamlet's words have a close resemblance to a passage from the 
beginning of Cicero's De Officiis ( I . n ) , the locus classicus for the 
special obligation of m a n  , as contrasted with animals, to fulfill his 
duties. But the parallel becomes even closer when one consults a 
sixteenth-century edition of De Officiis, such as the Paris edition of 
1560, which has the traditional headings, marginal notes, and 
commentaries. In this edition, Erasmus introduced the passage as 
being from the sententiae that concern the chief good that proceeds 
from nature: " E x veteris Academiae & Stoicorum sententiae, qui 
s u m m u  m b o n u  m a natura proficisci putant" (Cf. Hamlet's "the 
chief good and markets of his time"). T h  e text follows: 
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Principio generi animantium omni est a natura tributum, 
ut se vitam, corpusque tueatur, declinetque ea quae nocitura 
videantur, omniaque quae sint ad vivendum necessaria 
anquirat & paret: ut pastum ut latibula, ut alia generis 
eiusdem. C o m m u n  e item animantium est coniunctionis ap­
petitus, procreandi causa, & cura quaedam eorum quae 
procreata sunt. Sed inter hominem & beluam hoc maxime 
interest, quod haec tantum quantum sensu movetur, ad id 
solum quod adest, quodque praesens est, se accommodat, 
paulum a d m o d u  m sentiens praeteritum aut futurum: H o m  o 
autem quod rationis est particeps (per quam consequentia 
cernit, causas rerum videt, earumque progressus, & quasi 
antecessiones non ignorat, similitudines comparat, rebusque 
praesentibus adiungit atque annectit futuras) facile totius 
vitae cursum videt ad eamque degendam praeparat res 
necessarias.1 
T h e obvious similarities between the two texts are heightened by 
the marginal notes in the 1560 edition, which provide the structure 
of Hamlet's reflection: Hamlet poses the question, W h a t is m a n ? 
(quid intersit inter hominis propria & beluarum); and he answers 
that m a n ' s possession of reason sets him off from the animals 
(rationandi vis hominis propria)—the rationandi vis of the note 
designates more specifically the mental process Hamlet calls "dis­
course" than does the ratio of the text.2 T h  e properties of animals in 
Cicero are ut pastum ut latibula ut alia generis eiusdem; in Hamlet 
they are "but to sleep and feed" (in the balanced structure of the 
passage, Shakespeare used hendiadys and mentioned only these two 
major "good and markets"). Hamlet's phrase "large discourse, 
looking before and after" summarizes Cicero's homo autem quod 
rationis est particeps . . . totius vitae cursum videt; "large," in 
particular, glances at totius vitae cursum; for looking, Cicero has 
videt and cernit; for "before and after," praeteritum aut juturum. 
Hamlet's "god-like reason" is accounted for by rationis est particeps 
and by the note cujus (ut alio loco ait Cicero) prima homini cum 
Deo conjunctio est. This note would also account for Hamlet's 
making G o d rather than nature the source of man's reason, but such 
change was to be expected in the appropriation of pagan wisdom in 
the Christian Renaissance. It m a  y be added that Betuleius's com­
mentary interprets the whole passage in the sense of a reproach for 
m a n as Hamlet applies it: " T o our shame w e must say that no 
animal neglects the law prescribed by its kind, nor does it have to be 
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goaded to it; m a n  , however, cannot be provoked even by the spur 
of conscience." 3 
There were other versions of the commonplace available to 
Shakespeare in English.4 But I have yet to see a passage that in 
general drift, structural correspondence, and verbal parallels comes as 
close to Hamlet's words as that in De Officiis. Shakespeare, I believe, 
must either have remembered it very clearly from his grammar-school 
days or consulted Cicero for the purpose of penning Hamlet's speech. 
Certainly no passage was more relevant in the Renaissance than 
Cicero's for emphasizing the conflict between the rational m a  n of 
theory and the bestial m a  n of experience—a conflict Theodore 
Spencer has called an essential part of Hamlet's conscience.5 
APPENDIX B 
Lucrece: " W h y Should the W o r m

Intrude the Maiden Bud?"

M o r e than one critic has claimed that Shakespeare's poem Lucrece 
was a most important preparatory work for his later tragic art.1 
It should also be noted that the poem is suffused with theoreti­
cal patterns of self-knowledge as hardly any other of Shakespeare's 
works. These attach, in particular, to Tarquin, w h o is an early 
example of a Shakespearean hero prompted by passion to commit a 
spectacular act of folly and crime; he is a very general model for the 
later Othello, Lear, Antony, and, most of all, Macbeth. A brief 
demonstration m a y here suffice to show h o w this conception arose 
from Shakespeare's study of humanistic ideas of self-knowledge, 
especially as they concerned the virtue of temperance and the obliga­
tion of moral decorum. 
T h e story was ready-made for a tragic interpretation that stressed 
Tarquin's self-loss. In De Legibus (II.iv.io), Cicero depicted Tar­
quin as a public figure whose lack of self-knowledge brought about 
a dangerous political situation, and L a Primaudaye summarized 
the story of Tarquin's crime and fall as an illustration of a par­
ticularly serious manifestation of intemperance because committed 
by a prince.2 T h e tragedy of Lucrece presented a more difficult 
problem because of Christian objections to suicide in general and to 
the glorification of hers, in particular, by Saint Augustine in The 
City of God (1.19). But in the literature with which Shakespeare is 
likely to have had direct acquaintance, sympathetic accounts pre­
vailed. Renaissance moralists, particularly those that concerned them­
selves with the education of w o m e n  , noted her as an example of 
chastity, which she demonstrated in herfidelity to her husband. 
Thus the theologian T h o m a s Rogers thought her an example from 
which Christians could learn self-knowledge and lauded her chastity, 
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a major ingredient in the complex of virtues represented by 
temperance as it applied to w o m e n .  3 
I believe that Shakespeare presented her sympathetically; but she 
need not concern us here except for the contrast she offers to 
Tarquin in the earlier parts of the poem, when she becomes an 
almost personified temperance. T h  e contrast between temperance and 
intemperance is here woven into the poem's fabric, most notably in 
the pervasive juxtaposition of light and dark tones. Thus when 
Tarquin hears of Lucrece's beauty, envy "taints" his heart (38). 
B  y contrast, "silver-white" virtue stains the blushing beauty of 
Lucrece (56). T h e dark pigments of envy, greed, hate, hypocrisy, 
and deceit blend into the blackness of intemperance; the luminous 
hues of beauty, honor, chastity, and holiness softly encircle the 
whiteness of temperance.4 
In this atmosphere of color symbolism, the lengthy internal con­
flict in Tarquin proceeds. It is a "debate" in the Elizabethan sense of 
the word as not only an intellectual argument but also a contention 
of opposing forces. In Tarquin's case, the concupiscible appetite, 
leagued with his will, is locked in a deadly combat with his reason. 
The vehemence of the struggle is such that Tarquin's soul, as 
Shakespeare says in an image frequent a m o n g the moralists, re­
sembles a tempest-tossed ship (171, 279) . In L a Primaudaye's words, 
"as the winds torment and toss that ship which they have seized 
upon n o  w here, n o  w there and will not suffer it to be guided by her 
master, so intemperance, moving and compelling the soul to disobey 
reason, suffereth her not to enjoy tranquillity and rest, which is an 
assured heaven of harbor from all the winds" (p. 8 1 )  . Tarquin is 
allured by the pleasures that, as L a Primaudaye said, "flatter us with 
disguised visage and, whe  n they depart, they leave us full of sorrow 
and sadness" (p. 224) . T h e "honest fear" that attempts to pull him 
back is the shame or shamefacedness allied with temperance: "There 
is, saith Cicero, a certain shame and bashfulness in temperance, which 
is the guardian of all vertues and deserveth great commendation, 
being also a most goodly ornament of the whole life, as that which 
fashioneth it according to the pattern of decency and honesty" 
(p. 242). 
Temporarily, Tarquin's "honest fear," the ally of his conscience, 
makes him see his evil purpose in the right perspective; he asks him­
self in the biblical losing-finding antithesis: " W h a t win I if I gain 
the joy I seek?" and he answers appropriately that the prize is 
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nothing but a dream, a breath, afleeting joy, and a toy (211-13). 
But Tarquin acts against his better knowledge; although reason has 
irrefutable arguments to make him desist, will, which has already 
become "reprobate desire," wins out, and he stamps out "reason's 
weak removing" (243). "There is," says L a Primaudaye, "no kind 
of dissoluteness wherein the intemperate m a  n plungeth not himself, no 
wickedness or cruelty which he executeth not for satisfying of his 
unclean desires and insatiable lusts, no fear or imminent danger 
which can draw him back" (p. 182). Tarquin thus braces himself: 
" W h  o fears a sentence or an old man's saw / Shall by a painted 
cloth be kept in awe" (244-45). H e rationalizes his moral weakness 
into martial courage like L  a Primaudaye's intemperate m a n  , w h  o 
"laboreth oftentimes to procure that glory and honor should be 
given to his most cursed and execrable misdemeanors, imagining 
and fancying with himself dreams answerable and agreeable to that 
he most desires" (p. 182). Tarquin pleads the superiority of love 
and beauty over moral scruples and extols the glory that is attached 
to conquering the object of love. Instead of ruling appetite by reason 
as the moralists demanded, Tarquin enlists under the banner of pas­
sion and makes affection his "captain" (271 ff.). Like the oath-
breaking courtiers of Navarre in Love's Labor's Lost, he becomes 
one of "affection's men-at-arms," but with the difference that the 
affection he calls love is lust and has tragic consequences. Instead 
of keeping the frail part of his mind bound as Cicero demanded, 
Tarquin "heartens up his servile powers" (295). T h e psychology 
of this disastrous subversion is traditional: on the prompting of the 
eye, affection corrupts the heart and inveigles it to revolt against 
reason. Tarquin implicitly acknowledges the moral disaster when 
he pretends to fear no "sinking"; this is the imagery in which the 
moralists warned against the subjugation of the will: to make affec­
tion the pilot is to provoke a storm of passion that wrecks the ship 
of the soul.5 
F r o  m a rationalizer, w h  o speciously attempts to persuade himself 
that evil is good, Tarquin turns into a perverter of values. W h e  n he 
contends that "sad pause and deep regard beseems the sage" (278), 
he states the important moral doctrine Cicero placed in the center 
of the teaching of temperance, the doctrine of decorum, or the rule 
of what beseems a m a n . "In temperance," said L a Primaudaye, "a 
m a  n m a  y behold modesty, with the privation of every perturbation 
in the soul, as also a w a  y h o  w to frame all things according to that 
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which is decent or seemly, which the Latins call decorum, being a 
convenience meet for the excellence of m a  n and that wherein his 
nature differeth from other living creatures" (p. 171). 
A kind of dramatic examination of this decorum is central to the 
Tarquin part of the poem,first in the rapist's perversion of the doc­
trine, then in Lucrece's counterarguments that restate it in orthodox 
fashion. Tarquin's insistence that what "beseems" him is the part 
of youth that beats "sad pause and deep regard" from the stage ap­
plies the rules not of moral but of aesthetic decorum, which derived 
from literary criticism.6 T h e image itself m a y actually have come to 
Shakespeare through a line in Horace in which the poet, speaking 
as an old roue, orders himself to m a k  e place for youth "lest he be 
beaten away by this age, for which wantonness is more becoming." 7 
But Tarquin also can be said to see himself quite generally in the 
stereotyped role of the young lover of comedy with the temeritas, 
appetitus, libido, and cupiditas proper to the part. However , Tar­
quin does not beat off the stage the competitor of juventus in R o m a n 
comedy, that is, the senex amans with his timiditas, tristitia, and 
severitas, which are temporarily muted by his libido, but rather he 
rejects the qualities of aged prudence that both the commentators 
of Terence and the moralists admired and associated with ratio: 
respect, pause, and regard. These were high up in the humanistic 
scale of values espoused by Shakespeare.8 Tarquin's choice of the 
role of a lascivious youth is definitely perverse from the point of 
view of moral decorum, which decreed temperance and thus the 
control of the appetites. For Cicero, the law of nature was violated 
when the appetites escaped the rein of reason and galloped away to 
overleap all bounds of measure.9 For Tarquin, "nothing can Affec­
tion's course control, / O  r stop the headlong fury of his speed" 
(500-501). 
This rejection of all hindrances makes Tarquin very m u c h the 
intemperate m a  n the moralists described. In L  a Primaudaye's words, 
"Thus w e see that intemperance, as Cicero saith, is the mother of 
all perturbations in the soul and causeth m a n  , as Socrates said, to 
differ nothing from a beast because he never thinketh upon that 
which is best but only seeketh h o w to satisfy and content the un­
bridled desires of pleasure and lust, having no more use of reason 
than beasts have" (p. 181). Lucrece's attempt to dissuade Tarquin 
from his nefarious intention must therefore fail: "Like a white hind 
under the grype's sharp claws," she "Pleads, in a wilderness where 
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are no laws, / T o the rough beast that knows no gentle right"—a 
beast that obeys nothing but "his foul appetite" (543 ff.). Like E d  ­
m u n  d and Iago, Tarquin recognizes only the law of the jungle. 
Yet Lucrece continues to plead in this wilderness—for fifteen long 
stanzas—before Tarquin stops her. She becomes here the mouth­
piece of temperance, proclaiming, at times quite abstractly, the 
greatness of this virtue and refuting Tarquin's specious arguments 
for passion and crime. Temperance is for her L  a Primaudaye's virtue 
that comprehends all others and through which "a harmony, con­
cordance, and conjunction of them all is made" (p. 172). She im­
plores Tarquin by what was dear to him before he became passion's 
slave, by knighthood, friendship, holy h u m a  n law, c o m m o  n loyalty, 
heaven and earth, sacred hospitality, and h u m a  n pity. But her cli­
mactic argument, like Tarquin's, turns on the doctrine of decorum. 
Shakespeare made her unconsciously answer Tarquin's treatment 
of the subject that provided the rationale for his attack. Lucrece 
n o w asks him to desist for his o w n sake and become again the m a n 
in whose "likeness" she entertained him (596). With this appeal, 
she admonishes Tarquin to observe the individual decorum that he 
perversely distorted when he saw himself in the role of a young 
lover. But herfinal appeal turns on what Cicero called the decorum 
of circumstance, the proper behavior according to profession and 
age. She asks him to envisage the shame that will be "seeded 
in thine age," when "thus thy vices bud before thy spring!" (604) 
—an argument that refutes Tarquin's adoption of the "part of 
youth." She goes on to remind him of his obligation to be an ex­
ample for the people: "For princes are the glass, the school, the 
book, / W h e r  e subjects' eyes do learn, do read, do look" (615-16). 
H e r admonishment echoes the humanists' demand that the prince 
must be the moral example, the pattern of his people. So, for in­
stance, Chelidonius: "The prince . .  . is, as it were, a theatre and 
glass that the world should behold." 10 
Lucrece subsequently backs up her argument on the decorum of 
circumstance by admonishing Tarquin to realize the paradoxical 
nature of his situation, in which he, a prince, is enslaved by passion. 
This is another strain of reasoning conventional in the teaching of 
temperance. In the same chapter on voluptuousness and lechery in 
which L  a Primaudaye summarized the story of Tarquin's fall, he 
asked the question whether the incontinent m a  n can be called free 
and answered that nobody can be called a master that is a slave to 
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pleasure and lust (p. 226) . Lucrece tries to restrain Tarquin with 
moral paradoxes of this kind, generally based on the fifth paradox 
in Cicero's Par adoxa Stoicorum, that "all wise m e  n are free and all 
fools are slaves," but I shall forbear to list the commonplace paral­
lels. The paradoxes that do not stop Tarquin have a w a y of inundat­
ing the reader. 
Of the rape itself, w  e are offered only the sparsest account—Lu­
crece's stifled cry and her tears, in which Tarquin bathes his hot 
face, are the only physical details. At the climactic m o m e n t of the 
poem, Shakespeare concentrated on the effect of the act on Tar­
quin's, the criminal's, soul. A n  d that was quite in agreement with 
the theme of temperance and intemperance, of which, according to 
La Primaudaye, the soul is the proper subject (p. 170). W  e are by 
the winning-losing antithesis (689) reminded of what is at stake 
and are told that Tarquin's psychic forces revert from joy to pain, 
from desire to disdain, and that his self-will has become tired like 
a jade. T h  e struggle of passion and reason in Tarquin has led to 
the spiritual collapse that L a Primaudaye described to be the final 
result of intemperance: "The sensual and unreasonable part of the 
soul contendeth no more with reason—which then is, as it were, 
stark dead and suffereth itself to be carried to ugly and unnatural 
vices and to all fleshly desires—because the divine part of the soul 
is weakened in such sort that she hath no more strength nor feeling 
of her essence, which is an enemy to vice" (p. 181). Shakespeare 
put the idea in words that, like L a Primaudaye's, echoed the Pauline 
terminology of the battle offlesh and spirit: "The flesh being proud, 
Desire doth fight with Grace, / For there it revels; and when that 
decays, / Th  e guilty rebel for remission prays" (711—14). 
Shakespeare symbolized the collapse of Tarquin's reason in an 
allegory familiar from Spenser's Faerie Queene (Il.ixjxi).11 Like 
Spenser's A l m a  , Tarquin's soul is mistress of a castle beleaguered 
by sins and vices. In agreement with the pagan context of Lucrece, 
the soul is a priestess inhabiting a "temple" and through Tarquin's 
act deprived of her power of prescience; the "consecrated wall" of 
her dwelling is n o  w pulled d o w n  . But the most dire effect is that 
Tarquin's soul has lost its immortality and become "thrall / T o 
living death and pain perpetual" (725-26). 
This concern not only with Lucrece's but also with Tarquin's 
soul (in fact, more with Tarquin's) is, atfirst sight, astonishing. But 
the poem is conceived as not merely depicting the tragedy of the 
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heroine but also, at least as poignantly, that of the hero. It is the 
latter's tragedy, one of subjection to intemperance, that effects the 
former's. This connection is imaginatively underlined by the per­
vasive siege imagery that has one of its climaxes in the account of 
the defeat of Tarquin's soul.12 This strain of images begins with 
Tarquin's setting out to attack the "never-conquered fort" of L u  ­
crece (482), is continued in some details of the account of the rape, 
as in the likening of Lucrece's breasts to ivory towers, and carried 
over into the Lucrece part of the poem. Here the heroine considers 
the tapestry depicting the fall of Troy and draws the analogy be­
tween Sinon and Tarquin: " A s Priam him did cherish, / So did 
I Tarquin; so m  y Troy did perish" (1546-47). A n  d again the trope 
of the siege appears w h e  n Lucrece ponders suicide because she feels 
her soul's "mansion batter'd by the enemy: / H e  r sacred temple 
spotted, spoil'd, corrupted" (1171-72). T h e act of intemperance 
unites violator and victim and gives the whole poem a unity of 
imagery and tone that modern readers interested in psychology but 
impatient of soul analysis, the original concern of this science, m a  y 
easily miss. 
Incidentally, Shakespeare has been criticized for making Tarquin 
disappear so suddenly after his crime by dropping him from the 
picture and barely reporting his banishment at the end of the poem. 
But this immediate departure is quite in agreement with the mor­
alists' description of gratified lust. "Th e repentance of an incontinent 
m a n , " said L a Primaudaye, "followeth hard at the heels of his sin 
and transgression" (p. 170).1 3 A n d thus Tarquin speeds away, "a 
heavy convertite." T h  e external catastrophe, in this case Tarquin's 
perpetual banishment, is a natural consequence of the internal catas­
trophe, the destruction of his soul. Tarquin's deed, however, remains 
in the reader's mind throughout the remainder of the poem, not 
only because of Lucrece's lamentations and veiled references, such as 
the analogy to the lust that felled Troy, but also because of the con­
tinuing imagery of staining and polluting. T h e stain on Tarquin's 
soul has infected Lucrece and it spreads beyond into R o m e  . It is in 
order to remove this blemish in her soul and to restore her reputation 
that Lucrece commits suicide. 
I shall touch briefly on Lucrece's pollution images because they 
constitute her main commentary on Tarquin's tragedy. T h e series 
of these images is introduced by the question " W h  y should the w o r  m 
intrude the maiden bud ?" and concludes with the generalization "But 
Appendixes 397 
no perfection is so absolute / That some impurity does not pollute" 
(848-54). Lucrece appears to ask here the question w h y there is 
such a thing as a tragic flaw and, in some sense, to give an answer. 
But the question is not clearly and directly posed, and neither is it, 
I think, satisfactorily answered from a philosophic point of view. 
That would have meant to write a philosophic disquisition, for which 
Shakespeare was hardly prepared and which would have taken some­
thing away from thefinal mystery that enshrouds all evil—a mystery 
that Shakespeare later found an effective dramatic device. In L u  ­
crece's questions, the images have ambiguous referents. Although 
the cankerworm settled in the maidenbud is logically associated with 
the "tyrant folly" that lurks in "gentle breasts" (851) and thus with 
the lust that vitiated Tarquin's rationality, the vivid figure also 
brings to mind the thrust of the rapist at the victim, and the maiden-
bud suggests the actual excellence of Lucrece even more than the 
deceptive one of Tarquin. The figure supports the generalization of 
the vulnerability of all perfection, which, however, raises in turn 
the question w h  y evil has such a destructive force. Lucrece does ask 
the latter question without answering it when she censors the 
treacherous Sinon while she views the wall painting of Troy: "For 
one's offence w h  y should so m a n  y fall, / T  o plague a private sin in 
general?" (1483). 
All this resembles the explorations of the nature of evil and crime 
onefinds in Seneca's dramas, from which, indeed, it appears, Shake­
speare borrowed here, perhaps, as has been suggested, via a com ­
monplace book such as Illustrium Poetarum Flores of Octavianus 
Mirandola.14 Seneca, the tragedian (as opposed to the philosopher), 
gave no answer to the question of the involvement of the innocent 
in guilt; and neither did Shakespeare in Lucrece, whatever he m a  y 
have thought privately on the subject. In her apostrophes to Night, 
Time, and Opportunity, and in her comments on the Troy painting, 
Lucrece does not seek to explain what exactly the tragic flaw is 
and h o  w it comes about except for saying that it is an imperfection 
in a universe constructed to allow, for whatever reason, such imper­
fection to become destructive. Without the help of Night, Oppor­
tunity, and Time, Tarquin could not have accomplished his deed; 
they "blew the fire when temperance was thawed" (838), and the 
fall of Troy shows by the most famous historical example that the 
world has always had its Tarquins and Lucreces. A universe such 
as Lucrece sees it—she m a  y be said to assume a choric function—is 
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eminently brittle and mutable. Tragedy in it is abetted by fortune 
and accident, and the chastest bodies like the greatest citadels are not 
able to control the forces of rape and destruction. 
Lucrece's consideration of the destructiveness of evil, of course, 
does not excuse Tarquin nor does it modify the analysis of Tar­
quin's imperfection as intemperance in the w a  y it is given in the 
poem. A n  d this analysis bore its fruit in the subtler dramatic presen­
tation of Shakespeare's later tragic heroes. Like Tarquin, these suf­
fer a moral failure that has spiritual consequences; they fall prey 
to passion, let their wills and passions pander their reason, pervert 
individual and general decorum, struggle in the grip of conflicting 
emotions and have temporary recoils before they finally damage 
their souls. A  s is true for Tarquin, the evil these heroes commit 
radiates outward, enthralls their victims' souls, and makes the whole 
state a scene of woe . But if these heroes lose themselves in a fashion 
similar to Tarquin, the processes of thought and emotion they un­
dergo are less schematic and more plausible. W h e  n Macbeth loses 
himself, he is not conscious, as is Tarquin, of the deep moral conse­
quences, even if w  e are. If Lucrece was for Shakespeare, as he called 
it in the Dedication, a "pamphlet," it was such in the sense of pre­
senting a program for his later dramatic practices, but a program 
that he modified considerably. 
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Hamlet: 
"What a Piece of Work Is a Man!" 
This, the most explicit statement of Hamlet on what m a  n is (Il.ii. 
295 fi\), is constructed on the same principle of the antithesis of 
m a n and animal as the passage investigated in Appendix A  . It is 
more complex philosophically, for it draws on the various aspects 
of the conjunctio oppositorum in m a n  . Hamlet's assessment forms 
a cryptic answer to Rosencrantz's and Guildenstern's probing for the 
secret of his melancholy: "I have of late—but wherefore I k n o  w 
not—," the prince explains, "lost all m  y mirth, forgone all custom 
of exercise." A n  d Hamlet goes on to paint a picture of the world 
and of m a n that delights him no longer. T h e humanistic orations 
on the dignity of m a  n that have been cited as analogues prove 
Hamlet's speech—and the orations themselves—to be a web of 
commonplaces; the correspondence of its structure to that of the 
eighth psalm and the parallels to exegeses of the biblical account of 
creation that have been pointed out demonstrate the theological or­
thodoxy.1 O n e must realize that the eighth psalm was for the hu­
manists and theologians a major source for the theme of "the dignity 
of man"—the heading the psalm has in the Genevan Bible—and 
that it suggested descriptions of m a  n according to his creation. But 
since the indebtedness of Hamlet's words to theological patterns has 
been expertly examined by others, I shall stress their conformity to 
the philosophical background. 
W h e n Hamlet looksfirst at the universe before considering m a n , 
he follows not only the structure of the psalm but also the demand 
of Cicero in Tusculan Disputations (V .69-70) to studyfirst the 
revolution of the spheres so that the soul might k n o  w its o w  n self 
and feel its union with the divine mind.2 This macrocosm-micro­
cosm sequence was almost automatic in Renaissance treatises. Pierre 
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de L a Primaudaye, for instance, began his chapter "Of M a n " with 
a rotund praise of the heavens,3 and Guillaume du Vair turned his 
eyes upward before asking m a n to "look into himself." 4 T h e fa­
miliar sequence, "this great world," followed by " m a  n that is so 
glorious a creature," is about all that is left of Hamlet's speech in 
the doggerel verse of the First Quarto (1603); the adapter, whoever 
he was, that mangled some of Shakespeare's best philosophical pas­
sages knew at least enough not to tamper with the order! 
W h e  n Hamlet appraises the macrocosm, he does so by paraphras­
ing the biblical account of creation as did, with slightly different 
details, L a Primaudaye and du Vair. Hamletfirst considers the earth: 
"this goodly frame, the earth, seems to m  e a sterile promontory." 
Then he appraises the heavens, which appear nothing to him "but 
a foul and pestilent congregation of vapours." In the descriptions of 
the heavens, modern editors generally prefer the version of Quarto 
2 : "this most excellent Canopie the ayre, look you, this braue ore-
hanging firmament, this maiesticall roofe fretted with golden fire." 
This version, however, obscures the essential bipartition of the 
creation:first G o  d created the earth, then the "firmament." T h  e lat­
ter was, as the Genevan sidenote to Genesis 1: 6 explained, again 
bipartitioned into "spreading over, and air." T h  e version of the 
Folio corresponds to the biblical dualism: [1] "this most excellent 
Canopy the Ayre, look you," [2] "this braue o'erhanging, this 
Maiesticall Roofe, fretted with goldenfire." T h  e "overhanging" is 
thus in turn partitioned into a "roof" and its upper adornment, the 
sphere of golden fires. 
S o m  e recent editors' preference for the version of Quarto 2 has 
created havoc with the interpretation of Hamlet's assessment of the 
microcosm and has led one commentator to sense a lack of balance, 
an abruptness, and repudiation of the traditional world picture.5 
But the Folio version, which appears to m e distinctly preferable, is 
clearly balanced. It will be instructive to set the two side by side: 
Quarto 2 (1604) : Folio (1623): 
W h a t peece of worke is a W h a t a piece of worke is a 
m a n , h o w noble in reason, m a n ! how Noble in Rea-
h o w infinit in faculties, in son ? h o w infinite in faculty ? 
forme and moouing, h o w in forme and mouing how 
expresse and admirable in expresse and admirable? in 
action, how like an Angell Action, how like an Angel? 
in apprehension, h o w like a in apprehension, how like a 
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G o d  : the beautie of the
world; the paragon of A n  ­
nimales; and yet to m e  , what
is this quintessence of dust:
m a  n delights not m e  , nor
w o m e  n neither, though by
your smilling, you seeme to
 God ? the beauty of the 
 world, the Parragon of Ani­
 mals; A n  d yet to m e  , what 
 is this Quintessence of Dust ? 
 M a  n delights not m e  ; no nor 
 W o m a  n neither; though by 
 your smiling you seeme to 
say so. say so. 
Hamlet's topic sentence, " W h a t a piece of work is a m a n , " echoes 
the "what is m a n " of the psalm. A s the Genevan side-note explained, 
m a n , "touching his first creation," was lower than G o d . Hamlet's 
phrase, "piece of work," is a reminder that m a  n was created by 
G o  d of the earth, and thus differed fundamentally from G o d  . A  s 
John 3 : 31, puts its, " H  e that is from on high is above all; he that 
is of the earth is of the earth and speaketh of the earth. H  e that is 
come from heaven is above all." T h e Genevan-Tomson side-note 
explained that he that is of the earth is "nothing else but m a n  , a 
piece of work m a d e of the slime of the earth." 
Hamlet then pays tribute to the nobility of man's reason—both 
theologians and philosophers saw in it man's greatest gift—but he 
balances the praise by also admiring the powers of the soul in gen­
eral: " h o  w noble in reason? h o  w infinite in faculty?" T h  e Quarto's 
"how infinite in faculties" is surely incorrect; the soul could be con­
sidered infinite in its power or potentiality, but not in the number of 
its faculties. A s a unit, it had one "faculty." For instance, Timothy 
Bright explained that the soul "is able, with one universal and 
simple faculty, to perform so m a n  y varieties of actions as the in­
strument by which it performeth them carrieth an apt inclination 
thereto." 6 
Because m a n was created in the image and likeness of G o d pri­
marily through his soul and secondarily through his body, Hamlet 
n o w considers the body: "In form and moving h o w express and 
admirable?" I fail to understand the sense of " h o  w infinite in fac­
ulties, in form and moving," as some editors, in agreement with the 
Quarto, divide. (To introduce "faculty" from the Folio into this 
confusion does not improve it.) Shakespeare, in the Folio version, 
speaks in terms of the creation of m a  n in the "image" of God . 
" F o r m " and "express" go particularly well with "image," for the 
latter word, as John Woolton explained, for some theologians meant 
anything that is 
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either in painting or graving or by another means expressed after 
the example of another matter. . . . The word "image" therefore 
appertaineth unto the form, and "similitude" unto nature. . .  . A  n 
"image" is an outward bodily form or fashion, expressing or repre­
senting any m a n . 7 
M a  n thus expresses the divine form, but no matter h o w "express and 
admirable" his body is, it is still—as is implied in "form and m o v ­
ing"—his animal part, for animals as well as m e  n possessed the 
faculties of sense and motion. 
But Genesis 1 :26 said that m a  n was created not only in the 
"image," but also in the "likeness" (or "similitude") of G o d  ; and 
in Woolton's definition "a similitude is a quality of the mind which 
w  e imitate and follow." Hamlet therefore turns once more to the 
primary resemblance of m a  n to G o d  : "in action, h o  w like an angel ? 
in apprehension h o  w like a G o d ?  " T h  e twofold evocation "angel" 
and " G o d " m a y well have come from the psalm, which in one ver­
sion, that of the prayerbook, reads, "thou madest him lower than 
the angels," and in another, that of the Genevan, "a little lower than 
G o d . " But the angels also fitted into the hierarchical Elizabethan 
world picture; and "angel . . . G o d " was another balanced dou­
blet. This action of the angels has disturbed some commentators; 
but in the general Christian tradition, angels have always been 
vigorous ministers of God's will, swift of motion, like flames of 
fire, riding the moving clouds. T h e "form and moving" of H a m ­
let's preceding sentence offers indeed an excellent transition to the 
"action" of the angels. A  n Elizabethan w h  o had been told that an­
gels were incapable of action might have retorted with Barckley 
that m a  n could well take the example of the angels for his action: 
If felicity, as the philosophers affirm, be the proper action of man, 
. .  . it must be an action peculiar and proper to him alone. A n  d 
seeing that m a n is made of two distinct natures, . .  . it is more 
reason that this felicity should be agreeable with the best part of 
his nature, which is a reasonable soul, and resembleth the angels 
that are made after the image of God, than with the worst part of 
his nature, which resembleth and is of the like substance to brute 
beasts.8 
T h e "action" of the angels, of which Hamlet speaks, is a spiritual 
activity, and the idea is rhetorically balanced by the "apprehension" 
of G o d  . A n  d not only rhetorically. T h  e division of action and ap­
prehension corresponds to the ultimately Aristotelian division of the 
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mind into an active and a speculative or contemplative part, or, 
simply, into judgment and will.9 Shakespeare knew this division, 
as can be inferred from Desdemona's " m  y speculative and active in­
struments" (Quarto i), or (in the Folio) " m  y speculative and 
offic'd instrument" (I.iii.270). "Offic'd" (which I prefer) is a 
particularly appropriate term for the active mind because it has an 
association with the angels, w h o  m Shakespeare elsewhere called 
"offic'd" (All's Well, III.ii.125)—tne office of t n e angels, of course, 
being to serve G o d . A s Peter Martyr explained: "They execute the 
office committed to them by God, both wisely and speedily, which 
two things are most worthily commended in ministers and ambas­
sadors. For then they rightly execute their office if they join celerity 
with wisdom." 10 There could be no more appropriate w a y to praise 
the active part of the mind than to liken it to the action of the angels. 
A n  d "apprehension" is similarly appropriate for the contemplative 
mind because it designated the highest activity of the rational mind, 
completely abstracted from the body, that draws m a n closest to God . 
A s Calvin said, " w e have no apprehension of the heavenly life when 
w e are tied to this world." u Hamlet thus proceeds properly from 
the action of the angels to the apprehension of G o d  ; by contrast, the 
Quarto's " h o  w like an angel in apprehension, h o  w like a G o d ,  " 
makes the angels inactive and ends in a direct comparison of m a n 
and G o d that to the Elizabethans must have sounded less than 
proper, if not blasphemous. 
In the concluding section of his appraisal, Hamlet considers once 
more man's physical nature, and he does so in a characteristically 
balanced antithesis: m a  n is "the paragon of animals" but also "the 
quintessence of dust." T h e Genevan side-note to the psalm ex­
pressed a similar contrast when it reminded m a n that he owed his 
existence to God, for w h o m "it had been sufficient . . . to have set 
forth His glory by the heavens though he had not come so low as 
to m a n  , which is but dust." M a  n is a proud and yet a wretched 
thing. 
Th  e phrase "quintessence of dust" is something of a discordia 
concors itself. M a  n was "quintessenced" because, as the duke in 
Measure for Measure explained, he existed "on m a n  y a thousand 
grains / That issue out of dust" (III.i.20-21). T h  e process of 
quintessencing was the attempt to distill a fifth essence or element 
from the other four; Aristotle was thought to have identified this 
fifth essence with man's mind.12 But this idea was generally declared 
to be theologically unsound. A s Sir John Davies noted, no air, fire, 
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earth, or water can be found in the operations of the soul, which 
operations are excellent beyond anything found in the elements: 
" W h a t alchemist can draw with all his skill/The quintessence of 
these out of the m i n d ? "  1  3 Yet the idea lingered, and D  u Bartas, 
although he denied Aristotle's account, still thought of the soul as 
a certain kind offifth essence, even though not a chemical one, when 
it rises in a mystic flight from the dull earth and, mounting to 
heaven, "quintessences" m a n in G o d . 1 4 T h e phrase "quintessence of 
dust" that strikes one as so Shakespearean in its intensity thus has 
an overtone of admiration; it is the deprecating yet transcendent 
touch that completes Hamlet's picture of m a n  . 
But with all its beauty and complexity, Hamlet's picture of m a  n 
is essentially a conventional picture, put together according to 
humanistic formulas. If Shakespeare ever wrote an essay on homo 
in g r a m m a r school, he was likely to have used some or all of the 
ideas in Hamlet's speech; even a modern scholar's little Latin allows 
him to put together a fair approximation of the content of Hamlet's 
speech by selecting appropriate quotations under such rubrics as 
mundus, homo, and anima in commonplace books like Nannus Mira­
bellius's Polyanthea. Shakespeare was certainly familiar with the 
technique of "finding out" pertinent "places" for philosophical 
themes and putting them together in rhetorical patterns. In com­
posing his Oration on the Dignity of Man, Pico presumably used 
the same method, as the beginning of his speech indicates: "It is a 
commonplace of the schools that m a n is a little world, in which w e 
m a y discern a body mingled of earthly elements, an ethereal breath 
and the vegetable life of the plants, and the intelligence of the angels 
and a likeness to G o d .  " 15 T h  e basic learning of the Renaissance 
was available at Stratford-on-Avon as well as in Florence. 
T h  e Elizabethans were taught by their humanistic schoolmasters 
to admire and imitate philosophical topoi. They had not yet lost 
what Douglas Bush has called "the courage of the commonplace." 
Shakespeare had this quality to the highest degree, and he had the 
skill to practice it. H e w h o , according to Francis Meres, distilled in 
his poetry "the sweet witty soul of Ovid," also knew h o w to quintes­
sence philosophic commonplaces. In doing so, he imprinted his poetic 
genius on material, conventional in kind, with which the labors of 
theologians and humanists and, more directly, of preachers and 
schoolmasters had provided him in the hope that he might thus learn 
to k n o w himself. 
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1900 (Ph.d. diss., University of Kentucky, 1967) ; and Eliza G  . Wilkins, The 
Delphic Maxims in Literature (Chicago, 111., 1929). For the classical sources, see 
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1949, rpt Theater Arts 35, no. 3. 
4. Venus, 525; R. Ill, II.iii.2; Merch., I.i.7; A.Y.L., III.v.57; Ham., V.ii.139; 
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II.ii.95; Cor., II.i.62; H  . VIII, II.ii.208; III.ii.378. 
5. The first, and so far only, systematic use of nosce teipsum tracts for Shake­
speare interpretation is by Paul A  . Jorgensen, Lear's Self-Discovery (Berkeley, 
Calif., 1967). 
6. For Shakespeare's education and classical background, I have particularly 
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Elizabethan World Picture (London, 1943). Tillyard himself came to modify this 
position somewhat, admitting that "it is then, on balance, nofiction that the con­
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8. L  . J. Potts, Comedy (London, 1948), p. 16. 
9. Maurice Charney, Style in Hamlet (Princeton, N.J. , 1969), p. xx. Charney's 
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with an inexorable fate that transcended even the will of the gods, a notion that 
conflicted with the Christian idea of divine providence (see Baldwin, Composi­
tional Genetics, p. 139). 
27. Wylie Sypher, Four Stages of Renaissance Style (Garden City, N . Y .  , 1954), 
p. 62. Sypher he*:e summarizes the concepts of artistic composition basic to the 
Renaissance style according to the fundamental study of Heinrich Wolfflin, Kunst­
geschichtliche Grundbegriffe (1915), translated as Principles of Art History ( N e w 
York , 1922). Wdlfflin's concepts are: (1) linear vision: the stress is on the outlines, 
the "limits" of things; (2) plane organization: the parts of a total form are re­
duced to a sequence of planes; (3) closed form: a clear, "tectonic" form is estab­
lished by rules and ratios that govern the relations of the parts; (4) multiple 
unity: the parts maintain a certain independence in a composition that aims at a 
harmony based on multiplicity. 
28. For an exposition of Renaissance natural law and its influence on drama, 
see George C  . Herndl, The High Design: English Renaissance Tragedy and the 
Natural Law (Lexington, K y .  , 1970). Herndl sees Shakespeare as an apologist of 
natural law; but I shall in later parts of this book argue that Shakespeare devel­
oped doubts about this concept as he did also of other Renaissance orthodoxies. 
29. E .g . , Sir John Fortescue, De Natura Legis Naturae, in Works, ed. T h o m a s 
Clermont (London, 1869), chap. 5 9 : " T h e Judge First S h o w s H o  w the W o m a  n Is 
Subordinated to M a  n in the Order of the Universe." 
30. Nosce Teipsum (1599), p. 11. 
31. Marcellus Palingenius, The Zodiac of Life, trans. Barnabe Googe (1567; 
2d ed., 1588), p. 120 [Libra]. 
32. E .g . , Boethius, De Consolatione, II, m . 8 ; III, m . 10 ; Romance of the Rose, 
1685-88; Chaucer, Knight's Tale, A 2985-88; Troilus and Criseyde, III, 1744-72; 
Spenser, Colin Clouts, 841-52; Faerie Queene, IV. i .xxx; An Hymne in Honour of 
Love, 85-92. 
33. French Academy (1589), p. 18. 
34. Sig. A 2  r . 
35. Zodiac, p . n  o [Libra]. 
36. See Albert  W . Fields, "Milton and Self-Knowledge," P M L A 83 (1968) : 
392-99. 
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37. Philippus Beroaldus, Commentary on Cicero's Quaestiones Tusculanae 
(Paris, 1562), fol. 34  : " H o m  o autem cognoscit seipsum, si originis natalisque ex­
ordia prima respexerit: . . . et hoc intelligi vult esto in loco M . T  . . . . anima 
cognoscit semetipsam, quando scrutamur utrum corporea vel incorporea, utrum 
simplex an ex pluribus composita, utrum facta an omnino a nullo sit facta, utrum 
origo ejus pariter c u  m origine corporis traducatur, quod se traducemfieri dicitur 
an perfecta extrinsecus veniens parato jam et formato inter viscera muliebra corpore 
inducatur et multa hoc genus." 
38. "Participate" apears to have here a more active meaning than indicated in 
Schmidt's paraphrase "to have in c o m m o  n with others." In its transitive use, the 
verb has the connotation of the translation of participere in Thomas Cooper's 
Thesaurus (1578) : "to give part, to make partner or of counsel." 
39. Bartholomaeus Anglicus, De Proprietatibus Rerum (Niirnberg, 1519), sig. 3 ' . 
40. Oth., III.iii.378; T. N., IV.iii.9. 
41. Rom., I.iii.28; Caes., II.i.66. 
42. Sir John Davies, Nosce Teipsum, p. 86. 
43. Hallett Smith, "Tamburlaine and the Renaissance," Elizabethan Studies and 
Other Essays in Honor of G. F. Reynolds, University of Colorado Studies (1945). 
pp. 126-31. 
44. See Ernest  W . Talbert, The Problem of Order (Chapel Hill, N . C .  , 1962). 
45. It could be said, of course, that the universe was "full" in a physical sense 
at least below the m o o  n because all voids werefilled with air; but theologians ob­
jected to the idea that no world morefilled with objects and creatures was con­
ceivable. This objection to plenitude is the same as noted for the Middle Ages by 
Arthur Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge, Mass., 1936), pp. 99ft. 
Thus one of the key concepts of the "great chain of being," as some modern critics 
have used the term, was decidedly unorthodox in Shakespeare's time. Lovejoy, 
contrary to Tillyard, does not claim that the great chain of being was a familiar 
image or idea for the Elizabethans. 
46. Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity [I.2], ed. Hanbury 
(London, 1830), 1: 114. 
47. Annibale Romei , The Courtier's Academy, trans. J. Kepler (1598), pp. 25-26. 
48. Laws [VIII.2], ed. Hanbury, 3 : 263. 
49. William Elton, "Shakespeare's Ulysses and the Problem of Value," ShakS 2 
(1966) : 9 5 - I I I . 
CHAPTER FOUR 
1. Th  e themes of the play and their derivation are meticulously examined by 
T  .  W . Baldwin, Compositional Genetics. I reached m  y conclusions before his study 
came out, but I have taken a few suggestions from him in presenting them. The 
serious elements of the play are emphasized by Harold Brooks, "Themes and 
Structure in The Comedy of Errors," in Early Shakespeare, Stratford-upon-Avon 
Studies, 3 (1961), pp. 52-72; by R  . A  . Foakes, Introduction to the N e  w Arden 
Edition (London, 1962) ; and by G w y  n Williams, "The Comedy of Errors Rescued 
from Tragedy," REL 5 (1964) : iv, 63-71. 
2. A . E . Housman, The Name and Nature of Poetry (New York, 1933), P- 35­
3. Cf. sonnet 74; Macb. V.viii.18. 
4. See Laurence J. Mills, One Soul in Bodies Twain (Bloomington, Ind., 1937)­
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5. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, I.67: " N o  n valet tantum animus, ut se ipse 
videat: at ut oculus, sic animus se non videns alia cernunt." Cf. Caes. I.ii.51 ff., 
Troi. III.iii.104 ff. 
6. Immortality (1576), fol. 74. 
7. For the five-act formula, see T  .  W . Baldwin, Five Act Structure. A  n example 
of a strong passion in Terence analyzed as being close to tragicus furor is Geta's 
outbreak of anger in Adelphoe Ill.ii; the term is that of Willichius in his com ­
mentary on Terence, Fabulae (Zurich, 1550), pp. 401-2. 
8. Williams, "The CE Rescued," p. 63. 
9. See Richard Henze, "The Comedy of Errors: A Freely Binding Chain," SQ 
22 (1971) : 35-41. This metaphorical use of the chain has nothing to do with the 
great chain of being; see above, chap. 3, n. 26. 
10. Baldwin, Compositional Genetics, pp. 166 ff. 
11. A New Anatomy (1576), fol. 4. Woolton's "enclosures of nature" translates 
lex naturae. Cf. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, V.xiii.38. 
12. E.g. , Peter Martyr [Pietro Vermigli], Commonplaces, trans. Antony Marten 
(1583), I, 124: ". . . w o m a n , compared unto m a n , as touching the actions and 
affairs of this life, she is not in the image of God , because she was created to be 
the helper of m a n . " Luciana's argument was also a properly legal one. See above, 
chap. 3, n. 29. 
13. Epistle, Metamorphoses (1567), sig. B 2  r . 
14. A New Anatomy (1576), fols. 12-13. 
15. Cf. Rom., II.vi.37, Caes., II.i.273, H . V, V.ii.357. 
16. Stefano Guazzo, Civil Conversation, trans. George Pettie (1581; ed. 1586), 
fol. 132 [Bk. III]. 
17. Zodiac, p. 127 [Libra]. Cf. Hankins, Shakespeare's Derived Imagery, chap. 
11, "Earth." 
18. Nosce Teipsum, p. 13. Chelidonius, Institution (1571), p. 158. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
1. Edward Dowden, Shakspere: A Critical Study of His Mind and Art (1872; 
rpt. N e w York, 1962), pp. 62 ff. T h e significance of the theme of self-knowledge 
in Love's Labor's Lost has been noted briefly by Cyrus H o y  , "Love's Labor's Lost 
and the Nature of Comedy," SQ 13 (1962) : 31-40. 
2. Cf. Theodore Spencer, Shakespeare and the Nature of Man, 2d ed. (New 
York, 1961), p. 87. 
3. Lodovico Guiccardini, Hours of Recreation, trans. James Sanford (1576), 
p. 70. 
4. Virgil Whitaker, Shakespeare's Use of Learning (San Marino, Cal., 1953), 
p. 84. 
5. Sigs.  A v - A 2  r . Subsequent references to this edition in this chapter are in the 
text. 
6. Zodiac, p. 9 [Virgo']. O  n the contradictions created by the fusion of classical, 
medieval, and Christian-humanist notions of honor, see Curtis B  . Watson, Shake­
speare and the Renaissance Concept of Honor (Princeton, N.J . , i960). 
7. Cf. J. S  . Reid, "Shakespeare's Living Art," P Q 1 (1922) : 226-27. 
8. French Academy, p. 41. For an example of the transmission of the distinction 
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between active and contemplative philosophy in a grammar school of Shakespeare's 
time, see Baldwin, Shakspere's Small Latine, 1: 325: a Winchester student re­
corded the division in his notebook from the dictation of his master. 
9. R o m . , 8 : 13, Col., 3 : 5. 
10. Cicero, De Officiis, I.19. 
11. Zodiac, p. 97. 
12. Ibid., 96, 98. 
13. Ibid., p. 98. 
14. Castiglione, Courtier, sig. Cc3 r [Bk. I V ] . 
15. Alexander Nowell's Catechism warns against abusing the n a m e of G o d 
"either with forswearing or with swearing rashly, unadvisedly, and without neces­
sity" (A Catechism, trans. T h o m a s Norton [1571], sig. D 2 V ) . 
16. Beroaldus, Commentary, Quaestiones Tusculanae (Paris, 1549), fol. 257: 
"Caeterum Hieronymus, Lactantius, Augustinus, ecclesiastici doctores reprobant 
aegritudinem Stoicorum, approbantes mediocritatem Peripateticorum: quod et 
ratio demonstrat, & sensus communis exposcit: namque extirpare radicitus affectus 
est hominem ex homine tollere, et in corpore constitutum esse sine corpore, et op­
tare potius q u a  m docere. Meritoque scripsit Flaccus in satyra: ' N a  m vitiis nem o 
sine nascitur. . . . Naturalia enim haec sunt, non voluntaria quae peripatetici provi­
denter et necessaria nobis insita esse demonstrant." The Horace quotation is from 
Satires, I.iii.69. In Drant's translation, it reads: "For faultless, doubtless, born is 
none, / A n  d he is even best / W h o s  e life sincere admitteth few / A n  d with the least 
is pressed" (Horace, trans. T h o m a s Drant [1567], sig. k 4V). 
17. Cf. L  a Primaudaye, French Academy, p. 3 0 : "Reason, by the means of 
God's grace, can both easily constrain, master, and compel all passions in such 
sort that they take no effect and also bring to pass that whatsoever is rashly de­
sired shall be overcome by the discourse of prudent counsel." Also, Woolton, 
Anatomy (1576), fol. 3 1 : " T h e devil . . . without God's especial and wonderful 
grace is able to do m u c h against silly and weak m a n . " Similarly, Barckley, 
Felicity of M a n , p. 472: "  A contented and quiet mind, void of sorrow and fear, . . . 
cannot be obtained without God's special grace and gift and his alliance to our 
endeavors." 
18. "Facile precor gelida quando pecus o m n e sub umbra / Ruminat" (IV.ii.89­
90) . Most modern editions, including Alexander, restore Holofernes's "Facile" 
to the "Fauste" of "good old" Mantuan. This emendation eliminates a joke: the 
pedagogue's Latin is a little rusty. 
19. For an examination of the recurring speculation that this passage is a 
satirical barb at an alleged "School of Night," see Ernest A  . Strathmann, "The 
Textual Evidence for 'the School of Night, '" M L N 56 (1941) : 176-86. A m o n g the 
emendations suggested, "suit of night" is attractive. O  n the basis of the Palingenius 
passage quoted above, "owl of night" might be appropriate, but it would be difficult 
to believe that it could lead to the misreading of "school of night." A  t any rate, 
the object of comparison must be of a dark hue and must fit into the context of 
contrasts between dark and light, night and day, which is conventional for the 
twin themes of spiritual warfare and courtly love. A satirical reference of the kind 
suggested by the adherents of the "School of Night" theory would be merely con­
fusing. 
20. Berowne's words echo as late as The Tempest (IV.i.52-53) : " T h  e strongest 
oaths are straw / T  o th'fire i'th' blood." Cf. also Merch., I.ii.20. 
21. T h  e repetitive nature of the subsequent lines indicates that Shakespeare re­
vised the passage and that both the original version (IV.iii.291-313) and the re­
vision (314-61) remained standing. In m  y analysis, I shall use this latter passage, 
which Shakespeare presumably wanted to take the place of the earlier lines. 
22. Cf. Pierre de la Primaudaye, The Second Part of the French Academy, trans. 
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Thomas Bowes (1594), p. 8 : 'All things created have their proper motion, which 
they follow according to that love that every one of them beareth to his natural 
disposition. . . . A n  d as the fire and air naturally love to be above and therefore 
draw thitherward without ceasing, so the water and earth love to keep below so that 
they always bend that ways." Shakespeare developed this idea at length in a conceit 
he carried through two of his sonnets (44 and 45). 
CHAPTER SIX 
1. This Tudor opinion is illustrated by Irving Ribner, The English History Play 
in the Age of Shakespeare (Princeton, N.J . , 1957), p. 161, and by Lily B  . Campbell, 
Shakespeare's "Histories"': Mirrors of Elizabethan Policy (San Marino, Calif., 
1958), pp. 168 ff. 
2. S o m  e key images are earth, blood, weeping, tongue, sickness, blot, sun, and 
m o o n  ; see Richard Altick, "Symphonic Imagery in Richard II," P M L A 62 
(1942) : 339-65. Most of these illustrate grief or give it cosmic dimensions. The 
up-and-down movement in the imagery has been noted by Paul Jorgensen, "Ver­
tical Patterns in Richard II" Shak. Ass. Bull. 23 (1948) : 119-34. Again, this 
imagery illustrates grief, considered by the physiologists a "heavy" passion, drag­
ging down the afflicted person. For the variations of the theme of grief in contrast­
ing patterns, see Rolf Soellner, "Th  e Four Primary Passions: A Renaissance 
Theory Reflected in the W o r k  s of Shakespeare," SP 55 (1958) : 549-67. 
3. Raphael Holinshed, The Chronicles of England, Ireland, and Scotland, in 
Narrative and Dramatic Sources of Shakespeare, ed. Geoffrey Bullough (London, 
i960), 3 = 388. 
4. See Bullough's Introduction to the sources of the play, and Willard Farnham, 
The Medieval Heritage of Elizabethan Tragedy (Berkeley, Calif., 1956). Froissart, 
whose Chronicle Shakespeare m a  y have read in the translation of Lord Berner, 
expressed considerable pity for Richard. Other French sources, such as, for 
instance, the Chronique de la Tra'ison et Mort de Richard Deux Roy Dangleterre, 
were even more decidely anti-Lancastrian. 
5. Chronicles, 3  : 401. 
6. Ibid. 
7. For an excellent argument on Shakespeare's relatively gentle treatment of 
Richard, see Peter Ure, Introduction, Richard II, N e  w Arden Edition (London, 
1956). 
8. Governor, fol. 177 [Bk. Ill, chap. 3]. 
9. I disagree with the argument that Shakespeare conceived Richard as a 
"mercurial humor" made by J.  W . Draper, "The Character of Richard II," P Q 
21 (1942) : 228-36. Mercurial humors were thought to be of Protean instability, 
changing from one m o o d to another. But the earlier Richard is not quite as un­
stable or "stupid" as Professor Draper finds him. 
10. Levinus Lemnius, The Touchstone of Complexions, trans. Thomas Newton 
(1565; 3d ed. I58i),fol. 98. 
11. Ibid., fol. 148. 
12. Ibid. 
13. Ibid., fols. 90-91. 
14. These features are noted by Timothy Bright, Treatise (1586), pp. 100-101. 
15. Consideration of Human Condition, p. 5. 
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16. Pope Innocent III, The Mirror of Man's Life [De Humanae Miseriae Con­
ditioned, trans. H u m p h r e y Kerton (1576), sig. B 3  r . 
17. O  n the elements of this passage, cf. Baldwin, Compositional Genetics, pp. 
326 ff. 
18. T h efirst to suggest that Holbein's woodcut influenced Shakespeare seems to 
have been Francis Douce, Illustrations of Shakespeare (London, 1807), 1:140. 
19. T h e well-worn commonplace of the theater of the world was , in its associa­
tion with consideratio, familiar to the Elizabethans by the titular image of B o ­
aistuau's popular Theatrum Mundi, in its first and longest part, a contemptus mundi 
tract. 
20. Institution,-p. 114. 
21. Richard's inability to separate his sacral role from his profane existence is

discussed by Ernst H  . Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval

Political Theology (Princeton, N J .  , 1957).

22. Catonis Precepta Moralia, ed. Erasmus (Strasbourg, 1515), sig.  C r : "In 
speculo teipsum contemplare, et si formosus apparebis, age quae deceant formam. 
Sin deformis, quod in facie minus est, id m o r u m pensato pulchritudine." Cf. chap. 
1, n. 1. 
23. Diego de Estella, A Method unto Mortification [De Contemptu Mundi], trans. 
T h o m a s Rogers (1586; ed. 1608), pp. 381-82. Peter Ure, in the introduction to 
the N e  w Arden edition, examines the veritas-vanitas convention and gives further 
references. Ure notes that Queen Elizabeth is said to have asked for a mirror 
on her deathbed, then rejected the "flattering glass" and demanded a "true" one. Cf. 
also Shakespeare, sonnet 62. 
24. Nosce Teipsum, p. 63. 
25. T h e association between the mirror symbol and books conducive to self-
knowledge was well established. T h o m a s B o w e s introduced his translation of The 
French Academy, Pt. II, by calling the book a "mirror" so the reader could " k n o w 
himself the better" by it (La Primaudaye, Second Part, sig. A 5  r )  . Pierre Charron, 
Of Wisdom, said in his preface to Part I, that " w  e have no clearer looking glass, 
no better book, than ourselves." There was of course, above all, The Mirror for 
Magistrates, into which Elizabethans might have wished Richard II to have looked. 
26. Mirror, sig. D 3  V . Similarly, L  a Primaudaye, French Academy (1589), p. 576. 
27. Anatomy, fol. 33. 
28. Plutarch, Morals, trans. Philemon Holland (1603), p. 1182 ["Of the Face 
Appearing in the M o o n " ] . T h e parallel was noted by Reinhold Sigismund, "Uber­
einstimmendes zwischen Shakespeare und Plutarch," SJ 18 (1883) : 156-82. 
29. Mirror, sig. D 2 r . Cf. Matth. 19: 21-26, 2 Cor. 6 : 10. 
30. John Middleton Murry, Shakespeare (London, 1936), p. 142. 
31. T h  e incomplete self-awareness of Richard is well described by Robert Heil­
m a n , Tragedy and Melodrama (Seattle, W a s h .  , 1968), pp. 180 ff. Heilman suggests 
that this lack of completeness is a major reason w h  y the play is a melodrama rather 
Ithan a tragedy. But I do not think that intellectual self-awareness is a prerequisite 
jfor a tragic hero; Othello and Lear (not to speak of Macbeth) possess little of 
this commodity, and I shall subsequently argue that the processes of self-knowledge 
in Shakespeare's later tragedies are not primarily intellectual. For Richard II 
setting a pattern for Shakespeare's tragedies, see Peter G  . Philias, "Richard II 
and Shakespeare's Tragic M o d e ,  " TSLL 5 (1963) : 344-55, and Travis Bogard, 
"Shakespeare's Second Richard," P M L A 70 (1955) : 192-209. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
1. For a review of unsympathetic reactions to Henry V, see Paul A  . Jorgensen, 
"Accidental Judgments, Casual Slaughters, and Purposes Mistook: Critical R e ­
actions to Shakespeare's Henry V," Shak. Ass. Bull. 22 (1947) 51-61. Hazlitt was 
an earlier critic w h o anticipated the modern antipathy to the play. 
2. Lemnius, Touchstone (i58i),fols. 33 ff. 
3. Huarte, Examen de Ingenios, pp. 239 ff. 
4. See J. H  . Walter, Introduction, Henry V, N e  w Arden Edition (London, 
I954)> and above, chap. 1. 
5. Erasmus, The Education of a Christian Prince [Institutio Principis Chris­
tiani], trans. Lester K  . Born ( N e  w York , 1936), p . 189. Similarly, Aristotle, Poli­
tics, VI I , xiv. 
6. E d w a r d Hall, The Union of the Noble and Illustrious Families of York and 
Lancaster (1542; ed. 1548), fol. 49. 
7. Chronicles, in Narrative and Dramatic Sources of Shakespeare, ed. Geoffrey 
Bullough (London, 1962), 4:406-8. 
8. Prince, pp. 153, 203. 
9. Lemnius, Touchstone, fols. 34-36. 
10. See Leslie Freeman, "Shakespeare's Kings and Machiavelli's Prince," Shake­
speare Encomium [The City College Papers, I] (Ne  w York, 1964), pp. 25-43. 
11. See Baldwin, Shakspere's Small Latine, 2:323ft., and William McAvoy, 
"Shakespeare's Use of the Laus of Aphthonius," (Ph.D. diss., Urbana, 111., 1952). 
12. A  s is noted by Walter in the introduction, Henry's "consideration" is reli­
gious as well as secular and amounts to a total change of personality. The program 
is of the kind outlined by Perrott, Consideration of Human Condition. Cf. below, 
chap. 16. 
13. Ronald S. Berman, "Shakespeare's Alexander: Henry V ,  " CE 23 (1962): 
523-38. Berman seems to m  e to overstate the similarities between Shakespeare's 
Henry and Plutarch's Alexander. 
14. Henry N  . Hudson, Introduction, Henry V, N e  w Hudson Shakespeare 
(Boston, 1908), pp. xlvi-xlix. 
15. Un  a Ellis-Fermor, The Frontiers of Drama, 2d ed. (Oxford, 1947), p. 45. 
16. Mark van Doren, Shakespeare (Ne  w York, 1939; rpt Garden City, N . Y .  , 
n.d.),p. 149. 
17. Cf. Albert H  . Tolman, "The Epic Character of Henry V," M L N 34

(1919) :7-i6.

18. Governor, fols. 176-77 [Bk. Ill, chap. 3]. 
19. This is the judgment of E  .  M .  W . Tillyard, Shakespeare's History Plays

(New York, 1944), p. 308.

20. Peter Martyr, for instance, went so far in his metaphysical optimism as to 
prove the wisdom of the divine plan by the argument that "there would be no life 
of lions if there were no slaughter of sheep wherewith the lions be fed; neither 
would there be patience of martyrs unless the cruelty of tyrants were permitted by 
G o d " (Commonplaces [1583], I, 200). 
21. Touchstone, fol. 51. 
22. Prince, pp. 162, 184. 
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23. V a  n Doren, Shakespeare, p. 149. 
24. Harold Goddard, The Meaning of Shakespeare (Chicago, 1951), 1: 263. 
25. H  . A  . Evans, Introduction, Henry V, Old Arden Edition (London, 1903), 
pp. xl-xli. 
26. For the principles of Renaissance composition that underlie the structure of 
Henry V, see above, chap. 3, n. 27. 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
1. Julius Caesar is considered Shakespeare's first problem play by Ernest Schan­
zer, The Problem Plays of Shakespeare (1963; rpt. N e  w York, 1965), p. 10. There 
has been no unanimity on the definition of "problem play" and on the question of 
which particular plays should be thus designated. F . S . Boas, w h o applied the term 
for the first time to Shakespeare (in analogy to Ibsen's social dramas), included 
Hamlet, Troilus and Cressida, All's Well That Ends Well, and Measure for 
Measure (Shakespeare and his Predecessors, N e  w York, 1896). E  . M  .  W . Tillyard 
accepted the same grouping (Shakespeare's Problem Plays, London, 1949).  W .  W . 
Lawrence restricted the term to the three comedies and found Cymbeline to have 
similar qualities (Shakespeare's Problem Comedies, N e  w York, 1931). Peter Ure 
took Boas's group, but added Timon of Athens (William Shakespeare: The 
Problem Plays. Writers and Their Work, Pamphlet No. 140, London, 1961). 
Schanzer's choices are Julius Caesar, Measure for Measure, and Antony and Cleo­
patra. Schanzer points out the difficulty of defining what a problem play is, but his 
o w n definition is also open to criticism. A problem play is for him one "in which 
w  e find a concern with a moral problem which is central to it, presented in such a 
manner that w  e are unsure of our moral bearings, so that uncertain and divided 
responses to it in the minds of the audience are possible or even probable." Moral 
centrality is too subjective a term to bear such heavy weight in deciding the 
designation of genre. 
2. T h e discussion of the use and the limitations of "mannerism" in art and liter­
ature is inextricably tied up with the controversy about the baroque. For the appli­
cation of the latter term to literature, see Rene Wellek, "The Concept of the Baroque 
in Literary Scholarship," in Concepts of Criticism ( N e  w Haven, Conn., 1963). 
Wellek makes an appeal for the use of "baroque" in "more general terms of a 
philosophy or a world-view or even merely an emotional attitude toward the 
world" (p. 63) . This general principle seems to m  e also valid for "mannerism." 
It is basic to Wylie Sypher's use in Four Stages of Renaissance Style; but un­
fortunately Sypher mars his literary analyses by metaphorical uses of terminology 
more proper to art history. Discussions on the literary side of the controversy are 
in Colloquia Germanica, 1 (1967) and in Literaturwissenschaftliches Jahrbuch, 
N  . F . , 2 (1961) : 174 ff. Major accounts of mannerism that also include literary 
analyses are: Jacques Bousquet, Mannerism: The Painting and Style of the Late 
Renaissance ( N e w York, 1964) ; Arnold Hauser, The Social History of Art, vol. 
 ( N e  w York, i960), and Mannerism, 2 vols. (London, 1965) ; John Shearman, 
Mannerism ( N e w York, 1967). M  y claim for the occurrence of mannerist features 
in Shakespeare is more limited than that of most others w h  o have used the term. 
Hauser considers all of Shakespeare mannerist, and so, it appears, does Freiherr 
Kleinschmit von Lengefeld, "Der Manierismus in der Dichtung Shakespeares," 
SJ Q7 (1961) : 62-99. Sypher finds Hamlet, Measure for Measure, Lear, and the 
romances mannerist. S o m e stimulating ideas on Julius Caesar and Hamlet as trans­
itional plays between Renaissance and baroque are in M a  x Deutschbein, "Individ­
2
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u u m und Kosmos in Shakespeares Werken ," SJ 69 (1933) : 6-26. For the applica­
bility of "mannerism" to the problem plays (defined as the three comedies), see 
Jewell K  . Vroonland, "Mannerism and Shakespeare's Problem Plays: A  n Argu­
ment for Revaluation" (Ph.d. diss., Kansas State University, 1969). 
3. It is arguable that the contradiction between the title of the play and the 
person of its protagonist stems from Shakespeare's still writing in the pattern of 
the histories. See M o o d y E . Prior, "The Search for a Hero in Julius Caesar," 
Renaissance Drama N  . S., 2 (1969) : 81-101. But the histories that are clearly 
tragedies, Richard II and Richard HI, have both their heroes and their centers of 
gravity in the same person, and there is no question about the appropriateness of 
their titles. 
4. Shakespeare's Problem Comedies, p. 233. 
5. E.g. , Brian Morris, "The Tragic Structure of Troilus and Cressida," SQ 10

(1959): 481-91.

6. Ernst Gombrich, " Z u m W e r k e Giulio Romanos ," Jahrbuch der Kunsthistori­
schen Sammlungen in Wien, N . F . , 8, 9 (1934/35) : 79-104, 121-49. Julio R o m a n o 
is, of course, the artist referred to in W T . , V.ii.95, as the alleged creator of the 
statue that turns out to be Hermione. Shakespeare was familiar with more homely 
forms of mannerist art, such as in late Elizabethan costumes and portraits. 
7. Shakespeare's Problem Plays, p. 3. 
8. See B . L . Joseph, Elizabethan Acting (London, 1951). 
9. Th  e distinction of irados and %0os is made by Quintilian, Institutio Oratorio, 
VI.ii.9ff. In De Oratore, II.liii.212, Cicero argued, m u c  h like Hamlet, that the 
more vehement emotions should be mingled with the milder ones in temperate 
speech; some inflow of mildness should reach the fiercest passion, and some 
energy must also kindle this mildness. 
10. Cf. Leonard Goldstein, " O  n the Transition from Formal to Naturalistic 
Acting in the Elizabethan and Post-Elizabethan Theater," Bulletin of the New 
York Public Library 62 (1958) : 330-49. 
11. Arnold Hauser, Social History, 2  : 100-101. 
12. Mannerism, p. 28. 
13. Justus Lipsius, Six Books of Politics, trans. William Jones (1594), p. 59. 
14. Essays, 2 :137 [chap. 12]. 
15. Sypher, Four Stages, p. 120. Th  e literary style of Montaigne is defined as 
"mannerist" by Helmut Hatzfeld, "Per una definizione dello stile di Montaigne," 
Convivium 22 (1953) : 284-90, and in Estudios sobre el Barocco (Madrid, 1964), 
pp. 308-17. 
16. The first systematic attempt to connect Shakespeare and Montaigne was 
made by J. M  . Robertson, Montaigne and Shakespeare (London, 1897). Robert­
son ascribed much of Shakespeare's intellectual growth to his reading of Montaigne. 
Less far-reaching claims are made by Elizabeth R  . Hooker, "The Relation of 
Shakespeare to Montaigne," PMLA 17 (1902) : 312-66; G  . C  . Taylor, Shake­
speare's Debt to Montaigne (Cambridge, 1925) ;  W . B  . D  . Henderson, " M o n  ­
taigne's Apologie of Raymond Sebond and King Lear," Shak. Ass. Bull. 14 (1939) : 
209-25. It has been argued that Shakespeare saw Florio's translation in manuscript 
prior to its publication in 1603. S o m e translation was circulating by 1600, judging 
from a remark in Essay 12 of William Cornwallis's Essays. 
17. Essays, 1: 288 [chap. 10]. 
18. Palingenius states the position emphatically: "But yet it forceth not if that 
the dunghill cock do guess / A precious stone as nothing worth, this makes not it 
the less / O  f value" (Zodiac [1588], p. 99 [Virgo]). 
19. See D o n C . Allen, Doubt's Boundless Sea; George T  . Buckley, Rationalism 
in Sixteenth Century English Literature (Chicago, 1933) ; Paul H  . Kocher, Chris­
topher Marlowe (Chapel Hill, N . C .  , 1946). 
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20. Cf. Woolton, Anatomy, fol. 2  : " T h  e philosophers, entreating of the excellence 
of man ' s nature, did guess and, as it were, dream of the divine qualities and opera­
tions of man ' s soul in the state of innocence." Quoting Luther, Woolton (fol. 5) 
says that Genesis gives "an evident and plain description of perfect nature, whereof 
the philosophers did rather divine and dream than k n o w anything effectually." 
21. See Rolf Soellner, " H a n g up Philosophy: Shakespeare and the Limits of 
Knowledge," M L Q 23 (1962) : 135-49. 
22. Essays, 2  : 141 [chap. 12]. 
23. Ibid., 2 : 1 4 4 [chap. 12]. 
24. M  . Johann Mannich Diaconus, Sacra Emblemata (Niirnberg, 1624), "Nosce 
Teipsum": "Ales, Juno, tuus gemmantes explicat alas, / Conspectis vero, dejicit 
has pedibus. / Dotibus ingenii fisus sic tollit in altum / Cristas: ac meditans, de­
primit has, h o m o , h u m u m . " ("Your bird, Juno, extends its brilliant feathers; but 
w h e n it has seen its feet, it lets them fall to the ground. So m a n , trusting his 
mental powers, lifts his crest up in the air; but w h e n he meditates, he lowers it to 
the earth.") 
25. Essays, 3  : 361 [chap. 13]. 
26. Ibid., 2 : 6 [chap. 1]. 
27. Cf. Friedrich Piel, " Z u  m Problem des Manierismus in der Kunstgeschichte," 
Literaturwissenschaftliches Jahrbuch, N  . F . , 2 : 207 ff. 
28. Cf. George Wilson Knight, The Wheel of Fire (1930; rpt. Oxford, 1965), 
pp. 73-96. 
29. See Nicholas A  . Sharp, "Shakespeare's Baroque C o m e d y  : The Winter's 
Tale" ( P h . D . diss., Ohio State University, 1971), chap. 2. 
CHAPTER NINE 
1. Cf. H.V, III.i.19, IV.vii.20ff., V.Prol.27ff. 
2. O  n the ambiguities in the character portrayals, see Schanzer, The Problem 
Plays, pp. 14 ff. Schanzer delineates well Shakespeare's technique of engaging and 
disengaging the sympathies of the audience; he seems to m e  , however, somewhat 
too generous to Caesar. The difficulties critics have had in interpreting the play 
and its charatcers are surveyed by Mildred Hartsock, "The Complexity of Julius 
Caesar" PMLA 81 (1966) : 56-57. 
3. Plutarch, "The Life of Marcus Brutus," in Narrative and Dramatic Sources 
of Shakespeare, ed. Geoffrey Bullough, 5 (1964) : n o  . 
4. Michael Drayton, The Barons' Wars (1603), p. 61 [Bk. Ill], echoed this 
passage in characterizing Mortimer: "Such one was he . . . / In w h o  m in peace 
th'elements all lay / So mixed as none could sovereignty impute / . . . His lively 
temper was so absolute, / That't seemed when heaven his model first began, / In 
him it show'd perfection in a m a n . " The edition of 1619 (which has slight altera­
tions in the text of the passage) has the marginal note: "In the person of Morti­
mer, the pattern of an excellent m a n . " Drayton recognized a pattern of perfection 
when he saw one. 
5. This is a biblical term. Cf. R o m  . 6:12-13 (Bishops): "Let not sin reign 
therefore in your mortal body that ye should thereunto obey by the lusts of it. 
Neither give you your members as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin." 
6. Cf. Cooper's Thesaurus (1578) : "Genius: The good or evil angel that pagans 
thought to be appointed to each m a n  ; the spirit of m a n .  " 
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7. d. Bernard Breyer,  " A N e  w Look at Julius Caesar" in Essays in Honor of 
Walter Clyde Curry (Knoxville, Tenn. , 1954), pp. 161-80. 
8. Plutarch, "Life of Julius Caesar," in Bullough, Sources, 5 : 7 8 . 
9. "Life of Brutus," in Bullough, Sources, 5 : 96. 
10. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, I.67. Beroaldus's commentary associates this 
figure explicitly with self-knowledge: " A n i m u s seipsum m o d o quodam videre dici­
tur, quando scilicet noscit seipsum" (Quaestiones Tusculanae [Paris, 1562], fol. 43) . 
11. Sir M u n g o  W . MacCal lum, Shakespeare's Roman Plays (London, 1935), pp. 
245 ff.; John Palmer, Political Characters of Shakespeare (London, 1945), pp. 1 ff. 
12. Plutarch, " T h e Comparison of Dion with Brutus," in Bullough, Sources, 
5  : 133­
13. J. Dover Wilson, Introduction, Julius Caesar, N e  w Shakespeare (Cambridge, 
1949). 
14. M a  x Liithi, Shakespeares Dramen (Berlin, 1957), pp. 32-33. 
15. Gordon R  . Smith, "Brutus, Virtue, and Will," S Q 10 (1959) : 367-79. 
16. "Life of Brutus," in Bullough, Sources, 5 : 90. 
17. Shakspere, p. 283. 
18. Caes., IV.iii.142 ff.: For the opinion that there was no revision and that the 
text as it stands is correct, see W a r r e n D  . Smith, " T h e Duplicate Revelation of 
Portia's Death," S Q 4 (1953) : 153-61. T h e argument appears strained, particularly 
in view of the fact that there is not only a repetition of the news of Portia's death, 
tout there are two very admiring comments by Cassius on Brutus's fortitude. O n e 
of them is surely redundant. 
19. In De Amicitia, Cicero said, "Take a w a y the motions of the mind, and tell 
m  e what difference there is—I will not say, between a beast and a m a n  , but even— 
between a m a  n and a stone or a log or any other such like thing?" (Four Several 
Treatises, fol. 22 ) . Bullinger spoke of the Stoics as m e n w h o "of patience do m a k e 
a kind of senselessness and, of a valiant and constant m a n  , a senseless block or a 
stone without passions" (Sermons, 1587, p. 302). Cf. Shrew, I.i.31. 
20. Sypher, Four Stages, p. 176. 
21. Harley Granville-Barker, Prefaces to Shakespeare, 1 (1927) : 61. 
CHAPTER TEN 
1. The question of self-knowledge and self-identity in Hamlet has received some 
consideration in recent years, e.g., by D  . G  . James, The Dream of Learning (Ox­
ford, 1951) ; Maynard Mack, "The World of Hamlet," YR 41 (1951/52) : 503-23, 
and "The Jacobean Shakespeare," in Jacobean Theater (Stratford-upon-Avon 
Studies, I), pp. n - 4 1  ; Harry Levin, The Question of Hamlet ( N e  w York, 1959) ; 
L . C  . Knights, An Approach to Hamlet (London, i960) ; Barbara Burge, "Hamlet: 
The Search for Identity," REL 5 (1964) : ii, 58-71; Robert Heilman, " T  o K n o  w 
Himself: A  n Aspect of Tragic Structure," REL 5 (1964) :ii, 36-57. However, 
none of these studies examines the question in the frame of the meaning of nosce 
teipsum in the Renaissance. 
2. Ham., V.ii.136-38: these lines are only in Quarto 2, not in the Folio; but 
since they dovetail with the rest, one can assume that they are not extraneous 
additions. 
3. La Primaudaye, French Academy, pp. 10-12. Similarly, Castiglione, Courtier, 
sig. o6r"y [Bk. II]. 
4*2 NOTES TO PAGES 
4. T . S. Eliot, "Hamlet and His Problems," The Sacred Wood (London, 1920). 
5. G  . B  . Harrison, Shakespeare's Tragedies (New York, 1951), pp. 88 ff. 
6. Cf. E . E . Stoll, Hamlet: An Historical and Comparative Study (Minneapolis, 
Minn., 1919). Stoll also makes the claim in other studies. 
7. Irving Ribner, Patterns in Shakespearean Tragedy (New York, 1060) D O 
68ff. 
8. A . C . Bradley, Shakespearean Tragedy (1904; rpt. N e  w York, i960), pp. 
102-3. 
9. E . E . Stoll, Shakespeare and Other Masters (Cambridge, Mass., 1940), p. 128. 
10. O  n the general motif, see Paul A  . Jorgensen, "Hamlet and the Restless 
Renaissance," Shakespearean Essays, ed. A  . Thaler and Norman Sanders, Uni­
versity of Tennessee Studies in Literature (Knoxville, Tenn., 1964), pp. 131-34. 
11. Of Wisdom, p. 56 [Bk. I, chap. 14]. 
12. Ibid., p. 136 [Bk. I, chap. 38]. 
13. Essays, 1: 7 [chap. 1]. 
14. Ibid., 2 :10 [chap. 1]. The vacillations of Hamlet's character are reflected 
in his way of speaking and gesturing. A s Maurice Charney notes, Hamlet has no 
single identifiable style (Style in Hamlet, p. 258). Charney distinguishes four major 
styles used by the prince: self-conscious, witty, passionate, and simple. 
15. Of Wisdom, p. 61 [Bk. I, chap. 14]. 
16. The Dream of Learning, p. 96. 
17. See O E D , "Passion." Richard Lever, The Art of Reason (1573), p. 172, 
noted: " S o m  e take passion for affection, be it great or small; but in our English 
speech w  e use the term w h e  n w  e express a vehement pang, either of the body or 
the mind." T h e first example of "passion" as a passionate speech or outburst 
quoted in O E D is from 1582. 
18. Cf. Estella, Mortification (1608) : "If thou have a desire to k n o w w h o thou 
art, take a glass and behold thyself in it. T h  e glass that a m a  n m a  y best behold 
himself in is another m a n . " Similarly, T h o m a s Wright, Preface, Passions of the 
Mind (1601). T h e humanists generally assumed that m a n could see in this glass 
the general features of humanity; with his contemptus mundi emphasis, Estella 
thinks of the dead body of m a n . 
19. T h e ghost's lack of specificity is discussed by Robert H  . Wes t , Shakespeare 
and the Outer Mystery (Lexington, K y . , 1968), chap. 4. A s W e s t argues, this lack 
is not due to Shakespeare's ignorance of ghost lore but rather to dramatic reasons. 
20. Quoted in Sypher, Four Stages, p. 108. 
21. Ribner, Patterns, p. 83. Ribner speaks of a "symbolic" level on which this is 
true. But the context of the passage is secular and not symbolically Christian. 
22. Essays, 3 :297 , 339 [chaps. 12, 13]. 
23. See Baldwin, Shakspere's Small Latine, 2  : 601 ff. 
24. See Hardin Craig, "Hamlet's Book ," Huntington Lib. Bull. 6 (1934) : 17-37­
25. See D . G . James, The Dream of Learning, pp. 58 ff. 
26. Essays, 2  : 157 [chap. 12]. 
27. H a m . , II.ii.293 ff: I have followed the Folio version rather than Alexander 
and Quarto 2. For a defense of this preference and an analysis of the speech in gen­
eral, see below, Appendix C  . 
28. M a  x Deutschbein, " W h a  t Is This Quintessence of Dust," SJ 70 (1934) : 525­
E  . M  .  W . Tillyard, however, thought it in the purest medieval tradition (The 
Elizabethan World Picture, p. 1 ) . Others have seen similarities to orations on the 
dignity of m a  n by Renaissance humanists. See K  . Clark, "Alberti and Shake­
speare," TLS, M a r c h 26, 1931 ; cf. R o y  W . Battenhouse, "Hamlet's Apostrophe on 
M a n  : Clue to the Tragedy," P M L A 66 (1951) : 1073. 
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2Q. E.g., La Primaudaye, Second Part, pp. 155 ff. 
30. Of Wisdom, p. 62 [Bk. I, chap. 14]. 
31. A contrary claim—that is, that the play-within-the-play already served the 
purpose of discovery in Ur-Hamlet—is made by Fredson Bowers, Elizabethan 
Revenge Tragedy 1587-1642 (Princeton, N.J . , 1940), pp. 85ff. But Bowers's argu­
ment seems to m  e unconvincing; the genesis and the execution of the device of the 
play in Shakespeare is all of a piece, and K y  d is not generally noted for inventing 
refined psychological stratagems. 
32. This form of audience reaction to tragedy was much discussed in the 
Renaissance. O  . B  . Hardison calls it "moral catharsis": "Three Types of Renais­
sance Catharsis," Renaissance Drama, N  . S., 2 (1969) : 3-22. 
33. The resemblance of Hamlet's words to the commentary of Lambinus is 
notable: "Aliquando vere dolemus, aliquando ficte. Si vere, commovemus et aptius 
et fortius; sificte, nihil aut parum concitamus auditorem. . . . Dicet aliquis: fictus 
est dolor tragoediorum, tamen saepe universum theatrum movet, cum sit genus 
orationis excogitatum, in quo falsum dicitur, atque imitatione similatum, de 
Antiopa, de Hecuba, de Polyxena, de Oreste, de figmentis. Illud quidem verum, 
sed major ars in hoc genere quaeritur et agendo commovendus est animus. Et 
histriones quidam aliquando in scena flere visi sunt; testis est Quintilianus. 
Praestat igitur vere dolere. Qui fieri potest? transformando animum in causam. 
Quomodo? apprehendendo rem alienam perinde atque nostram" (De Oratore 
[Paris, 1557], fol. 163). Shakespeare earlier associated Hecuba's madness through 
sorrow with "Tully's Orator" in Tit., IV.i.18-21. 
34. Essays, 2: 428 [chap. 27]. 
35. H a m . , V.ii.216: I a m following Q 2 ; the Folio has "Since no m a n has ought 
of what he leaves." This sentence looks like a simplification of Hamlet's skeptic 
thought according to the losing-finding antithesis in I T i m  . 6:7 (a verse read in 
the burial service). Alexander emends : "Since no m a  n owes of aught he leaves." 
But Hamlet's problem does not lie in any possessions he has or m a y leave behind. 
CHAPTER ELEVEN 
1. P  . 261. This use of the figure is related to the vanitas as well as veritas 
convention. See above, chap. 6. 
2. Persius, Satires, IV.23-24 : "Not a soul is there—no one—who seeks to get 
down into his o w n self; all watch the wallet on the back that walks before" 
(Juvenal and Persius, ed. and trans. G  . G  . Ramsey, Loeb Classical Library [Cam­
bridge, Mass., 1940], p. 360). For Shakespeare's evolving the figure from Persius, 
see Baldwin, Shakspere's Small Latine, 2  : 544-45. Wright's version is from Eras­
mus's Adagia, which in turn derives from Catullus, xxii, 21 : "Sed non videmus 
manticae quod in tergo est." 
3. Of Wisdom, pp. 136-37 [Bk. I, chap. 38]. 
4. Passions, p. 253. 
5. See U n  a Ellis-Fermor, "Discord in the Spheres," in The Frontiers of Drama 
(London, 1945), p. 64. For the internal conflicts of Troilus, see also Richard C  . 
Harrier, "Troilus Divided," in Studies in English Renaissance Drama ( N e w York, 
I959)» PP- 142-56. A sense of "fragmented experience and diffused identity" is 
felt in the play and demonstrated particularly in the sexual attitudes of Troilus 
and Cressida by Charles Lyon, "Cressida, Achilles, and the Finite Deed," Etudes 
Anglaises 20 (1967) : 233-42. The inner division and disunity in the characters and 
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in society are shown to lead to sterility by Arnold Stein, "Troilus and Cressida: 
the Disjunctive Imagination," ELH 36 (1969) : pp. 145-67. 
6. William Elton, "Shakespeare's Ulysses and the Problem of Value," ShakS 
2 (1966) : 95-111. 
7. D  . A  . Traversi, An Approach to Shakespeare (2d ed.; Garden City, N . Y .  , 
1956), P- 53­
8. Essays, 2: 332 [chap. 12]. 
9. See Soellner, "Prudence and the Price of Helen." 
10. Of Wisdom, p. 208 [Bk. I, chap. 57]. 
11. Cf. Norman Rabkin, "Troilus and Cressida: The Uses of the Double Plot," 
ShakS 1 (1965) 1265-82. 
12. For the concept of invisibility as the highest kind of beauty, cf. Tommaso 
Buoni, Problems of Beauty and All Human Affections, trans. Samson Lennard 
(1606), p. 48 : " W h  y doth the beauty of the mind make us like unto things heavenly, 
and that of the body many times like unto earthly? Perhaps because the chief 
good, which is the First Fair, is invisible like a fair mind." 
13. Losing distinction was thought to be a danger inherent in voluptas, as 
Lambinus (Commentary to Horace, Ode 1.18) explained: "Libido enim omnium 
rerum discrimen ac delectum tollit resque maxime inter se disjunctas ac diversas 
conjungit et exaequat" (Horatius Flaccus, Satyrae [Paris, 1568], p. 57). 
14. In Montaigne's "O  f the Force of the Imagination" (Essays, 1 : 9 ff. [chap. 
10]), the discrepancy between desire and execution is illustrated by the sexual act 
to which Troilus also alludes (III.ii.79). 
15. Joachimus Camerarius, Quaestiones Tusculanae (Paris, 1562), p. 641: "Quae 
m o  x de animis dicit manifesta esse omnibus nisi qui sint plane in physicis plumbei. 
. . . Diversa integra corpora duo aut plura unum esse quiddam intelligi non potest." 
16. Of Wisdom, p. 59 [Bk. I, chap. 14]. The contradictions of human logic were, 
of course, commonly attacked by the skeptics. 
CHAPTER TWELVE 
1. See T  .  W . Baldwin, Shakspere's LOVE'S LABOR'S W O  N (Carbondale, 111., 
1957). 
2. The relevance of sonnet 94 to All's Well and Measure for Measure has, in 
passing, been noted for Angelo by L . C . Knights, "The Ambiguity of Measure for 
Measure," Scrutiny 10 (1942) : 222-33; for Bertram, by Geoffrey Bullough, Narra­
tive and Dramatic Sources of Shakespeare, 2 (London, 1958) : 386. O  n mannerist 
ambiguities in Measure for Measure, see Wylie Sypher, "Shakespeare as Casuist: 
Measure for Measure," SR 58 (1950) : 262-80. The critical issues of the play are 
reviewed by Jonathan R  . Price, "Measure for Measure and the Critics: Towards 
a N e  w Approach," SQ 20 (1969) : 179-204. Price ends with a question: " H o  w has 
Shakespeare made us care so passionately about the drama of Measure for Mea­
sure?" That, indeed, is the greatest of the play's puzzles. 
3. See G  . K  . Hunter, Introduction, All's Well That Ends Well, N e  w Arden 
Edition (London, 1959), and J.  W . Lever, Introduction, Measure for Measure, 
N e  w Arden Edition (London, 1965). 
4. I a  m assuming that Measure for Measure followed rather than preceded All's 
Well. Since Measure for Measure improves some of the themes of All's Well, this 
sequence is probable. See Lever's Introduction. 
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5. Mary Lascelles, Shakespeare's Measure for Measure (London, 1953), p. 162. 
6. G  . B  . Giraldi Cinthio, Hecatommithi (De. 8, Nov. 5) trans, in Bullough,

Sources, 2:421.

7. O  n the legal and human aspects of the marriages in the play, see Ernest 
Schanzer, "The Marriage Contracts in Measure for Measure" ShS 13 (i960) : 81-89. 
A counterargument to Schanzer is made by S. Nagarajan, "Measure for Measure 
and Elizabethan Betrothals," SQ 14 (1963) : 115-19. Nagarajan claims that Claudio's 
and Juliet's is a de futuro promise, Angelo's and Mariana's a de praesenti betrothal. 
But clearly, Claudio and Juliet consider their pledge to each other binding in a 
way that Angelo and Mariana do not, and the ratification of the latter couple's 
marriage depends on its consummation. 
8. Ovid, Ars Amatoria, 498-502: " 'Preceptor of wanton love/ he [Apollo] 
said to m e , 'come, lead m y pupils to m y shrine, where there is a saying renowned 
in fame all over the world, which bids each to be known by himself. Only he w h o 
knows himself will love with wisdom and perform all his tasks according to his 
powers'" (The Art of Love and Other Poems, ed. and trans. J. H  . Mozley [Lon­
don, 1929], p. 101). 
9. A physiological explanation of the coitus is in Huarte, Examen de Ingenios 
(1594) > P- 314- Huarte thought that often, but not always, the seed of the stronger 
female would win out. The transforming power, both psychic and physical, of 
sexual love is discussed by Nicolas Coeffeteau, A Table of Human Passions, trans. 
Edward Grimestone (1621), pp. 157 ff. Cf. James L . Calderwood, "Styles of K n o w ­
ing in All's Well," M L  Q 25 (1964) : 272-94. 
10. I do not think that Shakespeare showed Isabella as "idealistic" in contrast to 
a society that is not, as is argued by Eileen Mackay, "Measure for Measure," SQ 
14 (1963) : 109-13. There is certainly no suggestion that the order she is about to 
join is corrupt. 
11. The term "glassy essence," according to J. V  . Cunningham, "Essence and the 
Phoenix and Turtle," ELH 19 (1952) :26s, describes man's intellectual soul, which 
is in the image of G o d ; hence "glassy" because it reflects H i m . Mary Lascelles, 
" 'Glassie Essence': Measure for Measure, II.ii.120," RES 2 (1951) : 140, notes the 
medieval tradition of the soul as a vessel of glass. 
12. Orosco, Emblemas Morales, I, Emblem 96. The inscription on the banner: 
"Nulli non sua forma placet" is from Ovid, Ars Amatoria, I.614. For the line of the 
motto, "la mal carada, se tendra por dea," cf. Metamorphoses, XIII, 838ff., Virgil's 
Eclogues, II, 25. L . S. Hall, "Isabella's Angry Ape ," SQ 15 (1964) : 157-72, draws 
attention to the traditional association of apes and looking glasses, dating back to 
the thirteenth century, in which the mirror is associated with vanity. 
13. For a comparison of the roles of Vincentio and Prospero, see Harold S. 
Wilson, "Action and Symbol in Measure for Measure and The Tempest," SQ 
4 (i953) : 375-84. Wilson assumes, however, that Shakespeare adopted identical 
designs for both plays, which, I think, is not true. See below, chap. 18. 
14. Innocent Gentillet, A Discourse Upon the Means of Well Governing and 
Maintaining in Good Peace a Kingdom or Other Principalities [Contre-Machiavel], 
trans. Simon Patrick (1602), p. 349. Cf. Machiavelli, The Prince, chap. 19; Aris­
totle, Politics, 1315A. 
15. Jean Bodin, Six Books of a Commonweal, trans. Richard Knolles (1606), 
p. 512 [Bk. IV, chap. 2]. Charron, Of Wisdom, p. 387 suggests a similar procedure. 
16. Strong claims have been made for the resemblance of the duke to James 
and for the influence of Basilicon Doron. Schanzer, Problem Plays, pp. 123 ff., 
asserts that the play deliberately turns on themes that were of special interest to 
James. The parallels, for all they are worth, are emphasized by David L . Stevenson, 
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APPENDIX A 
1. Fol. 14. 
2. Cf. Ambrosius Calepinus, Dictionarium (Lyon, 1550) under Ratio: "Accipitur 
et pro ipsa rationatione, hoc est, pro discursu animi ad investigandum rerum." 
3. Xystus Betuleius, Commentary, Cicero, De Officiis, fol. 15: "Nefandumque 
dictu est, animantium quodque in suo genere legem sibi a natura praescriptam, 
sine exactore non negligere; hominem vero ne conscientiae quidem stimulis ad 
officium excitari." 
4. Hankins, Shakespeare's Derived Imagery, pp. 121-23, cites Palingenius 
{Zodiac, 1588), p. 114. Robertson, Montaigne and Shakespeare, pp. 62-63, cites 
Montaigne, whose version he preferred to Cicero because he thought there were 
no parallels between Shakespeare and Cicero, but m a n y between Shakespeare and 
Montaigne. Yet the parallel to Cicero is m u c h closer. 
5. Theodore Spencer, Shakespeare and the Nature of Man, p. 94. 
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76 (1961) : 480-87. Cf. also Roy  W . Battenhouse, Shakespearean Tragedy (Bloom­
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5. Cf. Bullinger, Sermons, p. 589 [Dec. 4, Serm. 10] : "Since this will doth 
follow a blind guide, God wot, that is to say, corrupt affection, it is unknown to no 
m a  n what foolish choice it maketh and whereunto it tendeth. A n  d although the 
understanding be never so true and good, yet is the will like to a ship tossed to 
and fro with stormy tempests, that is, of affections." 
6. Cf. Marvin T  . Herrick, Comic Theory in the Sixteenth Century, p. 140. 
7. Epistles, II.ii.216: "Tempus abire tibi est, ne potum largius aequo / Rideat et 
pulset lasciva decentius aetas." Cf. also Epode, XIII.4-5: "dumque virent genua / 
Et decet, obducta solvatur fronte senectus." Lambinus here notes that senectus 
stands for sadness and severity: "tristitiamque ac severitatem senilem significat." 
Horatius Flaccus, Opera (Paris, 1568), p. 308. 
8. In his commentary on De Officiis (Paris, 1560), fol. 90, Betuleius lists the 
following factors of prudence: ratio, intellectus, circumspectio, providentia, docilitas, 
cautio. Cooper's Thesaurus (1578) gives "regard" and "respect" as translations of 
ratio. For Shakespeare's association of these terms with prudence and temperance, 
see Caes. III.i.224, Ham. III.i.66-69, Macb. II.iii.114—17. 
9. De Officiis, 1.102. The image is Plato's in the parable of the horse-drawn 
chariot of reason in Phaedrus, 253-54. 
10. Institution, p. 55. 
11. For the general convention, see C . L . Powell, "The Castle of the Body," SP 
16 (1919) : 197-205. Powell cites analogues to Spenser's allegory from medieval and 
Renaissance works, that is, Robert Grossteste's Le Chateau d'Amour, Sawles 
Warde, Piers Plowman, and D  u Bartas's Divine Weeks. In his preface to The 
Second Part of the French Academy (1594), Thomas Bowes, the translator, ex­
plained self-knowledge as a knowledge of body and soul and illustrated it by a 
lengthy allegorical description in the tradition of the castle of the body. 
12. O n the centrality of the siege imagery, see S a m Hynes, "The Rape of Tar­
quin," SQ 10 (1959) : 451-53­
13. La Primaudaye distinguished theoretically between incontinence and intem­
perance, but, like most moralists, disregarded the distinction in practice. 
14. James M  . Tolbert, "  A Source of Shakespeare's Lucrece," N  Q 198 (1953) : 
14-15. Cf. Seneca's Phaedra, 565 : "Cur omnium fit culpa paucarum scelus?" 
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2. Similarly, Cicero, De Natura Deorum, II.iv.15, 90, 98. Cf. Plato, Timaeus, 
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3. French Academy, p. 9. 
4. Guillaume du Vair, The Holy Love of Heavenly Wisdom [De la sainte 
Philosophie] (1594), p. 82. 
5. Hiram Haydn, The Counter-Renaissance, p. 655. 
6. Treatise, p. 41. Bright's chapter 13 explains " H o  w the soul by one simple 
faculty performeth so many and diverse actions." 
7. Anatomy, fols. 6-7. 
8. Discourse, p. 10. 
9. Aristotle, De Anima, 432b. 
10. Commonplaces, II, 358. 
11. Serm. Tim., 7632. Cf. O E D : "Apprehension." 
12. Cf. Cicero, Tusc. Disp., 1.22. This explanation was sometimes used by 
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13. Nosce Teipsum, p. 21. 
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257, 390 
Antony (Julius Caesar), 336 
Antony and Cleopatra, xix, 77, 241, 336, 
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n.2
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416 n.25, 434 n-11 
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434 n.5 
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Bush, Douglas, 404 
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ar], Dictionarium, 433 n.2 
Calvin, John, 16-20, 27, 28, 43, 126, 247­
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Castiglione, Baldassare, Courtier, 30-31, 
46, 52, 87 
Catechism. See Church of England: 
Cathechism; Nowell, Alexander 
Catharsis: alleged, at end of tragedies, 
77; Hamlet's use of theory of, on 
Claudius, 189, $23x1.32; as "tragic 
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Cato. See Disticha Catonis 
Catullus, 423 n.2 
Cawdrey, Robert, Treasury or Store­
house of Similes, 431 n.i6 
Chain of Being, 51-52, 411 n.26, 4i2n.45, 
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mation of Nosce Teipsum" [Eliza­
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Chapman, George, 244, 250, 257 
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255-58 
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Macbeth," 431 n.2 
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mus, Desiderius 
De Constantia. See Lipsius, Justus 
De Contemptu Mundi. See Estella, Di­
ego de. 
De Copia Verborum ac Rerum. See 
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and Elizabethan Betrothals," 425 n.7 
Narcissism. See Self-love 
447 
Nashe, Thomas, Anatomy of Absurdity,

300-301, 301-2

Nature: and m a n in Bacon and Shake­

speare, 37, 373-74; in Lear, 287; Lear

on needs of nature, 312-14

New Anatomy. See Woolton, John

New Book of Purgatory. See Rastell,

John

Newton, Thomas [Elizabethan humanist

and translator], 9

Nicolson, Marjorie H .  , Breaking of the

Circle, 411 n.22 
"Nihil." See Passeratti, John 
Nixon, Leroy, John Calvin's Teaching 
on Human Reason, 408 n.25 
Nobility: Macbeth's alleged, 336-37. See 
also Aristocracy 
Nobles and of Nobility. See Humphrey, 
Laurence 
North, Helen, Sophrosyne: Self-Knowl­
edge and Self-Restraint in Greek 
Literature, 405 n.i 
Nosce teipsum, xi, 47, 51, 256, 288, 321;

origin of, 3, 195, 282; Apollo as

patron-god of, 3, 195, 282; as slogan

in grammar school, 3, 6 ; in the clas­

sics, 3, 7, 9-12, 222, 226, 290, 405 n.i;

literature in the Renaissance, 3-24, 26,

180, 181, 188, 199, 254-55, 321, 372;

emblems, 3, 16, 48, 49, 106, 144-45,

225-26; in sermons, 17; in courtesy

books, 19-20; in literature for princes,

21-22; in Hobbes, 35; in Bacon, 37­

39. See also Self-discovery; Self-
image; Self-knowledge; Self-search

Nosce Teipsum. See Davies, Sir John

Nothing, quality of: in Richard II, 105,

109; in Lear, 289-92, 294, 299-300, 304,

308, 311-12, 319, 429 n.13, 429 n.26

Novum Organum. See Bacon, Sir Fran­

cis

Nowell, Alexander, Catechism, 87

Oedipus, n o  , 295

Of the Knowledge Which Maketh a 
Wise Man. See Elyot, Sir Thomas

Of Wisdom. See Charron, Pierre

Ophelia, 240

Optic Glass of Humors. See Walking-

ton, Thomas 
Optimism: humanistic balance of, and

pessimism, 23-24; Machiavelli's world­

ly, 34, 252-54; Henry V ' s ironic,

124-25, 417 n.20

Oration on the Dignity of Man. See 
Pico della Mirandola, Count Giovanni 
Order: Christian-Platonic, vs. Aristo­
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Order (continued) 
telian, 59; Renaissance, 71-73; at end 
of comedies, 75-77, 233; at end of 
tragedies, 76-77, 193-94, 325-26. See 
also Degree; M a n  ; Microcosm and 
macrocosm; Society; Shakespeare, 
William: and Renaissance order; 
World 
Orosco, Sebastian de Covarrubias, E m ­
blemas Morales, 16, 225-26 
Othello, 49, 95, 126, 137, 179, 210, 211, 
240, 241, 251, 255, 256, 257, 281, 328, 
339, 380, 390 
Othello, xvii, xix, 35, 132, 180, 210, 239­
43, 247, 250, 251, 255, 259-80, 281, 327, 
346, 347, 403, 4i6 n.31 
Ovid, 3, 7 ; Art of Love, 222, 226, 
425^12 ; Metamorphoses, 7, 45, 226, 
425 a 12 
Palfreyman, Thomas [contributor to 
Treatise of Moral Philosophy], 
408 n.36 
Palingenius, Marcellus, Zodiacus Vitae, 
8, 54, 55, 74, 80, 83, 85, 86, 87, 323, 
324, 325, 41411.19, 4i9n-i8 
Palmer, John, Political Characters of 
Shakespeare, 160 
Pandectarium. See Gessner, Conrad 
Parabolae Sive Similia. See Erasmus, 
Desiderius 
Paracelsus, 410 n.2 
Paradossi. See Landi, Ortensio 
Paradoxes : of self-evaluation, 24; in the 
thematic structure of Lear, 286-303; 
of tragedy, 303-4. See also Nothing, 
quality of; Salvation, paradox of 
Paradoxes. See Estienne, Charles 
Parolles (All's Well), 143, 216 
Parsons, Robert, First Book of Chris­
tian Exercise [Christian Directory], 
246 
Parvus Mundus. See Goidtsenhoven, 
Laurens van Haecht 
Passeratti, John, "Nihil," 289 
Passion: problem of control of, xiv, 5, 
7, 10, 14, 87-88, 251-52, 262-64, 268-71, 
309, 376-77; Hamlet's rhetorical, 135­
36, 179-80, 419 n.9; Hamlet's analysis 
of, 179-81, 183, 185, 190-92; intensified, 
in baroque, 243-44, 250-51, 256-58, 270, 
276-77; moving of, 254-55, 274-75, 
279-80. See also Ecstasy; Psychology, 
Elizabethan; Self-knowledge: as con­
trol of passion; and names of individ­
ual passions 
INDEX 
Passions of the Mind. See Wright, 
Thomas 
Pater, Walter, 224; Renaissance, 435 
n.15 
Patience: of w o m e n  , 20-21, 272, 365, 
367; and poverty, 224-45; Stoic, 251­
52; Christian, 252, 271-72; emphasis 
on, in Shakespeare's later plays, 252; 
as ironic keyword in Othello, 270-72; 
and blindness in Lear, 295-97; false, 
of suicide, 297-98; Lear's need for, 
312-13; Gonzalo as embodiment of, 
363-65; Miranda's, 355-67 
Patrick, M a x  . See Croll, Morris  W . 
Paul, Henry N .  , Royal Play of Mac­
beth, 431 n.a 
Paul, Saint, 80, 84, 224, 295, 349 
Paulina (Winter's Tale), 252, 363 
Perdita (Winter's Tale), 363 
Pericles, 64, 240, 356, 407 n, 12 
Perrott, Sir James, Consideration of 
Human Condition, 23, 103, 307-22 
passim, 417^12 
Persius, Satires, 3, 198, 290, 291, 429^13 
Pessimism: humanistic balance of, and 
optimism, 23-24; Elizabethan and 
Jacobean, 35-36, 48-49, 51-52, 252-53; 
Macbeth's nihilistic, 352 
Philias,	 Peter G .  , "Richard II and 
Shakespeare's Tragic M o d e ,  " 416 n.31 
Philosophie Morale des Stoiques. See 
D  u Vair, Guillaume 
Philosophy: active vs. passive, 83, 85. 
See also Shakespeare, William: phi­
losophy of 
Pico della Mirandola, Count Giovanni, 
Oration on the Dignity of Man, 404 
Piers Plowman. See Langland, William 
Plato, 144, 165, 197, 316; Alcibiades, 
158, 4O7n.io; Apology of Socrates, 
187; Ion, 190; Phaedo, 317; Phaedrus, 
93, 406 n.i, 434n.9 
Platonism, 14, 317-19, 369, 379; and the 
religion of beauty, 31, 60, 87, 207-8 
Plautus, Menaechmi, 62-75 passim 
Pliny, Historia Naturalis, 314, 315 
Plutarch, Lives, 121-22, 140-41, 150-70 
passim, 191; Morals, 108 
Politics: as execution of the divine plan, 
10; as dubious pursuit in Julius 
Caesar, 139, 155, 160-61, 169-70 
Polixenes (Winter's Tale), 256 
Polonius, 50 
Polyanthea. See Mirabellius, Nannus 
Poor Man's Passions and Poverty's 
Patience. See Warren, Arthur 
Index 
Popkin, Richard, History of Scepticism 
from Erasmus to Descartes, 409 n.3 
Poverty: idealization of, 146, 182-83;

and patience, 244-45; and need for

social justice, 302

Powell, C . L . , "Castle of the Body,"

434n.11

Power: baroque fascination with, 242,

373-74; problem of, in Tempest, 373­

83

Praise (laus) : characterization through,

118-20, 208-9

Praise of Nothing. See D . , E .

Prayerbook. See Church of England,

Book of C o m m o n Prayer 
Precepts of Cato. See Disticha Catonis 
Price, Jonathan R .  , "Measure for Mea­
sure and the Critics," 424 n.2 
Pride: in learning deflated, 91; in rea­

son deflated byfideists, 144-46; Bru­

tus's idealism as concealed, 169; in

self-discipline punctured in Measure

for Measure, 218-19, 226, 232-33

Prince. See Death: and the prince; 
Ideal prince; Mirror: for princes; 
Mirror; prince as 
Prince. See Machiavelli, Niccolo

Prior, Moody E . , "Search for a Hero

in Julius Caesar," 419 n.3

Pritchard, Thomas, School of Honest

and Virtuous Life, 407 n. 10

Problem play: definition of, 131, 418n.i.

See also Mannerism

Problems of Beauty and All Human

Affections. See Buoni, T o m m a s o 
Progymnasmata. See Aphthonius 
Proser, Matthew N .  , Heroic Image in 
Five Shakespearean Tragedies, 428

n.17

Prospero, 36, 77, 241, 339, 425^13

Providence: Hamlet's acceptance of,

192-93; in The Tempest, 364, 368, 370,

383

Prudence: of Henry V  , 117-18

Psychology, Elizabethan: humors theory,

IS; health of body and mind, 124-25;

operation of the mind, 153-54, 268; the

sexual act, 222-23, 425 n.9; hatred,

envy, and jealousy, 262; man's anti­

thetical composition, 288; anger and

choler in old age, 309; functions of

body and soul, 317-18; courage, rash­

ness, and fear, 342; conflict of passion

and reason, 391-96. See also Melan­

choly; Microcosm and macrocosm;

Mind; Passion; Soul; Will 
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Puritanism: self-analysis in, 19; and the

sobriety of Henry V  , 126-27; of

Angelo, 218-19, 232; alleged, in

Tempest, 382. See also Asceticism;

Calvinism

Pythagoras, 66, 67

Quaestiones Tusculanae. See Cicero, 
Tusculan Disputations 
Quiller-Couch, Sir Arthur, Introduction

to Measure for Measure, 231

Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, 190, 419

n.9 
Raleigh, Sir Walter, 85

Raphael (Sanzio), 52

Rapture. See Ecstasy 
Rastell, John, New Book of Purgatory, 
407 n.18 
Reason: disparaged by skeptics and

fideists, 18, 27, 28, 248-49; limited

role of, in self-knowledge, 19, 309, 322,

248-49, 279, 309, 322, 375, 4i6n.3i.

See also Passion; Psychology, Eliza­

bethan

Regan, xiv, 255

Renaissance: nature of, xv-xviii, 43-44,

132-33; education, xvi, 3-13, 53, 291;

style in literature and art, 44, 47-48,

52, 79-96 passim, 104, 123, 127-28, 138,

4iin.27; rhetoric, 53, 127, 135, 185,

191, 288-89, 362. See also Christian

humanism; Nosce teipsum: literature

in the Renaissance; World: frame of,

in the Renaissance

Repentance: Angelo's, and self-recovery,

229-30; Macbeth's failure of, 351-53;

Antonio's failure of, in The Tempest,

368; of Tarquin, 395-96

Ribner, Irving, English History Play in

the Age of Shakespeare, 415 n.i; Pat­

terns in Shakespaerean Tragedy, 176,

183

Rice, Warner G .  , "Paradossi of Orten­

sio Landi," 429 n.8

Richard II, 25, 53, 96, I13, 121, 127, 179,

187, 220, 247, 323

Richard II, xviii, 15, 17, 30, 76, 97-112,

114, 128, 139, 158, 328, 407n.i2, 419

n-3

Richard III, 113, 114, 147, 156, 337-38

Richard III, 145, 193-94, 250, 328, 419 n.3

Robertson, J. M .  , Montaigne and Shake­
speare, 4i9n.i6, 433 n.4 
Roerecke, E  . M .  , "Baroque Aspects of 
Antony and Cleopatra," 426x1.2 
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Rogers, Thomas, Anatomy of the Mind, 
14, 54, 262, 263, 264, 285, 316, 390-91, 
430 n.30 
Role-playing: for assuming identity in 
Cicero, 12, 185; Hamlet's, 180, 184-86, 
191-92; Prospero on man's, 378 
R o m a  n Catholicism, 245-46, 252 
Romano, Julio, 419 n.6. See also G o m b ­
rich, Ernst 
Romei, Annibale, Courtier's Academy, 
60 
Romeo , 208 
Romeo and Juliet, xviii, 57, 76, 137, 148, 
170, 327 
Rosalind (As You Like It), 71 
Russel, Burton, "Monstrous Birth," 
428 a 16 
Salvation, paradox of, 64-65, 78, 193, 
332-34, 359, 360, 391 
Samson, 295 
Sanford, James. See Mirror of Madness 
Sawles Warde, 434 n. 11 
Schanzer, Ernest, "Marriage Contracts 
in Measure for Measure," 425 n.7; 
Problem Plays of Shakespeare, 164, 
418 n.i, 420 n.2, 425n.i6 
Schlegel, August Wilhelm von, 177 
Schoenbaum, Samuel. See Muir, Ken­
neth, and Samuel Schoenbaum 
School of Honest and Virtuous Life. See 
Pritchard, Thomas 
"School of Night," 87, 414^19 
School of Virtue. See Seager, Francis 
Schoonhovius, Florentius Emblemata, 
48 
Schucking, L  . L .  , Baroque Character, 
336, 426 n.4; Character Problems in 
Shakespeare's Plays, 287, 336, 432 
n.19; Shakespeare und der Tragodien­
stil seiner Zeit, 426 n.4 
Seager, Francis, School of Virtue, 5-6 
Sebastian (Twelfth Night), 55-56 
Sebond, Raymond, Theologia Naturalis, 
138 
Self: balanced and organic, in Erasmus, 
4-5; corrupted, in Calvin, 18-19, 27; 
expansive, of aristocrats, 20, 30-31, 
83, 243-44; variable, of Montaigne, 
29; class-conscious, of courtiers, 30­
31; assertive, in Machiavelli, 31-35, 
253; arriviste, of Harvey, 34, 253, 
346; psychological and time-bound, in 
Bacon, 38, circumscribed, of Christian 
humanists, 44, 83; problematic, in 
mannerism, 145, 194; restless, of 
Hamlet, 176-79, 181, 184, 189, 194; 
I N D E X 
divided, of Troilus, 204-5, 209-13; 
heightened, of later heroes, 241-42, 
256-58, 259, 283, 328, 370-71; 382-83; 
acquisitive, of bourgeois, 243; lost, of 
Macbeth, 351-53; mastered, of Pros­
pero, 362, 370-83 
Self-alienation: in Comedy of Errors, 
65, 73-75; Macbeth's, 348-49, 35© 
Self-analysis. See Self-discovery; Self-
knowledge; Self-search 
Self-control. See Self-knowledge: as 
control of passion 
Self-discovery: in Aristotle and Shake­
speare, xii-xiii, 104, 110-11; Richard 
IPs limited, 105-11, 4i6n.3i; as con­
fession of sin, n o  , 246-47; Brutus's 
lacking of, 164-65, 170-71; Hamlet's 
problematic, 193; Troilus's avoided, 
210-13; Othello's disputed, 277-80, 
428 n.21; Edgar's tentative, 302-3; 
Lear's visionary, 309, 321-22; M a c  ­
beth's lacking of, 349"5o, 353-54 
Self-dramatization: Othello's romantic, 
272-74; of other tragic heroes, 428n.i7 
Self-evaluation. See Self-discovery; 
Self-knowledge; Self-search 
Self-image: Christian humanists' con­
ception of, 24-25; Richard II's chang­
ing, 99-104; Brutus's ambiguous, 157­
59; specious, of Angelo, 219, 221; 
ironic, of Isabella, 224-26. See also 
Mirror 
Self-knowledge: ancient, modern, and 
Shakespearean, xi-xv; explicit refer­
ences to, in Shakespeare, xiii-xv, 106, 
157, 174, 247, 264, 309, 330, 349-50, 
353; as control of passion, xiv, 4-21 
passim, 87-88, II5-16, 120, 122, 126, 
251-52, 268-70, 309, 375-88; Christian, 
and pagan, 4-5, 284-85, 292, 297, 303, 
315; as knowledge of cardinal virtues, 
io-n, 15, 114-17; through study of 
others, 12, 16, 33, 37-39, 181-86, 254­
56; as humorial balance, 15, 122, 151­
52, 309; as knowledge of man's misery, 
15-18, 23, 49-50, 103-9; practical, in 
courtesy books, 20-21, 30-31; as knowl­
edge of man's equality, 21-22, 24-25, 
100, 109, 123, 302, 308, 312-15; as 
knowledge of man's dignity, 23-24, 
47-48; theories of, questioned, 28-29, 
144-49, 174, 181-89, 104, 214; ego­
istic and utilitarian, in Machiavelli, 
33-35; used for the manipulation of 
others, 33-39, 196-97, 200, 227-29, 
253-56, 264-66, 298, 345-47; tough-
minded, of Gabriel Harvey, 34, 253, 
Index 
346; utilitarian, in Bacon, 36-39, 253­

54; arrogant, of Shakespeare's vil­

lains, 39-40, 255, 264-66, 283-84; Ren­

aissance, and the cosmic frame, 43-61,

72, 76-77, 98, 127-28, 144, 188-89;

practical, of Thomas Wright, 253-56;

as voice of conscience, 247, 349-50,

368; achieved by Prospero, 379-83.

See also Body and soul; Considera­

tion; Decorum; Ideal m a n ; Ideal

prince; Microcosm and macrocosm;

Mirror; nosce teipsum; Self-discov­

ery; Self-image; Self-search; Soul;

Temperance

Self-knowledge, lack of: according to

Aristotle and Shakespeare, xii-xiii;

according to Arthur Miller and

Shakespeare, xiii; Ferdinand's in

Love's Labor's Lost, 79, 82-83 > by

excessive self-assurance, 3, 82, 166-70,

218-19, 272-73, 275, 305; Adriana's in

Comedy of Errors, 73-75; Richard

II's, 98-101, i n  ; Troilus's, 195-96,

211-13; Angelo's, 219-20; Othello's,

272-75; of tragic heroes, 281; Lear's,

281-83, 290-91, 308-10; Gloucester's,

283, 293-95, 297-98. See also Tragic

flaw

Self-loss: comic, 66-70, 81, 93; in trage­

dies, 327-28; in Macbeth, 328-55 pas­

sim; threatened in Tempest, 356-83

passim

Self-loss to self-recovery, movement

from: in comedy and tragedy, xvii­

xviii; in comedies and tragicomedies,

63-64, 358-60, 361-62; in Comedy of

Errors, 64-65, 70-71, 75-76; in Love's

Labor's Lost, 88-97; in Richard II,

110-11; Hamlet's problematic, 192­

94; in Measure for Measure, 220-21,

233; in Lear, 298-303, 306-22; in Mac­

beth, 332; in Tempest, 362-83 passim.

See also Salvation, paradox of

Self-love: and self-awareness of Richard

II, 105-10; in Brutus's self-image,

157-58; in Achilles' ignorance, 196­

98; in Isabella's pleading, 224-26; in

Iago's self-control, 264-65. See also

Mirror; Vanity

Self-search: by questioning oneself, 22­

23, 70, 219-20, 305-15; in La Pri­

maudaye and Love's Labor's Lost, 79;

in Erasmus and Love's Labor's Lost,

79-94; Hamlet's unsuccessful, 175-76,

179-89, 193-94

Seneca [philosopher and dramatist], 
250 [dramatist], 397; De Providentia, 
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406 n.2; Hercules Fur ens, 251, 276;

Hercules Oetaeus, 251; Medea, 251,

432 n. 18; Naturales Quaestiones,

406 n.i; Oedipus, 251; " O f Anger,"

225; Phaedra, 434^14

Sententia Pueriles. See Culmannus,

Leonhardus

Shakespeare, William: texts used, ix;

First Folio, 166, 279, 400-403, 421 n.2;

Quartos, 98, 193, 400-403, 421 n .2 ;

phases of artistic development, xii, 29­

30, 35-36, 76-77, 127-28, 131-33, 239,

243, 256-58; and grammar-school edu­

cation, xvi, 4-13, 404-5; philosophy of,

xx-xxi, 39, 143-44, 165; and man's

potential greatness, 10; and Christian

humanism, 13, 22, 25, 40, 57-58, 126,

382-83; and religion, 17, 19, 80, 142­

44, 148-49, 247, 325, 378-79, 381-82;

and the aristocracy, 19-21, 243-44, 256­

57; and Montaigne, 29, 142, 4i9n.i6,

427 n.21; and skepticism, 29-30, 139­

42, 169-70, 214, 378-79; and Bacon

contrasted, 36, 39-40, 373-74; sympa­

thy with humanity dramatically ex­

pressed by, 39-40, 214, 232-33, 298,

303, 319, 325-26, 383; and Renaissance

order, 60-61, 111-12, 127-28; identified

with Henry V  , 126; and Stratford,

126, 296; on theatrical conditions, 134;

as actor and playwright, 136-37; and

the Essex rebellion, 140; between

Christian humanism and counter-hu­

manism, 149, 189, /214, 243, 256-58;

identified with Hamlet, 179-80; and

Thomas Wright, 198-99, 254-57,  427

n.21; identified with Vincentio, 227;

identified with Prospero, 227, 363,

374; and the bourgeoisie, 244; and

Seneca, 251; identified with Gonzalo

(Tempest), 363-64

Shearman, John, Mannerism, 418 n.2

Sidney, Sir Philip, Apology for Poetry,

xi; Arcadia, 292, 296

Siegel, Paul, "Damnation of Othello,"

427 n.4

Sigismund, Reinhold, "Ubereinstim­

mendes zwischen Shakespeare und

Plutarch," 416 n.28

Sin. See Self-discovery: as confession of

sin

Six Books of a Commonweal. See Bodin,

Jean

Skepticism: andfideism, 28, 142-45, 148­

49, 189, 218, 248; and the Copernican

revolution, 44, 50-51; in problem

plays, 139-49; moderate vs. Pyrrhonic,

452 
Skepticism {continued)

141-42, 204-5; m Julius Caesar, 167­

71; rampant in Troilus and Cressida,

196-200; 202-S, 212-14; Hamlet's,

177-79, 189, 193, 360; on war, 207;

and political absolutism, 228, 235; in

the ending of Measure for Measure,

233-38; and baroque emphasis on will,

248-49; Prospero's, 378-79. See also

Montaigne, Michel de; Charron,

Pierre

Smith, Gordon R .  , "Brutus, Virtue, and

Will," 156

Smith, Warren D .  , "Duplicate Revela­

tion of Portia's Death," 421 n.18

Society: and self in Bacon, 37-38; cor­

rupt, in problem plays, 137, 145 ; under

absolutism, 233, 235, 242-44; and cap­

italism, 244-45. See also Order; Pov­

erty; World: frame of, in the Ren­

aissance

Socrates, 158, 187, 190, 406 n.i

Soellner, Rolf, "Four Primary Pas­

sions," 415 n.2

Solomon, 114

Somnium Scipionis. See Cicero

Sonnets: 24, 47, 410n.4; 44, 415^22;

45, 414^22; 62, 4i6n.23; 94, 216,

227, 424n.2; 115, 407n. 12; 116, 407

n.12; 146, 57-58

Sophocles, King Oedipus, xii

Soul: immortality of, 8, 57, 187, 395;

and self in Renaissance nosce teip­

sum, 9-10, 13-14, 4O7n.i8; hegemony

of, in the body, 14; division of, 56­

57, 73, 153-54,' imagery, 6-67, 74-75,

212-13; and eye analogous, 67, 157,

196-99; Brutus's dissonant, 152-55,

163-64; of state, 200; as symbol of

unity, 212-13; as glassy essence, 225­

26, 228-31, 425n.11; perverted use of,

by Iago, 265, 273; creation of, from

nothing, 291; and self in Lear, 315­

26; mystery of, 322-26; intemperance

and death of, 395-96. See also body

and soul; Psychology, Elizabethan

Southampton, Henry Wriothesley, earl 
of, 421 n.21 
Spanish Tragedy. See Kyd, Thomas 
Speculum principis. See Mirror: for 
princes

Spencer, Theodore, Shakespeare and the

Nature of Man, 375, 389

Spenser, Edmund, Faerie Queene, 395,

434 n. 11; Hymne of Love, 54

Spivack, Bernard, Shakespeare and the

Allegory of Evil, 260

INDEX 
Stein, Arnold, "Troilus and Cressida: 
the Disjunctive Imagination," 423 n.5 
Stevenson, David L . , Achievement of 
MEASURE FOR MEASURE, 
42511.16 
Stoicism: 10, 83, 317; and suppression

of emotions, 87-88, 166-67, 218, 269­

70, 364; Hamlet's problematic, 192­

93; in Seneca's tragedies, 251; Brutus's

alleged, 164-68; Julius Caesar's boast­

ful, 167; will-power emphasized in,

249-52, 428n.i4; patience acclaimed

by, 251-52, 270; Iago as a disciple of

new, 269-70; Edgar's testing of, 298­

99. See also Seneca

Stoll, E . E . , Hamlet, 422 n.6; Shake­

speare and Other Masters, 177

Strachey, Lytton, Books and Characters,

382

Strathmann,	 Ernest A .  , Sir Walter 
Ralegh: A Study in Renaissance 
Scepticism, 409 n.3; "Textual Evi­
dence for 'the School of Night,'" 
Strauss, Leo, Thoughts on Machiavelli, 
409n.11 
Summa epitasis. See Climax, dramatic 
Swinburne, A  . C  , Study of Shakespeare, 
287

Sylvester, Sir Joshua [translator of D  u

Bartas], 43, 45

Sypher, Wylie, Four Stages of Renais­

sance Style, 139, 169, 4iin.27, 418

n.2; "Shakespeare as Casuist," 424

n.2 
Table of Human Passions. See Coef­
feteau, Nicolas

Taming of the Shrew, 72, 421 n. 19
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(Continued from front flap) 
M r  . Soellner distinguishes three points in 
Shakespeare's evolution: an early stage that 
culminates in the later histories and the ro­
mantic comedies, in which the dramatist re­
flected, sometimes almost schematically, the 
humanistic patterns of his time; a middle or 
interim phase that begins with Julius Caesar 
and includes both Hamlet and the "problem 
comedies," and in which Shakespeare expe­
riences certain hesitations and entertains 
some doubts about the patterns accepted un­
critically earlier; and thefinal period of the 
great tragedies and tragicomic romances, in 
which a growing awareness of the unpredict­
ability of h u m a  n nature leads to a dynamic 
synthesis in which what is the quintessence 
of humanism is fused with a full realization 
of the weakness of codification and a pro­
found sympathy for the h u m a  n condition. 
In the last of his great plays, The Tempest, 
M r  . Soellner finds, Shakespeare composed a 
brilliantfinale in which are worked m a n y of 
the patterns that he used in his earlier work. 
The dream of The Tempest, that m a n can 
control himself, limit his power, and even re­
sign it voluntarily, is totally humanistic — 
and m a  y be Utopian. But it is one of the 
happiest expectations of m a  n and represents 
an irresistible affirmation of his potential 
greatness. 
Rolf Soellner is professor of English at the 
Ohio State University. 
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